War Production Board Research Articles

The Electrical Distributor: War and Postwar

FOR THE purposes of this paper I will consider to mean the wholesale or distributing function which is being efficiently, effectively and economically performed today by hundreds of organizations in all phases of industry. Inasmuch as my thirty years in business have been devoted to the distribution of electrical equipment I must, therefore, narrow my talk to cover the distribution of electrical supplies and appliances. Basically, however, our business doesn't differ materially from that of other distributors. As a matter of fact, I think it can be said that it typifies better than any other our American system of distribution just as the electrical industry by and large represents a cross-section of all American industry. It is interesting in this connection to note that there is no electrical section of the War Production Board. There is a steel section, a copper section, and so on. The reason there is no electrical section is that in the electrical industry there are represented over fifty other industries from steel to lumber. It is further interesting, and much to the point, to note that in the electrical industry the wholesaler is the generally accepted channel through which equipment and merchandise flow from manufacturer to user. Inasmuch as the electrical industry in general, and the electrical distributor in particular are so representative he can be properly used as an example of distribution, as I intend to use him.

Title-National Defense

Journal AWWAVolume 35, Issue 12 p. 1596-1603 Article Title—National Defense War Production Board First published: 01 December 1943 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1551-8833.1943.tb19924.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume35, Issue12December 1943Pages 1596-1603 RelatedInformation

War Production Board-Office of War Utilities

Journal AWWAVolume 35, Issue 12 p. 1593-1595 Article War Production Board—Office of War Utilities First published: 01 December 1943 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1551-8833.1943.tb19923.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume35, Issue12December 1943Pages 1593-1595 RelatedInformation

Great Lakes Transportation

W ITH the formulation of a definite program of national defense in 1940, the Great Lakes fleet responded vigorously to the increased tempo of industrial activity. As preparations for a possible emergency continued, more and greater tasks were thrown on the lake ships, with the result that all units were fully employed. During 1941 great interest was aroused as to the limit of capacity of the vessels, and upon the outbreak of actual hostilities just at the close of the 1941 season there was some concern over the ability of the fleet to meet the urgent demands to be placed upon it during the war years. This, then, was the war problem confronting not only the industry but also the two war agencies most directly concerned, the War Production Board and the Office of Defense Transportation: What would be the transportation requirements, and what steps should be taken to see that these requirements were met?

Federal Regulations Affecting Allocation of X-Ray Equipment and Supplies

I Consider it an honor to be invited as a representative of the War Production Board to speak briefly on a subject that is of vital interest, namely, the supply and demand of x-ray equipment. I shall not confuse you with a discussion of the operations of the War Production Board, though I do wish to point out that what seems to some to be red tape, unnecessary restriction, and painful control, is in reality a logical procedure, coordinated with the many parts of a vast production effort. We are concerned with two related parts of that effort: you with the practice of radiology; the War Production Board with seeing to it that the radiological needs of the civilian population are served as effectively as is consistent with the requirements of the Armed Forces and the availability of scarce materials. The chief instrument governing this relationship is X-Ray Equipment Limitation Order L-206. In the development of that order, the War Production Board had the advice of the outstanding figures in the x-ray indu...

War Production Board—Office of War Utilities

Journal AWWAVolume 35, Issue 9 p. 1241-1244 Article War Production Board—Office of War Utilities Administrative Letter to All Utilities—August 24, 1943 J. A. Krug, J. A. Krug Director Office of War UtilitiesSearch for more papers by this author J. A. Krug, J. A. Krug Director Office of War UtilitiesSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 September 1943 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1551-8833.1943.tb21000.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume35, Issue9September 1943Pages 1241-1244 RelatedInformation

War Production Board—Office of War Utilities

Journal AWWAVolume 35, Issue 9 p. 1249-1249 Article War Production Board—Office of War Utilities Letter to All Water Utilities—July 28, 1943 J. A. Krug, J. A. Krug Director Office of War UtilitiesSearch for more papers by this author J. A. Krug, J. A. Krug Director Office of War UtilitiesSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 September 1943 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1551-8833.1943.tb21003.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume35, Issue9September 1943Pages 1249-1249 RelatedInformation

Problems of War Production Control in Japan

S INCE PEARL HARBOR the American people have had considerable experience of the difficulties involved in placing a complex industrial economy on a modern war footing and in seeing that this war economy is properly administered. There is some degree of satisfaction in knowing that Japan has been experiencing similar difficulties, and in very acute form. The fact that Americans had credited Japan with a thoroughly streamlined economic organization, along with the other elements of a well-oiled war machine, tends to enhance this satisfaction. There is good reason to assert that the United States War Production Board, as an instrument of production control which combines the essential features of flexibility and centralized authority, has been, despite all its troubles, considerably more effective than Japan's unwieldy apparatus, which General Tojo inherited at the outbreak of war and which he has been laboriously remodeling against many political obstacles for the past twelve months. Certain aspects of Japan's economic preparations for war were managed with great efficiency. In the period which preceded Pearl Harbor, the procurement of strategic raw materials and vital machine tools which Japan lacked was planned with extreme care and thoroughly implemented. There is clear evidence that the Japanese military authorities manipulated this program from behind the scenes. They were also instrumental in stimulating an unusually rapid development of the automotive and airplane industries in Japan after 1938. Arguing from these facts, Westerners have been inclined to credit the Japanese military with a greater degree of control over the productive system in Japan than they actually possessed. In this respect, the analogy often drawn between Japan and Nazi Germany is misleading, true as it may be in other respects. The Nazis won virtually full control over the German state apparatus in 1933-34. This political monopoly carried with it practically unlimited authority over the German economic system, which was comprehensively reorganized for war over a six-year period. Nothing like so sweeping and

War Production Board Construction Conservation Order L-41

Journal AWWAVolume 35, Issue 8 p. 1096-1096 Article War Production Board Construction Conservation Order L-41 First published: 01 August 1943 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1551-8833.1943.tb19874.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume35, Issue8August 1943Pages 1096-1096 RelatedInformation

Wartime Radio Production

It is argued that the problem of war production, in radio as elsewhere, is to keep output in line with the requirements of war. That involves synchronizing the various kinds of output. It requires that the factors of production, namely, facilities, materials, manpower, be available where needed. The War Production Board (WPB), in co-operation with the Armed Services, is endeavoring to minimize these problems. Within the Radio Division there are three groups which handle the three major problems of war production. There is a program group which keeps abreast of the requirements for military electronic equipment. Another group, working primarily with the B-1 components, sees to it that critical materials are delivered at the right time and delivered to the right places. A resources group makes certain that equipment and facilities of the industry are adequate to meet the schedules which have been set. There is a separate group in full charge of the maintenance of our civilian radio equipment. Finally, there is a new Radio Field Operations section working within the WPB regionaloffice structure, which assists the manufacturers at their plants, helping to solve their specific problems outside of Washington. An Engineering Advisory Section closely watches the developmental work going on in the laboratories in order that, when new devices reach the production stage, there be facilities to undertake the production swiftly; and also that these new designs use the minimum critical materials and components. We welcome any suggestions from The Institute of Radio Engineers which will assist the WPB, the Services, and Industry, to reach our 1943 objectives.

Salesmanship's Responsibility for the Future

T BELIEVE there is entirely too little ap1preciation of the contribution that salesmen have made to the success of America. Shortly before the Big Depression, a book was written by a New York banker, the title of which was American Prosperity, Its Causes and Its Consequences. A slightly over-simplified synopsis of that book is that the author believed that the industrial revolution had reached full bloom and that since industrial prosperity was synonymous with American prosperity, that since production was now by machines rather than by men, there was no possibility of another depression, Mass production meant products at such a low price that everybody could afford to buy them and buying them would keep everybody busy. That was before I929. In 1932 or I933 a sequel was written to book by the same author, stoutly defending his premise and reminding you that one of the steps in his chain of continued prosperity was selling. According to gentleman the cause of the I929 depression was that salesmen had gone softhad quit work-had forgotten how to sell, and thereby colild not keep the production lines busy. His simple and, to me, rather probably solution to the depressive condition we were still in was for salesmen to learn how to sell all over again. I have a lot of sympathy with that viewpoint. Recently I was handed a News Letter from Dartnell. In referring to the appointment of Arthur D. Whiteside to head up the War Production Board's Office of Civilian Requirements, they told of statements made by Mr. Whiteside on February 23 before the Sales Executives Club of New York. Either Mr. Whiteside has some peculiar slants or his talk was misunderstood. He stated, according to quotation, that this country's greatest economic troubles have resulted from salesmen. Apparently he contends that only in the automobile industry had salesmen and their managers been able to maintain the equation between production and consumption. He blamed the depression upon overselling and swollen inventories. Blaming the depression on the salesman confirms my previous reference, but blaming the depression upon overselling and swollen inventories, or tying that in with the criticism of selling is not criticizing salesmanship but is criticizing the lack of salesmanship and is the meat of the entire situation. That socalled salesman who persuades a distributor or dealer to stock up and then does nothing to assist that distributor or dealer in selling to the ultimate user certainly does not belong in my club. That salesman who undertakes the responsibility of selling to the ultimate consumer has never contributed to a depression except to relieve it. Fuller Brush salesmen, Holeproof salesmen, Electrolux Vacuum Cleaner salesmen, National Cash Register salesmen never created swollen inventories. Do you wonder that I get irritated at statements inaccurately expressed criticizing salesmanship when what they

Wartime Concentration of Production

C ONCENTRATION of the production of essential civilian goods in a few plants in each industry is a step which a nation at war may be forced to take when the need for resources becomes so critical that wasteful uses cannot be tolerated. When the War Production Board announced on July 23, I942, that it had approved the principle of concentration of production as a means of furthering the war effort,2 it was adopting a policy which has played an important role in the British war production program since March, I94I. In Great Britain some fifty industries had already been concentrated into nucleus plants by the middle of I942, and about 250,000 workers and over 55,ooo,ooo square feet of floor space had been released for other purposes.3 In this country, on the other

Water Works Maintenance Policy

Journal AWWAVolume 35, Issue 4 p. 539-541 Article Water Works Maintenance Policy As Affected by the War Production Board Harry E. Jordan, Harry E. JordanSearch for more papers by this author Harry E. Jordan, Harry E. JordanSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 April 1943 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1551-8833.1943.tb17405.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume35, Issue4April 1943Pages 539-541 RelatedInformation

Decentralization of War Production Board Activities

Decentralization of War Production Board Activities

War Production Board Regulations for Laboratory Equipment and Materials

War Production Board Regulations for Laboratory Equipment and Materials

The Copper Recovery Program

are exercised by the War Production Board. Converting the civilian economy to war production was a slow and delicate process. The transitional period witnessed the multiplication of WPB regulations progressively limiting the amounts of critical materials which could be used in fabricating nonessential articles and providing for the conservation of these materials through simplification and standardization of products. The effect of these L and M orders was

A New Frontier for Employee-Management Cooperation in Government

O NE of the most interesting and worthwhile developments in public administration during the past year has been the transplanting of the labor-management committee idea from industry government. Basically, the employeemanagement committee, as it should be called in government, is nothing dramatically new. It is a combination of the old suggestion-box type of employee suggestion plan and several modern ideas of employeemanagement cooperation; the latter components have added enough vigor and novelty an old idea account for a significant contribution public service employee relations. The introduction of the employeemanagement committee into governmental agencies followed, and was perhaps derived from, the basic provisions of the War Production Drive plan for industry initiated by Donald M. Nelson, chairman of the War Production Board. This provided for the establishment of management and labor committees give effect the President's direction of February 27, 1942, to bring home labor and management alike the supreme importance of war production. The initial proposal for the formation of such committees in government agencies originated in an employee-management conference within the office of the adminis-

Why Wage Incentives Work

IN this article Mr. Nickerson sets down some basic principles of wage incentives. How can wage-incentive plans be made to work efficiently and without the seemingly inevitable frictions so commonly associated with their operation? To that difficult question the author assays an answer. Mr. Nickerson, Director of the Management Consultant Division of the War Production Board, brings to his task a broad background in industry as well as in Government. An industrial engineer by profession, he has been concerned with labor relations as industrial representative on various Government boards.

Informing the Public: A Test Case

THIS article is not the first to charge that our information policy on the home front has been crippled by a lack of planning. Doubtless it will not be the last. But the authors do more than criticize. Here, in a typical American city, is a test case of what can be done to inform the public about the facts of wartime living. The issue is inflation, the strategy of information systematically planned. The results speak for themselves. Mr. Lambert, former president of both the Lambert Pharmacal Company and the Gillette Company, is no newcomer to the field of information. At present he is Consultant to the Chairman of the War Production Board. Dr. Cantril, Director of the Office of Public Opinion Research of Princeton University, is a frequent contributor to these pages.

Labor-Work Plus Ideas

MR. LUND, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the War Production Board, assesses the place of labor in American war production. The story is an exciting one-a tribute to free labor in a democracy. Labor has contributed in mills and factories; but it has also contributed in the high councils of Government. The structure and spirit of our war production effort which have made that contribution possible are here discussed. That the lessons we have learned in war are applicable in peace needs hardly be said. The author, as Director of the Labor Production Division of WPB during 1942 and part of 1943, has been in an ideal position to observe and evaluate labor's role. During that year and a half, the work of the Labor Production Division did much to make that role possible.