Water Allocation Agreement Research Articles

Role and relevance of three enabling conditions to resolve inter-provincial water conflicts in the Indus basin within Pakistan

AbstractAddressing water access, allocation, and use becomes a complex problem when it crosses multiple boundaries: political, jurisdictional, and societal, as well as ecological, biogeochemical, and physical. This paper focuses on transboundary water management (TWM) problems among the riparians with conflicting needs and competing demands. The complexity of TWM problems arises because of interdependencies among variables, processes, actors, and institutions operating at various scales. For such situations, the traditional notion of necessary and sufficient causal conditions is not adequate to resolve TWM problems. In essence, the resolution of many TWM issues becomes contingent upon the changes that occur within the context of the problem. A key for initiating and sustaining the resolution of complex TWM issues appears to be a set of enabling conditions, not any easily identifiable and replicable causal conditions or mechanisms. Thus, before analyzing and addressing contingent and situational factors important for any TWM issues, this paper argues for a reframing of these issues and examining the role and relevance of three enabling conditions. Using the inter-provincial water conflicts for the Indus basin within Pakistan as an illustrative case, it shows why over 30 years of dialog and discourse could not create any formal water allocation agreement. Then, it discusses how the Water Apportionment Accord of 1991 created the enabling conditions to address inter-provincial water conflicts within Pakistan in an adaptive way.

An Adaptive Basin Management Rule to Improve Water Allocation Resilience under Climate Variability and Change—A Case Study in the Laja Lake Basin in Southern Chile

Due to population growth and expansion in the agricultural and industrial sectors, the demand for water has increased. However, water availability in some regions has decreased due to climate change trends and variability, necessitating innovative strategies and adaptation in water allocation to avoid conflicts among users in a hydrological system. This paper presents a resilience analysis and a conceptual hydrological modeling approach to evaluate the resilience capacity of a new water allocation rule in the Laja Lake basin in southern Chile. Resilience assessments included absorptive and adaptive capacities with four system states: resilient, susceptible, resistant, and vulnerable. A modeling approach was used considering the climate variability uncertainty and climate change trends of the Laja system. Characterization of adaptive and absorptive capacities showed that the Laja Lake basin moved from resistant to vulnerable. Hydrological modeling analyses showed that after a new water allocation agreement, the Laja Lake system is moving from vulnerable to susceptible, since the new rule has more adaptive alternatives to face climate variability. The new rule diminishes the possibilities of conflicts among users, ensuring the fulfillment of water needs for uses such as farming and ecosystem services such as landscaping, and allows for increased water allocation for energy in wet hydrological years.

Enhancing climate resilience of transboundary water allocation agreements: the impact of shortening the agreement\u2019s lifetime on cooperation stability

Efficient use of transboundary rivers under climate change requires periodic adaptation of their governing regime to the hydrological realities of the basin. Applying a short-term time horizon to an agreement on water allocation can make it easier for the riparian states to update the terms of their cooperation periodically, and thus, adapt them to changes in water availability resulting from climate change. However, agreements with a pre-agreed termination date can only increase the efficiency of water use if they lead to a stable cooperation. In this paper, I analyze how riparian states’ previous knowledge of the termination date of a water allocation agreement affects the agreement’s stability. The results show that when riparian states are aware of the agreement’s termination date, there is a higher chance for them to free-ride. However, certain cases may occur in which previous knowledge of the agreement’s termination date can contribute to the stability of an agreement by enforcing compliance.

Hydrologic data as a human right? Equitable access to information as a resource for disaster risk reduction in transboundary river basins

Principles of equitable and reasonable use underpin international water agreements. Despite the potential for hydrologic information to enhance resilience to extreme events, comparable application of just principles to the distribution of hydrometeorological data is poorly established. Within the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) river basin, we find that water allocation agreements are codified into treaties or Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). Analogous decisions regarding hydrometeorological data sharing are often internalized at the level of river basin organizations and are not upheld as MoUs. This institutional structure provides extremely limited data to the most downstream nation of Bangladesh. Available precipitation and discharge stations are well below the minimum densities recommended by the World Meteorological Organization. Forecasters in Bangladesh therefore contend with vast areas of geopolitically ungauged catchment, precluding the application of basin-wide modelling approaches driven by observed data. Thus, capacity for increasing resilience to extreme events within Bangladesh is obstructed, demonstrating the potential for perceived injustice related to distribution of hydrometeorological data. Consensus that water is a human right warrants the application of equity to water allocation. But is security from water-related disasters also a human right? As hydrometeorological data can be a powerful resource with potential to profoundly affect lives and livelihoods, enhanced awareness of justice related to data sharing is needed.

Sustainable Agreements on Stochastic River Flow

Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyze whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing, or sustainable. We do so using an infinitely-repeated sequential game that we apply to several classes of agreements. To derive our main results we apply the Folk Theorem to the river sharing problem using the equilibrium concepts of subgame-perfect equilibrium and renegotiation-proof equilibrium. We show that, given the upstream-downstream asymmetry, sustainable agreements allow downstream agents to reap the larger share of the benefits of cooperation.

AN INTERACTIVE WATER INDICATOR ASSESSMENT TOOL TO SUPPORT LAND USE PLANNING

This paper presents an interactive web-based rapid assessment tool that generates key water related indicators to support decision making by stakeholders in land use planning. The tool is built on a consistent science based method that combines remote sensing with hydrological and socioeconomic analyses. It generates transparent, impartial, and verifiable information regarding the impact of land use changes on water productivity, water consumption, water availability, and employment. The usefulness of the tool was demonstrated in the Inkomati River Basin in Southern Africa, where the tool was used to assess the impact of converting land use on the water resources to prioritize areas for conversion and to track required changes in land use to comply with tripartite water allocation agreements. This contributed to confidence building and to strengthening the process of conscientious land use planning, which is an extension of conventional work in this field.

Self-Enforcing Agreements on Water Allocation

Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing agreement. The solution induced by this particular agreement implements the “downstream incremental distribution”, an axiomatic solution to water allocation that assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream countries.

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper we assess the stability of water allocation agreements using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.

Strategic Decision Support for Resolving Conflict over Water Sharing among Countries along the Syr Darya River in the Aral Sea Basin

The graph model for conflict resolution GMCR, along with its associated decision support system GMCR II, are employed for systematically studying the strategic aspects of conflict existing among countries in the Aral Sea Basin of Central Asia. Competition for water is increasing in the central Asian countries in the Aral Sea Basin since they became independent in 1991. Disputes have developed between the three downstream countries, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the two upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in the basin in sharing water in its two main rivers, Syr Darya and Amu Darya. The downstream countries are heavy consumers of water for growing cotton while the upstream countries want to use more water for electricity generation and farming. Accordingly, GMCR II is utilized as a formal mechanism for better understanding the complex conflict existing at present among countries along the Syr Darya and for providing insights as to how these countries may interact with one another in attempting to reach a resolution acceptable to all. In particular, strictly following the present water allocation agreement by all parties is found to be the most preferred resolution for both the upstream and downstream countries.

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.

Policy analysis for an amicable, efficient and sustainable inter-country fresh water resource allocation

In the area of fresh surface water resources, which are gradually becoming more scarce, sustainable utilization implies the need for policies aiming to provide adequate water supplies for everyone in both national and international contexts. Many international river basins are shared without any formal intergovernmental agreement, while bilateral agreements guaranteeing amicable cooperation amount to a handful. This paper presents a simple economic-ecologic model within which it examines input-output controls, social input prices, bilateral water trade, a water market for all water users, and a fixed water allocation agreement, as possible water policies for cross border river water sharing. All of these policies can satisfy the conditions for maximum joint economic benefits, while simultaneously working towards maintaining the functional integrity of river ecosystems. In theory, therefore, these policies are of equal use. There are, however, several costs associated with policy administration which are hidden and must explicitly be taken into account. The analysis indicates that bilateral water trade can prove a workable, efficient and sustainable policy for cross border water sharing.

Water Allocation Conflicts on the Canadian Prairies

The conflicts between water demands for energy production and irrigation development on the Canadian prairies and the available supply are reviewed. The water requirements for energy production in the western provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan arise from the development of oil sands and heavy oil. Manitoba has a large amount of developed and potential hydroelectric capacity. While a considerable area in the prairies is presently irrigated, a very large increase in irrigated area is possible in the forseeable future. All major rivers in the prairie provinces, flow from west to east. Consumptive uses in the western parts of the region reduce the potential for water-based developments in the east. Ground water is not a feasible source of supply across much of the region. A water allocation agreement is currently in force among the three provinces. While there are no problems apparent with the present allocation, areas of potential conflicts have been identified. A growing imbalance between supply and demand suggests that increasingly severe water shortages may be anticipated in many areas in the near future.