Abstract Philosophers have begun exploring justifications, such as liability and lesser-evil justifications, for consumer boycotting that are rooted in just war theory. The libertarian challenge holds that even morally objectionable consumer boycotts are nonetheless morally permissible in the sense that doing their constituent acts violates no rights or duties: consumer choice, information sharing, and advocacy are already permissible actions; boycotters do not acquire any special permissions that they did not already possess. I argue that even if consumers’ activities are generally permissible, they can become impermissible when done with certain intentions. Liability-based accounts of permissible boycotting should accept the view that intention is relevant to permissibility. Accepting this view marks a discontinuity between mere consumer choice and boycotting, and a discontinuity between permissible and impermissible boycotting, strengthening the argument that liability-based and lesser evil principles may sometimes be necessary for the permissibility of some consumer boycotts.