Weak Actors Research Articles

Secondary Bystander Effects on Intimate Violence: When Norms of Restraint Reduce Deterrence

Research on bystander effects indicates that bystanders encourage individuals to behave in conformity with norms. In modern Western society, there are norms against stronger actors using violence against weaker actors. To the extent that the presence of a bystander reduces the likelihood that stronger actors use violence toward weaker actors, we suggest that weaker actors may become more likely to use violence toward stronger actors because of their reduced risks from retaliation. In the present study, subjects indicated their own likelihoods of using violence in hypothetical situations of boyfriend/girlfriend conflicts with and without bystanders. As theoretically predicted, the results showed that the presence of a bystander decreased the use of violence by males toward females, and increased the use of violence by females toward males. We suggest that a greater understanding of indirect effects on interpersonal relationships is essential for both social theory and policy.

Reply to Linder and Houghton

Previous articleNext article No AccessCommentary and DebateReply to Linder and HoughtonGeorge Steinmentz and Erik Olin WrightGeorge Steinmentz Search for more articles by this author and Erik Olin Wright Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Sociology Volume 96, Number 3Nov., 1990 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/229578 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1990 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Kevin Young The Strong Embrace of Weak Actors: Explaining Social Support for Economic Liberalization through the Case Study of Small Business Associations in the European Union, (Jan 2007): 219–233.https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230607187_12PATRICK MULLINS Class Relations and Tourism Urbanization: The Regeneration of the Petite Bourgeoisie and the Emergence of a New Urban Form, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 18, no.44 (Dec 1994): 591–608.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.1994.tb00288.x

The Newly Industrializing Countries and the Political Economy of Protectionism

A perennial paradox in political science is that weak actors often prevail in confrontations with more powerful actors. This article explores this problem in the context of the world trading system. The United States and the European Economic Community have been increasingly erecting selective trade barriers, such as voluntary export restraints, that discriminate against newly industrializing countries. Despite this protectionism in textiles, footwear, and other sectors, some relatively weak exporting nations have found ways to increase their gains. Ad hoc American policies have produced a structurally deficient form of trade barriers, which countries such as Taiwan and Korea have exploited. By giving priority to long-run interests, bargaining for loopholes, linking issues, cheating, and mobilizing transnational and transgovernmental allies, these exporters have generally overcome the damaging effects of protectionism. As U.S. interest groups and decision makers learn from their mistakes, the obstacles to success become more severe. But what the newly industrializing nations have shown us is that less powerful states that emphasize bargaining rather than coercion, adjustment rather than intransigence, and the substance of international agreements rather than their form, can turn an adverse situation into advantage.