War Cabinet Research Articles

Israel: Political Developments and Data in 2023

AbstractIn 2023, Israel experienced a year marked by profound civic and security turmoil. The government's proposed judicial reform triggered widespread protests, highlighting deep divisions within the nation. Concurrently, escalating security threats emerged, with Hamas launching an unprecedented attack from the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah targeting Israel's northern border. These events led to the formation of an emergency government and a special war Cabinet. Despite the challenging circumstances, Israel's economic performance remained relatively stable until the onset of conflict, which led to negative economic impacts. The year saw significant amendments to the Israeli Basic Laws, aimed at reducing judicial oversight over government actions, which further intensified civic unrest. This article provides an overview of the political, security, and economic developments of 2023.

Common/wealth: Contested commons and proleptic critique

In May 1917, two South African feminist friends and critics of empire then in London sent a telegram to Field Marshal Jan Smuts, the Union of South Africa’s Defence Minister and delegate to the Imperial War Cabinet, in response to his early proposal for a Commonwealth of Nations. It read simply: “Your speech was fine”. Whether intended sincerely (as in “very fine”) or as faint praise (“fine as far as it goes, but”) is not known, but the ambiguity is fitting for an association and description with such contested associations – and one that, by some accounts, originated in the colonies (from an idea proposed by Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and South Africa’s then-Prime Minister J. B. M. Hertzog). It is fitting, too, that one of the cable’s authors was Olive Schreiner (1855-1920), leading novelist of the “New Woman”, advocate of sex equality, and clear-sighted critic of empire’s presumptions, rapacious designs, and gendered and ethnic biases, as well as of the race politics taking shape in South Africa at the start of the twentieth century. Even as we read Schreiner’s work today with an eye to its own prejudices and contradictions, this essay contends that it is worth considering the value of the proleptic critique it embodies for an understanding of the ongoing limitations — but also use-value — of the term “Commonwealth”, as well as of any term that might replace it. The outlines of Schreiner’s critique suggest that the term might yet encode a counter-ideal that points to an ongoing latent potential for the common to be reactivated as promise of a more equal and just division of empire’s spoils.

Discussion of the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia in the House of Commons of Great Britain on March 14, 1918 as an event of the British policy of intervention in Russia

The subject of this study is the discussion on March 14, 1918 in the House of Commons of Great Britain of the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia as the events of the British intervention in Russia. In this regard, the speeches of deputies from various political forces and a high-ranking official of the Military Cabinet of the United Kingdom in the lower house of parliament are disclosed and analyzed. Thanks to the content analysis method and the system method, not only the positions and arguments of the participants in the discussion are presented in detail, but also the connection of their speeches with the military-political and international situation that developed in March 1918 and which influenced the dynamics of the discussion is revealed. The scientific novelty is that for the first time in the historiography of the Civil War and foreign intervention in Russia, a meeting of the lower house of Great Britain on the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia is considered in the context of the history of British intervention policy in Russia and the significance of this event for this policy. The main conclusions of the study are that, despite the lack of a unified position in the House of Commons on the issue of Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia, the War Cabinet has caught the trend in favor of Japanese intervention in these Russian regions. As a result, he cautiously began to build a policy of intervention against Russia and to determine the place of Japanese intervention in it. Only large-scale events could force the House of Commons to adopt the policy that the Cabinet considered necessary to pursue in the current circumstances.

The first year of the Pacific War. Prospects of the Belligerents

The article provides a military-historical analysis of the development of events at the initial stage of the War in the Pacific and in East Asia from Japan's attack on the United States to the Battle of Guadalcanal inclusive. The authors aim to answer the question whether the US victory was an accident caused by strategic mistakes of the Japanese command, or whether it was an inevitable pattern. In the work, the authors also try to find out what was the role of the mobilizations in USA and Japan in the first year of the Pacific War in the development of relevant events. The article discusses strategies, in connection with which the authors come to the conclusion that there was no unity among the representatives of the highest military leadership of the Japanese Empire in matters of the directions of the offensives carried out by the imperial armed forces. The authors show the connection between the peculiarities of the mobilization of the armed forces of Japan, USA and Great Britain and the development of events at the initial stage of the War in the Pacific. It is emphasized that the Soviet factor and the resulting expenditure of resources on building up the offensive potential of the Kwantung Army, which absorbed the most prepared ground units, had a negative impact on the long-term plans of the Japanese armed forces. The authors assign great importance to the Battle for Guadalcanal, which due to the diversion of Japan's transport tonnage had a serious impact on the course of the entire Second World War in Asia. The authors pay much attention to the issue of the offensive of Japanese troops in Burma in early 1942 and the prospects of the Japanese invasion of India, they believe that the Japanese high command made a major strategic mistake by refusing to further advance in the western direction. On the other hand, the authors consider the defeat of the British in Burma as a result of the mistakes of the British War Cabinet and the peculiarities of the mobilization of human potential in the British Empire. The authors conclude that the Japanese Empire had a chance of winning the War in the Pacific in 1942.

Операция «Браслет»: британский полковник Э. Джейкоб о визите У. Черчилля в Москву в августе 1942 г.

The article presents the first Russian publication of a part of the diary of Edward Jacob devoted to the visit of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Moscow and to his talks with the leader of the USSR Joseph Stalin in August 1942. This visit was of a great importance for establishing personal contact between the leaders of two countries, which was necessary for the Allies’ cooperation during World War II. The subject of the research is diary of Edward Jacob (1899-1993), who was Military Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet in 1939-46. The document is stored in the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge in personal collection of Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Ian Claude Jacob. Publication of the documents in Russian is being made for the first time; it is justified by the necessity of advanced study of the Soviet-British relations and their influence on the course of World War II. This source contains an original version of events perception by their immediate participant, as reflected in diary records. The major method of research is content analysis of the diary, which makes it possible to detail events connected with Churchill’s visit, to reconstruct the image of Stalin, his environment, common Russian people, and day-to-day life in Russia and in Kremlin in perceptions of a foreigner, the British officer. Jacob’s diary contains original travel notes on his flight over the territory of the USSR, meetings and talks between Churchill and Stalin. Jacob also compiled brief summaries of information, in particular, on Churchill’s arrival to Moscow and the course of his talks with Stalin, which the author of the diary didn’t witness personally. Analysis of the diary text shows that he received his information directly from Churchill, and his interpretation of events is colored by emotional perceptions of the Prime Minister. W. Churchill considered personal contact with J. V. Stalin absolutely necessary for mutual actions during the war. Description of the banquet procedure in Kremlin, also reflected in other national and foreign sources (records of talks from both sides, memoirs of W. A. Harriman, A. Cadogan, etc.), makes it possible to reconstruct “Stalin’s court etiquette” and observations on Stalin’s personality in the perceptions of the diary’s author, distinct from the contents of other sources. Study of Jacob’s diary leads to the conclusion that, despite serious contradictions, which had appeared initially between the two leaders, the contact was re-established in the meetings on August, 14-16, and the change of interpreters helped. The work is of an interest for researchers studying the history of international relations and anti-Hitler coalition, as well as for all interested in the events of World War II.

Distortion, Illusion and Transformation: the Evolution of Dazzle Painting, a Camouflage System to Protect Allied Shipping from Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, 1917–1918

Brak

Canada and the Imperial War Cabinet

Canada and the Imperial War Cabinet

MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND POLAND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR THROUGH THE PRYSM OF THE WAR CABINET ACTIVITY (BASED ON THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE BRITISH NATIONAL ARCHIVES)

The article reveals mutual relationships between Great Britain and Poland on the verge of the Second World War based on the British National Archives documents. The authors acknowledge principles of the British foreign policy towards Poland and the activity of its diplomatic corps along with the War Cabinet. The paper determines that diplomatic and military-political relations between Great Britain and Poland have been multidimensional with deep historical roots.
 The article represents the analysis of the main misunderstandings and challenges that determined British-Polish relations before and at the beginning of the Second World War. Sequentially, the British position and interest regarding the establishment of the strategic military partnership with Poland are shown. The authors examined British-Polish agreements that were signed during the spring-summer period of 1939 in order to designate the nature of the negotiation process between the states.
 The publication also reveals the reasons for a weak practical element of the negotiation process, emphasising the difficulties concerning the Royal force on the European continent deployed on the Polish border. Also, the authors analyse scenarios of the counteractions towards the aggressive steps of Germany and search for the mechanisms of the aggression deterrence considering different dynamics of the events. It is stated that along with the British influence regarding the situation in Poland, either France took an active part in the decision-making process.
 Based on the documents from the British National Archives, the authors established that diplomatic commentaries and reports written by ambassadors and state officials with regards to German actions on the Polish territories on the verge of the Second World War. Emphasising the cruel legacy of the Nazi regime, the rapid nature of German army attacks and brutal treatment towards the Polish population in the first days of September 1939 are described.
 The authors concluded that actions of the British political and military circuits concerning aid to Poland at the start of the Second World War seem to have been inconsistent, unconfident and did not bring strategic effect.
 After the Nazi occupation of Poland, British authorities had to change their approaches to the realisation of British-Polish relations. London accepted the idea of recognition of Polish emigrated government officials headed by V. Sikorsky, providing them with substantial empowerment to the Non-Aligned Movement.

Interés geoestratégico de las Islas Baleares y actividades de reconocimiento aéreo de la Royal Air Force (1941-1944)

La localización geoestratégica de las Baleares en el centro de la cuenca occidental del Mediterráneo, y su utilidad como base naval y aérea, ayudó a que las islas fueron observadas y vigiladas por las fuerzas del eje y los aliados durante la segunda guerra mundial. Desde octubre de 1941 hasta marzo de 1944 las Baleares fueron objeto de un minucioso seguimiento a través de las fotografías aéreas verticales realizadas por vuelos de reconocimiento de las fuerzas aéreas británicas que salían desde Gibraltar. Estas fotografías eran utilizadas para realizar informes al gabinete de guerra sobre la situación en los puertos y aeródromos de las islas. Además, las diversas imágenes fotográficas, que tenían un grado de resolución muy elevado, fueron utilizadas en los informes especiales de interpretación para cada isla. Estos estudios técnicos de fotointerpretación realizan un análisis territorial exhaustivo, idóneo para una eventual ocupación militar. Las fotografías aéreas descubiertas son de gran interés, porque, mediante la georeferenciación, hacen posible los estudios geomorfológicos, biogeográficos, de usos del suelo, de cultivos, de la red viaria, de las infraestructuras, de la evolución urbana, o, incluso, de las primeras instalaciones turísticas a principios de los años 40 del siglo pasado.

Участие Канады в деятельности имперских военных органов в годы Первой мировой войны

Introduction. The paper is devoted to the participation of Canada in the creation and activities of the Imperial War Cabinet and two Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918 to explain the evolution of the foreign and political status of Canada as a part of the British Empire after the end of the War. Methods and materials. The paper is based on the British and Canadian Parliamentary Debates, Reports, Minutes of Proceedings and Meetings of the Imperial War Conferences 1917/1918 and the Imperial War Cabinet. To study them, it uses the method of historical criticism of sources. The author also uses the historical-genetic, comparative and the narrative methods to investigate the causes, the process of creating and activities of imperial military bodies for the unified management of the war. Analysis. The paper analyzes the reasons for the creation of imperial military organizations in the British Empire during the war. It reveals the organizational and functional differences between the two imperial military bodies: Cabinet and Conference. The author studies the activities of imperial military bodies during the war in detail, determines the role of the Canadian delegation in this process. The article analyzes the decisions of the imperial military bodies, reveals their domestic and foreign policy consequences for Dominion of Canada. Results. Canada’s active participation in the creation and activities of the imperial military bodies during the First World War was one of the factors in the transformation of the Empire into the Commonwealth of Nations, the formation of its own national identity, political and foreign independence within the Empire.

РЕАКЦИЯ В ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВЕ И ПАРЛАМЕНТЕ ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ НА СОВЕТСКО-ЭСТОНСКИЕ МИРНЫЕ ПЕРЕГОВОРЫ В 1919–1920 ГГ.

The article focuses on the contradictions in the British regarding the continuation of military operations against the Soviet Republic at the end of 1919 and the participation of Estonia in the White struggle. Documents of British archives, and transcripts of proceedings of Parliament shows that after a series of military setbacks of the White forces, and the failure of formation with the direct pressure from the British military advisers of the government of the North-West Russia to create anti-Bolshevik coalition under the political control of the British commissioners in the Baltic countries, the mood in Parliament and the War Cabinet of Britain has changed. Speeches of liberal members of Parliament at the meetings of 1919-1920, note that the issue of concluding a Bolshevik-Estonian peace Treaty has become positively evaluated in wide circles of British society. Criticism of the «militarism» of the government became particularly acute after the peace of Tartu in January 1920, and the firmness of the Estonian government, which had making peace, was welcomed by a number of deputies. Minutes of meetings of the British Imperial War Cabinet and documents of the War Council also shows a shift from the policy of active involvement of the Baltic countries in the anti-Bolshevik struggle to recognition of the failure of this struggle and the impossibility of its revival by spending the financial and material resources, which were strongly necessary to solve other problems that arose in the British government after the end of the First world war.

소련·핀란드 겨울전쟁과 영국의 정책

Before the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War on 30 November 1939, the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office argued positively the intervention of the Finnish problem. Though the Northern Department estimated that the Finnish intransigence towards the Soviet Union was folly, it inspired Finnish resistance for British national interest. Besides on 28 November, Churchill suggested to the War Cabinet the torpedo of the Russian ice-breaker. The French Prime Minister Daladier held the initiative in Allied policy towards Finland by Finnish strong resistance and expelling the Soviet Union from the League of Nations on 14 December. The Geneva resolution of the League of Nations intensified the British intervention towards the Soviet-Finnish War. In these circumstances. the British Chiefs of Staff that have opposed the intervention towards Finland before the Winter War endorsed the Scandinavian expedition at the cost of war with the Soviet Union by the end of December. Ironside influenced strongly a change of attitude of the Chiefs of Staff. But the influence of Churchill and Daladier was decisive. In the course of the development of British anti-Soviet intervention plans, Ling’s Report in the middle of January was the turning point of British intervention policy towards Finland. The middle of January thus must be regarded as the turning-point of the Winter War. The War Cabinet began to regard the assistance to Finland as an end. Furthermore, Daladier that suggested a plan of an expedition to Petsamo argued to expand the anti-Soviet front through an attack on Baku and Batum. Also, Churchill argued the strong anti-Soviet line through the speech of the light of freedom on 20 January. Thus by late January Churchill and Daladier began to see the Soviet Union as the main enemy. In the circumstances of the reinforcement of British intervention, on 29 January 1940, the Soviet Union responded to the peace fellers of the Ryti-Tanner government. In particular, on 12 February the Mannerheim Line was broken for the first time in the war. As a result, the Finnish military situation was aggravated severely. In the face of aggravated military situation and Finnish peace feelers, the Supreme War Council decided to send the allied regular army on 5 February. After this decision, in view of the comprehensive anti- Soviet plan Churchill pursued the military intervention to Finland at the risk of the war with the Soviet Union. Even Churchill suggested the military operation in Baku and the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, the appeasers of France argued to change the declared but unfought war with Germany into an undeclared but fighting against the Soviet Union. But on 29 February the Finnish government accepted in principle the peace terms of the Soviet Union. In the face of this situation, Churchill and Daladier tried to coerce the appeal of the aid of Finland through a threat of aid in order to prevent the termination of the Winter War. (Korea University / kssgh@hanmail.net)

КОНТРОЛЬ НАД ТРАНССИБИРСКОЙ ЖЕЛЕЗНОЙ ДОРОГОЙ КАК МОТИВ УЧАСТИЯ БРИТАНИИ В СОЮЗНОЙ ИНТЕРВЕНЦИИ НА ДАЛЬНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ И В СИБИРИ В 1917–1919 гг. И ЕЕ РОЛЬ В ЭТОЙ ОПЕРАЦИИ (НА ОСНОВЕ МЕМОРАНДУМА ДЖ.Н. КЕРЗОНА «СИБИРЬ» ОТ 20 ДЕКАБРЯ 1919 г.)

The article deals with the problem of control provision over the Trans-Siberian Railway as a motive for Britain’s participation in an Allied intervention in the Far East and Siberia and evaluates its role in this operation. The work is based on the facts and judgments contained in the memorandum “Siberia” by George Nathaniel Curzon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated December 20, 1919. The memorandum has not been previously described and researched in the domestic historiography. Besides the text of the memorandum, the source base includes the minutes of the meetings of the British War Cabinet, the memories of W. Graves, the commander of the American expeditionary force, and of J. Ward, the chief of the British expeditionary detachment, and some other sources of personal origin. Works by N.E. Bystrova, F.D. Volkova, R. Ullman, A.I. Utkin, N.A. Halfin and other researchers were also used. The main research methods were comparative and narrative. The comparative method made it possible to compare the memorandum with some other documents from the National Archives of the United Kingdom, as well as with the sources of personal origin important for the research topic, and confirm its analytical, resumptive nature. Since some of the documents, including the memorandum “Siberia”, have not been previously investigated and described in the domestic historiography, the narrative method was widely used in the study. First, the author examines the main issues: Curzon’s approaches to the Eastern policy of Britain; Russia’s place in the British Eastern policy; control over globally important railways as an element of Britain’s Eastern policy. Then the author reviews the provisions of the memorandum relating to the Trans-Siberian Railway and the motives for Britain’s participation in the intervention in the Far East and Siberia, as well as the data on the participation of the United States, Japan, and Britain in the operation, and, on this basis, investigates the specificity, forms of participation and role of Britain in the intervention in these regions. The author concludes that, in fact, Britain became the main political driving force that led to the Allied intervention in the Far East and Siberia. The active position of Britain regarding the intervention in the Far East and Siberia was based on the tasks to oppose Germany during the war and at the same time to form and maintain Britain’s long-term Eastern policy under the new conditions. The control over the Trans-Siberian Railway could be an effective instrument to overcome these challenges. A possibility to participate in the allied control over the Trans-Siberian Railway was a weighty motive for Britain to intervene in Eastern Russia. Its role in the operation was political and pragmatic.

«Новая дипломатия» Д. Ллойд Джорджа на путях от войны к миру, 1916-1922 гг.: проблема современной интерпретации

В статье предпринимается попытка в качестве основного предмета переосмыслить британскую внешнюю политику в период пребывания у власти военного кабинета и коалиционного правительства Д. Ллойд Джорджа (1916-1922 гг.) на основе концепта «публичной («новой») дипломатии». Автор исследует международно-политические изменения и перемены в состоянии общественного мнения как в Британии, так и по всему миру, наметившиеся к концу Первой мировой войны, в также их влияние на Дэвида Ллойд Джорджа, складывание его особого политического стиля и предпочтений в пользу персональной дипломатии встреч и переговоров. В силу междисциплинарного характера исследования были использованы методы как исторического, так и политического анализа. Представлены различные точки зрения современных зарубежных историков на стиль политического лидерства и внешнюю политику Ллойд Джорджа и на основе их сопоставления сформулирована новая версия истоков публичной дипломатии. Что касается конкретной проблемы, то Ллойд Джордж, обращаясь к широкой аудитории в стране и за рубежом, умело формировал благоприятное для Великобритании общественное мнение и обеспечивал продвижение британских интересов. В результате оценки достижений и просчетов британского премьера исследователь приходит к заключению о значительном вкладе британской политической элиты в становление как публичной дипломатии, так и современной политической культуры в целом.

Changes in the policy of rendering British aid to the White Forces of Siberia and Southern Russia in July 1919 and their causes (based on the meeting protocol of the War Cabinet of July 25, 1919)

The object of this research is the changes in the policy of rendering British aid to the White Forces of Siberia and Southern Russia in July 1919 and their causes. The subject of this research is the information on these matters, contained in the meeting protocol of the British War Cabinet of July 25, 1919 and related decision. Within the framework of the question “Situation in Russia”, were comprehensively discussed the reasonableness and possibilities of rendering British aid to A. V. Kolchak’s army in Siberia and A. I. Denikin’s army in Southern Russia. The author applies narrative method of research for description of documents that have not been previously introduced into the scientific discourse by the Russian scholars. The comparative method is used for correlation of data collected from various sources. The scientific novelty consists in the comprehensive examination of the claimed topic based on the meeting protocol of the War Cabinet of July 25, 1919, as well as other newly introduced documents from the United Kingdom National Archive. The author comes to the conclusion that the escalation of social tension in British society, major defeats of A. V. Kolchak, successful offensive operations of A. I. Denikin, along with the lack of financial resources for supporting the White Forces on all fronts, led to curtailing of British aid to Kolchak’s army and increased support of Denikin’s army, since his military achievements at the moment theoretically allowed counting upon invasion of Moscow.  

Why Moral Theorizing Needs Real Cases: The Redirection of V‐Weapons during the Second World War

In 1944, the German Wehrmacht started terror bombing London. With the help of double agents that the British authorities had recruited among German spies, it would have been possible to deceive the enemy into redirecting his bombs away from Central London. This would likely have greatly reduced civilian casualties in Central London, while leading to a comparably smaller increase of civilian deaths in some areas of South London. While the British deception authorities were in favour of redirecting the bombs, the War Cabinet's Ministers were opposed. In this paper, I investigate whether the Ministers had moral reason for their qualms. I argue that they did, as redirecting the bombs meant showing an unequal concern for the safety of dierent parts of the population. I suggest that all things considered, redirecting the bombs could nevertheless have formed part of a morally optimal response to the terror bombings. My discussion draws on insights from the moral philosophical literature that makes extensive use of hypothetical cases. Critics of this literature worry that its method renders its insights practically irrelevant. My paper suggests that this worry is exaggerated, but not without merit. The historical case that I discuss is not easily resolved using ideas from the case-based literature, but such ideas still help illuminate the decision the British authorities faced.

Technical considerations on the Takoradi–Cairo air route of the Second World War

This paper describes an initiative of the British War Cabinet to procure thousands of aircraft to Egypt during the crucial, central years of the Second World War. The aircraft were sent crated by cargo ships to Takoradi, in the Gold Coast (current Ghana), assembled at an on-purpose facility there, and flown over Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Egypt to the Nile Delta, where appropriate Maintenance Units would deliver them later to fighting squadrons. More than 5000 airplanes were dispatched in this way from British harbors, arriving into the Cairo area just a few weeks later. Most aircraft flown in this trans-African route were fighters, which required fully loaded external drop tanks to cover the longest stages, commonly against prevailing trade winds. The convoys were typically formed by a light bomber, as lead aircraft, and six to eight fighters. The aerodynamic characteristics of the fighters have been modelled with first level preliminary airplane design methods, to reconstruct its performances in the route. The results, in terms of range and cruise speed, agree very well with scarce data available from literature.

Stalin’s War Cabinet: ‘Normalisation’ and Political Dynamics of the Dictatorship

Amid the extensive literature on the Stalinist dictatorship during the 1930s and the postwar period, the gap in scholarship on the Soviet leadership during the war years is particularly noticeable. This article fills that gap. Stalin’s war cabinet is characterised according to several criteria: first, the formal status of members of the leadership; second, the system of delegating authority; third, the functioning and competency of the structure of collective leadership; and fourth, Stalin’s loyalty to his top associates and the degree of their political immunity. The article demonstrates that the war years saw a relative ‘normalisation’ of the dictatorship. These important changes influenced the subsequent development of the Stalinist system of power and the evolution of Soviet authoritarianism after the dictator’s death.

Moffat, Ian C. D. The Allied Intervention in Russia: The Diplomacy of Chaos (review)

SEER, 96, 2, APRIL 2018 376 Soviet Russia to reduce its support to the Reds and facilitated the German invasion which aided the Whites to victory in May 1918. Twilight of Europe is of high scholarly value and an important contribution to the history of international relations and revolutionary upheavals in East Central Europe at the end of First World War. Department of Philosophy, History, Culture Johannes Remy and Art Studies, University of Helsinki Moffat, Ian C. D. The Allied Intervention in Russia: The Diplomacy of Chaos. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2015. xiii + 317 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. £60.00. The literature on Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War has developed substantially in the century since that conflict took place. While Soviet historians attributed the intervention primarily to a desire to crush the Soviet state (something attributed from the 1930s to the West broadly, and from the 1950s to the USA specifically), classic Western studies of Allied policy in Russia placed the war against the central powers and the desperate need to reconstruct some sort of eastern front at the forefront of their explanations. More recent studies of national policies have complicated this picture. David Foglesong argued for a much deeper hostility to Bolshevism on the part of the American government, and Woodrow Wilson in particular, than has been previously acknowledged. In the case of France, Michael Carley has interrogated the combination of politics and pragmatism at play amongst different elements of the policy-making elite. There is still plenty of scope for reconsideration of the intervention as an international endeavour, and one that involved nongovernmental organizations and individuals, and ordinary soldiers, as well as statesmen and generals. Ian Moffat’s new history of the Allied intervention is a curious and in many ways frustrating addition to this literature. Moffat does not position his book in relation to this large and complex historiography, or indeed mention it, except to acknowledge a couple of books that he found particularly useful. One of these is Richard Ullman’s three-volume history of Anglo-Soviet relations, still a seminal text on Britain and the intervention despite being written in the 1960s and ’70s and without access to many British official documents. Moffat’s book might have been pitched as an update to this classic work, in that it offers a close, archivally-based account of British decision-making in the period of the intervention. It does not draw directly on British archives, but makes substantial use of British documents held in Canadian microfilm collections REVIEWS 377 and Canadian documents. The author had originally intended to write a history of the Canadian contribution, and the book includes some interesting insights into the relationship between Britain and Canada as illuminated by the intervention. The book’s claim to be a study of the Allied intervention as a whole is more problematic. No French documents are consulted, and only published American documents. The sections on France are short and rely heavily on Carley’s work. Major texts on the Japanese intervention (Frederick Dickinson’s history of Japan in the Great War, or Paul Dunscomb’s work on the period of intervention) are not cited at all. The anti-Bolshevik Russians rarely appear as partners or actors in the intervention. Sections of text that deal with events in Russia are dependent on a curious mix of official British documents and a couple of favoured texts (Richard Debo, Martin Kettle, George Kennan). This makes the narrative about many events, including the 1917 revolutions, difficult to recognize, but it also means that there is no engagement with key reference points in the historiography. A section on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that makes no mention of John Wheeler Bennett’s classic work on that subject is a case in point (there is also a new reassessment of Brest-Litovsk by Borislav Chernev, but this came out after the publication of Moffat’s book). A twopage account of the Provisional Government’s conduct of the war on pages 12–13 draws almost entirely on one book (Bruce Lincoln’s Passage Through Armageddon) plus British War Cabinet minutes. One of the principal motifs of the...

The Allied Intervention in Russia: The Diplomacy of Chaos

SEER, 96, 2, APRIL 2018 376 Soviet Russia to reduce its support to the Reds and facilitated the German invasion which aided the Whites to victory in May 1918. Twilight of Europe is of high scholarly value and an important contribution to the history of international relations and revolutionary upheavals in East Central Europe at the end of First World War. Department of Philosophy, History, Culture Johannes Remy and Art Studies, University of Helsinki Moffat, Ian C. D. The Allied Intervention in Russia: The Diplomacy of Chaos. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2015. xiii + 317 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. £60.00. The literature on Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War has developed substantially in the century since that conflict took place. While Soviet historians attributed the intervention primarily to a desire to crush the Soviet state (something attributed from the 1930s to the West broadly, and from the 1950s to the USA specifically), classic Western studies of Allied policy in Russia placed the war against the central powers and the desperate need to reconstruct some sort of eastern front at the forefront of their explanations. More recent studies of national policies have complicated this picture. David Foglesong argued for a much deeper hostility to Bolshevism on the part of the American government, and Woodrow Wilson in particular, than has been previously acknowledged. In the case of France, Michael Carley has interrogated the combination of politics and pragmatism at play amongst different elements of the policy-making elite. There is still plenty of scope for reconsideration of the intervention as an international endeavour, and one that involved nongovernmental organizations and individuals, and ordinary soldiers, as well as statesmen and generals. Ian Moffat’s new history of the Allied intervention is a curious and in many ways frustrating addition to this literature. Moffat does not position his book in relation to this large and complex historiography, or indeed mention it, except to acknowledge a couple of books that he found particularly useful. One of these is Richard Ullman’s three-volume history of Anglo-Soviet relations, still a seminal text on Britain and the intervention despite being written in the 1960s and ’70s and without access to many British official documents. Moffat’s book might have been pitched as an update to this classic work, in that it offers a close, archivally-based account of British decision-making in the period of the intervention. It does not draw directly on British archives, but makes substantial use of British documents held in Canadian microfilm collections REVIEWS 377 and Canadian documents. The author had originally intended to write a history of the Canadian contribution, and the book includes some interesting insights into the relationship between Britain and Canada as illuminated by the intervention. The book’s claim to be a study of the Allied intervention as a whole is more problematic. No French documents are consulted, and only published American documents. The sections on France are short and rely heavily on Carley’s work. Major texts on the Japanese intervention (Frederick Dickinson’s history of Japan in the Great War, or Paul Dunscomb’s work on the period of intervention) are not cited at all. The anti-Bolshevik Russians rarely appear as partners or actors in the intervention. Sections of text that deal with events in Russia are dependent on a curious mix of official British documents and a couple of favoured texts (Richard Debo, Martin Kettle, George Kennan). This makes the narrative about many events, including the 1917 revolutions, difficult to recognize, but it also means that there is no engagement with key reference points in the historiography. A section on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that makes no mention of John Wheeler Bennett’s classic work on that subject is a case in point (there is also a new reassessment of Brest-Litovsk by Borislav Chernev, but this came out after the publication of Moffat’s book). A twopage account of the Provisional Government’s conduct of the war on pages 12–13 draws almost entirely on one book (Bruce Lincoln’s Passage Through Armageddon) plus British War Cabinet minutes. One of the principal motifs of the...