Voter Information Research Articles

A new approach to measure tactical voting: evidence from the British elections

Although tactical voting attracts a great deal of attention, it is very hard to measure as it requires knowledge of both individuals’ voting choices as well as their unobserved preferences. In this article, we present a simple empirical strategy to nonparametrically identify tactical voting patterns directly from balloting results. This approach allows us to study the magnitude and direction of strategic voting as well as to verify which information voters and parties take into account to determine marginal constituencies. We show that tactical voting played a significant role in the 2010 election, mainly for Liberal–Democratic voters supporting Labour. Moreover, our results suggest that voters seem to form their expectations based on a national swing in vote shares rather than newspaper guides published in the main media outlets or previous election outcomes. We also present some evidence that suggests that campaign spending is not driving tactical voting.

Reelecting Corrupt Incumbents in Exchange for Public Goods: Rouba mas faz in Brazil

This article addresses the paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians. It explores why corrupt politicians are reelected, paying particular attention to incumbent provision of public goods and voter information on incumbent misconduct. Using a new data set on mayoral elections (2000 and 2004) in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, we specify econometric models to test the hypothesis that incumbents’ performance in delivering public goods might mitigate reputational losses. Our main empirical analysis suggests that (1) corruption decreases the probability of incumbent reelection, (2) public expenditure increases the probability of reelection, and (3) the negative marginal effect of corruption on reelection disappears as public expenditure increases.

Siła celebrytów w kampanii wyborczej

The article presents analysis of perceptions of electoral chances of celebrity candidates, and opinions about influence of celebrity endorsements on voters decisions among voters in the 2014 European Parliament elections and local elections in the same year in Poland.From 30% up to 50% of electorates of all except one party agree with the preposition that celebrities have bigger chances to win elections than traditional politicians. The only exception are voters of New Right of Janusz Korwin–Mikke. Up to 57% of electorates tend to agree with claims that celebrity endorsement have significant influence on voters decision. In this case neither party identification nor declared ideology is significant differentiator. These findings interpreted in terms of the low information rationality theory suggest that utilisation of celebrity in electoral campaings my serve as an important cue for a low information voters.

The causes of legal rents extraction: evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper analyzes the causes of legal political rent extraction by using a direct measure of it, namely, local top politicians’ wages. In particular, we investigate whether local politicians’ incentives to extract rents by setting their own wages are influenced by the degree of political competition and voter information. We use a sample of the largest Spanish municipalities over the years 2008–2010. The results indicate that weaker political competition and lesser voter information are related to more rent extraction. In an additional analysis, we show that higher wages do not ensure better financial management. These findings confirm that when politicians can set their own salaries, higher wages do not mean better management, but they are just political rents.

What’s information got to do with it? Third-party voting in plurality systems

Although strategic voting theory predicts that the number of parties will not exceed two in single-member district plurality systems, the observed number of parties often does. Previous research suggests that the reason why people vote for third parties is that they possess inaccurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning. However, research has yet to determine whether third-party voting persists under conditions of accurate information. In this article, we examine whether possessing accurate information prevents individuals from voting for third-placed parties in the 2005 and 2010 British elections. We find that possessing accurate information does not prevent most individuals from voting for third-placed parties and that many voters possess reasonably accurate information regarding the viability of the parties in their constituencies. These findings suggest that arguments emphasizing levels of voter information as a major explanation for why multiparty systems often emerge in plurality systems are exaggerated.

The Effects of Increased Campaign Finance Disclosure: Evaluating Reform Proposals

Campaign disclosure requirements vary considerably across the United States. In some states, it is difficult to learn much about outside group spending in non-federal elections; other states have recently passed disclosure laws that go beyond federal requirements. This study builds upon a growing body of research on the impact of anonymous spending to address two questions about campaign finance disclosure: what types of disclosure information voters pay attention to and whether there are partisan differences in responsiveness to campaign finance data. We address these questions via an experiment in which people are randomly assigned to receive additional information about the donors to an outside group. We find some evidence that campaign finance information affected candidate evaluations and vote choice, but that subjects’ evaluations were particularly sensitive to whether they were told that out-of-state donors were behind the outside group. Further, we find little evidence that partisan identification conditioned these treatment effects; Republicans, Democrats, and Independents responded to our experimental stimuli in much the same way.

Is Voter Competence Good for Voters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance

A long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence. This literature got its start arguing that voters' lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability. A more recent literature deepens the debate, with some authors claiming that voters effectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies, and other authors claiming that voters are insufficiently rational to do so. We argue that, regardless of its conclusions about voter competence, this literature’s single-minded focus on voter behavior is misguided. We use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the effect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians. When this strategic interaction is taken into account, increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes make democratic performance worse. One simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics affect the behavior of politicians.

LOCAL POLITICS AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND POLARIZATION

We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination with a new economic geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic reasons, whereas voter stratification occurs due to political preferences. When trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts.

Voter information and electoral outcomes: the Norwegian list of shame

This paper studies the effect on vote shares and reelection probability for the incumbent’s party from a signal indicating poor fiscal performance. In Norway, local governments with persistent deficits are placed in the Register for State Review and Approval of Financial Obligations (Robek). In addition to increased central government monitoring, placement in Robek triggers a great deal of attention in the local media. It is thus expected to raise voter awareness of the fiscal stance of the local government. The results indicate that voters value the information embedded in this signal, and take it into account when casting their votes. Both the share of votes for the incumbent’s party and the probability that the incumbent party stays in office is significantly reduced as a consequence of the local government being included in the register. The vote share for the incumbent is reduced by about three percentage points, while the reelection probability is reduced by about 0.12.

Incumbency Disadvantages in African Politics? Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Zambian Elections

Are incumbents disproportionately advantaged at the polls relative to non-incumbents in Africa’s emerging democracies? The prevailing wisdom characterizes African politics as predominantly ‘neopatrimonial’ and ‘semi-authoritarian’, whereby incumbents systematically manipulate the electoral process to their own advantage. In stark contrast to this perspective, this regression discontinuity study finds significant incumbency disadvantages in Zambia’s local government elections and no discernible incumbency advantages at the parliamentary level over the period 1991-2011. Furthermore, the strength of these disadvantages appears to be closely associated with higher levels of voter information, poorer economic conditions, and a structural shift in party competition. These results effectively expand the incumbency effects literature into the African context and offer an important contrast to the conventional wisdom on African politics.

GSM based electronic voting machine using touch screen

The Electronic voting machine plays a key role in elections. The major drawbacks like it needs more man power, time and mislead the voting scenario due to influence of local people. The proposed system overcome the above problems using biometric (FINGERPRINT), Touch screen based GLCD and GSM modules. Finger print authentication is used to identify the voter and display the voter information on graphical LCD. If the person is authenticated then the vote is issued and the polling process is done using the touch screen, else that denies the process. At every regular intervals of time the polled votes are transferred to the server through GSM module. The GSM module receives the polled votes and updates the database. At the end of voting session the server counts all the polled votes and display on LED module. This system gives an efficient way to conduct elections and display the results on the same day.

Ideology, Salience, and Complexity: Determinants of Policy Issue Incongruence between Voters and Parties

How come voters and their parties agree or disagree on policy issues? We claim that voter–party mismatches are due to a lack of information of voters regarding parties' positions. Three mechanisms determine levels of information: ideology, salience, and complexity. We test these ideas drawing on a large sample of policy statements (50) presented to voters and party leaders prior to regional elections in Belgium. Contrary to existing studies, we include predictors on all three levels: issue, voter, and party level. We find support for our claim. Major ideological divides such as the left–right divide yield useful information to the voters about where parties stand. Salience also generates information for voters, or makes information more accessible for voters, which decreases the odds that they have a different stance than their party. Our measures of complexity yielded the expected results too. When the task of voting is made more difficult, voters succeed less in voting for a party that matches their preferences.

Good News for People Who Love Bad News: Biased Media and Political Agency

A large literature asserts that biased media are harmful for democracy. Using a game-theoretic model, I evaluate the validity of this claim. I show that when political polarization is low (i.e., politicians have similar policy preferences), voter information and welfare is the same with two balanced biased media outlets as with an unbiased Press. When polarization is high (i.e., politicians have opposite policy preferences), voters are always less informed with biased news providers. Welfare, however, can be higher with two biased outlets than an unbiased Press. I demonstrate further that this result still holds after a merger between biased news organizations. Biased media can therefore be good for democracy.

Abstract ADV21: Improving quality of life for cancer patients and survivors.

Abstract ACS CAN combines the power of science with compelling personal stories, urging lawmakers to make cancer a national priority. We work to protect and increase public investment in medical research, inform voters, and improve nationwide access to cancer prevention, early detection, treatment, and follow-up care. ACS CAN is the nonprofit, nonpartisan advocacy affiliate of the American Cancer Society. It holds lawmakers accountable and empowers every citizen to fight back against cancer. Quality of life (QOL) is a key aspect of this work, and is approached in a variety of ways. Access to oral chemotherapy. Oral medications are now available as alternatives to IV infusions for many different cancers, and they offer advantages to patients and caregivers. The convenience and flexibility of oral treatment are especially important for patients and caregivers in rural areas, and those who need to minimize their time away from work. However, higher out-of-pocket costs for oral prescription drugs force many patients to choose IV infusions. ACS CAN has successfully advocated for new laws in 20 states, which now require health insurers to cover oral anticancer drugs no less favorably than IV drugs. We hope to improve access to oral chemotherapy nationwide by enacting a similar requirement at the federal level. Pain management. Cancer pain is a problem in at least 60% of patients in active treatment, and can persist for years after treatment. Although it can typically be relieved, cancer pain is often undertreated, with significant disparities in medically underserved populations. Untreated pain can be disabling and greatly diminishes QOL for survivors and their families. ACS CAN works to promote open communication between doctors and patients, including frequent and comprehensive pain assessment. Public awareness and policy initiatives are also important for preserving safe and appropriate access to pain medications. Palliative care. This specialized care reduces suffering and distress from serious or chronic illness, at any age and any stage of disease. Pain management is only one facet of this approach. A palliative care team works together with the patient's own doctor to address the patient's and family's priorities and goals. This team treats not just the disease, but the whole person - maximizing QOL, improving quality of care, and reducing healthcare costs. But access to palliative care is limited, especially for underserved populations. ACS CAN is promoting federal legislation that would address barriers to palliative care, by increasing health professional training in this field; investing in QOL and palliative care research; and expanding delivery of palliative care in hospitals and other community settings. Citation Format: Amy Schutz-Geschwender. Improving quality of life for cancer patients and survivors. [abstract]. In: Proceedings of the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Association for Cancer Research; 2013 Apr 6-10; Washington, DC. Philadelphia (PA): AACR; Cancer Res 2013;73(8 Suppl):Abstract nr ADV21. doi:10.1158/1538-7445.AM2013-ADV21

We Want Our Co-Ops Back

We can reform all our large voter organizations, including democracies and corporations, by starting with reforming our co-ops (including financial co-ops such as credit unions). Most large institutions lack effective democratic control by voters. Even though citizens of democracies can vote, corporate shareowners can vote, and co-op members can vote, those voting rights are ineffective if voters lack the information, insight and nomination rights necessary to elect the best leaders. This paper outlines how we can better implement the fundamental co-op principle of democratic member control, even when co-ops grow very large. Later we can apply these ideas to our democracies and corporations.Democratic accountability to voters need not come with a cost of decreased effectiveness of the co-op's management. On the contrary, if democratic reform includes a voter information system that gives voting members insight into which director candidates would better serve the co-op and thus its members, the result will be improved performance of the co-op.Instead of co-ops following corporations down the path of undemocratic governance, they can lead corporations toward democratic governance. All that's needed is for us voters to learn which governance changes are democratically empowering, and which are disempowering. In particular, improving our voter information systems can enhance director elections and board accountability.Co-ops that grow large (e.g. over 10,000 members) often tend to become less democratic. Voter turnout falls, and boards become less accountable to members. Boards may create bylaws and rules that shift power from members to boards. Directors may become more allied with a co-op's senior staff than with the members. As this trend progresses, a co-op's power structure can become an oligarchy. But the trend is not inevitable -- we can reverse it. The further a co-op slides toward oligarchy, the harder it is to reverse; but it's never too late, as the Arab Spring has recently reminded us.

EXTENSION EDUCATION SYMPOSIUM: The future of biosecurity and antimicrobial use in livestock production in the United States and the role of extension1

As the global population continues to grow, food needs will increase as well. The amount of land and other resources devoted to agriculture production is not expected to grow significantly, leading most to agree that the substantial increases in food production to meet food security needs will come through the development of technologies that improve production efficiency. Diseases are constant threats to efficiency in all segments of agriculture. In livestock production, many of the bacterial pathogens that infect food animals are controlled through the use of antimicrobials. Antimicrobials are currently used in the United States not only to treat specific diseases, but also as feed additives to prevent bacterial disease in general or to improve growth performance. In recent years, there have been several proposals in the United States, both at state and federal levels, aimed at curtailing or dramatically reducing the use antimicrobials as feed additives, creating a policy similar to that of the European Union. Here we review the current policies on antimicrobial use in the European Union and their impact on food animal production. In addition, we discuss the future of antimicrobial use in food animal production in the United States and the increasing role of biosecurity programs. Finally, we discuss the role of Cooperative Extension Service in creating improved biosecurity programs and extension programs that provide policy makers and voters information on modern food animal production practices and technologies so that policies and regulations are effective and appropriate.

Close Enough for Comfort? The Spatial Structure of Interest and Information in Ballot Measure Elections

This study considers the importance of spatial context in state ballot-initiative elections. We argue that spatial context provides important information voters use to decide how to vote on initiatives with geographically based policy implications. Herein, we analyze tract-level voting on three California Indian Gaming initiatives. The findings indicate that voters located near Indian nations without gaming were less likely to support expansion of gaming, whereas those with exposure to tribes with gaming were more likely to vote in favor of its expansion. Further, exposure to gaming conditions the relationship between exposure to tribes without gaming and voting on gaming initiatives. Theoretically, the results suggest that spatial location serves as a proxy for the information that voters rely on when voting on geographically linked ballot initiatives.

Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses

This article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with continuous private signals. In equilibrium, some citizens ignore their private information and abstain from voting, in deference to those with higher-quality signals. Even as the number of highly informed peers grows large, however, citizens with only moderate expertise continue voting, so that voter participation remains at realistic levels (e.g. 50 to 60 percent, for simple examples). The precise level of voter turnout, along with the margin of victory, are determined by the distribution of expertise. Improving a voter's information makes her more willing to vote, consistent with a growing body of empirical evidence, but makes her peers more willing to abstain, providing a new explanation for various empirical patterns of voting. Equilibrium participation is optimal, even though the marginal voter may have very little (e.g. below-average) expertise, and even though nonvoters' information is not utilized.

Corruption scandals, voter information, and accountability

We study the effects of the availability of information about corruption scandals on electoral outcomes. The paper uses a novel and rich database with information on corruption scandals that affected Spanish local governments during the period 1996–2009. The database includes information about press coverage of each scandal and also about the intervention of the judiciary as published by the press. This allows us to analyze whether voters react to the amount of information (e.g., number of news) and to information regarding the seriousness of the case (e.g., judicial charges). We find that the incumbent's vote loss after a corruption scandal can rise to 14% when we consider cases in which the incumbent has been charged with corruption and press coverage has been extensive. However, we find no vote loss at all in cases dismissed or with reports to the courts which did not lead to further judicial intervention. The results suggest that information provided by the press modifies voters' beliefs regarding the prevalence of corrupt activities and helps them disentangle cases of founded vs. unfounded corruption.

Centralization and Accountability: Theory and Evidence from the Clean Air Act

This paper studies fiscal federalism when voter information varies across regions. We develop a model of political agency with heterogeneously informed voters. Rentseeking politicians provide public goods to win the votes of the informed. As a result, rent extraction is lower in regions with higher information. In equilibrium, electoral discipline has decreasing returns. Thus, political centralization e¢ ciently reduces aggregate rent extraction. The model predicts that a region's benefits from centralization are decreasing in its residents' information. We test this prediction using panel data on pollutant emissions across U.S. states. The 1970 Clean Air Act centralized environmental policy at the federal level. In line with our theory, we find that centralization induced a differential decrease in pollution for uninformed relative to informed states.