In two decisions in the mid-1970s, Washington v. Davis and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Supreme Court made clear that proving that a law racially neutral on its face disproportionately disadvantages racial minorities does not establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or even create a presumption that such a violation has occurred. Disproportionate racial impact “is not irrelevant,” the Court explained, but “it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.” The key, according to the Court, lies in proving that the law was the product of a racially discriminatory purpose. This Article, part of a Contemporary Issues in Election Law symposium, examines the fundamental inadequacy of the Davis-Arlington Heights approach and the reprieve that it wrongly gives to voter identification laws, purges of voters from registration rolls, and other legal barriers to voting that, though framed in terms that make no mention of race, disproportionately disadvantage racial minorities. Part I explains the lessons of Davis and Arlington Heights for equal protection challenges to facially race-neutral laws that disproportionately disadvantage racial minorities. Drawing on legal barriers to voting for illustrations, Part II maintains that, from the start, the Davis-Arlington Heights approach posed relatively little threat of invalidation to laws disproportionately disadvantaging racial minorities and that the only laws truly threatened by the approach are ones patently and unmistakably the product of bias against racial minorities. Proceeding in a more prescriptive mode, Part III argues that the Davis-Arlington Heights approach to disproportionate racial impact wrongly ignores basic assumptions about the lawmaking process that help explain the Court’s longtime treatment as “suspect” of laws explicitly disadvantaging racial minorities. Part IV then proposes an alternative approach that gives disproportionate racial impact the independent importance it deserves under the Equal Protection Clause. Part V discusses the implications of adopting the proposed approach, with special attention to the implications for prevalent legal impediments to voting. The Article concludes in Part VI by highlighting the practical importance of the proposed approach even if today’s Supreme Court may not appear to be an ideal audience to embrace it.