The Dynamics of Base State Coercion: Exploring the Relationship between Violent Groups and Their 'Hosts'

Abstract

Violent non-state actors continue to present significant challenges within the international system. These groups create a base within a state’s sovereign territory, and with or without the support of this base state, proceed to mount conventional attacks, insurgencies, and terrorist campaigns against other states. These targeted states can potentially combat this threat by employing coercive tactics against the base state where these groups reside. This paper examines the dynamics of base state coercion and explores when and under what conditions states that base violent groups can be coerced to clean up their own backyard and contain the activity of these violent non-state actors. I argue that by exploring the relationship between the base state and the violent group, and assessing the magnitude of effort required by the base state to alter its relationship with the violent non-state group, it is possible to determine the likelihood of coercive success. The relationship between the base state and the violent group is shaped by two variables: the foreign and domestic interests of the respective actors. An analysis of these elements underscores the significant costs to be borne by the base state if it complies with the coercer’s demands. Ultimately, the magnitude of these costs greatly impacts the probability of success. Finally, this paper explores the larger policy implications for employing this distinctive coercive strategy.