Violent Non-state Groups Research Articles

Bridging the Norms of Counter-Terrorism and Responsibility to Protect: Countering the Proliferation and Activities of Armed Groups in Nigeria

Abstract How do we achieve the protection of vulnerable civilians from violent non-state actors in Nigeria? This article argues that despite the seemingly different approaches of Responsibility to Protect (r2p) and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, both can align at an intrastate implementation level to protect exposed communities from armed groups. The UN’s adoption of a people-centric approach to counter-terrorism (ct) and the preventive measures against heinous crimes instituted in pillars one and two of r2p creates the space for this cooperation. This article further shows how practitioners can integrate both regimes with local networks to provide a holistic civilian protection strategy. This approach encompasses international, state, and local agency in halting the proliferation and activities of violent non-state groups. I espouse a framework for the protection of vulnerable Nigerian populations based on three factors – community self-protection, economic well-being, and ideological reorientation.

The Logic of Illicit Flows in Armed Conflict

ABSTRACTWhy is there variation in how violent nonstate groups interact in armed conflict? Where armed conflict and organized crime converge in unstable regions worldwide, these groups sometimes enter cooperative arrangements with opposing groups. Within the same unstable setting, violent nonstate groups forge stable, long-term relations with each other in some regions, engage in unstable, short-term arrangements in others, and dispute each other elsewhere. Even though such paradoxical arrangements have intensified and perpetuated war, extant theories on group interactions that focus on territory and motivations overlook their concurrent character. Challenging the literature that focuses on conflict dynamics alone, the author argues that the spatial distribution of illicit flows influences how these interactions vary. By mapping cocaine supply chain networks, the author shows that long-term arrangements prevail at production sites, whereas short-term arrangements cluster at trafficking nodes. The article demonstrates through process tracing how the logic of illicit flows produces variation in the groups’ cooperative arrangements. This multiyear, multisited study includes over six hundred interviews in and about Colombia’s remote, war-torn borderlands.

Fighting for survival: responding to state capacity and terror group end

ABSTRACT The well-established argument in the literature suggests that the higher state capacity is associatedwith the lower chance of experiencing civil conflict or higherchance of defeating the violent non-state groups. However, theliterature does not sufficiently address how these groups respondto increasing state capacity, and how their responses to that shapethe dynamic of political violence. I investigate the impact of statecapacity on terrorist group termination by exploring the waysterrorist groups respond to increasing state capacity. I argue thatincreasing state capacity might lead to a set of responses fromthe terror group in a way that it might induce the group to producemore terrorist violence to show that the group can still persist. Itmay also encourage the group to provide positive and negativeincentives to its constituents in order to rehabilitate its physicalcapacity to operate, and to prevent a shift of popular support a wayfrom the group towards to the government. Thus, such responsesof the group will decrease the likelihood of its terror campaign. Ialso expect that these arguments are especially relevant for ethnicor religious terror groups. The results of the empirical analysessupport these theoretical expectations.

Emerging Transnational Self-Defense Norms & Unrealized Liberal Values

This Chapter critiques emerging norms regarding the use of alleged defensive force by powerful states against violent non-state groups located in the territory of other, typically weaker states, sometimes called “transnational self-defense.” Although the contemporary international legal system now formally and universally embraces basic liberal values of sovereignty, equality, and liberty/autonomy, emerging transnational self-defense norms effectively perpetuate a system of de facto inequality traceable to an earlier era. The use of armed conflict paradigms and war measures against “terrorist” groups, including targeted killing in what is effectively preemptive or preventive self-defense, perpetuates a discriminatory international system wherein sovereignty and humanity are deemed equal only between so-called “civilized” nations and peoples. Properly understood, the self-defense principles of necessity and proportionality require that states: (1) resort to defensive measures only when necessary to protect lives and property from relatively certain, significant harm and (2) use only the amount of force which is strictly necessary to neutralize the threat that is reasonably believed to exist at the time force is used. Because self-defense principles constrain both the resort to force and the nature of any force used, the alternate norms posited here do not implicate contested issues involving the extraterritorial application of international human rights law.

Violence amidst Virus: A Game-Theoretic Exploration of Conflict during a Pandemic

This paper explores how the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting conflicts world-wide. On one hand, confrontation would expose both states and violent non-state groups to contamination, potentially causing massive loss of human lives. Moreover, attacks aimed at signalling discontent or making bigger demands, are unlikely to generate media and diplomatic attention at the level it otherwise would have, sans the pandemic. Hence there might be mitigation in the intensity of conflicts. On the other hand, the capacity of the states to retaliate will, to a large extent, be compromised, since huge financial and human resources will have to be dedicated to fighting the widespread health and economic effects of the pandemic. Hence the belligerent groups may have a greater incentive to launch attacks. This paper attempts to game-theoretically study these various issues and incentives facing the conflicting parties, under the threat of COVID-19. We consider the simple conflict model by Hirshleifer (Hirshleifer, 1995) and augment it by introducing possible effects that a raging pandemic might impose on the conflicting parties. Specifically, we introduce positive and negative externalities that a pandemic may impose on an existing conflict and explore parametric conditions under which it is likely to aggravate or mitigate. We find that conflicts are generally likely to lessen but may increase under specific circumstances. We present some narrative evidence on how conflicts seem to have ameliorated in a pandemic-stricken world.

Dynamics of insurgent innovation: How Hezbollah and other non-state actors develop new capabilities

Few issues are more important to security-studies scholars than understanding how violent non-state groups innovate. To shed new light on this subject, we examine Hezbollah’s innovations and the underlying processes that produced them. Based on this case, the most successful violent non-state groups are arguably those that systematically pursue incremental innovation. Although less dramatic than their discontinuous counterparts, a commitment to steadily improve an organizations' tactics and techniques can have dramatic effects. Indeed, even Hezbollah’s remarkable performance during the 2006 Lebanon War is attributable to the perfection of techniques utilized since the organization's inception. While innovations were incremental in character, a bottom-up process of learning and experimentation by field commanders was critical to generating most of these innovations. If generalizable to other violent non-state actors, these findings suggest that the most formidable insurgent and terrorist groups will actually be those that relentlessly pursue incremental innovations in a bottom-up fashion.

The Future of the U.S. Diplomatic Representations after the Case of Benghazi: The Brittle Relationship between Security and Diplomacy

ABSTRACTOne of the conditions for the development of diplomacy is the existence of a peaceful climate. To create this, diplomatic missions and agents should enjoy some privileges and immunities granted by the receiving state. Since the late 1970s, the emergence of violent non-state groups is changing the conception of security, and this transformation has a direct effect on diplomatic relations. We have selected three crises that span the relationship between diplomacy and security between diplomacy and security. The first one occurred in 1979 in Tehran, the second started in 1983 in the Lebanon finishing in East Africa 15 years later, and the last of these crises took place in Benghazi, with the attack on the American consulate in 2012. Each crisis has caused a shift in the paradigm of diplomatic security. The measures adopted by the U.S. Department of State to prevent future attacks, far from solving the problem, are threatening the future of diplomacy.

Explaining Patterns of Urban Violence in Medellin, Colombia

Latin America is one of the world’s most violent regions, with 40 of the 50 most violent cities, but with only 8% of the world’s population, and a staggering 33% of global homicides. At the forefront of these high levels of violence are gangs that are more flexible and persistent than previously thought. This paper provides a discussion on gangs in one Latin American city, Medellin, Colombia, where different non-state groups have contributed to changing patterns of homicide rates. The paper presents preliminary findings to show how, despite the city experiencing a 90% reduction in homicide rates in less than 25 years, violent non-state groups have become embedded as part and product of their environment, acting as coherent, logical and functional players, linked to the structural inequalities and institutional fragility of the larger society.

The Geography of International Terrorism: An Introduction to Spaces and Places of Violent Non-State Groups. By Richard M. Medina and George F. Hepner. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013.

The Geography of International Terrorism: An Introduction to Spaces and Places of Violent Non-State Groups. By Richard M. Medina and George F. Hepner. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013.

Why They Join, Why They Fight, and Why They Leave: Learning From Colombia's Database of Demobilized Militants

For nearly ten years the Colombian government has systematically debriefed men and women who have left the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other violent extremist organizations. Today, the Colombian government maintains a database of more than 15,000 digitized interview transcripts—the largest of its kind in the world. With the proper enhancements and analysis, the database can provide critical insights into topics such as extremist recruitment, motivation, information operations, intelligence activities, leadership, and tactical and operational adaptation and innovation. Although Colombia's political violence is unique in many respects, further research using the database contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of insurgency in other regions. Ultimately, this research could enhance efforts to prevent recruitment into, and encourage current members to exit from violent non-state groups, such as gangs, terrorist groups, militias, and drug trafficking organizations.

The Dynamics of Base State Coercion: Exploring the Relationship between Violent Groups and Their 'Hosts'

Violent non-state actors continue to present significant challenges within the international system. These groups create a base within a state’s sovereign territory, and with or without the support of this base state, proceed to mount conventional attacks, insurgencies, and terrorist campaigns against other states. These targeted states can potentially combat this threat by employing coercive tactics against the base state where these groups reside. This paper examines the dynamics of base state coercion and explores when and under what conditions states that base violent groups can be coerced to clean up their own backyard and contain the activity of these violent non-state actors. I argue that by exploring the relationship between the base state and the violent group, and assessing the magnitude of effort required by the base state to alter its relationship with the violent non-state group, it is possible to determine the likelihood of coercive success. The relationship between the base state and the violent group is shaped by two variables: the foreign and domestic interests of the respective actors. An analysis of these elements underscores the significant costs to be borne by the base state if it complies with the coercer’s demands. Ultimately, the magnitude of these costs greatly impacts the probability of success. Finally, this paper explores the larger policy implications for employing this distinctive coercive strategy.

Armed Conflicts and Security of Oil and Gas Supplies

The paper offers a systematic analysis of the impact of international or civil wars and violent non-state groups on global oil and gas supplies. Statistical evidence points to the fact that international wars are becoming increasingly rare, while civil wars remain frequent. The paper discusses the cases of the Iraq-Iran war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, showing the limits to the damage that belligerents were able to inflict on oil installations and illustrating how the world was able to compensate for this damage. The Iraqi insurgency following international intervention to replace the Saddam Hussein regime is discussed together with other cases of civil wars in Nigeria, Angola and Sudan. The analysis supports the conclusion that oil and gas installations appear to be much more resilient to armed conflict than is normally acknowledged. History shows that civil wars have caused limited damage to existing installations, but they have hindered the desired investment in new development and attainment of target production levels. However, it is very obvious that government’s inability to overcome or reabsorb violent opposition discourages international oil company investment even if the violence does not affect the areas around oil and gas installations. * Giacomo Luciani is Director of Gulf Research Centre Foundation. CEPS Working Documents are intended to give an indication of work being conducted within CEPS’ research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the field. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent any institution with which he is affiliated. Research for this paper was carried out in the context of the SECURE project (Security of Energy Considering its Uncertainties, Risks and Economic Implications), funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme. The project develops appropriate tools for evaluating the vulnerability of the EU to the different energy supply risks, and for promoting the optimisation of EU energy insecurity mitigation strategies, including investment, demand side management and dialogue with producing countries.

The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups

It is widely recognized that the security of states are strongly influenced by the internal policies of other states. Although states threatened by the internal policies of an adversary often consider the use of coercive instruments to compel a change to the policy, I argue that a dilemma arises in the use of harsh punishments that renders them unattractive and incredible. I analyze this compellence dilemma in the situation where a state is targeted by a violent non-state group that is hosted by a second state. Thus, the security of the state targeted by the group is threatened by the host state's provision of an international base for the group. I argue that although harsher punishments make cooperation with the target state against the group more attractive for the host, they are also destabilizing and make the host a less capable agent in the future. I analyze the compellence dilemma with a three-player infinitely repeated dynamic game in which the actors play stationary Markov strategies. I find that the existence of the compellence dilemma is pervasive in equilibrium and often prevents the target from utilizing a harsh punishment even when such a punishment would compel the host to cooperate. Concerns about future capacity and group power drive this result.

Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State

Several violent non-state groups also administer social services. Although earlier works stress the effects of social service provision on support and sympathy for violent groups, this article emphasizes a broader challenge. Namely, social welfare organizations threaten to rob the state of the legitimacy it derives through the social contract. Abolishing these organizations can cause humanitarian crises, radicalize populations, and erode domestic and international policy support. Ignoring them invites the continued erosion of state power. The way out of this dilemma is through a strategy of “displacement,” whereby the state eradicates non-state social services while concurrently extending its own welfare capacity.