Virtue Of Prudence Research Articles

Adam Smith’s Virtue of Prudence in E-Commerce: A Conceptual Framework for Users in the E-Commercial Society

As founder of modern political economics and prominent theorist of the commercial society, Adam Smith’s importance is universally recognized. Little, however, has been done so far to develop Adam Smith’s virtue ethics in the context of modern business, characterized by digitalization. This article aims to rediscover Adam Smith’s virtue of prudence and its relevance for the “e-commercial society”: It presents a framework that considers the central place of prudence in the relationship between a prosperous e-commercial system and societal flourishing. In Smith’s view of the commercial society, prudence enables people to develop habits of character related to industriousness, genuineness, spirit of sacrifice, and self-command, which help in the conduct of a prosperous business activity. This article translates Smith’s virtue of prudence into a language typical of consumers in the current e-commerce scenario, considering their development as persons and the contribution of their activities to the good of society.

Medical Secrecy and the Development of Virtue in Medical Oncology Practice the Secret of Sugar Canes

This case concerns the reckless words of Doctor A., who, under the influence of alcohol, revealed the name and medical condition of Mr. L. at a social gathering. The patient learned about this event through a nurse who attended the party. The issue of medical confidentiality is very important in medical oncology practice. I decided for this reason to address this topic. The objective of this commentary is to analyze four ethical dilemmas concerning medical secrecy: Does a doctor have the duty to remain silent while off duty? How to resolve an ethical conflict? Is the extension of secrecy lawful? In addition, can confidentiality be violated in any circumstance? A broad ethical overview allows us to conclude that the duty of silence accompanies the doctor in all times of life. The nurse mismanaged this conflict. The secret can be shared, and it is relative because sometimes it is lawful to violate confidentiality. Finally, this article presents a fable about the virtue of prudence. This is applicable to medical oncology practice.

The Abuse of Conscience: A Century of Catholic Moral Theology by Matthew Levering

Reviewed by: The Abuse of Conscience: A Century of Catholic Moral Theology by Matthew Levering Peter Cajka Matthew Levering, The Abuse of Conscience: A Century of Catholic Moral Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2021), viii + 360 pages. Matthew Levering wants to know why conscience, important before the Second Vatican Council, became even more dominant in Catholic moral theology in the late twentieth century. His book seeks to understand, as he frames it, “why, in Catholicism, conscience so easily and stubbornly takes over the whole terrain” (11). Levering bats away confession as an answer to this smart question, observing how the sacrament has declined. He then quickly dismisses the debate over Humanae vitae as ground zero. The battle over contraception is often seen as a decisive moment in a supposed twentieth-century pivot from law to conscience. Instead, Levering provides a more creative and interesting story. Conscience sky-rocketed to a place of prominence in the late twentieth century on the wings of the existentialist surge in Continental and Catholic thought after important intellectual foundations laid by Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers in the 1940s inspired Karl Rahner, Joseph Fuchs, and Bernard Häring to infuse Catholic moral theology with existentialism in the 1960s and after. These important intellectuals began a turn towards conscience well before the 1960s. Then they inspired a generation of moral theologians to amplify conscience in Catholic tradition. Conscience remains important today. Levering’s book parallels the pathbreaking insights found in historian Edward Baring’s recent work, Converts to the Real: Catholicism and the [End Page 87] Making of Continental Philosophy, a book that shows how Catholics were crucial in spreading existentialism and phenomenology across Europe in the twentieth century, making it truly “continental.”1 The approach of infusing conscience with existential thought has been picked up and pursued most prominently in recent years by Jesuit James Keenan of Boston College. Levering’s intervention is historical and, as I explore below, also profoundly theological. Rahner, Fuchs, Häring, and Keenan are just four of the twenty-six figures that Levering profiles in his impressive book. Levering has assembled a cast of characters that includes allies with whom he agrees and detractors held up as problematic. Here is where Levering’s theological intervention begins to emerge. Those he counts as fellow travelers acknowledge the importance of conscience but do not make it the center of Catholic thought; the interlocutors he takes issue with place too much hope in conscience. Levering says the writers in this latter group place conscience “at the helm” of Catholic life (192). He disagrees with this inflation, and his book seeks to subordinate conscience to other concepts while still allowing it to maintain an important role in Catholic ethics. Levering desires a much more diverse set of foundations for moral theology. “The Catholic moral life,” Levering writes, “consists in a Christ-centered ethics of the inaugurated Kingdom of God, in which the spirit leads us in charity while also forming us in humility and prudence, while also enlightening our perception of the natural law” (13). In this system, Levering adds, “conscience will continue to have a significant role, but now with the virtue of prudence” (16). He asks the twenty-six figures to serve as tour guides through four chapters, each of which constitutes discrete realms of analysis: (1) conscience and the Bible; (2) conscience and the moral manuals; (3) conscience and the Thomists; and (4) conscience and German thought. Levering lifts up thinkers like Benoît-Henri Merkelbach, Michel Labourdette, and Joseph Ratzinger, who, according to his analysis, bring conscience under the influence of other components of moral life, particularly the value of prudence. That is one side of his ledger. On the other side, Levering writes about the aforementioned existentialists but also explores the work of Biblical scholars like Philippe Delhaye, manualists like Austin Fagothey, S.J., and Thomists like Eric D’Arcy. He displays the work of these scholars as examples of Catholic thinkers who attributed too much power to conscience. Each of these writers assigns subjectivity a capacity to shape perceptions of reality. Each places serious checks on the power of law to coerce conscience. [End Page 88] Levering says...

Hati Nurani

This article describes the meaning of conscience according to the definition presented by the Second Vatican Council in the light of Thomistic and Carmelite perspectives and explains the depth of this definition, in order to dispel misconceptions about the meaning of conscience that are widely circulated, and show its proper role in the edifice of moral theology. For this reason, this article elaborates on the harmonious correlation between the two dimensions of conscience, namely, synderesis and conscientia, as well as the harmonious correlation they have with the virtue of prudence which is perfected by the gift of counsel from the Holy Spirit. The pastoral aspect of this article is presented in the end by analyzing the importance of conscience revived by the Church as presented in the apostolic exhortation of Amoris Laetitia.

Intelligence, empathy, and memory: Exploring moral enhancement through gene editing, training, and computer–brain interfaces

In this research article, I seek to expand the conversation regarding moral enhancement by identifying traits or capacities that if enhanced would lead to an increase in moral behaviour. I decided to focus on the three capacities: intelligence, empathy and memory. These abilities do not necessarily lead to moral behaviour on their own; however, building on a study on the relationship of intelligence and morality, I argued that enhancing intelligence and empathy simultaneously allows for moral behaviour as an emergent property. Intelligence alone is not sufficient because even though greater intelligence leads to more prosocial behaviour, prosocial behaviour is not inherently moral. Empathy alone can lead to partiality, especially favouring those who are a part of one’s in-group. The virtue of prudence, practical wisdom, relies on more than intellect or reason; it requires lived experience in order to effectively deliberate. Memory provides intelligence with that information. There are a variety of ways in which human enhancement can be pursued. I chose to focus on three methods in this study: gene editing, training and computer–brain interfaces. Turning to the existing scientific literature, I attempted to find examples or potential ways in which intelligence, empathy and memory could be enhanced through these methods. Genetic examples are difficult given the complexity of multi-gene traits, and that heritability is only a small percentage of overall variance. Training these capacities has had limited success, and there is no consensus in the literature on how effective is the training. Computer–brain interfaces appear to offer potential, but some experiments have only just begun on human subjects, whilst other approaches are still being tested on other animals.Contribution: This article ends with an appeal to prioritise moral enhancements over other forms. Doing so allows for a great impact on society and a safer overall approach to enhancements.

Troska o depozyt wiary katolickiej a normy dotyczące osób duchownych i zakonnych występujących w środkach społecznego komunikowania

The role of the means of social communication in social and religious life is increasing. This is clearly shown by the pandemic situation. The author has undertaken an analysis of the canonical norms of CIC / 83 regulating the presence of clergy in radio and television broadcasts. The analysis focuses on their respecting the deposit of the Catholic faith. The norms of the universal Church and of particular Churches in Poland do not differ in their meaning and content. However, their ethical optics are aimed at disciplining media participants (while fully approving of the pastoral role of the media) and advising them to be cautious based on the virtue of prudence. It is important that the clergy expressing their views and opinions in public or participating in broadcasts and commercial programs have adequate knowledge and preparation, but most importantly that they are guided by prudence.

Nonviolent struggle between norm and technique

Standard stories about the development of the study of nonviolent struggle characterize the maturation of the field as moving from principle to pragmatics, norm to technique. This big story about the field’s development is crystalized in the supposed dichotomy between principled and pragmatic nonviolence; a dichotomy that though common sense for those teaching and researching the repertoires of nonviolent struggle occludes the elision of critical normativity. Through a genealogical retrieval of Gene Sharp’s reading of Max Weber, this article unsettles this story. I argue that the turn to technique in the study of nonviolent struggle is itself a normative turn. Redescribing the turn to technique as itself normative, however, is not enough for a comprehensive description of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle. I develop this insight further by arguing that a recovery of the virtue of prudence, or practical reason, is necessary for a full account of nonviolent struggle.

Key Physician Behaviors that Predict Prudent, Preference Concordant Decisions at the End of Life

Background This study introduces an empirical approach for studying the role of prudence in physician treatment of end-of-life (EOL) decision making. Methods A mixed-methods analysis of transcripts from 88 simulated patient encounters in a multicenter study on EOL decision making. Physicians in internal medicine, emergency medicine, and critical care medicine were asked to evaluate a decompensating, end-stage cancer patient. Transcripts of the encounters were coded for actor, action, and content to capture the concept of Aristotelian prudence, and then quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed to identify actions associated with preference-concordant treatment. Results Focusing on codes that describe characteristics of physician-patient interaction, the code for physicians restating patient preferences was associated with avoiding intubation. Multiple codes were associated with secondary measures of preference-concordant treatment. Conclusions Prudent actions can be identified empirically, and research focused on the virtue of prudence may provide a new avenue for assessment and training in EOL care.

On the Need for a Major Revision of Investopedia’s Article on Adam Smith

There is no Theory of the “Invisible Hand of the Market” in either of Adam Smith’s two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) or The Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith uses the terms on one page each of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations as a literary devise only, as pointed out repeatedly by Gavin Kennedy over a twenty year period. None of the two references refers to market prices and wages moving up and down to clear markets. The Invisible Hand appears one time in The Theory of Moral Sentiments as a metaphorical device used to explain why the rich nobles must supply their mass of servants with the necessities of life because, if they did not do so, then they would not have any servants to serve them on a daily basis in a wide variety of tasks. This has been pointed out numerous times by Gavin Kennedy. The Invisible Hand appears one time in The Wealth of Nations, again as a purely metaphorical devise to explain why merchants choose the domestic or home trade as opposed to the international or foreign trade, given equal or nearly equal returns, where, according to Benthamite utilitarian criteria, they should be indifferent between the domestic and international trade. The answer, given by Smith, was that the merchants choose the home trade over the foreign trade because they have a greater knowledge of, and expertise and experience in, the home trade relative to the international trade. They have greater confidence in their decisions in the home markets because they have greater knowledge of the home trade and far less knowledge in the foreign trade. This argument is an early version of J M Keynes’s weight of the argument analysis in his A Treatise on Probability (1921) in chapters 6 and 26. Thus, merchants benefit the home country through their desire to avoid the risk, ambiguities and uncertainties of the foreign trade, although that was never their intention, which was strictly a private concern. Thus, the home country gains greater GDP, as if by an Invisible Hand, by decisions made by private merchants who never planned to benefit the home country by their decisions. Again, as pointed out by Gavin Kennedy, there is no Invisible Hand of the Market operating here to equilibrate returns at the margin, since Smith had already made it clear that the returns were equal or nearly equal in both the domestic and foreign sectors. Other quotations taken from the Wealth of Nation/Theory of Moral Sentiments to support the Invisible Hand of the Market claim fail to recognize that Smith’s rationale for maximizing behavior by the “sober” people is Smith’s Virtue Ethics approach, based on the Virtue of Prudence and not Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian view of the maximization of utility. In other words, just as a runner in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is planning on winning the racing competition contest and the first prize, so the sober people are planning to win the economic competition. So who is the creator of the Invisible Hand of the Market concept? The creator of the Invisible Hand of the Market concept is none other than Adam Smith’s great intellectual rival, Jeremy Bentham, whose utilitarian views Smith, as a virtue ethicist, had to completely and totally reject. Bentham’s oscillating pendulum model represents the first application of a physics/engineering physics concept in economics, where the pendulum at rest is identified with an optimal position somewhere on the boundaries of the static and dynamic production possibilities frontiers. Only exogenous, external, outside shocks can create temporary disequilibriums which will gradually be self correcting through the market mechanism, which serves to naturally absorb the shocks like a cars shock absorbers through changing prices and wages. Bentham asserts, in contradiction to Smith, that the economic system is internally harmonious, since there are none of Smith’s projectors, imprudent risk takers, or prodigals creating internal, endogenous shocks like speculative financial bubbles created with the aid of the private bankers.

Comparing Orthodox (N. G. Mankiw) and Heterodox (M. Zafirovski) Economist Views of Adam Smith, the Invisible Hand of the Market, and Laissez Faire: Both Views Completely Overlook the Very Severe Detrimental Impacts on the Macro Economy Created by Smith’s Upper Income Class Prodigals, Imprudent Risk Takers, and Projectors

The degree to which Adam Smith’s view, that the opulence of any nation at the macro level was the result of, and was determined by, large numbers of “sober” people practicing the Virtue of Prudence, which Smith demonstrated in Part VI of the Sixth Edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1790 was connected to the practice of the other Virtues of Self Command( a combination of Temperance and Courage combined), Justice and Benevolence, was ever understood by any economist was severely questioned by Gavin Kennedy in the 21st century. Kennedy argued, in his books, journal articles, and Blog, titled “Adam Smith’s Lost Legacy”, that practically no living economist understood Smith’s approach. This can be confirmed by analyzing the assessment of Adam Smith made by a highly recognized Orthodox economist, N. Gregory Mankiw, and the assessment made by a highly recognized Heterodox economist, Milan Zafirovski. Both authors agree completely that Smith’s views of the economic process were based on some kind of rational economic man concept, which resulted in Smith’s promulgation of his doctrine of The Invisible Hand of the Market leading to the need for Laissez Faire policies, which, with a few exceptions, would result in private self(ish) interest being turned into a social maximum that benefited all. Kennedy simply pointed out that Smith’s extensive and detailed discussions of the economic damages done by Upper-Income Class Prodigals, Imprudent Risk Takers, and Projectors required the government to impose preventive measures, laws, sanctions, and penalties against this category of powerful private citizens in order to prevent severe detrimental impacts such as depressions and inflations from hurting the sober people. Needless to say, there are no discussions about such a group of people in either Mankiw’s account or Zafirovski’s account. The conclusion reached is the same as the conclusion reached by G. Kennedy-there is no current economist who understands what it was that Adam Smith was stating led to the wealth and opulence of nations.

Adam Smith’s Sixth Edition of <i>The Theory of Moral Sentiments</i> in 1790 was specifically devised to refute Jeremy Bentham’s 1787 attacks on Virtue Ethics and <i>The Wealth of Nations</i> as contained in his Utilitarian tracts <i>The Principles of Morals and Legislation and In Defense of Usury</i>

Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian tracts The Principles of Morals and Legislation and In Defense of Usury contains an explicit attack on Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations on pages 8-23 in chapter Two of The Principles of Morals and Legislation, as well as on pages 167-168 and 187-188.Bentham argues repeatedly on these pages that all systems of moral philosophy based on sympathy and antipathy are flawed. Bentham’s conclusion is that ethics can only be based on the principle of utility alone and nothing else. Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments is based on sympathy ,but not antipathy. However, the major foundation for The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the virtue of prudence, since ,without prudence, sympathy can’t be backed up with actions and none of the later virtues can be successfully implemented. Bentham’s Utilitarian maximizing utility concept has nothing whatsoever to do with the virtue of prudence and is intended to replace virtue ethics completely .If Utility maximization were related to,or a form of, prudence alone, then it would have been subject to Smith’s withering attacks in The Theory of Moral Sentiments on all ancient philosophies that were based on Prudence alone, such as those expressed by the Stoics, Cynics, and Skeptics. That would mean that Bentham’s Utilitarianism was merely a variation on a theme that argued Prudence alone was the only virtue and mean that there was nothing original or innovative in Bentham’s utilitarian ethics. Smith realized that Bentham’s position had nothing to do with prudence at all and was a system of thought that sought to ink psychological egoism explicitly to the possession of money alone as the only criterion for ethical consideration and action. Bentham’s major innovation,then, was to claim that money alone was the best measure of ,or proxy for,the successful maximization of utility since all men loved money for money’s sake alone all the time. This entails that all actions always lead to results that lead to an increase in one’s monetary, pecuniary or financial position or situation in life. Happiness and success in life are then functions of the capability of a decision maker to accumulate more money over time. . Smith successfully decimated Bentham’s attack on virtue ethics and repelled his attempt to undermine the virtue of prudence in the Sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments .Unfortunately, Smith’s metaphorical and incidental use of the term, Invisible Hand , one time in both books allowed Benthamite Utilitarian economists to seek to transform the self interest (shrewdness, frugality, parsimony, saving) of the virtue of prudence, expressed in the The Theory of Moral Sentiments by the example of an athlete using maximum and sustained effort( practice, training ,preparation, intensity, concentration, etc.) to win a racing competition and in The Wealth of Nations by the brewer,baker ,and butcher using maximum ,sustained effort to win an economic competition,as being a rejection of the virtues of benevolence and magnanimity .Nothing could be further from the truth, as winning both the racing and economic competition first, by winning the prize or making an economic profit or gain, is a necessary condition that must take place before one can engage in the virtues of benevolence and magnanimity second. Just as there is a division of labor and specialization of function in the economic realm,the application of the different virtues also is divided up and specialized in actual application. Adam Smith’s example of running a race emphasized the fact that, when preparing and training and running the race, the only virtue that could be applied was the virtue of prudence. It is simply impossible to train for and run a race to win if the racer is considering the interests of the other competitors in the race besides his own. In fact ,it is an oxymoron to argue that the racer needs to be simultaneously concerned about how he finishes the race and how others may finish the race .It is only after he has finished the race and won(lost) that the virtues of temperance, justice(fairness),benevolence and magnanimity can come into play. So it is also in the economic competition in the market place. It is the virtue of prudence that is especially applicable in the economic competition in the same manner that it was applicable in the racing competition .However, after the competition in the market place has been won(lost),the other virtues are to be deployed . It is a very severe error is to assume that Smith’s prudence is Jeremy Bentham’s maximizing utility. They are not the same and there is no connection between the two .Economists err because they have confused and conflated Smith’s virtue ethics conception of self interest with Jeremy Bentham’s conflicting utilitarian conception of self interest.

The University of Chicago’s Economics Department Approach Is Based on the Philosophy of Jeremy Bentham’s Rational Utility maximizer:It Has Nothing to Do with the Virtue Ethics Approach to Self Interest of Adam Smith in the Theory of Moral Sentiments or the Wealth of Nations

The University of Chicago’s Economics Department Approach Is Based on the Philosophy of Jeremy Bentham’s Rational Utility maximizer:It Has Nothing to Do with the Virtue Ethics Approach to Self Interest of Adam Smith in the Theory of Moral Sentiments or the Wealth of Nations

There Never Was Any Real ‘Das Adam Smith Problem.’ The Virtues of Prudence and Benevolence, Expressed As Love Your Neighbor As You Love Yourself (Self Love), As Proclaimed by Jesus Christ, Were the Main Foundation for Both of Smith’s Books

A major confusion has been going on among academics for about 2 and ½ centuries with respect to assessments of Adam Smith’s use of the term self-interest. Economists have been confusing the Virtue of Prudence, which incorporates self-love or self-interest, emphasized by all spiritual leaders and teachers, including Adam Smith, with Jeremy Bentham’s maximization of utility. The Virtue of Prudence has nothing to do with the maximization of utility, assuming that such a task could be accomplished, which is very doubtful, given the lack of sufficient knowledge to estimate probabilities and the utility of outcomes. There are three separate approaches involved. Adam Smith recognized the priority of prudence above all other virtues, which are related to the Virtue of prudence. Smith accepts Jesus Christ’s precise and concise summary, that you should love your neighbor as you love yourself. …you love yourself is the virtue of prudence. Love your neighbor... Is the virtue of benevolence. One must love one’s self first before one can love another. Jeremy Bentham’s maximizing utility concept means to love oneself only, especially one’s money, given that money is the best proxy to serve as a measure of utility, according to Bentham, which all men love. Bentham’s egoistic approach can be summarized as loving your money only. The altruist position directly conflicts with the virtue of prudence as enunciated by Jesus Christ and Adam Smith. The altruist position is that you only love your neighbor and not yourself. Altruism is not a virtue. Only in very extreme cases can the altruist position even be considered. Economists have very severely confused benevolence and altruism. The self-interest enunciated by Bentham is always expressed from an egoist position as being associated with the love of money. Financial, pecuniary, and monetary gain only is what Bentham is talking about when he uses the term to Maximize your Utility. Smith and Christ are talking about maintaining your body, health, and good fortune, so as to build up a surplus that can be used, given that the future is uncertain and vague. Money is a tool that will help one care for one’s self. The accumulation of money, for money’s sake, is condemned by both Christ and Smith. The severe deficiencies in economists' understanding of Smith appear very early in The Wealth of Nations on page 13. Smith presents what he would consider an obvious conclusion. The butcher, brewer and bread maker provide their goods for sale because they are prudent. They do not provide their goods for sale in the market because they are benevolent since it is impossible to be benevolent unless one has been successful first in selling one’s product. The first virtue that must be practiced successfully is prudence. Otherwise, there can be no virtue of benevolence later.

The Virtues of Prudence and Self-Command, not Jeremy Bentham’s Max U or the Invisible Hand of the Market, is Adam Smith’s Foundation for the Wealth of Nations

The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; 1790) is the foundation for the Wealth of Nations(1776).Smith recognized, like all other major spiritual and moral teachers, that Prudence is the most important virtue because nothing can be accomplished without it being applied successfully first. The virtue of Prudence applies in all facets of life. However, there were individual philosophers who rejected virtue ethics. One such individual was Jeremy Bentham (another was Karl Marx). Bentham sought to replace Smith’s Virtue Ethics with his Principle of Maximizing Utility. Bentham argued that only his principle of maximizing utility could support the study of ethics. Bentham attacked Smith’s Virtue Ethics approach in 1787 in the same fashion as J.Viner attacked Smith’s Virtue Ethics in 1927. Both Bentham and Viner argued that • Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (virtue ethics) is very flawed • Smith’s support of interest rate control laws and skewing of bank credit to the sober people and away from the prodigals,imprudent risk takers, and projectors (Bentham was a strong supporter and employee all his life of the major projector company, the British East India Company, which started the American Revolutionary War) was very ill advised • Smith’s analysis of the macroscopic impact that the prodigals, imprudent risk takers ,and projectors have on an economy,endangering the sober people, was incorrect because the prodigals, imprudent risk takers, and projectors were really just innovative entrepreneurs pursuing their own self interest • Smith never actually made a single advance in the field of economics (political economy) in his lifetime as all of the parts of his theory were already available from other, earlier sources, which he failed to acknowledge properly and cite Smith responded to Bentham’s two pronged attack in 1787 by rewriting major parts of the The Theory of Moral Sentiments so that its virtue ethics message would be fine tuned in order to target legislators and government officials, which would counter the utilitarian message of Bentham’s Defense of Usury and The Principles of Morals and Legislation. There was now a clear cut choice between two completely different ethical systems upon which to build capitalism. Smith envisaged a completely different approach to capitalism than Bentham. Like the inhabitants of Augustine’s Earthly City and Heavenly City,there were two opposing groups, the middle class sober people, who practiced virtue ethics, and the upper class projectors, imprudent risk takers, and projectors, who practiced utilitarian ethics. The proper role of government was to use legislation, law and sanction to prevent the upper class projectors, imprudent risk takers, and projectors from damaging the middle class, sober people. The Smith and Bentham views about the correct evolution of capitalism over time are as different as night and day. A major confusion among economists, except G.Kennedy, since Smith’s death in 1790,is to confuse the operation and impacts of the virtue of prudence with the Invisible Hand. It is simply impossible for any Invisible Hand of the market to conceivably operate unless the sober people completely dominate the political, economic, social and institutional levers of power. Smith’s comments about the Invisible Hand in Part IV of the Wealth of Nations are simply a repetition of his comments in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; 1790), about the racer in a running competition always doing his very best to win the race, being applied to those engaged in a comparable economic race doing the best they can to sell their particular products. This brings out a positive response from their competitors, who also run and train harder. This positive interactive feedback effect is referred to metaphorically as an invisible hand, although it is actually the result of all of the sober people simultaneously applying the virtue of prudence. None of this has anything to do with Bentham’s Max U utilitarian approach. Once the gain, profit, or savings has been won, it is now time to apply the Virtue of Self Command (the Virtues of Temperance and Courage) to invest to expand one’s business.The correct choice is not financial manipulation , stock market speculation or conspicuous consumption, but investment in physical durable capital goods, worker training,and inventories of intermediate parts and materials.Business success now allows one to apply the final virtues of justice (fairness, equity), magnanimity and benevolence as worker wages and benefits can be increased.The result is opulence for all.

The Role of the Virtue of Prudence in a Racing Competition and in an Economic Competition in the Market Place: Prudence Is the First and Only Virtue Applied in Both Situations

Just as there is a division of labor and specialization of function in the economic realm, the application of the different virtues also is divided up and specialized in actual application. Adam Smith’s example of running a race emphasized the fact that, when preparing and training and running the race, the only virtue that could be applied was the virtue of prudence. It is simply impossible to train for and run a race to win if the racer is considering the interests of the other competitors in the race besides his own. In fact, it is an oxymoron to argue that the racer needs to be simultaneously concerned about how he finishes the race and how others may finish the race. It is only after he has finished the race and won(lost) that the virtues of temperance, justice (fairness), benevolence and magnanimity can come into play. So it is also in the economic competition in the market place. It is the virtue of prudence that is especially applicable in the economic competition in the same manner that it was applicable in the racing competition. However, after the competition in the market place has been won (lost), the other virtues are to be deployed. It is a very severe error to assume that Smith’s prudence is Jeremy Bentham’s maximizing utility. They are not the same and there is no connection between the two. Economists err because they have confused and conflated Smith’s virtue ethics conception of self interest with Jeremy Bentham’s conflicting utilitarian conception of self interest.

TO BE PRUDENT, THAT IS TO FORESEE: SENECA THE YOUNGER’S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS ON THE VIRTUE OF “PRUDENTIA

One of the most important themes in the literary legacy of Seneca, a Roman stoic philosopher and tutor of young Nero, is the science on virtues. Withing its aretology there is the virtue of prudence, prudentia, whose definition is: facienda providere. By way of example, we may understand it as predicting the effects of, for instance, enacting a specific law. The virtue of prudentia refers also to proper counseling, actually in different situations: prudentia suaserit; it recommends to make good use of present times, to care for the future, think and deliberate. To live prudently means to live for the moment, to take advantage of our life time of in a good way.

Ethical character and prudence: analysis of the human act in clinical-ethical decisions

First, the mutual interiority that exists in every human action between its ethical and technical dimension is analyzed, more specifically in relation to health practice. It is established that by means of technical or ethical habits, or applying certain deliberative guidelines, alone it is not possible to discern between the goodness or not of a certain action. For this to be possible, it is necessary to adopt a personal perspective, both as regards oneself and when judging the actions of others. Secondly, then, the virtue of prudence is essential to choose the most best path in a specific context. This ethical habit is greatly influenced by the overall ethical character of the person and by their deliberative capacity and knowledge of ethical principles. With regard to the second, it is necessary to follow the usual ways by which the person makes decisions and considers a certain action as good or bad. Therefore, it cannot be pretend using technical decision-making methods health professionals will deliberate and make ethical decisions. In conclusion, it is necessary that the prudence of professionals be based both on the personal ethical character and on an analysis of ethical cases in consonance with the natural way in which human reason acts.

Adam Smith’s Very Brief Mention and Discussion of the Invisible Hand, In His <i>The Theory of Moral Sentiments</i> and <i>The Wealth of Nations</i>, Was Not Intended to Provide Any Theoretical Foundation for Any of His Analysis: Smith Regarded the Invisible Hand as an Unimportant <i>Obiter Dicta</i> Used for Metaphorical Purposes Only

Adam Smith’s Very Brief Mention and Discussion of the Invisible Hand, In His <i>The Theory of Moral Sentiments</i> and <i>The Wealth of Nations</i>, Was Not Intended to Provide Any Theoretical Foundation for Any of His Analysis: Smith Regarded the Invisible Hand as an Unimportant <i>Obiter Dicta</i> Used for Metaphorical Purposes Only

Adam Smith Was Consistent in Both the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations on the Role of the Concept of Self Interest: Das Utilitarian Economist View Is the Problem

Adam Smith was very consistent in both the Wealth of Nations and in The Theory of Moral Sentiments concerning the role of self interest in both books. Like all advocates of virtue ethics, the first virtue to be mastered had to be the Virtue of Prudence, which required that the necessary condition of being able to take care of one’s self and family first, one’s self interest, had to be met first before any other virtue could be satisfactorily mastered and applied. Smith assumed that readers of the Wealth of Nations had previously read his The Theory of Moral Sentiments first, so that they understood that the butcher, brewer, and baker all had to succeed financially first before they could consider the interests of others second. Only after a clear and large surplus had been built up by the butcher, brewer, and baker from their small businesses would it be possible to meet the interests of others through benevolence. There is simply no contradiction or inconsistency between Smith’s position, made all through the The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that prudence is the most important virtue and that all other virtues come second or after prudence (self interest). Smith though it obvious that we get our dinner from the prudent behavior (own interest or self love) of the butcher, brewer, and baker and not from the virtue of Benevolence because Benevolence can only be practiced if the butcher, brewer, and baker has been successful in his business in amassing a surplus. The butcher, brewer, and baker can’t practice Benevolence if they are suffering losses or merely breaking even. It is the Utilitarian economists of the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries who created the myth that Smith had been inconsistent and/or had made contradictions in the two books, because these utilitarian economists rejected Virtue ethics and sought to place Bentham’s conflicting definition of self(ish) interests in place of Smith’s self interests in the Wealth of Nations. This was accomplished by the deliberate misinterpretation of the butcher, brewer, and baker quotation to support their claim that Smith had created an Invisible Hand of the Market force, to replace Hobbes’s government force, as the force that was the social institution that regulated the conflicting self(ish) interests of all citizens in the pursuit of the virtue of justice, so as to prevent the war of all against all. Utilitarian economists claimed that Smith’s Invisible Hand of the Market was a natural force, whose results were due to completely voluntary exchange actions, whereas government force was unnatural and involuntary. Smith’s mythical Invisible Hand of the Market became the natural reconciler of all conflicting self(ish) interests. Thus, there was really no need for government at all.

Adam Smithhs Approach to Virtue Ethics Had Nothing Whatsoever to Do With the Invisible Hand of the Market

Adam Smith’s version of Virtue Ethics can be traced directly back to Plato (Socrates) and Aristotle. Smith basically skipped Aquinas and Augustine because they were also Catholic theologians, as well as philosophers. Referencing them would not have been looked upon kindly by the Scottish Presbyterian Church, of which Smith was a nominal member. Virtue Ethics, as a system of ethics, is completely independent of the issue of whether or not there is a personal God or of any religion. However, Virtue ethics is a system of ethics which is completely consistent and compatible with the writings of the ancient Israelite leaders, like David and Solomon, and Confucius, Buddha, Plato (Socrates), Jesus, Mohammed, Ramakrishna, and Gandhi, among others, who had applied some type of Virtue ethics approach. For Smith, the cement or glue that held any and all societies together was a commitment to implementing the virtue of Justice. At the personal level, the most important virtue for any individual was prudence. However, the virtue of prudence has absolutely nothing to do with self(ish) interest as exemplified in terms like “Laissez Faire”, “Invisible Hand”, or “Maximizing your Utility”. These terms are consistent with a form of ethics called utilitarianism, which Bentham and others put forth as a rival of, and replacement for, virtue ethics. There is no, and there can never be, any overlap between the two different systems.