War Of Spanish Succession Research Articles

The Failure of the Anglican-Prussian Ecumenical Effort of 1710–1714

In 1710 Archbishop John Sharp of York of the Church of England and Daniel Ernst Jablonski of Prussia began a dialogue hoping for the possible union of their respective churches. They wanted to bring about a junction of the Reformed and Lutheran churches in Prussia through the adoption of the Anglican liturgy and episcopal polity and an organic union between this Prussian church and the Church of England, perhaps including other Protestant churches as well. The progress of this effort surprised even the men most dedicated to it, and it appeared likely that they could forge an association within a short time. Yet, in the end these churchmen were disappointed and their negotiations came to naught. The reasons, however, were not religious in nature; indeed, there seemed to be no religious impediment to the effort at all. Although the ministers of both Queen Anne and King Frederick expressed interest in the discussions, political considerations relating to the English exertions to end the war of Spanish Succession led to the failure.

A Question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of Spanish Succession, 1701–1705

The War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714), one of the major international conflicts of the eighteenth century, sought to resolve the greatest diplomatic issue of the day: the partition of the Spanish empire. This essay focuses on the Austrian emperor Leopold I's diplomatic efforts in the courts of the Maritime Powers to obtain the Spanish inheritance during the first years of that conflict. The early years of the war (between 1701 and 1705) were a formative period in the development of Habsburg foreign policy. The problems that plagued the Maritime Powers after Leopold's death in 1705, such as the disputes over the deployment of troops, the differences of opinion over precisely how the Spanish empire should be divided and the policy to be followed in dealing with the Hungarian rebels and the elector of Bavaria, and the questions that arose over the alliances with Portugal and Savoy were all either existing or anticipated during the latter years of his reign.

The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine

The huge literature on guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare published in the nineteen fifties and sixties was based almost entirely on the assumption that this phenomenon constituted a revolution in modern strategy. While it is perfectly correct that 'small war', partisan and guerrilla warfare had fallen into disregard in most industrial countries, it has, in fact, existed for a very long time; guerrilla fighting, for obvious reasons, predates warfare between regular armies.1 It has been argued that the history of guerrilla warfare begins with the Spanish insurrection against Napoleon since the partisans of previous ages were not politically inspired. But it cannot really be seriously maintained that the age of people's wars, of wars of 'national liberation' and of 'wars of opinion' begins in 1808, even if such wars had almost been forgotten in the eighteenth century. The present paper, part of a larger study on the history of guerrilla warfare, deals with the concepts of the theorists of small war between roughly 1750 and 1900, and their views on the utility and the limitations of partisan warfare. To regard these military thinkers as the precursors of modern guerrilla warfare is claiming both too much and too little. Too much, because only a few of them were concerned with the political implications of guerrilla warfare; too little, because from a 'technical' point of view they anticipated most present-day tactics and to regard them as mere forerunners is to belittle their part. The theory of small warfare (petite guerre) has its origins in the seventeenth century, being mainly based on the experience of the Thirty Years War, which, perhaps more than any other, had been a 'war without fronts', the Spanish War of Succession and the Wars of Frederick the Great. These early writings deal with the scope of the activities of relatively small detachments. The American War of Inde-

The Royal Navy's quest for pitch and tar during the reign of Queen Anne

Abstract The search for ship timber to meet the ever growing demands of the maritime European powers in the eighteenth century was accompanied by equally vigorous efforts to secure sufficient supplies of the preservative elements necessary for building and maintaining ships, pitch and tar. Average annual import of these two commodities into English ports rose from around 30,000 barrels at the beginning of the century to exceed 100,000 barrels on the eve of the American War of Independence.1 The major customer for pitch and tar was the Navy; during the War of Spanish Succession, the Navy's average annual demand was about twelve to fourteen thousand barrels, between one quarter to one third of the total volume of imports of pitch and tar.2 The body responsible for securing contracts for naval stores was the Navy Board, a permanent committee directly subordinate to the Admiralty. This present article is the result of detailed study of the minutes and records of the Navy Board during the crucial years 1700-1718, and seeks to utilise these and other documents in an examination of the problems faced by the Navy, and ultimately the government, at a time when intensive warfare in the seas of Northern Europe disrupted supplies of pitch and tar-already affected by the trade policies of the major supplier-and compelled the government to take action to ensure the adequate future provision of such supplies for the navy.

Subir para no bajar. Adaptación política y representación social de la nobleza urbana castellana (Murcia, 1665-1724)

Este artículo analiza algunas de las respuestas que la nobleza urbana castellana ofreció ante procesos de movilidad social durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVII. El descenso relativo de capital simbólico fue compensado, especialmente durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVII y la Guerra de Sucesión, con una reactivación del servicio real. Esto conllevó, en algunas ocasiones, una adaptación política -integración en el aparato administrativo de la Corona- y un incremento de la dignidad social -concesión de títulos nobiliarios-. El ejemplo de los Fontes de Albornoz, un linaje que se había convertido en un poder influyente en el conjunto del reino de Murcia, nos servirá para observar las motivaciones que llevaron a una reconstrucción sociopolítica de algunas elites provinciales de la Corona de Castilla.

The Diplomacy of Dr. John Robinson at the Court of Charles XII of Sweden, 1697–1709

IT is not possible to study the diplomacy of the war of the Spanish Succession without taking into account the Northern war which threatened in 1707 to upset the whole strategy of the Grand Allies. Ever since the formation of the League of Augsburg France had tried to win Sweden to her side, and the apparent military genius of Charles XII made her an even more desirable ally. Sweden might have seen much to recommend such an alliance, particularly in 1707 when Swedish disputes with the Empire took on a new importance, and when the prestige of the Grand Allies had suffered by the defeat at Almanza and the failure of the Toulon expedition. But this turning-point in the Spanish Succession war came and passed, Charles XII turned eastwards against Russia and disputes with the Empire ended in agreement. Never again were the two separate wars in danger of becoming one.

III. Archbishop Wake and the Whig Party: 1716–23. A study in Incompatibility of Temperament

In ‘The Sentiments of a Church of England Man’, written in 1708, Swift offered to the whig party (then entering into power thanks to the exigencies of the Spanish Succession war) a piece of advice which they would have been well advised to regard despite the suspected allegiance of the writer.

The Spanish Succession War in Spain with Special Reference to the British Action

(1909). The Spanish Succession War in Spain with Special Reference to the British Action. Royal United Services Institution. Journal: Vol. 53, No. 381, pp. 1444-1453.

<italic>Gustavus Adolphus: A History of the Art of War from its Revival after the Middle Ages to the End of the Spanish Succession War, with a Detailed Account of the Most Famous Campaigns of Turenne, Condé, Eugene, and Marlborough</italic>. By <sc>Theodore Ayrault Dodge</sc>, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel United States Army, retired list. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1895. Pp.

Gustavus Adolphus: A History of the Art of War from its Revival after the Middle Ages to the End of the Spanish Succession War, with a Detailed Account of the Most Famous Campaigns of Turenne, Condé, Eugene, and Marlborough. By Theodore Ayrault Dodge, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel United States Army, retired list. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1895. Pp. xxiii, 864.) Get access Gustavus Adolphus: A History of the Art of War from its Revival after the Middle Ages to the End of the Spanish Succession War, with a detailed Account of the most famous Campaigns of Turenne, Condé Eugene, and Marlborough. By Dodge Theodore Ayrault, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel United States Army, retired list. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1895. Pp. xxiii, 864.) John Bigelow, Jr. John Bigelow, Jr. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 1, Issue 2, January 1896, Pages 331–335, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/1.2.331 Published: 01 January 1896

Gustavus Adolphus: A History of the Art of War from its Revival after the Middle Ages to the End of the Spanish Succession War, with a Detailed Account of the Most Famous Campaigns of Turenne, Conde, Eugene, and Marlborough

Gustavus Adolphus: A History of the Art of War from its Revival after the Middle Ages to the End of the Spanish Succession War, with a Detailed Account of the Most Famous Campaigns of Turenne, Conde, Eugene, and Marlborough