War Plans Research Articles

Towards a New Arab Moment

Towards a New Arab Moment

Errand into the Wilderness of Mirrors: Religion and the History of the CIA. By Michael Graziano

This creative study of the CIA’s “religious approach” to fighting the Cold War joins a growing body of scholarship examining the intersection of religion and foreign affairs. In seven tightly argued chapters, Michael Graziano charts the development of a “world religions paradigm” in both the academy and the United States’ intelligence services from WWII through Vietnam. This paradigm led CIA officers, State Department officials, and US presidents to view “religion” as an ally in the Cold War, even as it obscured the nuances and contexts that shaped the religious worlds of people around the globe. The Iranian revolution shattered the religious models that intelligence operatives had spent three-plus decades constructing. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), predecessor to the CIA, began developing a religious approach by forging alliances with Catholics during WWII. Catholicism “was foreign enough to be worthy of study but familiar enough to be interpretable” (p. 30). Catholic allies in Italy provided a tantalizing cache of information on the Axis Powers, even though one of the most promising sources—which purported to reveal Japanese war plans and ended up on the desk of President Roosevelt—turned out to be the fabrication of an Italian pornographer. Such a high-profile embarrassment hardly slowed the OSS’s religious approach, however. OSS chief “Wild Bill” Donovan was himself a Catholic, and he popularized the notion that religion “was everywhere, free, and individual: a natural ally in war and diplomacy” (p. 15). This idea of religion suffused American policymaking in the early Cold War era.

Biting the ‘cherry of detachment’: Agaléga’s Cold War decolonisation

The British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) was created in 1965 to secure a range of Indian Ocean islands for United States and United Kingdom military use. However, despite being situated in the centre of this new Territory, the twin islands of North and South Agaléga were curiously excluded. In light of India’s modern military development of Agaléga, this article examines why British and American planners in 1965 passed over these islands, citing its uncertain strategic utility, the political and financial costs of dismemberment from Mauritius, and Agaléga’s usefulness as a destination for displaced Îlois from the Chagos Archipelago. Using declassified British and American government records, this article uncovers secret Western machinations to secure the Indian Ocean, as Britain was winding down its vast global empire. This article concludes by commenting on India’s modern-day development of Agaléga, articulating some commonalities and divergences compared to American and British Cold War plans.

NEGATIVE TRENDS FOR THE CENTRAL POWERS AT THE END OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BULGARIAN PARTICIPATION 1916-1918

The author examines the role of propaganda, the collapse of the rapid war plan, the transformation of the conflict into a total war, the shortage of allies for the Central Powers, the transition to the supremacy of the Agreement in 1918, with a focus on the negative effectsof the Bulgarian participation. Bulgaria met its commitments to the Central Powers in a dignified manner, but the main trends of the development of the war became unfavorable for all countries of the coalition. Unlike the imperialist forces, Bulgaria fought for its national unity, but had joined a losing imperialist group.

“Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory and the 1982 Israel War in Lebanon: Theory and Application”

The article draws on Michael Walzer’s just war theory to assess the conduct of the Lebanon War of 1982 (Operation Peace for Galilee) and argues that according to the underpinning principles of Walzer’s theory, it was an unjust war. Sharon’s war plans, codenamed “Grand Oranim,” were designed to relieve the Lebanese Christian militias of their so-called Palestinian burden by driving the refugees into Jordan where they would presumably bring about a regime change and turn Jordan into a Palestinian state. My analysis focuses on the causes of this war, jus ad bellum, whether it was a war of self-defense, and the means that were employed in its conduct, its jus in bello. Likewise explored and analyzed here are the concepts of proportionality and the treatment of non-combatants.

Escape From the Cold War: Planning Civilian Evacuation from British-Occupied Germany, 1946–55

Evacuations, imagined as well as actual, reflect national strategic preoccupations, cultural assumptions and prevailing social values; they also reveal practical strengths and weaknesses in international relationships and in states’ interactions with their own citizens, at home and abroad. But evacuations are deeply symbolically significant too and grounded in far longer, intertwined social and strategic histories. Using the remarkable case study of Operation Chivalrous, the first plan devised for the evacuation of British military families from early Cold War Germany, this article uses evacuation to throw light on the changed relationship between British citizens and the state after 1945. The plan and planning revealed not only the renewed significance of the family in the post-war world, but also the tensions in the new welfare state. But, more broadly, this article argues that Britain's Cold War planning was closely linked, both practically and symbolically, to its responses to the end of empire and the domestic aftermath of the Second World War. In unpacking the intricacies of a proposal that was never used, for a war that was never fought, this article underlines the wider historical value of unrealised plans in revealing ‘ideational contexts' and social attitudes.

Advanced Base Defense Doctrine, War Plan Orange, and Preparation at Midway: Were the Marines Ready?

Abstract Many of the books written about Midway focus on the battle itself, specifically the naval battle between the US and Japanese fleets. Most of the emphasis is placed on understanding and critiquing the decision-making of the leaders of the US and Japanese fleets and aircraft carriers. Aside from discussing the contributions of the air forces flying from Midway itself, many overlook the preparedness and contributions of the Marine defenders stationed there. Other than the occasional shelling by Japanese naval vessels, Midway was only ever attacked a single time on the morning of 4 June 1942 and never faced the invasion force the Japanese sent to take the atoll. The lack of information on the actual defenders on Midway has left unanswered the question of how prepared the Marine forces were to defend Midway from the Japanese. War Plan Orange and US leadership placed significant importance on Midway and directed the Marines to defend it. Advanced Base Defense doctrine of the time had seen significant development in the interwar years and was used when the Marines fashioned the defense of Midway. This article will examine the development of Midway as a base and the doctrine for the defense of advanced bases in effort to determine if the Marines were properly prepared to defend Midway from the Japanese.

The existential threat of nuclear war: A psychoanalytic comment1

AbstractUtilizing primarily the information and data compiled by both the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists as well as that of former nuclear war planner, Daniel Ellsberg, this paper discusses a number of heretofore classified or little publicly known dimensions of the nuclear war planning of the United States and other nuclear armed nation states, including policies of first use and command and control, the occurrence of false alarms and accidents, and the dynamics of nuclear detonation that would result in nuclear winter and worldwide famine. As such, the focus on these topics is an attempt to ameliorate both our shared ignorance regarding the once again growing threat of nuclear war, and its consequence—nuclear winter, as well as, the tendency of large groups to engage in collective denial in relation to thinking about the unthinkable, utilizing a definition from psychoanalysis of the defense mechanism of denial.

Alignment but not Alliance: Nordic Operational Military Cooperation

Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Nordic states have sought to advance their defence cooperation “beyond peacetime” to also encompass operational military cooperation in crisis and armed conflict. Relations between the two Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, have formed a vanguard, encompassing bilateral operational planning beyond peacetime. While no formal security policy guarantees have been exchanged, Sweden and Finland have created strong expectations that they will lend each other support in a crisis. In short, while no formal alliance treaty exists, the two states have nevertheless become closely aligned. In 2020, Sweden and Finland joined NATO member Norway in signalling their intention to strengthen their trilateral defence relationship. The following year, NATO members Norway and Denmark signed a similar agreement with Sweden. The goal of these documents was to coordinate their national operational plans – their “war plans” – and perhaps develop some common operational plans. In this article, it is argued that these agreements fall short of a formal military alliance, but that they represent an alignment policy between the Nordic states.

The Rhetorical Structure In The Value Visibility In The Letters Of Imam Al-Baqir “B”

Among the clash of deviant ideas and dark forces’ struggle against the Muslim lands and in light of the unification of the enemy’s front and the division of the Muslim scattered between those who believe in the ongoing war, and between those who deny and those who reject the enemy’s front and those who clap for it, and between those who are weak and who do not have the right to benefit or harm themselves, there is the Imam of hearts who takes control of all, taking from the Qur’an a canal and a platform, making his weapon of knowledge and knowledge and his forehead of scholars and educated people, because war is a war of minds, a war of ignorance, obfuscation, distortion of facts and confusion of papers. The way to spoil their war plan was to educate young people, arm them with science, inject them with faith, and put them in schools that would help them sort the overlapping papers and decipher the events in an elaborate manner. From here, the researcher tries through this research. Standing on the most important factors that made the school of Imam Al-Baqir live immortal, and continue to be steadfast, against the dangers of currents that were invading the Islamic community at the time, and dragging them to our present time, and measuring the extent of their convergence with the currents of today. For salvation, there is a way to save the Shiites of Imam al-Baqir, may God’s prayers be upon him, who live in the same conditions. This will be through the presentation of the letters of Imam Al-Baqir and his writings to his Shiites and his companions, which were collected by Sheikh Ahmed Al-Mayanji in his book (The Books of the Imams) in the third part of the book, where the book contained the writings of all the Imams and their writings that came in their own handwriting or dictated to one of their companions, and the book is verified by a professor The Seminary in the Holy Qom; Mujtaba Al-Farji. The book was revised several times under the supervision of the author's offspring.

Jugoslovenska vojska u Aprilskom ratu 1941. godine

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia found itself in a difficult position at the beginning of World War II. The internal antinomies caused by unresolved national and political issues reflected badly on the state of the military. The Yugoslav Army was unprepared for a modern war. The military factories in Yugoslavia only produced a segment of light weapons and ammunition, bombs and basic equipment. The active officer staff was few in numbers, which hindered the transition of the peacetime armed forces into the state of war. The military measures that were undertaken were inadequate, inefficient and implemented without a clear plan. The Yugoslav Army's war plan, called R-41, was ill-suited for the situation. It became obvious that three thousand kilometers of state borders were undefendable against a far superior enemy. On April 6th, 1941 Germans launched an attack on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The outcome of the war and the faith of the Yugoslav Army were decided by three German attacks, performed from a circular base: in Macedonia on April 6th, in Serbia on April 8th, and in Croatia on April 10th. German and Italian troops advanced rapidly, and by April 13th they took Vojvodina, Slovenia, Croatia and Western Bosnia. German troops entered deserted Belgrade on the eve of April 12th. The unconditional capitulation was signed on April 17th, and the entire fighting ceased on April 18th, at 12 PM. The majority of the Yugoslav Army was taken into captivity.

Utvrđivanje pirotskih položaja kao posledica jugoslovensko-bugarskih odnosa 1918-1941

Front fortification towards Bulgaria, especially Pirot's positions, outposts of Nišavski direction, is the consequence of concern of Yugoslav military top for Eastern border securing. This fear was justified if there were taken into account relationships between two countries which were mostly marked with wars. From military point of view, Nišavski direction was sensitive for both sides. For Bulgarian side, that was the shortest way by which Sofia could be threatened. Yugoslav side feared the deterioration of Niš, thus disconnection of the important Moravsko-Vardarska communication. All war plans of Yugoslav army have foreseen at that direction the concentration of strong forces, and additional fortification as well so that to make use of natural obstacles. Nevertheless, foreign policy-related circumstances in the 1920s and 1930s, facing with highly more aggressive neighbour such Italy, and later on Germany, led Yugoslav General Staff to secure, among all, Northern and Western borders. Border securing with Bulgaria was approached only in 1940, after its join to Triple Pact. The works were interrupted by the beginning of April's war, and unfinished fortifications represented none obstacle for breakthrough of German forces.

미일 교섭의 개시 - 미일 양해안의 성립과 미 국무부 관료들의 대응 -

In 1940, when France surrendered in Germany and the transition of World War II was greatly changed, the Japanese government tried to contributes to the victory of the German war through the Tripartite Pact, and to establish dominance to the whole East Asian region. The most important challenge for this was the solution of the Sino-Japanese War. Japan tried to keep Japan-China Basic Relations Treaty, and wanted to maintain political and economic dominance in the China continent after the end of the Sino-Japanese War. Meanwhile, the US government cooperated with the British, engaged in European battlefield to respond to the threat of Germany in the Atlantic Ocean, and they established a war plan to defeat Germany. In addition to Germany, the United States was prepared for the attacks of Japan, and established concurrent war performance plans over the Atlantic and Pacific, and shared it with the UK.<BR> Japan-US relationships were deteriorated by Tripartite Pact, a Military Alliance for the purpose of attack America, and America’s selecting the support for China and the strengthening of economic sanctions against Japan. In such a situation, American and Japanese people who have felt a sense of crisis are promoted between the intergovernmental dialogue for the Japan and US, and such efforts made US-Japan appreciation document established and Japan-US negotiations start. The John Doe Associates, a semi-official and a semi-civillian organization wrote US-Japan appreciation document. It shows that Japan will reduce the possibility of attacking US by she interprets Triparite Pack more generously. In order to solve the Sino-Japanese war problem, the US Government will promise to cooperate Japanese government, so she can maintain paramount status in the continental China. Most of the Japanese government officials were satisfied with the document, but the Matsuoka Yosuke Foreign Minister, who thought the Tripartite Pact is critical for Japan’s future, denied this ‘give-and-take’ proposal.<BR> Meanwhile, the bureaucrats in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, thought that the expansion of Japan

When the medium is war: Marshall McLuhan, media, and militarisation

ABSTRACT This essay explores Marshall McLuhan’s argument in War and Peace in the Global Village that ‘the first television war’ of Vietnam was staged in a new technological ‘medium’ that reduced viewers’ capacity for critical distance, blurred divisions between civilians and soldiers, undercutting the war’s domestic legitimacy and painfully shattering the ‘old image’ of national identity. Considering postcolonial critiques of McLuhan’s reliance on ethnopsychiatrist, J.C. Carothers, I explore the critical potential of his textual citations of Fanon, Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, J.K. Galbraith, and the satirical hoax, Report from Iron Mountain, and of Quentin Fiore’s graphic designs. Extending McLuhan’s arguments to the US military’s 2003 Iraq war media embedding programme, I argue that although they sought to avoid the uncontrolled media reporting of Vietnam, the war planners were nevertheless subject to the same destabilising ‘invisible environments of technological innovation’. McLuhan’s discussion of the ways technological innovation destabilises identities and promotes a violent quest to recover ‘old images’ of personal and national identity thus suggests that post-Vietnam war planners may have drastically overestimated the power of metaphorical and narrative framing when applied to media spectacle of war.

Going Nuclear, but How? The Netherlands Army and Tactical Nuclear Warfare in Europe, 1953–1968

Abstract In the historiography of nuclear arms in the Cold War the political and military strategic levels are dominant; little attention has been paid to the sub-strategic levels. This is understandable, because most archival material has been destroyed or is still classified. However, it is also remarkable because tactical nuclear weapons (tnw) were a crucial element in nato strategies and because all nato forces had to prepare, down to the lowest levels, to fight a war by nuclear means. Based on previously unused archives, this article analyses how the Dutch army, as an army of a small nato-member state, adapted step by step to the nuclearisation of land warfare in the period 1953 to 1968. Which role were the tnw s assigned in the war plans? But also, how realistic would these plans have been, given the influence of (inter)national political developments, moral and psychological aspects, and military-technical and military-tactical issues?

The Ten Aporias of Our Time. The Theory and Practice of Nuclear Deterrence

Rising international tensions and the risks of sliding towards a nuclear conflict in the face of the erosion of the arms control system between Russia and the West is becoming an essential subject of modern political discourse. In particular, the author investigates the psychological aspects of deterrence, the dichotomy of its functions of preventing and conducting nuclear war, the concepts of first and retaliatory strike, the dialectics of defense and offence, and plans for limited nuclear war, the effect of the entanglement of nuclear and conventional weapons.

The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine

Abstract In 2013, the U.S. government announced that its nuclear war plans would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” and would “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” If properly applied, these legal principles can have a profound impact on U.S. nuclear doctrine. The prohibition against targeting civilians means that “countervalue” targeting and “minimum deterrence” strategies are illegal. The principle of distinction and the impermissibility of reprisal against civilians make it illegal for the United States, contrary to what is implied in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, to intentionally target civilians even in reprisal for a strike against U.S. or allied civilians. The principle of proportionality permits some, but not all, potential U.S. counterforce nuclear attacks against military targets. The precautionary principle means that the United States must use conventional weapons or the lowest-yield nuclear weapons that would be effective against legitimate military targets. The law of armed conflict also restricts targeting of an enemy's leadership to officials in the military chain of command or directly participating in hostilities, meaning that broad targeting to destroy an enemy's entire political leadership is unlawful.

An Ottoman Staff Officer in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905): General Pertev Bey’s Impressions and Evaluations

In this paper, I discuss the influence of Japan’s military westernization on Ottoman conceptions of East-West relations, Westernization, and military reform, from the perspective of an Ottoman staff officer. Colonel (later General) Pertev (Demirhan) Bey visited Japan and the battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War as a military observer between 1904-1905. His experience on the battlefield dramatically influenced his way of thinking. In the successful Japanese example of military modernization, as he saw it in action against Russia, and found the answers to the long debate among Ottomans about the path for modernization in the face of threats from Western powers. He saw the Ottoman Empire and Japan as sharing many commonalities. Both faced a threat from Western modern states and their militaries. In reaction, elites and decision makers in both nations had sought to adopt Western practices, doctrines, institutions, science, knowledge, and cultural elements in order to reach the level of their threatening contemporaries. The Japanese military victory validated in the eyes of Pertev Bey, and many of his Ottoman contemporaries, the Japanese method of modernization. Japan replaced the West as the model of modernization for him. This led him to pen a report and unsuccessfully champion the Japanese example of military reform to Sultan Abdülhamid II. When he was given decision making power during the First Balkan War, tasked with planning the war against the Balkan allies, his experience in Japan played a central role in the war plan he presented, which in turn determined the contours of the Ottoman experience in the war.

Meighen McCrae. Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918.

M<scp>eighen</scp> M<scp>c</scp>C<scp>rae</scp>. <i>Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918</i>.

Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918, by Meighen McCrae

Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918, by Meighen McCrae