Decisions In Washington Research Articles

US–Afghanistan: the collapse of an asymmetrical alliance

This article reflects on the reasons for the collapse of the asymmetrical alliance between the US and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), which had existed for 20 years. Particular attention is paid to the roles of both countries within the alliance as senior and junior partners. The goals of the two players are not always the same, which are sometimes contradictory. The level of Afghan influence on American strategy and the cost to the U.S. of managing the alliance are demonstrated, as well as attempts by the Afghan side to manipulate the senior partner with a high degree of dependence on it. The legal basis for the US-IRA alliance is outlined. The author notes the initial lack of a clear U.S. strategy outlining overarching goals, the sequence of steps required to achieve these goals, and the resources allocated to carry out these actions. The rapidly changing political and military environment in Afghanistan has contributed to frequent changes in US strategies. The paper shows that, as a result, Washington was actually forced, along with security, to engage seriously in nation-building in Afghanistan, which was not part of its plans. The ignorance of US officials about the socio-cultural and political conditions in the IRA was an important factor contributing to failures at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The complexity of implementing a state-building strategy was also due to the overly broad range of objectives and the large number of actors involved in Afghanistan. Complicating factors were the unrealistic timeline for reconstruction of the IRA, the endless infusion of funds into Afghan institutions to address insecurity and the corruption of the Afghan government. It is concluded that the foundation of the bilateral asymmetric alliance has been undermined by the US-Taliban arrangements, and Washington's decision to withdraw US troops from the IRA has led to its collapse.

George Washington's image in China and its impact on the 1911 Revolution

The founding father and first president of the United States of America, George Washington was well known in late Qing China. Stories about his accomplishments and personal virtues were widely and continuously circulated. His name's Chinese transliteration became increasingly elegant and his legacy was subject to different spins, including his willingness to give up hereditary reign just like the Chinese ancient sage kings Yao and Shun, as well as his heroic role in leading a nationalist resistance to foreign rule and his moral courage in facing up to personal responsibility. The various Chinese manipulations of the George Washington story helped the Chinese to understand American history, changed their perceptions of foreigners, and contributed to the revolutionary mobilization against the Qing dynasty. In terms of democracy, the Chinese interpreted Washington's legacy from three angles: the nominal, the institutional, and the ideological. Although lacking a democratic tradition, the Chinese did nevertheless value public mindedness, as illustrated by the much admired legendary ancient sage ruler Yao who allegedly passed his reign to another capable leader Shun, instead of to Yao's own descendants. For this reason, the Chinese of the late Qing period could easily appreciate Washington's choice of a presidency over kingship, but they were ill equipped to fully understand the institutional ramifications and the ideological underpinning of Washington's decision. In short, what attracted the Chinese to the Washington story was the nominal implication for political reform in China, not the substance of genuine democracy. As a result of the popularization of the Washington story during late Qing times in China, the Chinese became much more apprehensive about monarchism than about authoritarianism. Hence, when Yuan Shikai exercised his dictatorship as president, few Chinese reacted strongly. But when Yuan made attempts to abandon the nominal constitutional democracy established in the Revolution's wake and to return to monarchy, the whole country opposed him, resulting in the total collapse of Yuan's imperial ambition. This turn of events had a great deal to do with the popularization of the Washington story in late Qing China.

Dispatches

Dispatches

Forrester Blanchard Washington and His Advocacy for African Americans in the New Deal

Forrester Blanchard Washington (1887-1963) was an African American social work pioneer recruited to the first New Deal administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as director of Negro Work in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. This role gave Washington a platform from which to object strenuously to the development of social policies that were predisposing African Americans to chronic dependence on welfare programs instead of creating equal opportunities for employment. Washington's policy analysis and recommendations represent social work's advocacy for equal employment opportunity long before the related civil rights legislation in the 1960s. An analysis is offered to explain Washington's decision to abort his federal career when the political agenda of the Roosevelt administration began to conflict with his values and professional goals. His actions are exemplary of resignation in protest--an aspect of advocacy more often discussed than used. This article is based on Washington's writings and materials found in the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland.

Why the United States Promotes India's Great-Power Ambitions

In March 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced Washington's decision to "make India a global power." No doubt U.S. arms manufacturers can now look forward to large contracts from India; but this course is dictated by broader strategic considerationsThis article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

The United States and the Ottawa process

The United States has been sharply criticized for its decision not to sign the Ottawa Convention to ban anti‐personnel mines (APM). Washington's decision is rather puzzling, if one considers the US's earlier stand on land mines. Fischer analyzes several factors which may have played an influential role in the decision making process. These factors include: international factors (the process and style of the negotiation process and the role of NGO5); domestic factors (the influence of bureaucratic factors, Congress, interest groups, and public opinion); and individual‐level factors (Clinton and Albright's position, to name a few). The APM issue exposes some important aspects of US foreign policy‐making in the post‐Cold War world and illustrates the United States’ changing position in the international community.

Valley Forge and the Green Bay Packers: Putting Life and Motion into Geography and History

In December of 1777, George Wash inton and his Continental Army marched into Valley Forge to camp for the remaining winter months. It was a difficult time for the Americans. They had just been defeated at the Battle of Brandywine and the British occupied the new nation's capi tal only eighteen miles to the southeast at Philadelphia (1). Why did Washington choose Valley Forge? Was it a safe haven from the British? Was it an appropriate site to shelter battered troops from the bitterly cold winter? In order to fully understand this event, it is important to examine Valley Forge from a geographic per spective and not simply as the place the Continental Army spent a harsh winter. Unfortunately, to many edu cators and students the geographic perspective means placing a dot on a map locating Valley Forge. Forgot ten are key geographic components essential to analyzing historical im plications of Washington's decision to use Valley Forge as the winter campsite for his troops.

The U.S.S.R. and the Gulf Crisis

The Gulf crisis has served as an excellent test for the political mentality that was supposed to mark the era of perestroika. Indeed, for the first time since the end of World War II, the Soviets and the Americans were in the same camp. The traditional Soviet-American rivalry in the Middle East brusquely seemed to disappear, and the two powers acted in concert, deciding to work together to prevent any escalation in the regional conflicts henceforth considered as the principal source of danger for world peace. Within 48 hours of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Secretary of State James Baker issued a joint communique condemning Iraq unequivocally and in the most vigorous terms. Not long after, on 19 August, the Soviet military attache in Washington went to the Pentagon to provide, on the instructions of his defense minister, precise information concerning the types of armaments and of military material sent to Iraq. This initial concord was manifested in Soviet support for all twelve Security Council resolutions concerning the Gulf, and notably for resolution 678; without this support, military action in the Gulf would have been far more difficult to justify. But the new harmony was not to continue without strain, especially after the launching of hostilities on 17 January. This culminated in Soviet bitterness over Washington's decision to proceed with the ground offensive on schedule despite the Soviet peace initiative of 18 February and despite the personal efforts of President Gorbachev, who reportedly spent the

Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (review)

BOOK REVIEWS183 seen as a resolution from above, was the work of blacks themselves rather than the Union armies or President Lincoln and the Republican Congress. Of course Magdol does not make this express argument , but that is the implication of his casual employment of the concept of self-emancipation. Though an appealing idea, it is not supported by evidence. Magdol's book would have been strengthened by a more thoughtful analysis of this matter. Herman Belz University of Maryland Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change. By Merritt Roe Smith. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. Pp. 363. $17.50.) In recent years historians have devoted increasing attention to technological history and Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology is an outstanding addition to the growing list. President George Washington's decision to locate a government arsenal in what was essentially a small isolated rural community on the Potomac River was prompted primarily by regional considerations. Until the Civil War the Armory manufactured arms for the government. Professor Smith discusses the Armory in the context of the local community and region, and compares it with the Springfield (Mass.) Armory, the other major federal arms establishment in the antebellum period. Smith contrasts the "dynamism and devotion to progress" at Springfield to the negative reaction to technological change at Harpers Ferry. The traditional generalization is that "most Americans accepted and welcomed technological change with uncritical enthusiasm." The author clearly demonstrates that this was not true at Harpers Ferry as change was accepted reluctantly. This attitude prevailed in spite of the fact that the Armory had skilled personnel throughout the period and a flow of technical information from Springfield and elsewhere. Smith attributes this to their "lack of contact with the outside world." "In the end," he concludes, "the stamina of local culture is paramount in explaining why the Harpers Ferry Armory never really flourished as a center of technological innovation." Not surprisingly, the author also discovers that local interests considered community needs more important than national goals. Positions of authority at the Armory were tied to a "larger network" of political and economic influence in the community. Management and workers frequently resisted procedures and machines that would have increased efficiency and productivity. Finally, Smith credits John Hall, who established a rifle works adjacent to the Armory, with the first "fully interchangeable weapon 184CIVIL WAR HISTORY in the United States." In a chapter entitled "Hall and the American System," the author argues convincingly that Hall played a major role in the initial stages of the industrial revolution in the United States. The book is well researched and written and fully deserves the Frederick Jackson Turner award for the year's best book-length manuscript in American history which it received in 1977. William N. Still, Jr. East Carolina University To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty: A Study in Anglo-American Relations , 1783-1843. By Howard Jones. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977. Pp. xx, 251. $15.95.) A controversial episode for over a hundred years, the Webster-Ashburton treaty has drawn inordinate scrutiny and criticism from contemporaries and scholars alike. No less than the dean of diplomatic historians, Samuel Flagg Bemis, once accused Daniel Webster of laundering British bribe money destined for Maine journalists (which the author denies) and winning a victory for Britain, while chauvinists in both nations called the agreement a sell out. Complicating a resolution of the Maine boundary dispute was a heritage of transatlantic fear and distrust exacerbated by domestic politics, the Caroline affair, the Creole incident and extradition procedures, the war of Maine "Red Shirts" and New Brunswick "Blue Noses" over the Aroostook, the Washington government's clumsy handling of the McLeod case, not to mention Lord Ashburton's low opinion of the "weak & timid & irresolute" Secretary of State and the American people, a "Mass of ungovernable and unmanageable anarchy" (p. 118). To resolve all the irritants threatening the Anglo-American relationship any treaty necessarily had to be a "package agreement." Drawing on copious research in British and American archives as well as a comprehensive bibliography, Professor Jones has written an absorbing, perhaps definitive, account of a complicated subject. The United States, especially...