Vital National Interests Research Articles

What the West Can Learn from Rationalizing Russia's Action in Ukraine

Russia's foreign policy decisions towards Ukraine in the context of the “Ukraine crisis” have been portrayed largely in a negative light which crudely paints Russia's actions as being imperialistic, evil and largely irrational. This article argues that by looking at the interplay of identity and perceptions at the foreign policymaking level, Russia's actions in Ukraine can be, to some degree, rationalized. First, Russia's Eurasian--oriented great power role identity and its perceptions of Ukraine as represent a vital national interest. Second, the European Union and the United States are perceived as embodying a Western team of anti-Russian imperialists, which led Moscow to pursue hazardous foreign policies.

How American Media Serves as a Transmission Belt for Wars of Choice

With the end of the U.S-Soviet Cold War in 1991 a fundamental shift occurred in global behavior of the United States with respect to “wars of choice” unconnected to vital national security interests. Parallel with that shift, American media increasingly have operated uncritically in conjunction with the bipartisan Washington political establishment to “sell” such wars to the American public. Among the key features of such cooperation discernable in successive conflicts are deficiency of geographic and historical knowledge as the American norm (the less people know the more likely they are to believe what they are told, with the least informed most persuaded of the need to “do something”); reliance on government sources, “ventriloquism,” and “information incest” (unknown to the public, much media “information” comes from government sources); centralized corporate ownership (official policy imperatives interface with ratings dollars for six giant corporate conglomerates); “para-journalism,” “infotainment,” and “atrocity porn” as a war trigger (atrocities appear seemingly on cue and then receive saturation coverage); demonization “Hitler” memes and “weaponization” of media (compromise and negotiation have no role in confronting absolute evil: war is the default option); America and the “international community,” the “Free World,” and American “exceptionalism” and “leadership”; disregarding “alternative” media, American samizdat (accurate information is available in “alternative” media, but the major still decide if it exists or not); “we never make mistakes,” “stay the course,” and “MoveOn-ism” (U.S. policy has no rearview mirror; authors of past blunders are not discredited, while those who said “tolya so” are ignored). In turn, media themselves are an integral part of a multifaceted, hybrid public-private entity with broad range and depth. Variously known as the Establishment, the Oligarchy, or the Deep State, this entity includes elements within all three branches of the U.S. government (especially in the military, intelligence, and financial sectors), private business (the financial industry, government contractors, information technology), think tanks, NGOs, the “Demintern,” both political parties and campaign operatives, and an army of lobbyists and PR professionals. Looking into the future in light of 2016 anti-Establishment challenges from Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, the shortcomings of Barack Obama’s policies in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine on top of those of George W. Bush in Iraq and Afghanistan, shrinkage of the American Middle Class, and increasing public skepticism of the “MSM” in favor of digital “alternative media,” both the Washington-based oligarchy and its media component show signs of losing their grip. The possibility exists for a peaceful evolution to a less warlike posture (impacting media as well) that would refocus on America’s domestic needs. Alternatively, the existing order could risk a major war in a desperate bid to save its wealth, power, and privileges – with unforeseeable consequences for America and the world.

INTERVENSI TURKI DALAM KRISIS SURIAH (2011-2014)

This research aims to explain Turkey’s intervention in Syrian crisis due to the perception of threat toward its security or domestic stability. Syrian crisis has directed threat indirectly to Turkey related to the existence of Kurd rebel group Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK’s activity in Syria. Syria makes the PKK affiliated to Syrian Kurd group Democratic Union Party or PYD an important actor particularly in northern area of the state during the crisis. Amid the instability caused by armed conflict in Syria, Turkey believes both political and military force of the PKK-PYD’s can injure its security or domestic stability now that the PKK still demands either territorial seccession or autonomy for Kurd’s southeastern area.The research applies the worldview of international relations realism to describe Turkey’s behavior as a state with its power in responding to its surrounding. To strengthen the approach used, the research applies intervention theory which is able to explain the relation of Turkey’s intervention to the threat toward its security or domestic stability which it perceives as a vital national interest. Indeed, the result of the research shows a finding that such perception of threat encourages Turkey to commit intervention in Syrian crisis. Turkey’s intervention aims to remove the leadership of Syrian current regime with that of Syrian opposition group in which it trusts to be capable of creating stability, controlling and restricting the political and military movement of Kurd groups in Syria.

The Disputes of South China Sea From International Law Perspective

<p align="justify">Disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) occur due to the seizure of mari- time regions of Spratly and Paracel islands, the regions which are rich in natural resources of oil and gas. Indonesia is not a claimant state to the features in SCS, but Indonesia has a vital national interest to the jurisdiction of waters of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf which overlaps with claims 9 dashed lines of PRC. In analyzing and resolving these disputes, the writer uses theory of law- based state as a grand theory, the theory of international law as a middle range theory, and theory of conflict resolution as an applied theory. The method is a normative legal research. The legal materials are collected based on the identifted list of problems/issues and are assessed according to the classiftcation of the problems. The legal materials are deductively managed to draw conclusions from the problems encountered, and are further analyzed to solve these problems. Conflict resolution to maritime territorial dispute can be achieved by legal means. The dispute settlement by legal means can be done through bilateral, multilateral, arbitration, to the International Court of Justice, while the dispute resolution through CBMs can be achieved through dialogue in international fora by applying the formula 6 + 4 + 2 or 6 + 4 + 1 + 1, and by conducting survey and research cooperation in the fteld of maritime.</p>

The cinema of Jacques Chirac: governing the French film industry, 1995–2007

During his two presidencies, Jacques Chirac was a vigorous advocate of France's system of state assistance to the film industry. The cinema, and culture more generally, were and are promoted by the country's political class as areas of vital national interest, usefully invoked in their relations with voters during and between elections. From 1995 to 2007, the President of the French Republic, working at different degrees of remove with Ministers of Culture in governments of right and left, repeatedly brought state attention to bear on the condition of French film production, distribution and exhibition. Beginning in 1995 with the possibility of enlisting culture as a means of addressing la fracture sociale, officers of state worked to devise means for French filmmakers to prosper through vagaries in the evolution of television broadcasting, to weather the storms of globalization, and take advantage of digital technologies threatening to throttle their revenue streams. Throughout these years, Jacques Chirac took the stage at home and abroad to advance and defend ‘a certain idea of France’ and the cinema's role in its culture.

Protection of “Vital National Interest” and Ethnoreligious Conflict: Western Balkan’s Unethical Political Economy, with an Emphasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina

Protection of “Vital National Interest” and Ethnoreligious Conflict: Western Balkan’s Unethical Political Economy, with an Emphasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina

A New Cold War? Missile Defenses, Nuclear Arms Reductions, and Cyber War

This study inquires whether the United States and Russia might be headed toward a new Cold War, at least with respect to certain aspects of their diplomatic-strategic behavior. Those aspects have to do with missile defenses, nuclear arms control, and conflict in cyberspace. Arguments pertinent to these three domains or issues are not necessarily transferable, as interpretations of trends in U.S.-Russian relations, to other aspects of their diplomacy and national security affairs. For example, one cannot necessarily infer the outcome of Russian-American relations over Syria, Ukraine, or Afghanistan based on prevailing tendencies in nuclear arms control or cyber war. Nevertheless, the examination of missile defenses, nuclear arms control, and cyber conflict may yield important insights about near- and longer term prospects, because: (1) each of these issues has been identified by both states as a matter of vital national security interest; (2), each issue offers a challenging mix of technical judgments and policy prescriptions; and (3) U.S.-Russian cooperation is a necessary condition for amelioration of the security risks in each of these issue domains, as well as in their possible areas of overlap.

Breaking Vicious Circle of the US-Russia Relations

Despite relative normalization of the US-Russia dialogue in early 2013 and their impressive cooperation on Syria and Iran later that year, the relations on the whole remain extremely fragile, volatile and at the same time stagnant. Their traditional agenda, based on arms control, is crumbling; leadership is both countries is not regarding positive US-Russian partnership as central for their vital national interests fulfillment; and the share of contradictions is growing. At best, this deprives the sides of many opportunities to advance their interests through cooperation. At worst, this could spark a new serious crisis by. The author argues that the fundamental problem of the US-Russia relations is their old-fashioned philosophy, centered on strategic deterrence and balancing. This philosophy, the paper claims, in its turn predetermines an agenda of the relations, which poorly reflects the real challenges that US and Russia face in the world of today and tomorrow. The author claims that the new philosophy of the US-Russia relations should be based not on strategic deterrence and strategic balance in a Cold war understanding, but on clear recognition that the sides need each other and need to cooperate in order to deal with real challenges and achieve real opportunities.

SEAPOWER AND SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA

The East China Sea (ECS) is gaining an increasingly central role in Sino-Japanese relations as it is crucial to the economic development and political affirmation of both countries, for whom the main sea routes crossing the ECS offer vital arteries for trade and energy imports. For the past year and a half, the ECS has attracted considerable international attention because of the flare-up of tensions over the sovereignty of the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. This small group of islands is also claimed by the authorities in Beijing and known in Chinese as Diaoyu. Is war looming? Are we seeing an escalation spiral that will ultimately set the two countries on a collision course? The article argues that the current tensions should be seen in the wider context of the increased strategic significance of the ECS. For there are two different types of disputes here. One concerns sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; the other concerns the demarcation of the Chinese and Japanese maritimeborders and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as defined by the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This distinction is important because sovereignty on land is different from sovereignty at sea. The former is connected to a vital national interest and historically, represented a primary reason for war. The latter focuses on functional rights over bodies of water included in the EEZ, not on the actual ‘ownership’ of the maritime realm. Accordingly, the article argues that seapower is going to play a crucial role in the projection of Japanese andChinese power and status in the ECS and in the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations more generally. Significantly, Naval Defence doctrines in both countries have evolved greatly over recent years.

The US-Russia Relations after the 'Reset': Pragmatism or a New Confrontation?

The US-Russia relations are entering a new political season in a shape which is far from being perfect. The “reset” is over, and throughout the years 2011 and especially 2012 the relations have worsened again. Political leadership of both countries is irritated and disappointed with each other. Unlike the last four years, neither Russia nor the US will invest much political capital in their relations improvement, and their relative priority will decrease in both countries’ foreign policies. The share of contradictions in the relations surpasses that of positive cooperation again. Yet, the paper argues, a new worsening of the US-Russia relations or their new stagnation over the next years is in neither side’s interests. The US and Russia still do have an important positive agenda to work on, which is crucial for both sides’ vital national interests. It includes, above all, Afghanistan and the Asia Pacific. The major impediment of progress on both dimensions, the author claims, will be in the near- and middle-term future a lack of political will on both sides to move the relations forward.

Policy Options in a Time of Transition: The US and the Israel-Palestine Conflict

After decades of unprecedented national concern and diplomatic mobilization, popular and policy interest in Israel's continuing settlement in the territories occupied in June 1967 has all but disappeared. This inattention is not a consequence of an American policy triumph, but rather the opposite. Observers of all persuasions agree that during its first term, the administration of President Barack Obama was singularly unsuccessful in leading a diplomatic process between the antagonists. It stood by as Israel continued to marginalize the PLO and expand settlements in occupied territories, even as the PLO focused on building a new, and at times troubled, relationship with Islamist forces ruling the Gaza Strip. On Obama's watch, policymakers and the public alike have surrendered to the passions that drive the conflict. Seemingly unable to affect the course of the conflict, and drawn to the more hopeful and dramatic narratives of the Arab Spring, the American public and policymakers alike have become bored with the problem between Israelis and Palestinians.But while the public may be forgiven for its lack of attention to, and interest in, the finer points of the conflict, policymakers are responsible for adhering to a more exacting standard. When the vital national interests of the United States are at stake, as they are in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, there is no credible excuse for inattention, much less for failure.President Obama has noted that the United States is in an of transition2 as it seeks to define and preserve its interests in a rapidly changing and sometimes revolutionary international environment. This article is both a response to these uncertain times and a guide for navigating them. It outlines a results-oriented paradigm for resolving the bitter antagonisms between Israelis and Palestinians that have eluded solution for decades. The article rests upon a new, if unremarkable assumption - that the United States, in order to advance its own interests, is obliged to draw a picture of the future of relations between Israel and a new state of Palestine and to lead the parties, as well as the international community, in realizing this vision.Notwithstanding the current policy malaise, nothing that has transpired in recent years is cause to alter the considered judgment that the resolution of the festering conflict between Israel and Palestine remains a critical and vital national security interest of the United States and a necessary prerequisite for fully realizing the uncertain promise of the Arab Spring. In order to act, and to convince others to act in concert, leaders need to be credibly committed to this unambiguous objective. As a new but uncertain era dawns in the Middle East and North Africa, the creation of a firm foundation for peace and security that includes the state of Israel living in peace and within recognized boundaries alongside the state of Palestine remains a core US interest.America's vital security interest in a solution was most cogently advanced by General James Mattis, commander of US Central Command, in March 2011:I believe the only reliable path to lasting peace in this region is a viable two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. This issue is one of many that is exploited by our adversaries in the region, and it is used as a recruiting tool for extremist groups ... The lack of progress also creates friction with regional partners and creates political challenges for advancing our interests by marginalizing moderate voices in the region. By contrast, substantive progress on the peace process would improve CENTCOM's opportunity to work with our regional partners and to support multilateral security efforts.3President Obama himself made the same point when he declared:It is a vital national security interest of the United States to reduce these conflicts because whether we like it or not, we remain a dominant military superpower, and when conflicts break out, one way or another we get pulled into them. …

The South China Sea Disputes: Is High Politics Overtaking?

The aim of this article is to examine the implications of high politics in the South China Sea disputes, which basically involve the United States, and other claimant countries, such as Vietnam and the Philippines on one side, and China on the other. The two main actors, namely China and the United States, appear to be re‐assertive. All the claimant countries are asking for their stakes, which involve their sovereignty, and sovereign and maritime rights. The fall‐out is the polarization of the stakeholders and greater military build‐up. Overt military confrontation is a remote possibility at the moment, mainly because of overriding considerations, such as interdependence in economy and a trend towards regionalism. Nevertheless, the array of sophisticated military forces and the vital national interests of the stakeholders in the Sea tend to portend a problematic frontier. This article indicates certain policy implications and attempts to develop the framework of a scenario that is likely to emerge premised on high politics.

The National security of France in White Papers on Defense. Continuity or change?

France after World War II was in a difficult situation. This involved a loss of position, not only as a superpower in the world but in Europe. Superpower, the global position of France, decided to rebuild, after the new president was elected in June 1959, Gen. Ch. de Gaulle. According to his conception of a foreign policy for France it should have a global dimension, supported by the independent French defense not only as a conventional but also nuclear power. Gen. Ch. De Gaulle took the position that France having regard to its independence in the political, military, economic and cultural center should not submit to any of the blocks. Independence in the foreign policy of France was understood as the freedom to determine their own place in the world, freely determine their fate, the defense of vital national interests and full freedom in the choice of ends, means and methods of foreign policy.

Recalibrating American Grand Strategy: Softening US Policies Toward Iran in Order to Contain China

Over the next decade, the United States will have to rethink its grand strategy as it addresses the challenge of maintaining its primacy as a global power in an increasingly multipolar world whose center of gravity has shifted to Asia. The task will be all the more daunting because significant fiscal and economic constraints imposed by a federal government debt that has mushroomed to nearly $16 trillion or about 100 percent of GDP, and a continuing economic slowdown that has been the deepest and longest since the Great Depression will force difficult tradeoffs as the United States seeks to realign and streamline vital national interests with limited resources. (1) The overarching national security objective of the United States must be crystal clear: to counterbalance and contain a rising China determined to be the dominant economic, political, and military power in Asia. While China's rise will not be a straight line, its trajectory to great power status is obvious. (2) A twenty-first century version of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with China at the epicenter is emerging. (3) China is the biggest economy in Asia, having surpassed Japan in 2010. (4) China is the largest trading partner of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, India, and the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Unquestionably, China is the economic engine of Asia, displacing both Japan and the United States. According to US government projections, China is expected to be the world's largest economy by 2019 in terms of purchasing power parity (which adjusts for cost of living) with a forecasted gross domestic product (GDP) of $17.2 trillion compared to an expected US GDP of $17 trillion. (5) From a strategic perspective, the Achilles heel of China is its overwhelming dependence on Persian Gulf energy imports to fuel its rapidly growing economy. The sea lines of communication (SLOCs) over which these vital oil and gas imports are transported by tanker--from the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, continuing on to the Bay of Bengal and through the Malacca Straits into the South China Sea--is China's jugular vein. Virtually all Persian Gulf energy exports destined for China (as well as for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) flow through this route. Two important alternatives to the Malacca Straits are the Sunda and Lambok Straits in Indonesia linking the eastern Indian Ocean to the Java Sea which continues to the South China Sea. Another key energy route flows from Saudi ports on the Red Sea (principally the port of Yanbu) to the Bab el Mandab in the Gulf of Aden proceeding on to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean and continuing to the Malacca Straits, or the Sunda and Lambok Straits. The five critical choke points--Hormuz, Bab el Mandab, Malacca, Sunda and Lambok--and the SLOCs linking them are controlled by the US Navy. China's economic and military security is inextricably intertwined with its energy security. Since 2000, China has been a net importer of oil and gas, primarily from the Persian Gulf. China became the world's largest energy consumer in 2009, with 96.9 quadrillion British thermal units (BTU) of annual energy consumption compared to 94.8 quadrillion BTU for the United States. (6) By 2011, China surpassed the United States as the largest importer of Persian Gulf oil, importing 2.5 million barrels per day (bbls/d) from the region (representing about 26 percent of total Chinese oil consumption of 9.8 million bbls/d), overtaking the United States which imported 1.8 million bbls/d from the Persian Gulf (representing about 10 percent of total US oil consumption of 18.8 million bbls/d). (7) In fact, over half of US oil imports come from three countries in the Americas: Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico, with Canada being the single most important foreign supplier. (8) The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that by 2030 oil imports, mainly from the Persian Gulf, will represent 75 percent of total Chinese oil consumption. …

How to Really Engage Iran: A Proposal

After the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), American public opinion understandably disfavored talk of negotiating with perceived enemies of the state. In this context, President Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign was criticized for its stated choice to engage Iran directly and to meet its president without preconditions. Thus, it became politically advantageous to appear tough with Tehran; the harrowing events of the Iran Hostage Crisis in the not-so-distant past added fuel to the fire. However, the ultimate question of how the world’s only remaining superpower may legitimately challenge Iran’s nuclear pursuits in accordance with international law must not be affected by changing political winds or by a Hollywood director’s choice of anti-American depictions. Thus, this Article first reviews U.S.-Iranian diplomatic history and principles of international law governing the use of force; to American eyes, Iran appears as a bulimic man with plenty of posturing though indeterminate intentions and nuclear weapon capabilities. Next, the Article looks to lessons learned from dealing with such “rogue” states as Cuba, North Korea and Libya. The Obama Administration’s first term foreign policy presages a continued stalemate with Iran, as Iran tends to not violate international law; moreover, Iran is unable to abandon one of its most vital national security interests. Finally, the Article suggests an alternative negotiation route. After decades of frayed diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran, the same-old strategies will predictably lead to only more frustration and continued deadlock. In this regard, the P5 1 should consider offering Iran the option of withdrawing from the NPT entirely or adhering to an NPT side letter that recognizes its nuclear weapons ambitions by enabling it to become a nuclear-capable state. Such a gesture of even-handedness has the collateral benefit of further revealing the parties’ intentions and improving regional peace and security.

Maintenance and achievement of national interests and security policy of the European Union

The objective of the research of connection between national interests and the security policy of the European Union is to perceive the possibilities of the Balkan states to preserve their identity and achieve their vital and permanent national interests by their membership in the European Union. According to the author, the implementation of the security policy of European Union is often opposite to one?s own national interests. However, a pragmatic question for political leaders is how to resolve the following dilemma: ?is the created european security identity more important at the moment than the preservation of immediate or some permanent national interests?? The author points to the fact that the notion of national interests is a variable both historically and theoretically. Political, economic, security and other objectives determine vital national interests in some historical periods. At the same time, not rarely, some states alter their strategies and objectives for their own interests assessing whether the conditions prevailing in the internal and external surroundings have changed. The author devotes special attention to a comparative analysis of defining, determining and conceptual determination of national interests from the aspect of national security policies of some important states and the European Union. The second part of the article contains an analysis of the response of a group of Macedonian experts to the questions pertaining to the possibility of preserving and achieving of national interests of the Republic of Macedonia through its membership in the European Union.

American Landpower and the Middle East of 2030

The Proverbial Debate As our current wars Iraq Afghanistan wind down, political deliberations in this country return to a familiar pattern. Intent on re-fighting the last a debate about future military strategy dominates the discussion. As in the past, the debate is sharpened by a budget ax suspended over the Department of Defense. The services anticipate funding cuts so deep as to allow for only one strategic approach to survival. And, as in the past, many approach the problem as bureaucrats defending turf, rather than as strategists objectively creating a military that will best serve the nation. These discussions risk overshadowing some of the most fundamental considerations necessary for developing a sound strategy--which threats will our nation most likely face and what will the military we retain be capable of doing. Even in a fiscal environment that foreshadows major reductions, elements of sound strategic planning remain invaluable. As military professionals, we need to examine threats to our national interests, current and future, and offer our best advice as to how these challenges should be addressed. If nothing else, the civilian leadership needs to be advised of those things that can and cannot be accomplished (without great cost or unacceptable risk) as a result of their decisions. This article frames a response to one future role of American land forces by examining the Middle East over the next twenty years. It begins by highlighting our enduring national interests in the region. It then considers potential threats to these interests, current and future, and attempts to assess their likelihood. Finally, those scenarios that require American ground forces are identified, along with the implications of these decisions. The intent is to provide a strategic perspective in a debate too often clouded by budgetary concerns and unnecessarily framed as an interservice, zero-sum game. The Problem with Predictions Any effort to forecast future conflicts is inherently a questionable endeavor. (1) If the past is any indication, the strategist is far more often wrong than right on the specifics. The work is doubly in jeopardy when the attempt is tied to a particular service and vulnerable to concerns of parochialism and bureaucratic interests. This article acknowledges these challenges, examining as it does the role of landpower in the Middle East for the next two decades from an Army perspective. This is not an attempt at perfect prediction nor are ground forces offered as the military panacea for all future contests in this region. There are, however, vital national interests at stake in the Middle East for the foreseeable future, and a wide range of threats to these interests. While informed observers may argue about the probability of one threat or another actually occurring, there is a general consensus regarding America's interests and the potential threats. There is little dispute that demand for petroleum will increase with the industrial expansion of China and India, or that demographic pressures and an overwhelmingly youthful population will increase political pressures on Middle Eastern regimes. The latent questions, then, are which of these threats requires a capability uniquely resident in American ground forces, and what does that mean for the Army in the current fiscal environment? While it may be impossible to predict with certainty the actions of a potential adversary, the experience of the last several conflicts has shown American ground forces, and the Army in particular, provide the nation with a set of capabilities that simply cannot be achieved solely from the other domains. Whether as a demonstration of American political intent through boots on the ground, a deterrent against the largely land-based forces of this region, a training partnership with current and future allies, or a force seasoned by a decade of war, American ground forces fill a vital and complementary role in the suite of options available to this nation in times of adversity. …

The Evolution of India's Look East Policy

This article tries to trace the evolution of India's Look East Policy, launched two decades ago, after the end of the Cold War. It analyses all the aspects of this policy, ranging from politico-strategic, economic, multi-lateral initiatives to its links with the region of Northeast. Structured within a theoretical paradigm, it goes on to establish that in the first decade of its inception, the policy had economic overtones guided by the neo-liberal policies of economic reforms adopted at home. But, gradually the strategic factors and security issues also gained due importance in the second decade, reflecting the neo-realist tinge of this policy. However, it concludes that now it is necessary that cultural diplomacy, using the instruments of soft power, should be of paramount importance in the region of Asia-Pacific for the Indian policy makers to secure its vital national interests. At the same time, it also underlines the need for a coordinated and a well thought out strategy, if it has to attain its desired objectives.

우리나라 운항환경을 고려한 소형 고속정의 타당성 분석

The Korea navy has a vital national interest in maritime security. The national strategy for maritime security focuses on preventing terrorism, crime, and hostile acts in the maritime domain. This requires the development of high speed crafts for maritime security in the South Korea domain. This paper reviews the state of the art on the development of high speed craft internationally, including efforts by the U.S. navy, and analyses the riverine environment to operate high speed crafts in South Korea. This paper makes specific proposals for high speed craft such as their main dimensions, speed, endurance, hull structure material, propulsion system, and general arrangement and 3D shape. This paper was used in the generation of basic resources for future ROC (requirement of capability) of high speed crafts using an engineering methodology.

Approaching the North: Norwegian and Russian foreign policy discourses on the European Arctic

The aim of this article is to identify Norwegian and Russian official foreign policy discourses on the European Arctic, and how perceived challenges are understood, framed and presented by the governments in their respective countries. The article makes use of discourse analysis to grasp how the Norwegian “High North” strategy is framed by the Norwegian government and, likewise, how the Russian approach to the European Arctic is framed by the Russian government. The empirical foundation is a study of primary texts such as white papers, official reports, speeches and strategies. We find that the Norwegian approach to the High North features in a powerful official discourse resulting from a robust and broad domestic discursive mobilization. The Russian approach is that of an increasingly assertive nation for which the zero-sum game and relative gains seem to be the main rationale, judging by the official discourse. The Russian approach is not as coherent or based on a broad discursive mobilization as in Norway’s case.We identify energy, security, the economy and the environment as key discursive nodal points that the foreign policy discourses of the two countries evolve around: we find that both countries regard the European Arctic’s potential as a future energy province to be the region’s most prominent aspect. The discourses show that energy is regarded to be of vital national interest, but the countries have differing perceptions on international cooperation. However, as the countries have some important common frames of references, a favourable climate for extended future cooperation could be further developed.