Shoot First or Fail Deadly: Transforming US Nuclear Posture Under Eisenhower

Abstract

Between 1953 and 1956 President Eisenhower directed a transformation in US nuclear posture so rapid and significant that it has never been matched. When he took office US posture—the combination of force structure and employment plans—centered on the co-mingled urban/industrial attack and counterforce missions. It was relatively relaxed, but would not remain that way for long. By 1956, Eisenhower had changed US posture from relaxed to ferocious. First, he embraced the counterforce mission through which Washington sought victory over Moscow through preemption. Second, in October 1953, he initiated the theater nuclear mission. Forward-deployed battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe would deter Soviet aggression. However, if deterrence failed war in Europe would become nuclear, and a nuclear war in Europe would probably become global. If deterrence failed, it would fail deadly. Third, by late 1956 the homeland nuclear air defenses that Eisenhower green-lit came online to mitigate the risk of nuclear attack on the US that the theater mission generated. Thus by 1956 Eisenhower’s nuclear posture combined two volatile logics: The co-mingled counterforce and urban/industrial attack missions gave Eisenhower the option of ‘shooting first’ to preempt the Soviets. And if American strength failed to deter aggression in Europe, deterrence would ‘fail deadly’ as a local conventional war rapidly escalated to theater, then global nuclear war.