Voluntary Environmental Agreements Research Articles

A Review of Interventions to Encourage SMEs to Make Environmental Improvements

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are an important part of the world economy but they are thought to be responsible for around 60% of all carbon dioxide emissions and 70% of all pollution. SMEs often have major problems with limited resources, limited knowledge, and limited technical capabilities to deal with their own negative environmental impact. SMEs exhibit widely differing characteristics and commitment where environmental issues are concerned. Yet under these conditions they are all expected to engage in environmental improvement. Interventions that encourage environmental improvement are often polarised between regulation and legislation at one extreme and voluntary environmental agreement at the other. It is clear that a holistic mixture of interventions is necessary to achieve maximum engagement and environmental improvement by all SMEs. In this paper we categorise the different levels of environmental commitment observed in SMEs and develop a selection or ‘toolkit’ of intervention strategies that might be deployed within each category of SME.

Applying voluntary tools to achieve Sustainable Consumption and Production: collaboration between the European Commission and the retail sector

AbstractThis article analyses recent activities undertaken by the European Commission in collaboration with retailers and other stakeholders to help achieve sustainable consumption and production (SCP) as proposed in its SCP/SIP Action Plan. The focus is on the setting up and functioning of a Retail Forum. These activities are seen in the wider context of the use of “soft law” and, in particular, of voluntary environmental agreements as an effective alternative to regulatory measures in promoting sustainable development both along the supply chain and as regards consumers. The article suggests that the voluntary approach can be extremely useful to promote sustainable consumption and production provided that some essential conditions are met: voluntary commitments must be verifiable, they need the right level of ambition and they must involve a wide range of actors. In particular, the article explores the feasibility of developing a code of conduct for the retail sector.

The ISO 14001 environmental management standard in Japan: results from a national survey of facilities in four industries

Since establishment of the ISO 14001 environmental management system in 1996, Japanese facilities have led the world in numbers of certifications. This research utilises survey data from more than 1700 Japanese facilities as well as follow-up interviews to identify the determinants of ISO certification, to examine the differences between early, recent and in-process certifiers, and to understand how ISO 14001 certification affects various environmental and managerial outcomes in Japan. Findings show that ISO certified facilities are larger and report higher levels of environmental management capacity. In addition, early certifiers are more likely to have established voluntary environmental agreements and are more active in international trade and business. Findings also provide evidence that while many facilities believe that ISO 14001 certification is excessively costly, they also report that certification has resulted in the establishment of new energy efficiency and waste reduction targets and higher target levels. Nevertheless, evidence indicates that certification does not generally result in longer-term outcomes such as post-certification adjustment of non-regulated targets.

Corporate environmental strategy: a must in the new millennium

For a long time, companies have been unaware of or unconcerned with their activities' consequences to the environment. In the 1990s, however, this narrow-minded attitude seemed to begin changing, as some signs increasingly appeared: overcompliance with regulation standards, voluntary environmental expenditures and agreements with regulators, the appearance of 'green' products, corporate statements on the environment and implementation of environmental management systems, among others. If companies are now taking the environment into account, they probably have an economic pull for doing so. The interaction process with regulators, stakeholders' pressure, corporate reputation enhancement, creation and taking advantage of competitive opportunities, and the view of corporate environmentalism as a strategic issue are the reasons examined here in order to evaluate the potential benefits for environmental integration in companies' management orientation. This article tries to present corporate environmental strategic management as an essential management function because of its ability to minimise costs and risks and enhance (or ensure) companies' value.

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries

Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government.

Voluntary Environmental Agreements when Regulatory Capacity is Weak

Voluntary agreements (VAs) negotiated between environmental regulators and industry are increasingly popular. However, little is known about whether they are likely to be effective in developing and transition countries where local and federal environmental regulatory capacity is typically weak. We develop a dynamic theoretical model to examine the effect of VAs on investment in regulatory infrastructure and pollution abatement in such countries. We find that under certain conditions, VAs can improve welfare by generating more private-sector investment in pollution control and more public-sector investment in regulatory capacity than the status quo.

Voluntary agreements in environmental policy: an empirical evaluation for the Chilean case

In this paper the author assesses and discusses the Chilean approach on voluntary environmental agreements. Based on a survey-questionnaire performed in 322 facilities belonging to four industrial sectors, the author evaluated the effectiveness and (static) efficiency of five voluntary agreements (VAs). Using the propensity score method, the study found out that VAs had a significant effect in encouraging the implementation of environmental initiatives, although, most of them represent incremental rather than radical improvements. Moreover, whilst it confirms that VAs can suffer from regulatory capture, it also reveals that capture can coexist with significant environmental improvements in other areas. Regarding the static efficiency impact, it suggests that VAs succeeded in encouraging cost minimization in terms of operational and transaction costs. Furthermore, this research documented that participation in an industrial association is by far the most significant variable associated with voluntary agreements, and that regulatory threats and governmental funding are incentives of secondary importance. Finally, it concludes, by highlighting that the lack of public participation together with several institutional and political factors that subdue the ambitiousness of targets, are the most serious drawbacks, which should be addressed in order to avoid credibility issues of VAs, in the near future.

VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS IN WATERSHED PROTECTION EXPERIENCES FROM COSTA RICA

This article analyses the application of voluntary environmental agreements (VEAs) in watershed protection in Costa Rica. Next to an involvement of private energy firms, the Costa Rican state, and farmers, the participation of NGOs is a remarkable feature. From an analysis of these multi-stakeholder arrangements, it is concluded that these arrangements bring benefits to all actors involved. VEAs have been able to grow as powerful policy instruments, generating positive environmental effects. Essential is their embedded ness in a broader set of environmental policies, especially related to forest management

Prospective voluntary agreements for escaping techno-institutional lock-in

Abstract The paper looks for evolutionary policy responses to techno-institutional lock-in, a persistent state that creates systemic market and policy barriers to technological alternatives. We address the coordination role for authorities rather than corrective optimisation and elaborate three evolutionary policy objectives, including fostering of (i) the diversity of technological options, (ii) common vision for the implementation of technological alternatives and (iii) changes in social and physical networks. We use these objectives to analyse documented experiences from environmental voluntary agreements and foresight activities. We argue that combining the virtues of these tools into a new policy tool, named prospective voluntary agreement, can help facilitate an escape from techno-institutional lock-in. The merit of the prospective voluntary agreement lies with the enhancement of collaborative policy cultures and inter-sectoral and interdisciplinary stakeholder learning that creates commitment to desired action for escaping lock-in.

Stakeholder Participation in Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Analysis of 10 Project XL Case Studies

This article examines stakeholder involvement and influence as part of voluntary environmental agreements between regulatory agencies and companies. Ten pilot projects that were part of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL (excellence and leadership) were examined to evaluate process goals (fairness and competence) and outcome goals (trust and incorporation of public values in decisions). The ten case studies encompass a range of businesses, locations, and ideas for regulatory “reinvention” projects, and they span a spectrum of stakeholder participation processes and outcomes. Although results point to numerous problems in implementation, they also indicate that in several cases, stake holder groups significantly affected the final project agreement (FPA) and enforceable permit. The evidence suggests that companies can work collaboratively and constructively with residents of local communities, members of national environmental organizations and other interest groups, and government regulatory officials to craft voluntary environmental agreements that are cooperative and environmentally beneficial.

Environmental Reform, Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process in Hong Kong: An Exploratory Study of Stakeholder Perspectives

A number of social surveys on environmental issues have been conducted in Hong Kong over the past 20 years but none has investigated processes of environmental reform from a stakeholder perspective. This paper reports on the findings of a survey of 120 representatives of eight stakeholder groups conducted in 2003. This exploratory study had two main objectives. First, it investigated stakeholder views on environmental policy making in Hong Kong including policy objectives and priorities, the policy instruments employed, the discourse surrounding environmental policy making and sustainable development, and the effectiveness of local environmental institutions. Second, it explored the extent to which Hong Kong is undergoing environmental reform processes consistent with the principles of ecological modernization. The results indicate that a conventional command-and-control model focusing on pollution control drives environmental policy making in Hong Kong. Government is seen as a relatively unresponsive, ‘controller’ regime relying heavily on laws and regulation to pursue its policy objectives. Support exists among stakeholders for the use of new environmental policy instruments (NEPIs), particularly those of an economic nature, but there is scepticism about the potential effectiveness of voluntary environmental agreements. Local environmental discourse is characterized by the counter-positioning of economic development and the environment. Most stakeholders share the view that the debate surrounding sustainable development has been poorly informed and that the concept is not well-understood. Stakeholder responses suggest that there is considerable divergence between the potential and actual effectiveness of important local environmental institutions. While there is empirical evidence indicating that some environmental initiatives have produced technical outcomes consistent with ecological modernization, our findings suggest these do not reflect a conscious change in the direction of environmental policy and that the social and institutional transformations that also underpin ecological modernization have yet to become embedded in Hong Kong.

Voluntary Environmental Agreements and Competition Policy

Voluntary environmental agreements are oftensuspected to promote collusive practicesbetween participating firms. The paperaddresses the antitrust implications ofGermany's voluntary Dual Management System forPackaging Waste Collection and Recycling (DSD). It uses analytical tools of the economictheory of the firm to examine features ofDSD's governance structure that were oftenidentified to impede competition. While thepaper does not argue that DSD performs asefficiently as a hypothetical solution in amore competitive setting, it shows that thesefeatures have an economic rationale from theviewpoint of the theory of the firm. Thegeneral conclusion is that it is necessary tocarefully analyze the institutional fine-tuningof a voluntary agreement in order to derive theoverall impact stemming from a formal lack ofcompetition. A more case-to-case-oriented,institutional research approach could thereforefruitfully supplement model-driven, theoreticalanalyses of voluntary environmental agreementsand their effect on market competition.

Book Reviews Comptes Rendus

Book reviewed in this article:The Politics of Public Management: The HRDC Audit of Grants and Contributions:By DAVID A. GOODArctic Justice: On Trial for Murder, Pond Inlet, 1923:By SHELAGH D. GRANTScience, Money and Politics: Political Triumph and Ethical Erosion:By DANIEL S. GREENBERG.Introduction to Emergency Management:By GEORGE D. HADDOW and JANE A. BULLOCK.Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Process, Practice and Future Use:Edited by PATRICK TEN BRINKSThe Canadian Federalist Experiment: From Defiant Monarchy to Reluctant Republic:By FREDERICK VAUGHANOrganization Behaviour Reassessed: The Impact of Gender:Edited by ELISABETH WILSONThe Struggle for Quebec: From Referendum to Referendum:By ROBERT A YOUNG

Environmental policies for agriculture in Europe

This study analyses the environmental policies in Europe and particularly in The Netherlands. Comprehensive analysis of their policy package, which includes environmental taxes, tax exemptions, and the voluntary environmental agreement are provided. Each method does seem to show significant effects to reduce the environmental bads. This paper also presents an economic analysis of the glasshouse horticulture industry in The Netherlands, focusing on direct and dynamic effects, where direct effect refers to strengthening the cost competitiveness of the industry and dynamic effect refers to the incentives on technological innovations.

Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Taking Up Positions And Meeting Pressure

This paper portrays voluntary agreements as a Nash‐bargaining game between the authorities and the polluting industry. Before bargaining starts, the authorities threaten to introduce emission licences if the negotiations come to nothing, while industry, by the use of lobbying campaigns, can make it politically costly to regulate by law. The most likely game of the ones considered is characterized by the authorities first announcing a level of licensing, whereupon industry will adjust its lobbying activity. This game results in a relatively defensive industry and authorities than other games under consideration.

Introduction to the symposium on ‘new’ policy instruments in the European Union

Throughout the international community - and specifically in the European Union - there is an increased focus on 'new modes of governance', for three different - but sometimes interrelated - reasons: achieving more efficiency and better delivery, creating the pre-conditions for participatory governance, and modernizing the regulatory system. The debate on 'what public policies can really achieve', how they can 'bring society back in', and whether 'smart regulation' is rhetorical smoke or substance raises all sorts of problems, ranging from definitional issues to substantive questions of policy accountability and legitimacy. What 'new modes of governance' boil down to, however, are the instruments chosen by governments. This Symposium discusses the politics of new modes of governance in the EU from this advantageous angle. In doing so, it gains in specificity and allows comparisons across policies, although at the cost of missing something of the 'grand' debate on 'government' and 'governance'. Policy instruments are the tools used to achieve policy objectives (Howlett and Ramesh 1993). In the EU context, 'new' policy instruments include codes of conduct, eco-labels, scoreboards, benchmarking, best practice, high-level fora, voluntary agreements, co-regulation and other tools. This European Forum Symposium is governed by no particular theoretical orthodoxy. The papers use a variety of theoretical explanations to new policy instruments. While it is an important and dynamic area in the EU governance picture, soft law does not encompass all the new instruments present in the system. Instruments can be legally binding and quite 'hard' in terms of their regulatory impact (an example being economic instruments like taxation). There may be substantial shades of 'soft' and 'hard' policy instruments: soft law may be used in an extremely hard way (environmental voluntary agreements, for instance, are binding in The Netherlands). One of the key findings here is that the instruments discussed in this Symposium may not be all that 'new' in areas such as social policy and the environment. Equally, how much substantial impact these 'new' types of instruments have on a sector needs to be evaluated. As several papers note, considerable amounts of EU innovation actually may be centred on the modification of older instruments as well as on the creation of a mix where the new instruments complement the traditional regulations in place.

An institutional framework for analysis of voluntary policy: the case of voluntary environmental agreements in Kita Kyushu, Japan

This paper seeks to understand the effect of social, economic and political conditions on the selection and effectiveness of voluntary policy in Japan. Borrowing from two sets of literature, the paper develops a two-dimensional framework for analysis of voluntary policy that helps clarify the contextual factors that determine voluntary policy choice and effectiveness. The establishment of voluntary agreements in Japan are then investigated and the specific experiences of one Japanese city's experience, Kita Kyushu. Findings show that insufficient national and local statutory regulations, local citizen pressure resulting from significant pollution problems, city-controlled non-regulatory resources, and local level regulatory power determined Kita Kyushu's policy choice and the resulting effectiveness of voluntary environmental agreements. Findings then indicate where the Japanese experience falls within the framework. The usefulness of the framework for analysis and practice is then reinforced, and challenges for some of the basic assumptions of current theory are suggested.

Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Process, Practice and Future Use

Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Process, Practice and Future Use

The Politics of Bounded Innovation: 'New' Environmental Policy Instruments in France

French environmental policy-making has been characterised by a 'dual policy style' including both statist and meso-corporatist elements. This style translated into a multiplication of environmental institutions and a wide set of policy instruments, with hypothecated environmental charges and voluntary agreements being used as early as the 1960s and 1970s. From the late 1990s, a second phase of experimentation with 'new' instruments was conducted under the left-wing Jospin government. In particular, an innovative 'pollution tax' (the 'TGAP') sought to redefine the meso-corporatist bargain and reconfigure environmental institutions. However, the main reforms were stalemated by the opposition of economic actors and the electoral defeat of the left in 2002. Thus despite auspicious beginnings, the overall impact of 'new' environmental instruments in France has so far been limited in comparison to other OECD countries. Indeed, 'new' instruments have either been contained within long-standing policy paradigms, or excluded and largely ignored.

A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a ‘toughest firm principle’ holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.