Waste Management Firms Research Articles

Rethinking market connections: mobile phone recovery, reuse and recycling in the UK

PurposeThe purpose of this article is to provide an application of network literature that can be used for teaching and learning purposes.Design/methodology/approachThe information used to present the case study is drawn principally from documentary evidence as well as discussions with a phone manufacturer, retailer and waste management company.FindingsDescribes the role of key actors in the development of “circular” supply chains for mobile phones and outlines two recovery and reuse/recycling schemes, one which operated as a trial (having been initiated by mobile phone manufacturers) and one which has functioned as a commercially viable arrangement since 2002 and is led by waste management and retail firms. The two schemes demonstrate ways in which various parties seek to influence the behaviour of others as well as changes (both temporary and permanent) in the activities performed by and connections between parties.Research limitations/implicationsWhichever way various companies choose to deal with electronic waste, one factor remains constant, namely that collection schemes are of little value without consumer involvement. The case study would have benefited from empirical research of consumer awareness of and propensity to contribute to phone collection schemes.Practical implicationsA valuable illustration for teachers and students of “markets as networks” using a problem which is prevalent in any geographic location. The case could also be used as a vehicle for students to design and conduct research into consumer disposal of discarded phones and awareness of/propensity to make use of available recovery and reuse/recycling schemes.Originality/valueRequires the reader to think beyond linear supply chains and shows how network literature can incorporate consumers and organisational actors alike. The UK perspective provides a useful teaching/learning tool by describing how discarded mobile phones are handled. In addition to this, the case study could be used as a starting point from which to investigate how networks are organised in other geographic locations for dealing with this same problem.

The Impact of Environmental Regulations on the Location of Firms in the Hazardous Waste Management Industry

This paper examines the relation- ship between environmental regulations and the location decisions of hazardous waste manage- ment firms. This industry provides a powerful test of the effect of state environmental regula- tions on location because environmental regula- tions significantly affect the cost of providing waste management. The results indicate that state spending on environmental programs can deter firms, as does potential public opposition. Spend- ing affects the implementation and enforcement of regulations and thus is very important in firms' location choices. Hazardous waste management firms do not appear to be deterred by the strin- gency of regulations, but instead are attracted to more comprehensive policies. (JEL H73, R38, Q28)

Public/Private Competition in Solid Waste Management: A Case Study of Alternatives to Flow Control

Profound changes are occurring in municipal solid waste management as a result of the 1994 U.S. Supreme Court decision that struck down solid waste flow control ordinances. Local governments have scrambled to find alternatives to flow control in the face of increasing competition from private sector waste management firms. This article details the case of the Southeastern Public Service Authority's efforts to develop feasible alternatives to flow control and strategies for dealing with private sector competition in solid waste collection and disposal. These strategies may serve as a useful model for municipal solid waste agencies in the post-Carbone era.

Beyond Nimby: hazardous waste siting in Canada and the United States

The virtual inability to open new hazardous waste management facilities in Canada and the United States stems directly from a form of community opposition so common and vehement that it is commonly identified as a syndrome: Not In My Back Yard (or NIMBY). Whether such facilities are proposed by governmental agencies or by private waste management firms, communities are usually shocked to learn that they have been selected to host these facilities and take collective action to thwart them. Such actions have blocked many poorly planned facilities and stimulated greater interest in preventive, waste reduction strategies. They have also, however, thwarted the adoption of new waste management technologies and created serious geographic inequities in the distribution of waste management responsibility across the two nations. Beyond shows that certain siting strategies in Canadian provinces and American states have created successful siting agreements, broad public support, and comprehensive systems of waste management and prevention. These include continuous public involvement in waste policy deliberations, a commitment to pursue siting only among communities that volunteer after extended democratic dialogue, and extensive packages of economic compensation and assurances of safe, long-term facility management. Also important are guarantees that any new facility be part of a broader waste strategy for a particular province, state, or region and will not be allowed to become a magnet for wastes from areas that have not taken serious steps to address their own waste problems. The book concludes with the suggestion that these strategies can be applied to other NIMBY blocked proposals, such as siting for prisons, drug and alcohol treatment centers, and nursing homes.

Industry-Wide Disclosure Dynamics

Voluntary disclosures by some firms seem to provoke other firms to make related disclosures. After Citibank announced the extent to which its Third World loans were in default, many other money center banks did likewise.' After Chambers Development took a write-off for their waste disposal arrangements, many other waste management firms did too.2 Several insurance companies successively disclosed their potential liability from hurricanes Hugo3 and Andrew,4 and the Los Angeles earthquakes.5 Besides having disclosures that occur in herds, there appears to be another characteristic common to each of these examples: the disclosures were motivated by managers' attempt to influence the financial market's assessment of the firms' values, rather than the product market behavior of other firms. In this paper, we propose a theory to explain such disclosure dynamics, when each firm selects a disclosure policy to maximize its expected price at each point in time, while taking into account that other firms behave similarly.