Weak Players Research Articles

The role of coherent supply chain strategy and performance management in achieving competitive advantage: an international survey

The results of a major international survey into the relationship between corporate strategy, supply chain strategy and supply chain performance management are reported. Five clearly defined groups are identified: Supply Chain Leaders, Strong and Weak Players, Lagging Players and Non-players. Those business units that report a close link between their supply chain strategy and their supply chain technology, in comparison with those that report a weaker link, displayed a consistent set of characteristics. They rate supply chain strategy as more important for corporate strategy. They have a relatively sophisticated definition of their supply chain strategy. They think their supply chain is more important in achieving competitive advantage, they have invested more in supply chain infrastructure and IT support and they have more formal means of assessing their supply chain performance. There is evidence of inconsistency in the way many businesses relate their supply chain, corporate, and investment strategy.

Congestion Ahead: Japanese Automakers in Southeast Asia

For three decades Japanese auto producers, supported by the Japanese government, deployed with extraordinary success market and nonmarket strategies to access the small and fragmented but rapidly growing car markets of Southeast Asia. The last half-decade has presented a series of unexpected challenges, including extended recession and financial reform in Japan; the lingering effects of the financial crisis in Southeast Asia; and the entry of new competitors from South Korea, North America, and Europe. These pressures have split the industry into two. Leaders Toyota and Honda have defended and extended traditional Japanese production networks. Weaker players such as Nissan, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki have accepted subordination to the leading western firms, which are rationalizing their Japanese partners and using them to enter Japan and other Asian markets. This article explores production, trade, and investment data, industrial policies toward autos in Japan and Southeast Asia, and brief case studies of Toyota and Nissan to illustrate the challenges to, and varying responses of, Japanese auto producers in developing Asia. These firms remain committed to Southeast Asia, but the days of Japanese dominance are drawing to a close.

Congestion Ahead: Japanese Automakers in Southeast Asia

For three decades Japanese auto producers, supported by the Japanese government, deployed with extraordinary success market and nonmarket strategies to access the small and fragmented but rapidly growing car markets of Southeast Asia. The last half-decade has presented a series of unexpected challenges, including extended recession and financial reform in Japan; the lingering effects of the financial crisis in Southeast Asia; and the entry of new competitors from South Korea, North America, and Europe. These pressures have split the industry into two. Leaders Toyota and Honda have defended and extended traditional Japanese production networks. Weaker players such as Nissan, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki have accepted subordination to the leading western firms, which are rationalizing their Japanese partners and using them to enter Japan and other Asian markets. This article explores production, trade, and investment data, industrial policies toward autos in Japan and Southeast Asia, and brief case studies of Toyota and Nissan to illustrate the challenges to, and varying responses of, Japanese auto producers in developing Asia. These firms remain committed to Southeast Asia, but the days of Japanese dominance are drawing to a close.

On the Accuracy of Gaia Radial Velocities

We have obtained 782 real spectra and used them as inputs for 6700 automatic cross-correlation runs to the aim of investigating the radial velocity accuracy that GAIA could potentially achieve as function of spectral resolution and signal-to-noise ratio. We have explored the dispersions 0.25, 0.5, 1 and 2 Ang/pix (bracketing the 0.75 Ang/pix currently baselined for the 8490--8740 Ang GAIA range centered on the near-infrared CaII triplet) over S/N ranging from 10 to 110. We have carefully maintained the condition FWHM (PSF) = 2 pixels during the acquisition of the 782 input spectra, and therefore the resolutions that we have explored are 0.5, 1, 2 and 4 Ang corresponding to resolving powers R=17200, 8600, 4300 and 2150. We have investigated late-F to early-M stars (constituting the vast majority of GAIA targets), slowly rotating (V_{rot} sin i = 4 km/sec, as for field stars at these spectral types), of solar metallicity (<[Fe/H]> = -0.07) and not binary. The results are accurately described by the simple law: lg sigma = 0.6(lg S/N)^2 - 2.4(lg S/N) + 1.75(lg D) + 3, where sigma is the cross-correlation standard error (in km/sec) and D is the spectral dispersion (in Ang/pix). The spectral dispersion has turned out to be the dominant factor governing the accuracy of radial velocities, with S/N being less important and the spectral mis-match being a weak player. These results are relevant not only within the GAIA context but also to ground-based observers because the absence of telluric absorptions and proximity to the wavelengths of peak emission make the explored 8490--8740 Ang interval an interesting option for studies of cool stars with conventional telescopes.

Five seconds or sixty? Presentation time in expert memory

For many years, the game of chess has provided an invaluable task environment for research on cognition, in particular on the differences between novices and experts and the learning that removes these differences, and upon the structure of human memory and its paramaters. The template theory presented by Gobet and Simon based on the EPAM theory offers precise predictions on cognitive processes during the presentation and recall of chess positions. This article describes the behavior of CHREST, a computer implementation of the template theory, in a memory task when the presentation time is varied from one second to sixty, on the recall of game and random positions, and compares the model to human data. Strong players are better than weak players in both types of positions, especially with long presentation times, but even after brief presentations. CHREST predicts the data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Strong players’ superiority with random positions is explained by the large number of chunks they hold in LTM. Their excellent recall with short presentation times is explained by templates, a special class of chunks. CHREST is compared to other theories of chess skill, which either cannot account for the superiority of Masters in random positions or predict too strong a performance of Masters in such positions.

Five Seconds or Sixty? Presentation Time in Expert Memory

For many years, the game of chess has provided an invaluable task environment for research on cognition, in particular on the differences between novices and experts and the learning that removes these differences, and upon the structure of human memory and its paramaters. The template theory presented by Gobet and Simon based on the EPAM theory offers precise predictions on cognitive processes during the presentation and recall of chess positions. This article describes the behavior of CHREST, a computer implementation of the template theory, in a memory task when the presentation time is varied from one second to sixty, on the recall of game and random positions, and compares the model to human data. Strong players are better than weak players in both types of positions, especially with long presentation times, but even after brief presentations. CHREST predicts the data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Strong players' superiority with random positions is explained by the large number of chunks they hold in LTM. Their excellent recall with short presentation times is explained by templates, a special class of chunks. CHREST is compared to other theories of chess skill, which either cannot account for the superiority of Masters in random positions or predict too strong a performance of Masters in such positions.

What Price Fairness? A Bargaining Study

Our study concerns bargaining behavior in situations where one party is in a stronger position than the other. We investigate both the tradeoff the favored party makes between pursuing his strategic advantage and giving weight to other players' concern for fairness, and the tradeoff the disadvantaged player makes between pursuing a fair outcome from a disadvantaged position and the cost of that pursuit. In particular, we hypothesize that the degree to which strategically strong players attempt to exploit their strategic advantage depends on their potential costs for doing so. Similarly, the degree to which weak players persist in seeking “fairness” is also a function of how much it (potentially) costs them to do so. Students negotiated in pairs over the division of $HK50 using a finite horizon, fixed-cost (per rejection) alternating offer rule. Each pair consisted of a high-cost and a low-cost bargainer. In accordance with the hypothesis, the willingness of the high-cost bargainers to demand fairness and to persist in their demands was a function of how much it cost them to do so, and the degree to which the low-cost bargainers attempted to exploit their strategic advantage depended on their own cost of rejection. We conclude that “fairness” has a price such that the higher its price, the lower the “demand” for it. This suggests that demands for fairness are subject to cost-benefit evaluation, are in this sense deliberate, and are well thought out.

Stronger Opposition May Make it Easier to Win

Suppose that in a three-player tournament the strongest player, A 1, meets the winner of the match between A 2 and the weakest player, A 3. It is shown that, for A 1 and A 2 of fixed strength, A 1's chances of winning may be increased if A 3 is replaced by a stronger player. The paradox is studied with special emphasis on probability models important in the method of paired comparisons.

Virtual Chess: Meaning Enhances Users' Sense of Presence in Virtual Environments

Presence refers to the sensation of going into a computer-simulated environment. We investigated whether presence and memory accuracy are affected by the meaningfulness of the information encountered in the virtual environment (VE). Non-chess players and three levels of chess players studied meaningful and meaningless chess positions in VEs. They rated the level of presence experienced in each and took an old-new recognition memory test. Non-chess players reported no difference in presence for meaningful compared with meaningless positions, yet even weak chess players reported feeling more present with meaningful compared with meaningless positions. Thus, only modest levels of expertise were needed to enhance presence. In contrast, tournament-level chess-playing ability was required before meaningful chess positions were remembered significantly more accurately than meaningless chess positions. Tournament players' memory accuracy was very high for meaningful positions but was the same as non-chess players for meaningless positions. Meaning did not significantly influence memory accuracy for weak chess players. Our memory results replicate and extend the findings of Chase and Simon (1973). Out presence results show how cognitive factors inherent in the user can influence the quality of the human-computer interface. Practical implications are discussed.

On the formation of alliances in conflict and contests

This paper examines the problem of the formation of alliances in conflict and, more generally, in contests with three players. Each player possesses an exogenous strategic endowment (e.g., arms, efforts, rent-seeking activity). The outcome of contests, including those between any alliances of players, is governed by a Contest Success Function (CSF). In the three-person/one-cake problem an alliance between two players against the third one will form if and only if the CSF has an increasing returns characteristic. When an alliance forms, there is a tendency to be formed by the weaker players against the strongest player. Similar tendencies exist in other three-person problems that I examine.

Recall of rapidly presented random chess positions is a function of skill

A widely cited result asserts that experts' superiority over novices in recalling meaningful material from their domain of expertise vanishes when they are confronted with random material. A review of recent chess experiments in which random positions served as control material (presentation time between 3 and 10 sec) shows, however, that strong players generally maintain some superiority over weak players even with random positions, although the relative difference between skill levels is much smaller than with game positions. The implications of this finding for expertise in chess are discussed and the question of the recall of random material in other domains is raised.

Knockout tournaments with diluted Bradley-Terry preference schemes

Israel has shown the surprising and counter-intuitive result that there exist knockout tournament plans (rooted binary trees with as many terminal nodes as players) for which, under a random assignment of players to terminal nodes, a weaker player has a greater likelihood of winning the tournament than a stronger player. Chung and Hwang have shown, however, that such an anomaly cannot occur if the probability that player C i beats player C j is given by π ij = π i /( π i + π j ), where π 1, π 2,…, are fixed measures of ‘relative strength’ for the players. We extend their result to the case in which π ij =( απ i +(1 − α) π j )/( π i + π j ), 0.5<α≤1.

Partners and rivals: a model of international collaboration in advanced technology

Concepts from bargaining theory and neorealist theory are integrated in a partners-and-rivals (PAR) model that explains the terms of collaboration between rational actors (for example, firms) that are potential competitors. The model contends that the stronger player's incentive to collaborate is determined not only by its interest in absolute welfare benefits from collaboration but also by its concern about and loss of utility from unfavorable shifts in relative position vis-à-vis the weaker player. Two propositions are derived from the model. According to the disparity principle, the stronger player's net payoff from collaboration (the sum of its welfare benefits and positional costs) is a function of the disparity in capabilities between the two players. The net payoff curve is low when the disparity in capabilities is large, reaches an optimum when the disparity is moderate, and then falls again as the disparity approaches zero. The slope of the curve is also affected by a coefficient, α, which reflects the stronger player's sensitivity to positional losses. According to the compensation principle, for collaboration to arise, the weaker player must make an adjustment in the terms of the bargain, or a side-payment, to compensate the stronger player for its positional losses from collaboration. The validity of the PAR model is tested by comparing Franco-German collaboration on military aircraft in two cases, one in which the disparity in capabilities between the players was moderate and the other in which the disparity was small.

An mth Generation Model for Weak Ranking of Players in a Tournament

The problem of ranking players in a tournament has been studied by a number of authors. The methods developed for ranking players fall under two general headings—direct methods and rating methods. The present paper extends the tournament ranking problem in two directions. First, the usual definition of a tournament is broadened to include ties or draws. Thus, our model determines the best weak ranking of the players. Second, the ranking method presented takes account of player strength in that wins over strong players are valued higher than wins over weak players. To account for player strength, we evaluate both direct or first-order wins of players over opponents (i defeats j) and indirect or higher-order wins (i defeats k, who defeats j). A model which derives a composite score for each player, combining both direct and indirect wins, is used to obtain an overall ranking of the competitors.

German dominance in the EMS: evidence from interest rates

The paper presents an empirical analysis of German dominance and asymmetries in the EMS based on a dynamic system of equations explaining national money market interest rates. The hypothesis of strict German dominance of the EMS is rejected. However, there are some noticeable asymmetries in the EMS. Germany is a relatively strong player and has been the least dependent country in the early phase of the system. Since 1983, German independence has diminished. In contrast, France throughout and Italy in the early phase of the EMS have been relatively weak players in the system.

An mth Generation Model for Weak Ranking of Players in a Tournament

The problem of ranking players in a tournament has been studied by a number of authors. The methods developed for ranking players fall under two general headings—direct methods and rating methods. The present paper extends the tournament ranking problem in two directions. First, the usual definition of a tournament is broadened to include ties or draws. Thus, our model determines the best weak ranking of the players. Second, the ranking method presented takes account of player strength in that wins over strong players are valued higher than wins over weak players. To account for player strength, we evaluate both direct or first-order wins of players over opponents (i defeats j) and indirect or higher-order wins (i defeats k, who defeats j). A model which derives a composite score for each player, combining both direct and indirect wins, is used to obtain an overall ranking of the competitors.

Coalitions in decision-making groups: Organizational analogs

The literature on organizations has long focused on the concept of coalition behavior. An experiment on coalition formation was designed as a simulation of organizational decision-making groups. Previous research and a variety of game theoretic and social psychological models of coalition behavior provided strong empirical and theoretical bases for the study. Groups of masters students interacted in four sessions that manipulated the power of the five actors in each group. Results were compared to previous findings and were used to evaluate the theories. The findings suggest that (1) revenge was not often used by the players in these groups; (2) social pressure and the weak players' ability to communicate depressed the strongest players' outcomes; and (3) S.S. Komorita and J. Chertkoff's (1973 Psychological Review, 80, 149–162) Bargaining theory and the Roth-Shapley value ( A. E. Roth, 1977 Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 16, 153–160; Econometrica, 45, 654–657; L. S. Shapley, 1953 in H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to thefs theory of games (Vol. 2), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) predicted coalition outcomes better than the other models tested. The implications for organizations and their members are discussed.

A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model

The equal division kernel and the α‐power solution are two recently proposed theories of coalition formation in n‐person characteristic function games with sidepayments. A closed form solution for payoff disbursement is derived from the α‐power model for n‐person games with only 1, n‐1, and n‐person permissible coalitions and no weak players. It is shown that for this class of games, which are frequently employed to experimentally test theories of coalition formation, the equal division kernel is a special case of the α‐power model with α = 1/2.

Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives

Apex games place weak players in the formal equivalent of a multiperson prisoner's dilemma in which each weak player must choose between competing against the other weak players for the opportunity to coalesce with the strong player or cooperating with the other weak players to produce a jointly preferable outcome. Punishments, not rewards, are predicted to be effective for enforcing cooperation by the weak players. Fifty-four groups of four subjects each played the weak role in a five-person apex game with a confederate playing the apex (strong) role in a 3×3 design with factors of low, medium, and high levels of rewards and punishments available as incentives. As predicted, punishments but not rewards had a significant impact on increasing cooperation. Despite this effect, many groups experienced harmful effects of punishment availability that increased the risk of retaliatory spirals. It is concluded that a second-order dilemma may be seen in prisoner's dilemmas, since punishments are both necessary for enforcing cooperation and detrimental to that cooperation.

Nonsymmetry and Core Size in N-Person Sidepayment Games

This article presents a procedure for indexing n-person cooperative games in terms of degree of nonsymmetry. This ordinal-level index is limited to sidepayment games, but applies generally to games of three or more players. To validate the index, a laboratory experiment was conducted with four-person games differing in degree of nonsymmetry and in core size. The results show that, while core size had no significant effects, the players' payoffs varied significantly as a function of nonsymmetry. Strong players received increasingly more and weak players received increasingly less as nonsymmetry increased. Tests for goodness of fit of several prominent solution concepts show that, across experimental treatments, the Shapley value predicts better than other solutions. Shapley is followed in order by the disruption nucleolus, the nucleolus, and finally the equality solution. These tests also show that all of the theories decline in predictive accuracy as the degree of nonsymmetry increases. Reasons for this trend are discussed in terms of predictive patterns and payoff variances.