Abstract

Before the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War on 30 November 1939, the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office argued positively the intervention of the Finnish problem. Though the Northern Department estimated that the Finnish intransigence towards the Soviet Union was folly, it inspired Finnish resistance for British national interest. Besides on 28 November, Churchill suggested to the War Cabinet the torpedo of the Russian ice-breaker. The French Prime Minister Daladier held the initiative in Allied policy towards Finland by Finnish strong resistance and expelling the Soviet Union from the League of Nations on 14 December. The Geneva resolution of the League of Nations intensified the British intervention towards the Soviet-Finnish War. In these circumstances. the British Chiefs of Staff that have opposed the intervention towards Finland before the Winter War endorsed the Scandinavian expedition at the cost of war with the Soviet Union by the end of December. Ironside influenced strongly a change of attitude of the Chiefs of Staff. But the influence of Churchill and Daladier was decisive. In the course of the development of British anti-Soviet intervention plans, Ling’s Report in the middle of January was the turning point of British intervention policy towards Finland. The middle of January thus must be regarded as the turning-point of the Winter War. The War Cabinet began to regard the assistance to Finland as an end. Furthermore, Daladier that suggested a plan of an expedition to Petsamo argued to expand the anti-Soviet front through an attack on Baku and Batum. Also, Churchill argued the strong anti-Soviet line through the speech of the light of freedom on 20 January. Thus by late January Churchill and Daladier began to see the Soviet Union as the main enemy. In the circumstances of the reinforcement of British intervention, on 29 January 1940, the Soviet Union responded to the peace fellers of the Ryti-Tanner government. In particular, on 12 February the Mannerheim Line was broken for the first time in the war. As a result, the Finnish military situation was aggravated severely. In the face of aggravated military situation and Finnish peace feelers, the Supreme War Council decided to send the allied regular army on 5 February. After this decision, in view of the comprehensive anti- Soviet plan Churchill pursued the military intervention to Finland at the risk of the war with the Soviet Union. Even Churchill suggested the military operation in Baku and the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, the appeasers of France argued to change the declared but unfought war with Germany into an undeclared but fighting against the Soviet Union. But on 29 February the Finnish government accepted in principle the peace terms of the Soviet Union. In the face of this situation, Churchill and Daladier tried to coerce the appeal of the aid of Finland through a threat of aid in order to prevent the termination of the Winter War. (Korea University / kssgh@hanmail.net)

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