Voluntary Partnership Agreement Research Articles

FLEGT and livelihoods.

Abstract This review explores the links between the EUs Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Voluntary Partnership Agreements (FLEGT VPA) and forest and wood product-based livelihoods in the signatory and negotiating countries. It is a stock taking exercise of how sustainable livelihoods, within the context of the FLEGT VPA, have been considered in the literature, what have been the most prominent issues considered in the debates and which ones have been overlooked. Given the paucity of references specifically focused on the topic this review has widened to include issues around livelihoods and forests and conditions under which forests can or do contribute to poverty alleviation, tenure and governance arrangements, gender, regulation and formalization, and potential impacts of the VPA. This review concludes with a list of some unanswered questions that remain which perhaps point towards elements of a broader research agenda or policy focus.

Experimentalism in transnational forest governance: Implementing European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreements in Indonesia and Ghana

AbstractOver the past decade, the European Union (EU) has created a novel experimentalist architecture for transnational forest governance: the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative. This innovative architecture comprises extensive participation by civil society stakeholders in establishing and revising open‐ended framework goals (Voluntary Partnership Agreements [VPAs] with developing countries aimed at promoting sustainable forest governance and preventing illegal logging) and metrics for assessing progress toward them (legality standards and indicators) through monitoring and review of local implementation, underpinned by a penalty default mechanism to sanction non‐cooperation (the EU Timber Regulation that prohibits operators from placing illegally harvested wood on the European market). This paper analyzes the implementation of VPAs in Indonesia and Ghana, the two countries furthest advanced toward issuing FLEGT export licences. A central finding is the reciprocal relationship between the experimentalist architecture of the FLEGT initiative and transnational civil society activism, whereby the VPAs’ insistence on stakeholder participation, independent monitoring, and joint implementation review, underwritten by the EU, empowers domestic non‐governmental organizations with local knowledge to expose problems on the ground, hold public authorities accountable for addressing them, and contribute to developing provisional solutions.

Resources and Rules of the Game: Participation of Civil Society in REDD+ and FLEGT‐VPA Processes in Lao PDR

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) aims to achieve its purpose by working across multiple sectors and involving multilevel actors in reducing deforestation and forest degradation in tropical countries. By contrast, the European Union (EU) Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and its Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) focus on forestry and functions at a bilateral state level. The FLEGT Action Plan specifically aims to tackle illegal logging and improve forest governance in countries exporting tropical timber to the EU. Since illegal logging is just one driver of forest degradation, and legalisation of logging does not necessarily reduce deforestation and forest degradation, the two instruments differ in scope. However, by addressing the causes of forest degradation and their underlying governance issues, the FLEGT VPAs and REDD+ share many functional linkages at higher levels of forest policy and forest governance. The contribution and participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) and other actors are imperative to both processes. Our study is based on a survey of key actors (national and international) in REDD+ and FLEGT VPA processes in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR). Our analysis was guided by the theoretical perspectives of the policy arrangement approach and examination of two specific dimensions of this approach, namely resources and rules of the game. This paper argues that participation of CSOs in both processes is crucial because it facilitates and nurtures much needed cooperation between other national and international actors. The paper concludes that participation of CSOs could bring valuable information and knowledge into REDD+ and FLEGT VPA processes, thus contributing to increased legitimacy, justice and transparency.

Synergies among social safeguards in FLEGT and REDD + in Cameroon

Two key international policy processes have been developed to combat illegal logging and promote the contribution of forests to climate change mitigation in developing countries: the European Union's Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and its Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change policy on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). The implementation of these policies raises concerns about unintended adverse effects on the environment and local peoples' livelihoods. To prevent such effects, both processes involve developing country-level safeguards, so that they ‘do no harm’. This paper presents (i) a comparison of the social safeguards of the FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ processes and an explanation of their commonalities and differences, and (ii) an exploration of the potential synergies and the challenges to realizing them. The three main research methods used in the study were semi-structured interviews, content analysis of policy documents, and focus group discussions with local communities and indigenous peoples in south and east Cameroon. Our analysis shows that whereas FLEGT-VPA includes legality-based safeguards with legally binding monitoring and reporting obligations, REDD+ adopts a right-based approach to safeguards. Potential synergies between the two approaches were identified. The synergies lie in the participatory nature of the process of designing benefit sharing mechanisms, strengthening forest and land tenure, and defining the criteria and indicators in FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ safeguards. However, realizing the synergies is challenging, given the existing political economy of Cameroon.

Commodifying Legality? Who and What Counts as Legal in the Indonesian Wood Trade

ABSTRACTThis article examines how legality verification in Indonesia, as developed under the European Union (EU) Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA), shapes who and what count as legal. A review of Indonesia’s evolving legality verification system and in-depth stakeholder interviews reveal a process of commodification driven by international demand for an interchangeable label of “legality.” This interchangeability is produced through a reduction of forest governance to a narrow set of legal standards and third-party, private auditing, which risks obscuring key governance challenges such as corruption and unclear tenure, and excluding most domestic and small-scale operators from economic and legal recognition. Given the market logic of legality licensing, it is more likely to “ratchet down” than “ratchet up” local access to, and benefit from, wood production, unless there is greater support and investment in legal and tenure reforms and improved local benefit capture.

Regulation, formalization, and smallholder timber production in northern Central Java, Indonesia

Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade agreements between the EU and countries that grow tropical timber aim to complement, alter, or generate new regulatory mechanisms that ensure the legality of timber products. These regulatory changes affect pre-existing policies and practices within timber production networks. The Indonesian-EU Voluntary Partnership Agreement was signed in 2013, and legality verification is scheduled to become mandatory for all smallholders by the end of 2017. Using grower surveys conducted in the Jepara regency of Central Java (n = 204), we generate information on who Jepara smallholders are, what timber species they are growing, and how programs that provide free and discounted seedlings contribute to STP. We use these data to understand how STP operates and how Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu (SVLK), the Indonesian method for timber legality verification, will affect STP networks and producers. We find that resource provision and oversight of source documentation increase formalization within STP. Our discussion details four policy-relevant insights for promoting STP amid continued formalization.

Empowering civil society in forest policies and governance: livelihood impact assessment of EU FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreements

SUMMARY This paper explains the process, methodology and some key outcomes of ex ante Livelihood Impact Assessment (LIA) of Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) under the EU FLEGT Action Plan. It is based on undertaking LIA in Vietnam, Indonesia and Honduras. LIA involves a series of multiple stakeholder workshops informed by background contextual studies such as vulnerable stakeholder analysis. By raising the capacity and credibility of civil society to undertake systematic analysis of the livelihood implications of VPAs, LIA can contribute to the theory of change of how the FLEGT-VPA process can promote equitable outcomes. Specifically LIA helps meet the VPA social safeguard — the commitment by VPA signatories to understand, monitor and mitigate adverse social effects. The wider utility of the LIA methodology is shown by its spontaneous adoption and/or adaptation by NGOs in Vietnam and Honduras, and its adaptation for subnational REDD+ planning in Vietnam and Nepal.

Experimentalism in Transnational Forest Governance: Implementing EU Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (Flegt) Voluntary Partnership Agreements in Indonesia and Ghana

Over the past decade, the European Union has created a novel experimentalist architecture for transnational forest governance: the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative. This architecture comprises extensive participation by civil society stakeholders in the establishment and revision of open-ended framework goals (bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreements or VPAs with developing countries aimed at promoting sustainable forest governance and preventing illegal logging) and metrics for assessing progress towards them (legality standards and indicators) through ongoing monitoring and review of local implementation by countries and firms, underpinned by a penalty default mechanism to sanction non-cooperation (the EU Timber Regulation that prohibits operators from placing illegally harvested wood on the European market). This paper analyzes the implementation of VPAs in Indonesia and Ghana, the two countries that are closest to being able to issue FLEGT export licences. A central theme of the analysis is the reciprocal relationship between the experimentalist architecture of the FLEGT initiative and transnational civil society activism, whereby the VPAs’ insistence on stakeholder participation, independent monitoring, and implementation review, underwritten by the EU, empower domestic NGOs with vital local knowledge to expose problems on the ground, hold public authorities accountable for addressing them, and contribute to developing joint solutions.

Participation, public policy-making, and legitimacy in the EU Voluntary Partnership Agreement process: The Cameroon case

This paper discusses how participatory policy-making processes such as the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) negotiations are and should be organised to foster political legitimacy and support. The VPAs are bilateral agreements between the European Union (EU) and timber producing countries. VPAs constitute a cornerstone in EU's Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) programme, the most important tool for the EU to address illegal logging problems. The EU requires that national VPA negotiations include participation by the relevant stakeholders. Based on primary data, we compare the VPA negotiations in Cameroon (2006–2009) with three different ‘ideal’ models of participatory policy-making: the rationalist, the communicative incremental and the mixed model, which we expect have different implications for legitimacy. We conclude that the Cameroonian process is closest to a rationalist model with elements of the mixed model, and that this has increased legitimacy and support only to a limited extent. For future processes in other countries, we recommend stronger elements of the mixed model, and more careful considerations about stakeholder identification processes; how to adapt policy-process to specific contexts; and how to strengthen communication and information flows. Considerations about these elements could also strengthen the applicability of the ideal models.

Effects of national community-based forest certification on forest management and timber marketing: a case study of Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

SUMMARY This study clarified the changes in forest management and timber marketing after acquisition of the Indonesian Ecolabelling Institute's community-based forest certification through a case of Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The certification had good effects to improve forest management, although any apparent effects on timber marketing were not observed. Meanwhile, this study observed the potential of certification to help with the acquisition of the Indonesia Timber Legality Assurance System certification under the Voluntary Partnership Agreement of Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade. In order to disseminate the forest certification to small-scale forestry it is necessary to promote selling certified timber and generate a premium price for smallholders. In particular, the challenges of Chain of Custody and the inherent nature of small-scale forestry should be addressed. The dissemination of national forest certification, which provides more appropriate benefits for smallholders and...

Legality Constraints: The Emergence of a Dual Market for Tropical Timber Products?

The European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA), and Australia have adopted specific measures to avoid the placing of illegal timber on their markets. These measures might encourage the diversion of timber products from traditional large importers to destinations with a less stringent regulatory framework. During 2001–2013, the international trade in tropical primary timber products (logs; sawnwood; veneers and plywood) decreased by 13% in volume and increased by almost 5% in value. Imports by Australia, the EU, and the USA halved, while those by emerging economies such as China and India initially remained stable and later increased. Tropical timber products—mostly logs and sawnwood—might have been diverted towards emerging economies over the period considered. This general trend is confirmed when analyzing imports from countries that are implementing voluntary partnership agreements (VPA) within the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan. Several factors might influence these market dynamics, including changes induced by the 2008 financial crisis and the increasing domestic demand for timber products by emerging nations. The effects of legality measures on market trends are still unclear. Nonetheless, they might have encouraged uncertainty with regards to traditional importers and favored emerging ones.

Strengthening the rule of law in Indonesia: the EU and the combat against illegal logging

Indonesia is an emerging power, but one problem particular taints the success story: corruption. While corruption affects all public policies, its disastrous effects are most visible in forestry. Indonesia is still home to the third largest rainforests in the world, but the country is losing its forests fast. One main driver of deforestation is illegal logging. The strengthening of the rule of law is therefore a key to stop or at least to slow down Indonesia’s deforestation rate. The European Union has been keen to support the Indonesian government in its fight against illegal logging in accordance with the European Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade Policy (FLEGT). In September 2013, Brussels and Jakarta have signed a FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement (a FELGT-VPA, more commonly known as “Timber Pact”). Under the Timber Pact, Jakarta promises an overhaul of its forest governance. This reform of forest governance is costly to the Indonesian government, in financial and political terms. After all, many actors profited from the old system. The question arises why the Indonesian government agreed to the Timber Pact. In the first part of the analysis, a rationalist perspective is taken to answer this question, focusing on the political and economical gains for the decision-makers. The second part looks at the issue from a constructivist angle and shows how the norm “fight illegal logging” fitted into the normative framework of Indonesian politics. By combining a rationalist and a constructivist perspective, a broad picture of successful EU norm diffusion is painted.

Estimation of illegal logging by the formal timber sector in Ghana: implications for forest law compliance, enforcement and EU-Ghana voluntary partnership agreement

SUMMARY Despite all the attention the problem of illegal logging has recently attracted, the empirical base remains remarkably weak in many countries including Ghana. Using both official reported figures and actual harvest figures estimated from domestic and export consumption statistics, the annual average illegal logging for the period 2000–2011 among the formal sector in Ghana is estimated at 0.78 million m3 or 104% of the legal harvest. The results indicate that illegal logging was much more prevalent in the forest reserves than outside forest reserves, and among the traditionally endangered timber species more than the lesser known timber species. The implications of these findings on forest law compliance, enforcement, and the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the European Community and Ghana are discussed and recommendations proffered.

Forests, Timber and Rural Livelihoods: Implications for Social Safeguards in the Ghana-EU Voluntary Partnership Agreement

Based on detailed income data of 478 rural households, the nexus between forest, trees and rural livelihoods in Ghana is investigated and applied to assess implications of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the EU and Ghana on illegal logging. It is found that, after crops, environmental income (cash and subsistence) is the most important contributor to households’ total yearly net income. Fuelwood, bushmeat and wild foods from plants are the most important environmental products. The survey shows meagre income from timber and poles, but is likely to underreport this source due to its illegal nature. Yet, when the likely incomes from illegal timber harvesting as estimated by other studies are compared with this study’s comprehensive livelihood data, it is obvious that an imagined full implementation of the VPA would have limited impact on the majority of rural households. Rather than focusing on social safeguards to mitigate any perceived or real negative impacts in the short-term, policy makers in Ghana—and the donors supporting them—should focus on other aspects of the VPA, notably forest policy reforms and in particular reforms that devolve management rights and benefits to trees on farm and fallow land to those occupying and cultivating the land. Such efforts would provide incentive for timber production and thus enhance rural livelihoods, while combatting illegal logging, deforestation and forest degradation.

Verified Legal? Ramifications of the EU Timber Regulation and Indonesia's Voluntary Partnership Agreement for the Legality of Indonesian Timber

The recent entry into force of the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) completes the EU's policy framework designed to curb trade in illegal timber. In light of the imminent ratification of a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the EU and Indonesia, the Timber Regulation raises questions about the role that Indonesia's timber legality assurance system—the SVLK—will play in securing access for Indonesian timber to the European market. We performed a regulatory analysis and found that the SVLK will serve as the basis for licensing direct exports of timber to the EU under the VPA, but that it has weaknesses which the VPA may be unable to address. The Timber Regulation, which requires due diligence for timber imports, might have helped address these weaknesses, but it explicitly excludes VPA timber from these requirements. However, trade data indicates that the size of the timber trade that the VPA will govern is not large. Further, the Regulation will apply to Indonesian timber that enters the EU via third countries. Its ability to address gaps in the SVLK as regards this timber depends on two contingencies: (1) whether the SVLK meets the Timber Regulation's certification scheme reliability criteria; and (2) whether the due diligence provision can be construed as permitting regulators to demand proof of legality beyond certification. We argue that the EUTR will continue to play an important role in regulating imports of Indonesian timber even after the VPA is ratified.

News from Guyana: 15 Columns on Forest-Related News Published in the Quarterly CFA Newsletter, March 2011 to March 2015

The 15 columns document and analyze the principal forestry-related processes and events in Guyana during the final three-years in office (2011-2015) of the ethnic East Indian-dominated government that ruled uninterruptedly for 22 years (1992-2015). The evidence and consequences for the forests, economy and society of Guyana’s large-scale and long-term illegal logging and log trading are presented and assessed. I show how regulatory capture is manifest in the ways in which the log export policy from 2009 served the interests of the dominant Asian log exporters and the budget of the Guyana Forestry Commission while being fiscally ineffective. I show the points at which the Government of Guyana failed to use regulation and fiscal measures to make the implementation of national policies for in-country timber processing commercially feasible. I document the faltering steps taken to implement one of the conditions in the Guyana-Norway Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed in November 2009, which is ‘evidence of Guyana entering a formal dialogue with the European Union with the intent of joining its Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) processes towards a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA)’. One of the key elements of a VPA is a legality verification system (LVS), to provide assurance that timber imported into the EU from the producer country shall have been produced at least legally if not sustainably.

Rent-seeking and timber rights allocation in Ghana

SUMMARY This paper describes types, processes and importance of rent-seeking in the allocation of timber rights in Ghana. It is based on an analysis of 30 interviews with large-, medium- and small-scale timber firms, as well as government officials and timber industry organizations in Ghana. The paper documents that timber rights allocation is associated with both bureaucratic and political corruption. The latter comes in two forms. First, the findings suggest that well-established relationships exist between politicians and senior bureaucrats on the one side and large-scale timber firms on the other involving exchange of timber rights for political support and/or material, personal benefits. Second, timber rights are allocated to persons or firms outside the timber sector allegedly as payment for political support. The paper concludes that the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the EU is likely to reduce the observed practises in the future through increased transparency.

COST AND BENEFIT IMPLICATIONS OF SVLK IMPLEMENTATION TO SMALL-SCALE TIMBER SECTOR

In 2009, Indonesia decided to make the implementation of the Timber LegalityVerification System (SVLK) mandatory for all timber enterprises in order to ensure full legality compliance of Indonesia timber. This decision was intended to remove any doubts about the legality of the Indonesian timber traded internationally. SVLK was also designed to become the basis for the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the European Union and Indonesia. In September 2013,VPA was finalized and SVLK officially became its cornerstone. However, there are serious problems with implementing SVLK system. In the large-scale timber sector, achieving SVLK compliance may not be a big problem. However, small-scale timber enterprises face numerous challanges. This study examines the obstacles preventing the progress with SVLK in the small-scale sector, particularly the cost and benefit implications. The necessary data were collected through stakeholder interviews and field observation in timber business units. The study concludes thatSVLKcertification carries significant additional costs for small-scale timber sectors with little improvement of benefits.We recommend the Ministry of Forestry and other relevant institutions should simplify SVLK implementation requirements for small scale timber enterprises and guard against a potential drop in competitiveness of the small-scale timber exports due to additional costs.

Contesting national and international forest regimes: Case of timber legality certification for community forests in Central Java, Indonesia

The Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the European Union (EU) have signed a Voluntary Partnership Agreement on Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT-VPA), which aims to prevent illegal timber products from entering the EU. This agreement recognizes a certification for timber products exported from Indonesia based on FLEGT-VPA standards and implemented through the timber legality verification system, Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu (SVLK). While the implementation of SVLK complies with the FLEGT-VPA, it has not dissolved pre-existing national systems for forest management and timber trade. Implementing SVLK standards amid multiple forest regimes causes redundancy of administrative procedures in forest management and timber trade in Indonesia. This redundancy, in turn, leads to decrease in cost efficiency, weak legitimation, and low effectiveness of the system, especially in community forests.

Proposing an indicator framework for FLEGT voluntary partnership agreements impact monitoring

In 2003, the European Union (EU) launched the Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT). The Action Plan aims to combat illegalities in the forest sector, using trade as the leverage to involve producers, traders and consumers in its implementation. A key instrument emerging from the Action Plan is Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs). These are bilateral trade agreements between the EU and wood exporting countries, to ensure that all wood exports were produced and traded in accordance with the laws of the originating country. Six such agreements were negotiated so far and with their implementation nearing, it is important to develop methodology for monitoring key impacts of a VPA. The VPAs and the Action Plan specifically outline the requirement to monitor their impacts on the livelihoods of forest dependent communities. For this an effective VPA impact monitoring system has to be built that fits with the context and capacity of the country. This paper aims to contribute to these developments by proposing an indicator framework for a country-level VPA impact monitoring. The framework comprises of 46 indicators designed to capture changes across ten key impact areas of VPAs. The paper also discusses requirements and possible challenges of VPA impact monitoring as well as its implications to good forest governance in the VPA countries and offers principles for cost-effective VPA impact monitoring.