Washington's Policy Research Articles

Finally, Diplomacy with Cuba not Vitiated by Hubris?

Cuba has merited five decades of American punishment because its domestic policies were disobedient to Washington. This article examines whether President Barak Obama will continue to demand that one sovereign state demand submission from another. Assuming his honesty and good intentions, Obama will encounter a problem in the mind-set of the elite Washington policy circle, which has thought little about Cuba. In 1991, most of them rejoiced when Cuba's economy virtually collapsed following the demise of the Soviet Union. But official American attitudes, shaped by Cold War views and the strength of Cuban–American opponents of the Castro government, have not only been passed by, but also have shown to be hollow. Cuba continues to resist and survive—but has been wounded in the process. Looking at the hubris of American policy toward Cuba and the odyssey of post-Cold War Cuban–American relations allows for understanding why President Obama announced at the Trinidad meetings of hemispheric nations in April 2009, the end of one of the United States' most stupid, long-enduring and unfair policies.

Washington's ‘silent ally’ in World War II? United States policy towards Spain, 1939–1945

This article examines an important aspect of wartime American policy that, although the subject of heated contemporary debate, has received little scholarly attention. It traces shifts in Washington's Spanish policy from a protracted period of appeasement lasting well into 1943, to a course marked by strident verbal opposition to the Franco government. In both phases—sometimes described as ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’—American policy was in fact guided by pragmatic concerns and driven by a mixture of short-term military necessity and by the long-term advance of American influence. Based on an examination of the contemporary domestic debate on Spanish policy, the article also explores the relationship between government policy and the public discourse within which it was framed.

Sovereign Dilemmas: Saudi Arabia and Sovereign Wealth Funds

While the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can claim over half of SWF assets globally, the largest and most strategically important state, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has heretofore lacked a dedicated investment fund. This paper challenges some of the conventional wisdom on SWFs in explaining the Saudi government's reticence to launch an SWF and its recent decision to cautiously move in this direction. First, while Washington policy makers raise fears of enemies using SWFs against US interests, Saudi foreign assets have been used in support of its continuing alliance with the United States. And second, while critics decry the lack of transparency of SWFs, the Saudi launch of a new SWF could represent a move toward greater transparency, by working to separate “private” sovereign funds from “public” ones. Indeed, the launch of a SWF fits into a broad pattern of reforms rationalising Saudi governing institutions as King Abdullah has moved to control spendthrift princes, to streamline decision making, and to attract more foreign investment.

US Policy toward Kosovo: Sowing the Wind in the Balkans, Reaping the Whirlwind in the Caucasus

For the past decade, the United States has been promoting national transformation in the Balkans. In pushing the independence of Kosovo, Washington policy makers apparently believed that Serbia would acquiesce, most nations would recognize the newest independent state, and Russia would accept America's decision. None of these assumptions came to pass. Unfortunately, the war in the Caucasus was an inadvertent consequence of US policy in the Balkans. The West acted contrary to international law, violated the sovereignty of another state, and carelessly sacrificed the interests of neighboring states. The point is not that Russia acted correctly or legitimately in Georgia but that American policy makers must learn that actions have consequences, even actions by the US government. They need look no further than from Kosovo to Georgia.

A Waste of Public Diplomacy? The Performance of Al-Hurra TV among Lebanon's University Students

AbstractAs part of their 'War on Terror', Washington policy makers launched a massive public diplomacy campaign hoping to 'gain Muslim hearts and minds.' Their efforts, including the production of advertisements and documentaries, culminated with the inauguration of Al-Hurra, a commercial-free satellite station broadcasting in Arabic. Despite the substantial amount of money poured into it, Al-Hurra's success was strongly questioned among media scholars and US policy experts. And yet, Al-Hurra has generated very little academic research testing its effectiveness as an instrument of public diplomacy. This article reports the results of a survey administered in seven Lebanese universities to assess the performance of Al-Hurra among the country's college students. More specifically, it examines Al-Hurra's viewership, credibility, and trustworthiness in comparison to Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. The paper also tests the relation between Al-Hurra's viewership and audience attitude toward the United States. Findings show that Al-Hurra's viewership is considerably lower than Al-Jazeera's and Al-Arabiya's. Its credibility is also lower than that of its two Arab counterparts. Finally, Al-Hurra viewership did not predict a positive attitude toward the USA. The study raises questions about public diplomacy tools in general and Al-Hurra in particular.

September 11 and the rise of political fundamentalism in the Bush administration: domestic legitimatization versus international estrangement?

This article explores the tension between the role of religious language as a domestic legitimising device for the Bush administration and its adverse impact on Washington's foreign policy image. It argues that President Bush's political fundamentalism after 9/11 has become a major obstacle to effectively addressing the challenge of international terrorism. It examines the interface between religion and the traditional idea of US exceptionalism, considers the political rise of the Christian right in American politics since the 1970s, shows how 9/11 served as a transformative event in the emergence of political fundamentalism in the White House and explores the impact of the construction of President Bush's ‘war on terror’ policies on the domestic and international environments. The conclusion acknowledges a substantial gulf between the domestic and international responses to President Bush's brand of political fundamentalism, but concedes that these differences have been narrowing over time.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, Security Is Overtaking Development as Washington's Top Policy Priority

Abstract The global war on terror, as well as China's massive economic interventions, is having a significant impact on U.S. policy in Africa. As a result, for the first time in 60 years, the traditional U.S. emphasis on economic development in Africa has begun to lose the top-priority policy status that had been accorded to it for more than half a century.

Introduction

This issue of EIAL honors Thomas E. Skidmore, professor emeritus of Brown University and eminent historian of Brazil. It features articles written by Professor Skidmore's former students and other scholars who have been inspired by his wide-ranging contributions to a deeper understanding of contemporary Brazilian history and culture. In 1960 Skidmore received his doctorate from Harvard University with a major in modern European history specializing in German and British history. At precisely that moment, the unfolding revolution in Cuba became a pressing concern for Washington policy makers and leading institutions of higher education in the United States. Both recognized that they did not have sufficient specialists trained in Latin American history, politics, culture, and society. Responding to this need Harvard University offered the young historian a three-year post-doctoral fellowship to travel to a Latin American country and develop an understanding of its history and culture. He was also offered the option to return to Harvard to either teach his newly acquired knowledge or to continue work on European history. Skidmore chose Brazil and devoted the next forty years to studying the country. The breadth of his interests took him from a study of Brazilian political history from 1930 to the 1964 military coup d'état, to an examination of race, and later to a history of the military regime that ruled the country for twenty-one years.

Forrester Blanchard Washington and His Advocacy for African Americans in the New Deal

Forrester Blanchard Washington (1887-1963) was an African American social work pioneer recruited to the first New Deal administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as director of Negro Work in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. This role gave Washington a platform from which to object strenuously to the development of social policies that were predisposing African Americans to chronic dependence on welfare programs instead of creating equal opportunities for employment. Washington's policy analysis and recommendations represent social work's advocacy for equal employment opportunity long before the related civil rights legislation in the 1960s. An analysis is offered to explain Washington's decision to abort his federal career when the political agenda of the Roosevelt administration began to conflict with his values and professional goals. His actions are exemplary of resignation in protest--an aspect of advocacy more often discussed than used. This article is based on Washington's writings and materials found in the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland.

German Antifascist Refugees in America and the Public Debate on “What Should be Done with Germany after Hitler,” 1941–1945

The debate over “what should be done with Germany after Hitler” became so intense in America in 1943–44 that competitive organizations were created to influence public opinion and official postwar planning. German refugees fought on both sides in the crossfire of opinion. Recent historical scholarship has discussed the failure of the German political emigration to gain formal political recognition from the United States government and the right to participate in Allied planning for postwar Germany. Though correct, this contention should not obscure the significant role that some of the anti-Nazi exiles played in framing the public debate on the treatment of Germany. They swam against the tide of extreme anti-German sentiments at the height of the Second World War, and their views found considerable resonance among American intellectuals. The public debate on the Allied policy for postwar Germany was more extensive than many historical accounts suggest in focusing on the proposals of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and the infighting within President Roosevelt's administration. German antifascist emigrants in America devised the arguments and rhetorical tools against the movement for a draconian peace long before the political controversy over the Morgenthau Plan in September 1944. Their contribution to the wartime debate on Germany's future helped to prepare Americans to accept the modification of Washington's tough policy for occupied Germany before the Cold War turned a onetime enemy into an ally. By the terms in which they cast this debate, they contributed also to the marginalization of the Holocaust in the wartime discourse on Germany more than historians have hitherto recognized.

Nuclear Deterrence and Animosity in Japan‐North Korean Relations: Steps to Coexistence

The relationship between Japan and North Korea continues to be characterized by a considerable amount of animus and distrust, their geographical proximity notwithstanding. While the “history problem” still creates antagonism in the bilateral relationship, several other matters, such as the North Korean nuclear crisis and the missile and abduction issues, have not made the prospects for rapprochement especially good. Also not helping to better this very strained bilateral relationship is Japan's recent willingness to strengthen its security alliance with the United States and Washington's policy toward North Korea, which Pyongyang sees as uncompromising and hubristic. Of particular concern is that both Japan and North Korea reason that a real or claimed nuclear deterrent force is necessary for the purpose of national security. This article argues that Tokyo and Pyongyang need to implement bold measures that palpably demonstrate their commitment to improving bilateral ties, stressing that trust‐building actions are important for them to experience peaceful coexistence.

North-South Visions of Central America

The United States Discovers Panama: The Writings of Soldiers, Scholars, Scientists, and Scoundrels, 1850–1905. Edited by Michael LaRosa and Germán R. Mejía. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Pp. 336. $65.00 cloth.) How Wall Street Created a Nation: J.P. Morgan, Teddy Roosevelt, and the Panama Canal. By Ovidio Diaz Espino. (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2001. Pp. 320. $16.00 cloth.) Emperors in the Jungle: The Hidden History of the U.S. in Panama. John Lindsay-Poland. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. Pp.256. $69.95 cloth.) The U.S. Catholic Press on Central America: From Cold War Anticommunism to Social Justice. By Edward T. Brett. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003. Pp. 265. $22.00 paper.) Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala. By Victoria Sanford. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Pp. 352. $35.00 cloth.) Hidden Powers in post-conflict Guatemala: Illegal Armed Groups and the Forces Behind Them. By Susan C. Peacock and Adriana Beltrán. (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2004. Pp. 97. $2.00 paper.) Ajuste hacia la paz: La política económica y la reconstrucción de posguerra en El Salvador. By James K. Boyce, et al. (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 1999. Pp. 409. $11.00 paper.) From the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine onward, Washington's view of Latin America has been refracted through the prism of U.S. national interest. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, competition with the Great Powers of Europe shaped how the United States thought about the Western Hemisphere. Since the mid-twentieth century, the Cold War, then the drug war, and now the war [End Page 403] on terrorism, have distorted Washington's vision of Latin America in general and nearby Central America in particular. This collection of books, each in its own way, speaks to the issue of how the United States has seen its Central American neighbors, and the impact Washington's policy has had on them. The consistent message, whether from Harper's Weekly articles published in the 1850s or the Pentagon's efforts to create a Counter-Drug Center in Panama in the late 1990s, is that Central America has been an arena for U.S. action in furtherance of its own national interest, regardless of the will or interests of Central Americans. Not surprisingly, Washington's worst policy failures have come about when Central Americans proved to be less pliant and more resilient than Washington anticipated. U.S. interest in the region dates to the mid-nineteenth century and early ideas about the need for an inter-oceanic canal to link the eastern seaboard with newly acquired western territories. LaRosa and Mejía's collection of essays are drawn from Harpers Weekly and The Atlantic Monthly between 1850 and 1905 and focus on Panama and alternative inter-oceanic routes in Nicaragua and Mexico. The essays offer a nineteenth-century view of how U.S. writers saw the region and portrayed it to the reading public at home. Most are travelogues, chronicling the writers' adventures in territory they regarded as exotic, forbidding (because of tropical diseases), and populated by people who (when they merited any attention at all) were seen as racially inferior and uncivilized. The region deserved the attention of readers in the U.S. because of its value as a transit point; its people were superfluous. The essays begin with accounts of the Panama Railroad, which preceded the canal and, for almost half a century was the preferred route between east and west. The next group of articles recounts the debate over alternative routes—from the Chiriqui Lagoon to San Carlos Bay, through the Darien jungle along the Colombia-Panamanian border, through Nicaragua via the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua, and—by far the most entertaining– across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico, with locomotives pulling the boats across dry land on rails. The...

The Politics of Conceptualizing Islam and the West

n the last three years, a large number of books have been published, all trying to answer the now-classic post–September 11 question: Why do they,“the Muslims,”dislike or hate “us”?—with the “us” variously defined as the United States, the West, or the modern world. Scholarly and nonscholarly curiosity on this topic is not limited to the history of al-Qaeda and a small network of fundamentalist terrorists but also tries to explain why untold numbers of Muslim intellectuals have critical, and even hostile, opinions of the United States and Western civilization. Are critiques of the “West” peculiar to the Muslim world? Are they a reflection of a simple discontent with the international order or a conservative rejection of Western-originated, universal modernity? How should Western intellectuals and leaders respond to the Muslim critiques of modernity, the international order, and Western civilization? Bernard Lewis’s What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East, though completed before the events of September 11, 2001, examines “the longer sequence and larger pattern of events, ideas, and attitudes that preceded and in some measure produced them.” Appearing at a fortuitous moment, the book not only became a bestseller but soon also a favorite of Washington policy circles. Lewis’s approach takes the exceptionalist view that the content of the “Muslim revolt against the West” is shaped by the centuries-long conflict between Islamic and Christian civilizations. According to Lewis, as Christian civilization came to produce and embody modernity in the last three hundred years, Muslim civilization first rejected modernity due to its Christian nature during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then tried to emulate this Christian modernity after realizing that this was the only method for survival against the expansion of Western modernity. Lewis also implies that MusThe Politics of Conceptualizing Islam and the West

Dealing with Iran and North Korea

The US is again turning its attention to the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. It is perhaps indicative of the extent to which Iraq posed an exceptional case – in terms both of US threat perceptions and the legal, political and military circumstances which led to war – that Washington's non-proliferation policy has shifted from military force and regime-change strategies back toward traditional multilateral diplomacy designed to alter Tehran and Pyongyang's behaviour. Nevertheless, prospects for diplomatic success in either case are plainly mixed.

America and Iran

Tensions between America and Iran are rising. US concerns about Iran's terrorism links, and what Washington regards as Tehran's accelerating efforts to develop nuclear weapons, are reciprocated by Iranian anxieties about Washington's tougher policy statements, the presence of US forces in Iran's vicinity, and the precedents of regime change established in Afghanistan and Iraq. These tensions are aggravated by divisions within each capital about policy towards the other: a problem reflected in inconsistent behaviour and inept communication by both sides. The episodic overtures and apparent opportunities for cooperation of the last two years have come to nothing.

The Sanctions Malaise

'WHEN A COUNTRY DOES SOMETHING WE DO NOT LIKE we express our disaffection. Rhetoric is not enough and we don't want to send the marines. Sanctions are still popular but their effectiveness is dubious. Politically there is a reason to do it. It allows politicians to say am tough on Iran because I voted for sanctions; the president is the one who's soft. '(1) These words from Lee Hamilton, who until recently chaired the International Relations Committee of the United States House of Representatives and is widely respected for his expertise in foreign affairs, point to the inherent flaw in economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. Sanctions are a compromise between two undesirable options - inaction or full-scale military action - and a decision to impose them may, therefore 'be taken less on its intrinsic merits than because of its attractions in relation to the alternatives.'(2) And, unlike potential military intervention, which is usually given careful analysis, sanctions are often imposed hastily. More alarming is the fact that they have proliferated at a dangerous pace. The numbers are staggering: in 1993-6, 61 US laws and executive actions authorized unilateral economic sanctions against 35 countries comprising 42 per cent of the world's population.(3) These figures give a strong hint that Washington has used this (questionable) tool of foreign policy in a knee-jerk, indiscriminate, and therefore uncritical fashion.This article explores the use of US sanctions against Cuba to illustrate what is dangerous about their haphazard use: their goal of encouraging democracy is far too ambitious; they cause tension between the United States and its closest allies because they violate international law; they are dictated by an interest group that by definition cannot be said to have global US interests in mind; and not only are they unsuccessful in changing Fidel Castro's policy behaviour but they also provide nationalist fuel to legitimate Castro's rule. Furthermore, the most recent sanctions variant, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD, better known as Helms-Burton), strips from the president the power to lift sanctions and gives it to Congress, where the influence of interest groups is strong. Nor has there been any study that compares actual to intended effects and no independent government review of US-Cuban relations since 1960. Indeed, nothing approximating a reasonable cost-benefit analysis - to the extent that one is feasible - informs Washington's policy towards Cuba. A complex amalgam of factors, including policy inertia, has kept this anachronistic cold war policy frozen in time.THE LOGIC OF SANCTIONSPolicy goals of such scope as altering a state's military behaviour or changing its regime or internal political structure are delicate matters. Prior to 1914, war was viewed as the only means of bringing about such change; in the aftermath of the First World War, economic sanctions came to the fore as a more humane liberal alternative to war. David Baldwin argued that: 'Reasonable people may differ with respect to the utility of war as an instrument of policy, but there is little to be said in defense of unnecessary wars... It would be a pity - perhaps a global disaster - if a contemporary American president were to resort to war solely because the nature, implications and consequences of economic statecraft had been misrepresented to him by his advisors.'(4)Indeed, compared to the human cost of war, this policy tool cannot help but be seductive. The landmark scholarly work in support of sanctions as a policy tool is Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.(5) In 115 cases identified between 1914 and 1990, the authors report success in 34 per cent. Because it is the only study to use a large enough database to derive statistically significant conclusions, sanctions supporters constantly cite it to bolster their views. However, the results do not settle the debate. First, a tool that is effective one-third of the time is hardly foolproof; second, many have raised doubts about the methodology of the study and its authors' generous definition of success. …

U.S. Imperial Ambitions and Iraq

Officially Washington's current policy toward Iraq is to bring about a "regime change"—either through a military coup, or by means of a U.S. invasion, justified as a "preemptive attack" against a rogue state bent on developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction. But a U.S. invasion, should it take place, would not confine its objectives to mere regime change in Baghdad. The larger goal would be nothing less than the global projection of U.S. power through assertion of American dominance over the entire Middle East. What the world is now facing therefore is the prospect of a major new development in the history of imperialism.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

US Policy on Dollarisation: A Political Analysis

Dollarisation has become a topic of intense debate throughout Latin America, raising the prospect of a vast new currency bloc in the western hemisphere - a potentially pivotal geopolitical event. What policy responses can be expected from the United States? An assessment of potential benefits and costs, both economic and political, suggests that there is no clear presumption regarding US interest, leaving wide latitude for policy discretion. Little change of Washington's current policy of passive neutrality can be expected in the foreseeable future. The only exception would be the possibility of a serious challenge to the dollar's global pre-eminence by Europe's new euro, which could trigger a competitive response from Washington.

Reshaping national intelligence in an age of information

The world of intelligence has been completely transformed by the end of the Cold War and the onset of an age of information. Prior to the 1990s, US government intelligence had one principal target, the Soviet Union; a narrow set of 'customers', the political and military officials of the US government; and a limited set of information from the sources they owned, spy satellites and spies. Today, world intelligence has many targets, numerous consumers - not all of whom are American or in the government - and too much information, most of which is not owned by the U.S. government and is of widely varying reliability. In this bold and penetrating study, Gregory Treverton, former Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council and Senate investigator, offers his insider's views on how intelligence gathering and analysis must change. He suggests why intelligence needs to be both contrarian, leaning against the conventional wisdom, and attentive to the longer term, leaning against the growing shorter time horizons of Washington policy makers. He urges that the solving of intelligence puzzles tap expertise outside government - in the academy, think tanks, and Wall Street - to make these parties colleagues and co-consumers of intelligence, befitting the changed role of government from doer to convener, mediator, and coalition-builder.

Stability, America's Enemy

The diplomats and decisionmakers of the United States believe, habitually and uncritically, that stability abroad is our most important strategic objective. They may insist, with fragile sincerity, that democracy and human rights are our international priorities--although our policymakers do not seem to understand the requirements of the first and refuse to meet the requirements of the second. The United States will go to war over economic threats, as in Desert Storm. At present, we are preoccupied with a crusade against terrorism, which is as worthy as it is difficult. But the consistent, pervasive goal of Washington's foreign policy is stability. America's finest values are sacrificed to keep bad governments in place, dysfunctional borders intact, and oppressed human beings well-behaved. In one of the greatest acts of self-betrayal in history, the nation that long was the catalyst of global change and which remains the beneficiary of international upheaval has made stability its diplomatic god. Our insistence on stability above all stands against the tides of history, and that is always a losing proposition. Nonetheless, our efforts might be understandable were they in our national interest. But they are not. Historically, instability abroad has been to America's advantage, bringing us enhanced prestige and influence, safe-haven-seeking investment, a peerless national currency, and flows of refugees that have proven to be rivers of diamonds (imagine how much poorer our lives would be, in virtually every regard, had our nation not been enriched by refugees from Europe's disturbances in the last century). Without the instability of the declining 18th century, as the old European order decayed, we would not have gained the French assistance decisive to our struggle for independence. Without the instability of the 20th century, protectionist imperial regimes might have lingered on to stymie our economic expansion. And without the turbulence that seeks to rebalance the world today, much of humanity would continue to rot under the corrupt, oppressive regimes that are falling everywhere, from the Balkans to Southeast Asia. A free world subject to popular decision is impossible without the dismantling of the obsolete governments we rush to defend. In one of history's bitterest ironies, the United States finally became, in the 1990s, the reactionary power leftists painted us during the Cold War. Before examining in greater detail why instability abroad is often to America's long-term benefit, let us consider the foolish manner in which we have descended from being a nation that championed change and human freedom to one that squanders its wealth, power, and lives in defense of a very bad status quo. We began well enough, applauding Latin America's struggles to liberate itself from the grip of degenerate European empires (except, of course, in the case of Haiti, whose dark-skinned freedom fighters made our own Southern slave-holders nervous). The Monroe Doctrine was not about stability, but about protecting a new and beneficial instability from reactionary Europe. We did take an enormous bite of Mexican territory, which Mexico had inherited and could not manage, but we did not attempt to destroy or to rule Mexico. At the end of our Civil War, we were even prepared to intervene militarily on Mexico's behalf against European interlopers, had not the Emperor Maximilian met a fitting end at Mexican hands. It all began to go wrong when we found ourselves with an accidental empire. Future historians, with the clarity allowed by centuries, may judge the Spanish-American War to have been America's decisive conflict, a quick fight that changed our nation's destiny and practice fundamentally. Brief, nearly bloodless, and wildly victorious, that war's importance has always been underestimated. Unlike almost all of America's other wars, it was a war that need not have been. Because it did happen, we turned outward, abandoning the convent for the streets, and could not go back. …