Previous articleNext article No AccessThe American Sugar Refinery Company, 1887-1914: The Story of a MonopolyRichard ZerbeRichard Zerbe Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 12, Number 2Oct., 1969 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/466672 Views: 17Total views on this site Citations: 17Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1969 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Jacob Burgdorf The strategic impact of voluntary vs. mandated vertical restraints and termination restrictions on exclusion of rivals, Journal of Regulatory Economics 59, no.11 (Nov 2020): 94–107.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09419-8Wallace P. Mullin Sugar Industry, (Feb 2018): 13275–13277.https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2632Jacob Burgdorf The Strategic Impact of Voluntary vs. Mandated Vertical Restraints on Exclusion of Rivals, SSRN Electronic Journal 104 (Jan 2018).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392402John Asker, Heski Bar-Isaac Raising Retailers’ Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals, American Economic Review 104, no.22 (Feb 2014): 672–686.https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.2.672John William Asker, Heski Bar-Isaac Vertical Practices Facilitating Exclusion, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2012).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2255878Wallace P. Mullin Sugar Industry, (Dec 2016): 1–2.https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2632-1Tim Brennan RPM as Exclusion: Did the U.S. Supreme Court Stumble Upon the Missing Theory of Harm?, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2008).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1161255John S. Heywood, Matthew McGinty Leading and Merging: Convex Costs, Stackelberg, and the Merger Paradox, Southern Economic Journal 74, no.33 (Jan 2008): 879–893.https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2008.tb00869.xDavid Genesove, Wallace P. Mullin Predation and its rate of return: the sugar industry, 1887-1914, The RAND Journal of Economics 37, no.11 (Mar 2006): 47–69.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00003.xWerner Troesken Exclusive Dealing and the Whiskey Trust, 1890–1895, The Journal of Economic History 58, no.33 (Mar 2009): 755–778.https://doi.org/10.1017/S002205070002115X Sara Fisher Ellison , and Wallace P. Mullin Economics and Politics: The Case of Sugar Tariff Reform, The Journal of Law and Economics 38, no.22 (Oct 2015): 335–366.https://doi.org/10.1086/467335Jerry Ellig Why do regulators regulate? The case of the southern California gas market, Journal of Regulatory Economics 7, no.33 (May 1995): 293–308.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01067099César J. Ayala Social and Economic Aspects of Sugar Production in Cuba, 1880–1930, Latin American Research Review 30, no.11 (Oct 2022): 95–124.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100017180Roland H. Koller Predatory pricing: where do we stand?, (Jan 1992): 133–145.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2795-0_8 Malcolm R. Burns Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, Journal of Political Economy 94, no.22 (Oct 2015): 266–296.https://doi.org/10.1086/261374 Howard P. Marvel , and Stephen McCafferty The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, The Journal of Law and Economics 28, no.22 (Oct 2015): 363–379.https://doi.org/10.1086/467090RICHARD O. ZERBE THEORETICAL EFFICIENCY IN POLLUTION CONTROL: REPLY, Economic Inquiry 9, no.33 (Sep 1971): 314–317.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1971.tb01649.x