Virtue Ethics Framework Research Articles

Right/Wrong: How Technology Transforms Our Ethics

Right/Wrong: How Technology Transforms Our Ethics

The Anatomy of moral agency: A theological and neuroscience inspired model of virtue ethics

VirtuosA (‘virtuous algorithm’) is introduced, a model in which artificial intelligence (AI) systems learn ethical behaviour based on a framework adapted from Christian philosopher Dallas Willard and brought together with associated neurobiological structures and broader systems thinking. To make the inquiry concrete, the authors present a simple example scenario that illustrates how a robot might acquire behaviour akin to the virtue of kindness that can be attributed to humans. References to philosophical work by Peter Sloterdijk help contextualise Willard’s virtue ethics framework. The VirtuosA architecture can be implemented using state-of-the-art computing practices and plausibly redescribes several concrete scenarios implemented from the computing literature and exhibits broad coverage relative to other work in ethical AI. Strategies are described for using the model for systems evaluation —particularly the role of ‘embedded evaluation’ within the system—and its broader application as a meta-ethical device is discussed.

How to Deter Financial Misconduct if Crime Pays?

Financial misconduct has come into the spotlight in recent years, causing market regulators to increase the reach and severity of interventions. We show that at times the economic benefits of illicit financial activity outweigh the costs of litigation. We illustrate our argument with data from the US Securities and Exchanges Commission and a case of investment misconduct. From the neoclassical economic paradigm, which follows utilitarian thinking, it is rational to engage in misconduct. Still, the majority of professionals refrain from misconduct, foregoing economic rewards. We suggest financial activity could be reimagined taking into account intrinsic and prosocial motivations. A virtue ethics framework could also be applied, linking financial behavior to the quest for moral excellence and shared flourishing. By going beyond utilitarian thinking and considering alternative models, we offer a fuller account of financial behavior and a better perspective from which to design deterrence methods.

Towards an Ọmọlúàbí code of research ethics: Applying a situated, participant-centred virtue ethics framework to fieldwork with disadvantaged populations in diverse cultural settings

This paper presents a participant-centred virtue ethics approach, the Ọmọlúàbí moral-ethical framework, which moves beyond researcher-centred reflexivity to incorporate participants’ moral virtues within a broader research ethics framework. It demonstrates a methodical application of the framework during research with rural Yorùbá communities in Northcentral Nigeria through the principles of continuity; adherence to local and national processes; adaptation to local ways of being and doing; and provision of tangible benefit. After proposing a conceptual approach for participant-centred ethics, the paper explores the tensions and complexities that may occur when attempting to reconcile diverse ethical traditions and provides practical suggestions for researchers who wish to conduct moral and ethical fieldwork in similar contexts. Ultimately, the paper argues for an integration of participants’ values and virtues within research ethics in order to affirm diverse ethical and intellectual traditions.

An Implementable Conversation Between Foucault and Chinese Virtue Ethics in the Context of Youth Social Work

Abstract Recently, virtue ethics has been increasingly considered as one of the most appropriate alternative ethical frameworks for youth social work internationally and in China. Extant literature has the tendency to emphasise cultural difference and neglect the universality of (virtue) ethics; instead, this article aims to inspire a balanced theoretical conversation on similarities between western (Foucauldian) and Chinese virtue ethics (mainly classical Confucianism and Daoism) supported by examples from case studies. Three areas are addressed: (i) similarities in the interior (personal) dimension and the exterior (relational) dimension of the self; (ii) the situational and universal features of virtue ethics, and the need for a reflective approach to balance both; and (iii) ethical cultivation of the reflective approach. These key themes add to a body of knowledge for the development of a virtue ethics framework for Chinese youth social work.

Was Snowden virtuous?

Professor Shannon Vallor’s theoretical framework of technomoral virtue ethics identifies character traits that can be cultivated to foster a future worth wanting in an environment of (mostly digital) emerging technologies. Such technologies and increased citizen participation in the new digital environment have reconfigured what is possible in policing and intelligence-gathering more quickly, perhaps, than sober and sensible policy reflection and formulation can keep pace with. Sensational and dramatic, seismic and devastating, the Snowden disclosures represent a particular expression of dissent against American intelligence community exploitation of emerging technologies in undertaking mass surveillance on a global scale. Responses to Snowden’s actions, and perceptions of the (dis)value of the disclosures he made, are polarized. Polar opposites equate to vices in the Aristotlean view that posits virtue as the middle way. Here, the theoretical framework of technomoral virtue ethics is used for objective evaluation of Snowden’s asserted motivations and documented actions against the benchmark of good cyber-citizenship that the framework describes. The fact that Snowden’s account is strongly disputed by the U.S. Government does not in and of itself invalidate a theoretical evaluation. It is not the probative value of Snowden’s account that is being tested, but how the narrative presented measures up to an ethical framework.

How to Be a Responsible Scientist. The Virtues in Max Weber’s Appeal to Scientists

ABSTRACT In Science as a Profession and Vocation, Max Weber presents a clear task to scientists: he claims that they have the responsibility to present uncomfortable knowledge to politicians, students and others to prompt them to reconsider their value judgments. This clear appeal is a welcome message in the current debates on the social and political role of scientists. It is especially interesting because it is at odds with acclaimed ideas about the role of scientists, such as those of Pielke, Flyvbjerg or Kitcher. Unfortunately, Weber’s sociological work, although it reflects this appeal to scientists in many respects, does provide a normative support for it. This article argues that a virtue ethical framework can be integrated into Weber’s position to strengthen the appeal for the scientist’s responsibility. I show that the obstacles to such an integration can be overcome by following MacIntyre’s modernized version of virtue ethics. The combination of Weber’s appeal and MacIntyre’s virtue ethics offers a well-founded position that is critical of current acclaimed positions on the political and societal role of the scientist and that provides a promising perspective in times of a looming fact-free politics.

Review of "Rhetoric technology and the virtues by Jared S. Colton and Steve Holmes," Colton, J. S., & Holmes, S. (2018). Rhetoric, technology, and the virtues. Utah State University Press

Discussions about communication and education have become focused on social justice in recent years, and with good reason. Social justice is at the forefront of many aspects of our daily lives in news, education, and even entertainment. As digital rhetoricians and educators, we have found ourselves looking for ways to work at the intersections of our field and social justice to improve both learning experiences and networked communication in non-academic contexts. This work is both timely and needed, as the hierarchies and inequities experienced in "real life" often translate to, and are amplified by, networked and digital forms of engagement. Fortunately, Rhetoric, Technology, and the Virtues offers an insightful and practical discussion about ethical frameworks that contribute to our understanding of digital social justice. Colton and Holmes persuasively argue for the value of Aristotle's virtue ethics, especially the idea of hexis , as a model for empowering students, educators, and others to enact digital social justice. As they explain, Aristotle identified virtues "such as patience, courage, temperance, and liberality" that contribute to ethical behavior and "are developed not solely through reason or by learning rules but through practice of the emotional and social skills that enable us within a community to work toward...human flourishing and general well-being" (p. 32). An essential part of Aristotle's framework is hexis , a person's disposition that has been crafted through habit and repeated practice (p. 11). Colton and Holmes effectively demonstrate how a virtue ethics framework can empower individuals to take ownership of the ethical implications of digital practices. Throughout the book, Colton and Holmes address familiar topics in digital rhetoric ranging from captioning (pp. 3--5, 49--73), remixing (pp. 74--94), and issues inherent in online activism (pp. 95--126).

Critical thinking in nursing clinical practice, education and research: From attitudes to virtue.

Critical thinking is a complex, dynamic process formed by attitudes and strategic skills, with the aim of achieving a specific goal or objective. The attitudes, including the critical thinking attitudes, constitute an important part of the idea of good care, of the good professional. It could be said that they become a virtue of the nursing profession. In this context, the ethics of virtue is a theoretical framework that becomes essential for analyse the critical thinking concept in nursing care and nursing science. Because the ethics of virtue consider how cultivating virtues are necessary to understand and justify the decisions and guide the actions. Based on selective analysis of the descriptive and empirical literature that addresses conceptual review of critical thinking, we conducted an analysis of this topic in the settings of clinical practice, training and research from the virtue ethical framework. Following JBI critical appraisal checklist for text and opinion papers, we argue the need for critical thinking as an essential element for true excellence in care and that it should be encouraged among professionals. The importance of developing critical thinking skills in education is well substantiated; however, greater efforts are required to implement educational strategies directed at developing critical thinking in students and professionals undergoing training, along with measures that demonstrate their success. Lastly, we show that critical thinking constitutes a fundamental component in the research process, and can improve research competencies in nursing. We conclude that future research and actions must go further in the search for new evidence and open new horizons, to ensure a positive effect on clinical practice, patient health, student education and the growth of nursing science.

Phronesis in administration and organizations: A literature review and future research agenda

AbstractPhronesis is essential for good decision‐making and actions. This literature review shows how phronesis has been discussed and related to elements of the field of administration and organizations. A search in the database systems Scopus, EBSCO, Web of Science, and Scielo, based on eligibility criteria, resulted in 43 theoretical and 14 empirical works. The analysis of these studies showed the most significant empirical contributions, the most cited authors, methods, journals, and central themes addressed in studies on phronesis to understand ethics in business. From a virtue ethics perspective, we discuss the major theoretical and empirical contributions, as well as the implications of a restricted understanding of phronesis when it is treated apart from other elements of the virtue ethics framework. We present a synthesis of the concepts of phronesis, based on dimensions of magnitude and amplitude of the conceptions, ranging from formal to substantive phronesis, and covering individual, organizational, or societal levels of analysis. We argue that a substantive conception of phronesis within virtue ethics may improve our understanding of ethics because it assumes the interdependence of phronesis and moral virtues, integral anthropology, and the common good. We present a future research agenda, considering the study's limitations and findings.

A More Virtuous Understanding of Sex

To strengthen a Christian understanding of sex, this article uses the framework of virtue ethics to show how males and females can flourish in distinguishable ways. It shows a positive rather than a negative vision for sexual complementarity since humans tend to gravitate toward beauty. In so doing, it contributes to the complementarian-egalitarian debate which has come to a standstill. Some have tried to bypass the debate by proposing new avenues of conceiving of the divide, yet such proposals fail to convince those entrenched within their exegetical, theological, and social positions. A virtue-centered approach to the debate may breach the impasse and will provide a more accurate account of sex. Specifically, this article argues that motherhood and fatherhood form the essential difference between the sexes and points to humanity’s telos.

From Ethics to Ethos: An Expanded Agenda for Counsellor Training and Development

The publication of the Psychotherapy and Counselling Federation of Australia’s ([PACFA], 2017) Code of Ethics contains several features that are frequently absent from similar professional codes. Most notably, PACFA’s Code extends its professional requirements beyond the regular ethical standards for compliance and towards an articulation of the profession’s ethos through its commitment to clients, personal qualities of its members, and its acknowledgement of the complexity of practice. This theoretical paper explores the significance of the concept of ethos that has been articulated within PACFA’s Code, and considers how this concept might expand the research and practice agenda of educators and supervisors of counsellors and psychotherapists. The paper takes the position that the framework of virtue ethics provides a useful augmentation to the existing models of ethics, and uses this framework to explore models for professional identity development and personal character development in therapists.

Listening to People: Using Social Psychology to Spotlight an Overlooked Virtue

AbstractI offer a novel interdisciplinary approach to understanding the communicative task of listening, which is under-theorised compared to its more conspicuous counterpart, speech. By correlating a Rylean view of mental actions with a virtue ethical framework, I show listeners’ internal activity as a morally relevant feature of how they treat people. The listener employs a policy of responsiveness in managing the extent to which they allow a speaker's voice to be centred within their more effortful, engaged attention. A just listener's policy of responsiveness avoids unwarrantedly dismissing speakers’ messages on the basis of peripheral attention alone.

Reconceptualizing the Electronic Health Record for a New Decade: A Caring Technology?

Since the 2009 publication by Petrovskaya et al on, "Dilemmas, Tetralemmas, Reimagining the Electronic Health Record," and passage of the Health Information Technology for Economic Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, 96% of hospitals and 78% of providers have implemented the electronic health record. While many positive outcomes such as guidelines-based clinical decision support and patient portals have been realized, we explore recent issues in addition to those continuing problems identified by Petrovskaya et al that threaten patient safety and integrity of the profession. To address these challenges, we integrate polarity thinking with the tetralemma model discussed by Petrovskaya et al and propose application of a virtue ethics framework focused on cultivation of technomoral wisdom.

Author Court D. Lewis Meets Critics on Repentance and the Right to Forgiveness

Court D. Lewis, author of Repentance and the Right to Forgiveness, presents a rights-based theory of ethics grounded in eirenéism, a needs-based theory of rights (inspired by Nicholas Wolterstorff) that seeks peaceful flourishing for all moral agents. This approach creates a moral relationship between victims and wrongdoers such that wrongdoers owe victims compensatory obligations. However, one further result is that wrongdoers may be owed forgiveness by victims. This leads to the “repugnant implication” that victims may be wrongdoers who do not forgive. Author Lewis addresses the “repugnant implication” by showing that victims are obligated to work toward forgiveness, if not forgiveness itself. Critic Gregory L. Bock argues that victims are not the only ones who can forgive, that the personal dimensions of forgiveness are overlooked, and that the force of the “repugnancy implication” may be questioned. Instead of rights-based eirenéism, Bock supports a virtue ethics framework. Instead of rights-based eirenéism, Bock encourages virtue ethics. Critic David Boersema raises questions about the binding nature of relationships, the dependency of flourishing upon forgiveness, and the nature of needs or rights. Boersema also questions the wisdom of a rights-based approach to forgiveness. Critic Jennifer Kling asks whether a rights-based approach is necessary to ground obligations to meet the needs of others: why not an ethics of care? If a rights-based approach is taken, perhaps a wrongdoer is obligated to not make forgiveness a life good. By disengaging this obligation, we avoid constraining a victim’s work toward forgiveness, especially when the wrongdoing is oppressive. Author Lewis responds to these objections.

Narrating Catastrophe, Cultivating Hope: Apocalyptic Practices and Theological Virtue

Apocalypticism has been widely denounced as a framework that devalues the world and its history, funding moral dualism. While this is certainly true of many forms of apocalypticism, it is not an accurate understanding of ancient apocalyptic texts. This article establishes a framework of theological virtue ethics drawn particularly from Herbert McCabe, in which human rationality and Christian morality are understood as political, linguistic, narrative, bodily and sacramental. From within this framework, Anathea Portier-Young’s work is considered, relating early Jewish apocalyptic to trauma theory and describing how these texts narrated socio-political catastrophe in order to open up possibilities of resistance and hope. These considerations point us towards a constructive understanding of apocalyptic imagination and praxis within a political, linguistic, narrative, bodily and sacramental framework. Contemporary employments of Afro-pessimism in Black theology, particularly in J. Kameron Carter, then interrogate the proposed apocalyptic imagination, asking whether Christian apocalyptic praxis can cultivate hope in the face of the catastrophe of modern racism.

The ethics of HRD practice

ABSTRACTProfessional fields are guided by the search for reasoned answers to the question of what to do, and this both in the exercise of daily practice and in the education and training of future practitioners. In educational theory and in management, the framework of virtue ethics has received much attention as an alternative to duty-based and result-oriented approaches of considering what to do in professional practice. Virtue ethics dates back to Greek philosophy and is concerned with practical wisdom, defined as acting virtuously in pursuit of a good and worthwhile form of living. This article outlines the major tenets of virtue ethics in the context of working and work organization and posits that the focus on practical wisdom should be seen as a central concern of HRD practice and HRD education.

Chrononormativity and the community of character: a queer temporal critique of Hauerwasian virtue ethics

ABSTRACTThis essay critically examines Stanley Hauerwas’ ecclesial-based virtue ethics, arguing that his account of formation risks foreclosing differences that exist within Christian community. Placing Hauerwas’ virtue ethical framework in conversation with queer theoretical work on temporality, turning to Elizabeth Freeman’s notion of chrononormativity and José Esteban Munoz’s critique of straight time, and with Kathryn Tanner’s theological work on culture, this essay demonstrates how Hauerwas’ account narrowly assumes what community and character does and should look like, and in doing so relies upon and reproduces a logic that undermines and ultimately oppresses difference – through assimilation, normalization, and exclusion. This essay also explores constructive resources queer temporality might offer for a virtue ethical framework that avoids difference-foreclosing normalization. Placing Muñoz in conversation with Dietrich Bonhoeffer, this essay proposes an apophatic anti-telos that shifts focus from a prescriptive telos seeking success and stability to a horizon of eros and encounter.

Character ethics and interprofessional practice: Description and analysis

Abstract To be an effective interprofessional clinician, one must consistently practice essential character traits of courtesy, curiosity, and courage. This assertion is derived from many years of observation and practice by the authors within a variety of healthcare settings. The background for this analysis includes references to trends in interprofessional education and practice, workplace incivility, and group function. The traits are defined and analyzed within a framework of virtue or character ethics. How each trait provides necessary checks and balances to the others is discussed.

The Virtues and Vices of Innovators

Innovation processes are extremely complex and opaque, which makes it tough or even impossible to govern them. Innovators lack control of large parts of these developments and lack of foreknowledge about the possible consequences of emerging technologies. Because of these features some scholars have argued that innovation processes should be structurally reformed and the agent-centered model of responsibility for innovation should be dismissed altogether. In the present article it will be argued that such a structural idea of responsible research and innovation presumes rational agents who can be motivated by reasons. Instead of dismissing the agent-centered approach to responsibility for innovation processes a virtue ethical approach will be developed. Virtues should be considered as the intellectual and moral dispositions presumed for good decision making. It will be shown that creativity and eagerness are creditable character traits that have a distinct positive value for managing the opaqueness of innovation processes. Such traits are mandatory for change and betterment. Furthermore, it will be argued that the notion of responsibility of innovators should not be understood merely as means for constraining them but also as a tool to perpetuate their integrity and happiness. Through discussing the captivating examples of Steve Jobs and the protagonist of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein it will be shown how to apply this virtue ethical framework for innovators in practice.