Purpose: Government levels may better fulfill the expanding expectations for public service governance, performance management, and accountability with the use of risk management backed by an integrated management accounting and control system. To explain how the risk management committee and risk disclosure affect bank value, this paper draws on agency theory and signaling theory, by using the market to book ratio (MTBR) to measure bank value. Theoretical Framework: This article explains how the characteristics of risk management committees (RMCC) (size, independence, qualifications, meetings, executive membership, expertise, and dual membership) and voluntary risk disclosure influence each other on the value of Jordanian banks from 2014-2021. Design/methodology/approach: The descriptive statistics of risk disclosure practices were calculated by the study sample using data from 18 banks collected between 2014 and 2021. The study variables' observations have an unbalanced distribution as well. 120 observations across all study variables are included in this paper. To calculate the bank value in this study, we use the Market to Book Ratio (MTBR). The regression analysis employed the multiple regression model. Findings: The results indicate that risk management committee qualifications in accounting or finance significantly negatively affect bank value, while other variables have a significant impact on the value of Jordanian banks, such as risk management committee expertise, risk management committee dual membership with the compensation committee, risk management committee independence, and executive membership in the composition of the risk management committee. Originality/value: This paper provides new empirical evidence in financial and accounting literature regarding the effect of the RMCC characteristics on Jordanian banks' value. Also, The main contribution of the paper is the discovery that the influence of an RMCC tends to encourage more disclosure of risk management to minimize risks.