Weapons In Europe Research Articles

Сравнительный анализ военной помощи Украине со стороны Германии и Франции (2022–2024 гг.)

The article examines German and French strategies for military support of Kyiv starting from 2022. The analysis reveals two different models for military assistance, although gradually they became more similar. While France distributes money mainly by means of the European Peace Facility, Germany focuses more on bilateral support. Having not much military equipment in stock, Paris started delivering military equipment from the French army and later established a special fund to provide direct supplies to Ukraine. Berlin, at first, tended to avoid the delivery of heavy weapons, participation in “Ringtausch” and transfer of weapons from Bundeswehr stocks, but later bought more military equipment from German industry through state funds for security capacity building. Since 2024, both countries have been involved in capability coalitions for military support of Ukraine. France and Germany went through three stages of their policies: 1) restricted deliveries of European weapons to Ukraine (spring 2022); 2) a gradual increase in EU military supplies from stock, and the launch of production (second half of 2022 – early 2023); 3) increase of the military industry capacity (2023–2024). Both countries stimulate each other to support Ukraine, but their volumes of supplies and types of weapons do not always coincide. Both countries have to increase their military capacities to fulfill commitments for Ukraine, especially the production of the SAM system IRIS-T SLM and self-propelled howitzer CAESAR as well as the launch of new facilities for artillery shells. The authors conclude that Paris and Berlin have no joint projects and agreements for joint procurement. Thus, unlike other crises, the current conflict makes France and Germany act in parallel, but not together.

Who’s Afraid of the Bomb?: The Euromissiles Crisis and Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Past and Present

Who’s Afraid of the Bomb?: The Euromissiles Crisis and Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Past and Present

Dream of European Army: Is It a Feasible Objective or Not?

The European Union’s (EU) defense initiatives have changed over time, reflecting both the pursuit of security and defense goals and the shifting dynamics of European integration. To improve defense cooperation and create a common defense strategy for the EU, several initiatives have been made. The EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which strives to strengthen its capacity to handle security concerns and preserve stability, has a significant influence on defense-related operations. We have witnessed new security and military efforts from the EU in the first two decades of the 2000s, such as the European Security Strategy, EU’s Global Strategy and Security Compass. 2013 marked a turning point when the USA deployed its new nuclear weapons in Europe. The announcement of the creation of the European army was made on November 13, 2017. Europe should be able to act independently in areas of defense and security rather than merely relying on the US or NATO. Because of these kinds of reservations, desires to pursue more advanced capabilities on their own have been raised.
 There has been a lot of debate and analysis around the reasons for and against the formation of a European army. Numerous parties have expressed interest in and influence over the notion of a European army. The development of a European army has been heavily debated over the past several years. Why is the idea of a European army so heavily investigated? Is building such an army a realistic goal or not? What are the benefits, drawbacks, and challenges to achieving it? Who is in favor of and against building an army in Europe? These are the primary questions that we attempt to address in this article.

Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Technology and Magic in the Ghost Dance, Boxer Uprising, and Maji Maji Rebellion

AbstractThis article explores the widespread phenomenon of anti-colonial movements that relied on magical rituals for protection against European weapons. It examines both the beliefs of the magical practitioners themselves, and those of colonizing observers whose fascination with stories of “primitive magic” contributed to their contrasting self-representations as superior beings in possession of technological wonders. North America’s Ghost Dance movement, China’s Boxer Rebellion, and East Africa’s Maji Maji uprising took place on three different continents but occurred almost simultaneously. The cases come from a narrow period of time, roughly 1890 to 1910, during a peak of colonial violence all over the world.

REVIEW: Award-winning account of Taranaki taonga’s long journey home

Te Motonui Epa, by Rachel Buchanan. Wellington: Bridget William Books, 2022. 251 pages. ISBN: 9781990046582.
 TE MOTONUI EPA is a brilliant account of how five carved panels that were smuggled out of New Zealand were recovered after a long struggle and prompted major reassessments in official attitudes towards preserving Indigenous artefacts. The story begins during the Musket Wars when Ngāpuhi and Ngāti Whātua rivalry led to clashes in which warriors armed with European weapons fought for dominance in the North Island. As war spread to the Taranaki, Te Ātiawa hapū dismantled their most important public buildings and hid significant pieces in the Peropero swamps.

Who Is to Blame and What Is to Be Done? The Rise and Fall of Russian Authority in the Olympics

Who Is to Blame and What Is to Be Done? The Rise and Fall of Russian Authority in the Olympics

Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weapons post‐Ukraine

AbstractIn the past, the European public has not been enthusiastic about nuclear deterrence and the stationing of US American nuclear weapons in Europe. Has the Russian invasion of Ukraine changed that aversion? We conducted a unique study, surveying the same population of respondents at two points in time—in September 2020 and in June 2022. We find that European respondents became much more hawkish after the invasion: nuclear deterrence was viewed more favourably, the willingness to use nuclear weapons increased, and support for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons dropped significantly. The paper draws a number of policy implications from these results.

Nuclear Weapons in the Tweede Kamer: Analysis of Nuclear Motions in the Dutch House of Representatives in Times of Contestation

Abstract US nuclear weapons are presently hosted in five European countries. In recent years, parliaments in four out of the five countries held debates about these weapons. For most of them, this was the first (or the only) debate in many years. By contrast, in the Netherlands, the Tweede Kamer, the House of Representatives, held forty-four votes related to nuclear weapons in the last two parliamentary periods alone. Although parliament's powers are restricted, these votes can oblige government to pursue a certain policy and ultimately put soft constraints on government's freedom of action. Yet, the extent of the contestation of nuclear weapons in European parliaments is almost unknown. Using the Dutch case and spatial modeling methods, we offer three lessons: first, that security policy does not stand above the parliamentary politics; second, that cross-bench voting happens but the activity originates in partisan silos; and third, that there is a strong partisan element to the debates about nuclear weapons in Europe.

Основные шаги на пути к контролю за вооружениями в Европе

The purpose of this article is to analyze and prepare specific recommendations on key, but still unresolved, topical issues of arms control in Europe. The recommendations, in particular, include the further prevention of the deployment of new medium- and shorter-range missiles, non-strategic ("tactical") nuclear weapons, as well as the identification of prospects for limiting the conventional arms race and issues of means to prevent dangerous military incidents. In this regard, the article analyzes a promising set of measures for creating a mutual system of European security and resolving a number of key problems in this area through the prism of the issues of the INF Treaty, TNW and other international documents and treaties, suggests concrete steps and ways of effective implementation in this direction. The article used systematic, retrospective, comparative, hermeneutic methods of scientific research. The novelty of the approach lies in the fact that the article does this in the context of an analysis of the aggravation of the situation around Ukraine, its attempts to join NATO and Russian demands to the United States and NATO on the need for legally binding guarantees of mutual security made in November-December 2021. The six concrete steps proposed by the authors towards arms control in Europe, as well as a set of measures in the field of limitation and reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, consisting of twelve points, are also innovative. The authors focus on the need to reduce the number of non-strategic nuclear warheads and their placement, eliminate certain classes of non-strategic nuclear weapons, exchange information on the types and number of delivery systems of non-strategic nuclear warheads, formalize obligations not to dock non-strategic nuclear warheads with their delivery systems, as well as obligations not to exceed the aggregate limit on non-strategic and non-deployed strategic warheads, conduct periodic mutual on-site inspections. The authors see promising measures to create a flexible and constructive security architecture in the European region in the intensification of both diplomatic and military dialogue between Russia and NATO, in the formation of legally fixed measures to prevent the threat of mutual military clashes, in the resumption of joint work on cooperation in airspace and in marine areas, in the development of new procedures for de-escalation military incidents and conflicts. The practical and theoretical significance of the work lies in the systematic analysis of a set of important security measures on the European continent after a fundamental change in the world security system, including the termination of almost all international arms control agreements. This was especially relevant already at the beginning of 2022 in the situation of Russia conducting a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine and increasing the likelihood of a military nuclear conflict between Russia and NATO.

German views on US nuclear weapons in Europe: public and elite perspectives

ABSTRACT Stationing of US nuclear weapons in Europe is a pillar of NATO deterrence. Despite their growing contestation, scholarly research on contemporary attitudes of both voters and political elites to the continued stationing of these weapons on their soil is lacking. We conducted original surveys of 2020 Germans and of 101 Bundestag members. Our results show scepticism about the military utility of US nuclear weapons in Germany, and aversion towards their use. At the same time, the results show a sizable support among both politicians and citizens for their removal from German territory as part of new nuclear arms control initiatives.

CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES REGARDING THE EXTENSION OF THE “NEW START” TREATY: CAN THE USA AND RUSSIA PRESERVE EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL?

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (“New START”) is the last pillar of the arms control regime on which the end of the Cold War and the new world order rested. Its expiration on 5 February 2021 is a top security challenge and indicates a possible new strategic arms race. However, can the United States and Russia still preserve the existing strategic arms control by extending the Treaty for another five years? What are the prospects, the opportunities and obstacles for this extension? What are the most pressing issues USA and Russia face with in order to preserve strategic arms control and are they willing to do so? In order to answer to these research questions author analyses several key issues that are of paramount importance for extension of the New START: nuclear modernization processes, invention of new weapons and emergence of new warfare domains; transparency and verification and broader confidence building measures; missile defence and prompt global strike; tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia; general US-Russia relations which include question of democratic capacity; and broader influence of this Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation regime. By using content and discourse analysis author concludes that, although it is obvious that the extension of the New START would be primarily in favour of Russia and that the USA has not much to gain, the character of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age gives reasons to believe that the New START will be extended for another five years.

Debating the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe: What Germany expects from Russia

The recent debate in Germany about nuclear sharing confirmed the broad support among decision-makers for continued involvement in the political dimension of NATO’s sharing arrangements, i. e., participation in the Alliance’s nuclear consultative bodies. At the same time, German decision-makers hold divergent views on continued participation in the operational and technical aspects of nuclear sharing. Russia’s arsenal of approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons is of great concern to Germany and many in Berlin are worried that Russia is systematically expanding its nuclear arsenal. German decision-makers and the government support NATO’s dual-track policy of deterring and engaging Russia. German policy-makers’ arguments on the added military value of forward-deployed US nuclear weapons remain vague and there are few specific ideas about what type of arms control would be best suited to reduce the role and number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. There are four frameworks in which tactical nuclear weapons could be discussed with Russia, namely the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), other multilateral fora, the Russian — US bilateral dialogue on strategic stability, and the NATO — Russia Council. If Russia is serious about reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons in Europe, it should accept the reciprocity paradigm and drop some worn-out demands and positions that have little relevance for political debates around arms control in Berlin and elsewhere.

КАТАЛОГИ МУЗЕЙНИХ ЗІБРАНЬ ГАРМАТ XІV–XVIІІ СТОЛІТЬ: СУЧАСНИЙ СТАН В УКРАЇНІ, ПРОБЛЕМИ ПОБУДОВИ

The article analyzes a number of problematic issues that arise when cataloging gun collections, offers possible solutions. The current state of cataloging of weapons in the museums of Ukraine on the example of artillery collections is considered. Possible options for creating and forming catalogs for the integration of artillery history into the modern world scientific information space are proposed.Weapons collections are always especially valuable in the funds, are of great interest to visitors and professional researchers. That is why the problem of professional attribution and interesting presentation of information about the meeting is acute. Over the last decade, modern Ukrainian and European weapons studies have developed a sufficient scientific base, which creates a qualitatively new basis for the information content of weapons catalogs. The article develops recommendations for the structure, content, and information content of the catalog of gun collections. Possible options for presenting information to visitors in electronic form on the museum's website using the latest technologies used by European museums are proposed.Due to the significant growth in the popularization of weapons studies and military history studies both in Ukraine and abroad, modern Ukrainian museums face new challenges related to the introduction of weapons into the professional scientific space.During the Soviet period in the history of Ukraine, under the influence or even pressure of political factors, weapons science as a science did not develop. A small number of works by Ukrainian scientists of that period were published solely due to the enthusiasm and efforts of their authors. The ideological load of Soviet works on the subject created a distorted historical picture of the development of artillery in Ukraine. This state of affairs was reflected in museum expositions, cataloging of collections, which, in their content, should be based on professional research.We believe that modern Ukrainian armaments has accumulated enough historiographical work to fill a striking gap in Ukraine against the general background of world trends.

Proliferation and threats of reconnaissance-strike systems: a Russian perspective

ABSTRACT Russian military officials, scholars, and politicians have long been aware of reconnaissance-strike systems, and have developed a sophisticated set of military countermeasures, as well as a number of weapons with roughly the same traits. Russia monitors the ongoing proliferation of such weapons in Europe and sometimes uses it for political purposes, but general planning remains focused on the capabilities of the United States and NATO. Arms-control measures within this domain seem to be hardly possible right now, although there are several options that policy makers might consider useful, including unilateral transparency measures. The prospect of rapid development and massive deployment of new intermediate-range missiles in Europe in the mode of yet another conventional precision weapon must drive the search for advanced security-architecture ideas. Most of all, communication, including military to military, is essential for avoiding misperceptions and eventual incidents that could easily spark an all-out conflict.

USA and Military Security of Europe: Evolution of Approaches

Over the past few years, American military policy in Europe has changed qualitatively. Official Washington was forced to recognize the strengthening of Russian military power and the need to reconsider the role of the European command as a rear, designed to ensure the actions of the Central and African command. Of particular concern to the Pentagon is the Russian potential in areas such as air defense, long-range artillery, anti-tank ammunition and electronic warfare. The United States believes that over the past decade there has been a marked improvement in the quality of Russian troops, their combat readiness and equipment. Under these conditions, the American armed forces are losing their once undeniable and absolute superiority in Eastern Europe. The Americans had to once again increase the number of their armed forces on the European continent (though on the basis of rotation), increase allocations for “deterring Russia” and persistently demand from their European allies to increase defense budgets. OfficialWashington does not exclude the possibility of a large-scale military conflict with Russia in Europe. The new US Nuclear Policy Review of 2018 states that the Russian Federation is ready for the first use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The earliest evidence for mechanically delivered projectile weapons in Europe.

Microscopic analysis of backed lithic pieces from the Uluzzian technocomplex (45-40kya) at the Grotta del Cavallo (southern Italy) reveals their use as mechanically delivered projectile weapons, attributed to Anatomically Modern Humans. Use-wear and residue analysis indicates the lithics were hunting armatures hafted with complex adhesives, while experimental and ethnographic comparison supports their use as projectiles. The use of projectiles conferred a hunting strategy with a higher impact energy and a potential subsistence advantage over other populations and species.

Sharks upon the Land: Colonialism, Indigenous Health, and Culture in Hawai'i, 1778–1855

The population of Hawaii suffered terribly following European contact in 1778. The dynamics of its decline are distinct and important. Substantial losses occurred before 1820, even in the absence of military conquest, foreign settlement, or exploitation of native land and labor. Seth Archer's analysis offers important lessons for how we think about colonial epidemics and depopulation. Syphilis and gonorrhea arrived with James Cook and caused widespread misery, mortality, and infertility. English, French, Russian, and American traders inundated Hawaii with alcohol, tobacco, and firearms. They created markets for prostitution and fueled inter-island warfare, and their livestock overran crops. Disease disrupted Hawaiian societies, and these disruptions increased susceptibility to disease—a vicious cycle of mortality and poverty. Archer emphasizes Hawaiians' efforts to exploit the colonial encounters. King Kamehameha used European weapons to conquer the archipelago. Noblewomen overthrew the legal and religious system that had governed Hawaiian life. Elites profited at the expense of the common people.

Shoot First or Fail Deadly: Transforming US Nuclear Posture Under Eisenhower

Between 1953 and 1956 President Eisenhower directed a transformation in US nuclear posture so rapid and significant that it has never been matched. When he took office US posture—the combination of force structure and employment plans—centered on the co-mingled urban/industrial attack and counterforce missions. It was relatively relaxed, but would not remain that way for long. By 1956, Eisenhower had changed US posture from relaxed to ferocious. First, he embraced the counterforce mission through which Washington sought victory over Moscow through preemption. Second, in October 1953, he initiated the theater nuclear mission. Forward-deployed battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe would deter Soviet aggression. However, if deterrence failed war in Europe would become nuclear, and a nuclear war in Europe would probably become global. If deterrence failed, it would fail deadly. Third, by late 1956 the homeland nuclear air defenses that Eisenhower green-lit came online to mitigate the risk of nuclear attack on the US that the theater mission generated. Thus by 1956 Eisenhower’s nuclear posture combined two volatile logics: The co-mingled counterforce and urban/industrial attack missions gave Eisenhower the option of ‘shooting first’ to preempt the Soviets. And if American strength failed to deter aggression in Europe, deterrence would ‘fail deadly’ as a local conventional war rapidly escalated to theater, then global nuclear war.

Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Collapse of Arms Control

Medium-term prospects for nuclear arms control collapsed with the demise of the INF treaty. Geographically, the nuclear theater has shifted east, making Russia more aggressive in defending state security. Doctrinally, ambiguity over use of low-yield nuclear weapons in densely populated Europe gives Russia political leverage, which it will not trade away easily. Technologically, the development and deployment of new non-strategic and cyber weapons complicate limitation and verification regimes. Geopolitically, the United States, Russia, and China show little interest in serious arms limitation as they hedge against security risks. And in public discourse, nuclear weapons are politically less salient today than during the Cold War. As a consequence, chances are slim that new nuclear arms agreements will be reached anytime soon to mitigate risks of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation. The threat environment is more dangerous today due to the conundrum of arms control in an era of great power competition.

Высокоточное оружие большой дальности в Европе: проблемы ограничения и контроля

Высокоточное оружие большой дальности в Европе: проблемы ограничения и контроля