Is voluntary risk disclosure informative? The role of UK firm-level governance

Abstract

PurposeThe study investigates how firm-level governance (FL_G) affects the disclosure of voluntary risk information. Likewise, it explores the influence of FL_G on the informativeness of voluntary risk disclosure (VRD). Specifically, it examines how FL_G shapes the nexus between VRD and firm value.Design/methodology/approachIt uses a sample of non-financial firms from the FTSE350 index listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2018. The authors utilise an automated textual analysis technique to code the VRD in the annual reports of these firms. The firm value, adjusted for the industry median, is a proxy for investor response to VRD.FindingsThe results suggest that UK firms with significant board independence and larger audit committees disclose more risk information voluntarily. Nevertheless, firms with larger boards of directors and higher managerial ownership disseminate less voluntary risk information. Besides, VRD contains relevant information that enhances investors' valuation of UK firms. These results are more pronounced in firms with higher independent directors, lower managerial ownership and large audit committees.Practical implicationsThe study rationalises the ongoing debate on the effect of FL_G on VRD. The findings are helpful to UK policy-setters in reconsidering the guidelines that regulate UK VRD and to the UK investors in considering risk disclosure in their price decisions and thus enhancing their corporate valuations.Originality/valueIt contributes to the risk reporting literature in the UK by presenting the first evidence on the effect of a comprehensive set of FL_G on VRD. Besides, it enriches the existing research by shedding light on the role of FL_G on the informativeness of discretionary risk information in the UK.