Weak Punishment Research Articles

Suppressing defection by increasing temptation: The impact of smart cooperators on a social dilemma situation

In a social dilemma situation, where individual and collective interests are in conflict, it sounds a reasonable assumption that the presence of super or smart players, who simultaneously punish defection and reward cooperation without allowing exploitation, could solve the basic problem. The behavior of such a multi-strategy system, however, is more subtle than it is firstly anticipated. When exploring the complete parameter space we find that the emergence of cyclic dominance among strategies is rather common, which results in several counter-intuitive phenomena. For example, the defection level can be lowered at higher temptation, or weaker punishment provides better conditions for smart players. Our study indicates that smart cooperators can unexpectedly thrive under high temptation, emphasizing the complexity of strategic interactions. This study suggests that the principles governing these interactions can be applied to other moral behaviors, such as truth-telling and honesty, providing valuable insights for future research in multi-agent systems.

Study on the Influential Factors of the Involvement of Local People in Participatory Forest Management: The Case of Wof-Washa District, Ethiopia

Participatory Forest Management (PFM) is crucial to the implementation of effective forest management and improvement in the living conditions of local communities. But local people involvement in PFM practice is affected by demographic, biophysical, institutional, and socio-economic factors. A cross-sectional survey research design was employed to collect information from 295 households (127 participants and 168 non-participants) by stratified sampling technique followed by a random sampling method. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected from primary and secondary sources through structured interview schedules, Focused Group Discussion (FGD), Key Informant Interviews (KII) and field observation. The study employed both descriptive statistic and logistic regression model to compute the socio-economic characteristics and to identify influential factors that affect the community’s involvement in PFM practice respectively. The results of the logistic regression model revealed that household’s family size, educational status, training, benefits derived from the forest, and the number of livestock were positively affected local people’s participation in PFM activities, whereas the distance of the forest from household resident was negatively affected. Apart from demographic, biophysical, institutional, and socio-economic factors granting ownership right, improved awareness, fear of displaced from the forest area, fear of forest lose and moral obligation were enhancing factors while the expansion of agricultural land and settlement, illegal logging, weak punishment, the insufficient fund or lack of incentives, poor forest management trend, conflict of interest, and doubt on the continuity of PFM program were some influential factors that hinder local people’s participation in PFM activities. The study assisted policymakers to inform the influential factors that affect local people’s participation in the study area and formulate effective policy advice to promote PFM practice in the region. Keywords: Participatory forest management; Influential factors; Household; Socio-economics; Wof-Washa District; Policy advice DOI: 10.7176/RHSS/11-17-04 Publication date: September 30 th 2021

Deviant or wrong? The effects of norm information on the efficacy of punishment

Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of the existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.

STUDY ON THE INFLUENTIAL FACTORS OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL PEOPLE IN PARTICIPATORY FOREST MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF WOF-WASHA DISTRICT, ETHIOPIA

Participatory Forest Management (PFM) is crucial to the implementation of effective forest management and improvement in the living conditions of local communities. But local people involvement in PFM practice is affected by demographic, biophysical, institutional, and socio-economic factors. A cross-sectional survey research design was employed to collect information from 295 households (127 participants and 168 non-participants) by stratified sampling technique followed by a random sampling method. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected from primary and secondary sources through structured interview schedules, Focused Group Discussion (FGD), Key Informant Interviews (KII) and field observation. The study employed both descriptive statistic and logistic regression model to compute the socio-economic characteristics and to identify influential factors that affect the community’s involvement in PFM practice respectively. The results of the logistic regression model revealed that household’s family size, educational status, training, benefits derived from the forest, and the number of livestock were positively affected local people’s participation in PFM activities, whereas the distance of the forest from household resident was negatively affected. Apart from demographic, biophysical, institutional, and socio-economic factors granting ownership right, improved awareness, fear of displaced from the forest area, fear of forest lose and moral obligation were enhancing factors while the expansion of agricultural land and settlement, illegal logging, weak punishment, the insufficient fund or lack of incentives, poor forest management trend, conflict of interest, and doubt on the continuity of PFM program were some influential factors that hinder local people’s participation in PFM activities. The study assisted policymakers to inform the influential factors that affect local people’s participation in the study area and formulate effective policy advice to promote PFM practice in the region. KEYWORDS: Participatory forest management; Influential factors; Household; Socio-economics; Wof-Washa District; Policy advice

Just ask? Preference revelation and lying in a public goods experiment

This paper studies the extent to which simply asking group members to report their demand-type promotes cooperation in a public goods experiment with private, unobservable incentives. The design uses a simple public goods game, in which group members differ in both their dominant strategy contributions and socially optimal contributions. Treatments are conducted in which individuals either do not report their private payoff information, report only to group members, report to group members who can punish them, or report to a binding mechanism that charges them the socially optimal contribution for someone of their reported type. In all cases, messages are non-verifiable and participants are told that they are free to lie. When participants are able to report their type, either to their group members or to a binding mechanism, they contribute more. When reporting to a mechanism, there is a positive effect initially that fades with repetition, while reporting to group members is particularly effective at sustaining cooperation over time. Further, the misreporting of type is less frequent, considered more dishonest, and punished more harshly than free-riding. Consistent with work showing that weak punishment can backfire, the punishment mechanism is underutilized in this environment and its presence negates the positive effect of sharing information.

The role of visibility on third party punishment actions for the enforcement of social norms

This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one’s defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player’s action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma’s incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.

Deviant or Wrong? The Effects of Norm Information on the Efficacy of Punishment

Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of the existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.

The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms

This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one’s defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player’s action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma’s incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.

Altruistic Norm Enforcement and Decision-Making Format in a Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Past research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. However, it at the same time suggests that such third-party punishment may not be strong enough to enforce cooperation norms in dilemma situations. This paper experimentally compares the effectiveness of third-party punishment between different enforcement formats. Consistent with past studies, our data shows that having an individual third-party punisher in a group does not make one’s defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity. It also shows that third-party punishment is not effective when two individuals form a pair as a punisher and jointly decide how strong third-party punishment they impose. However, third-party punishment can be sufficiently strong to enforce cooperation norms when a third-party punisher’s action choice is made known to another individual third-party punisher in a different group, or when there are two independent individual third-party players in a group.

Accelerating the Warr Against Corruption: A Sociological Perspective.

This paper starts by critiquing the various definitions of corruption. It proceeds to note that its not possible to arrive at a single definition of corruption and that instead of trying to define a broad based multifaceted and multi-structural concept, researchers should focus on identifying the key characteristics of corruption. The paper goes ahead to argue that an act can only constitute corruption if: a) The duty holder has an obligation to act free of any influence from interested parties. (b) The person exerting the influence is aware of his obligation(s) to refrain from the same (c) The duty holder acts under this undue influence, (c) (S)he acts in favour of one (or more) parties over others (d) There is a form of gain (or potential gain) on the duty holder. (e) That there is a normative and or legal sanction against the action. The paper notes that opportunity and weak punishment often contribute to rampant corruption in the executive, judiciary and legislature and that there is need for a multi-faceted approach in fighting corruption. It concludes by examining the role of a strengthened judiciary in fighting corruption and hails the development and strengthening of anti-corruption commissions as an anti-corruption strategy.

A Tale of Two Commitments: Equilibrium Default and Temptation

I construct the life-cycle model with equilibrium default and preferences featuring temptation and self-control. The model provides quantitatively similar answers to positive questions such as the causes of the observed rise in debt and bankruptcies and macroeconomic implications of the 2005 bankruptcy reform, as the standard model without temptation. However, the temptation model provides contrasting welfare implications, because of overborrowing when the borrowing constraint is relaxed. Specifically, the 2005 bankruptcy reform has an overall negative welfare effect, according to the temptation model, while the effect is positive in the no-temptation model. As for the optimal default punishment, welfare of the agents without temptation is maximized when defaulting results in severe punishment, which provides a strong commitment to repaying and thus a lower default premium. On the other hand, welfare of agents with temptation is maximized when weak punishment leads to a tight borrowing constraint, which provides a commitment against overborrowing.

Explanations for continued gender discrimination in South Korean workplaces

This paper investigates potential explanations for the continued gender discrimination in South Korean workplaces despite decades of gender policy reforms and improved education for women. Making use of both primary and secondary data sources, the institutional theory, the voluntary compliance regulatory enforcement strategy and the typology of regulatory noncompliance provide a framework from which four explanations regarding the origin and nature of Korean firm equal opportunity (EO) compliance issues are derived. Identified through data analysis, explanations include a lack of legal enforcement, a weak punishment system, a tacit acceptance of the status quo by women, organizational cultural issues stemming from the traditional Korean mind-set that allow gender discrimination and a general lack of knowledge about EO regulations by many companies. Reforms and paradigm changes addressing these gender policy compliance issues could yield considerable social benefits in reducing the scope and quantity of gender discrimination in Korean workplaces.

On punishment and well-being

The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in some public goods experiments to increase considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an experiment to study the conjecture that an environment with strong punishment possibilities may lead to higher material payoffs but lower subjective well-being, in comparison with weaker punishment or no punishment possibilities at all. The more general motivation for our study stems from the notion that people’s subjective well-being may be affected by the institutional environment they find themselves in. Our findings show that harsher punishment possibilities lead to significantly higher well-being, controlling for earnings and other relevant variables. These results complement the evidence on the neural basis of altruistic punishment reported in De Quervain et al. (2004).

Effects of alternating weak and strong shock during blocks of variable-interval punishment.

12 naive rats were run on a variable-interval punishment schedule (superimposed on a variable-interval food schedule) during 4 punishment periods, alternated with 4 no-punishment periods. Punishment intensity for the 4 punishment periods was varied in two sequences: 0.4 ma., 1.0 ma., 0.4 ma., and 1.0 ma., or vice versa. Two effects of punishment were observed: (1) an immediate, but reversible, suppressive effect during punishment and (2) a permanent, gradual decremental effect which was observed during post-punishment sessions. The two effects appeared to function reciprocally. When strong suppression during the weaker punishment (first effect) occurred in some Ss, there was better recovery following punishment to pre-punishment levels (no second effect); however, if little suppression (no first effect) occurred and S continued to respond, there was more eventual response decrement (second effect).

Acquisition of a passive avoidance response as determined by variations in prior aversive stimulation

The effects of various forms of prior enforced sleep Td (SD) and of pre-shock (PS), as presumed traumatizing agents, were studied in rats 15 days following treatment using an approach-avoidance test procedure involving successive response to food, mild punishment, food, and weak punishment. PS Ss and Ss whose SD treatment involved prolonged walking on an abrasive surface exhibited greater avoidance of the food area to mild punishment than controls, while Ss whose SD treatment consisted of prolonged walking on a smooth surface or prolonged standing in deep water exhibited significantly less conflict. With one exception, similar results were obtained under the weak test punishment.