Violent Jihad Research Articles

Remembering the Disremembered

Abstract This article reads Abubakar Ibrahim’s short story “The Book of Remembered Things” as an anti-jihadist narrative that meditates on the traumatic effects of violent jihadism on the postcolonial Muslim domestic space and a counternarrative to the dominant body of Western fictional responses to the 9/11 terror attacks. Situated at the intersection of Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” and postcolonial trauma theory, the article argues that Ibrahim mourns and remembers the traumas of the disremembered postcolonial subaltern African Muslim woman elided in the dominant discourses on the WoT and also subtly critiques fundamentalists ideologies like Boko Haram. Ibrahim shows that Jihadists’ quest for an Islamic theocracy or caliphate is doomed to fail because it revolves around a sacrificial structure wherein the Muslin woman is sacrificed on the altar of ideological incoherence. By focusing on the nexus between WoT and gendered trauma, the article explores how Ibrahim reclaims the subaltern woman’s voice in the wake of violent jihadism.

Sudanese totalitarianism: violent jihad as a state policy

The case of Sudanese violent jihadism is a curious one, starting from 1881–1899 Mahdist’s uprising. Since the 1956 independence, the history of Sudan has been marked by civil wars taking place in various parts of its huge territory; violence under the outwardly jihadist banner culminated in the 1990s. The Islamic state used violent jihad, by the army and by militias, as a way to impose unitary rule and shari’a law upon a significantly diversified population. Jihad was thus called for three purposes: to mobilise resources for fight with non-Muslim southern Sudanese; to consolidate the Muslim north internally in the context of the struggle of the totalitarian regime against opposition and struggles within the regime itself; and also to define the international role of Sudan as a supporter of radical Islamic movements. The case of Sudan is thus one in which violent jihad was part of the state ideology and an instrument of policy.

Preventing Catastrophic Cyber–Physical Attacks on the Global Maritime Transportation System: A Case Study of Hybrid Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

This paper examines hybrid threats to maritime transportation systems and their governance responses; focusing on the congested Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) as an illustrative case study. The methodology combines secondary sources with primary data from 42 expert interviews, a 28 respondent survey, and two maritime security roundtables. Key findings were that ships’ critical systems are increasingly interconnected, yet aging IT infrastructure and minimal cybersecurity awareness among crews heighten risks. Meanwhile, regional terrorist groups have previously targeted shipping and shown considerable skill in exploiting online tools, aligning with broader calls for jihadist violence. Furthermore, opportunistic piracy persists in the SOMS with the potential to disrupt shipping. Experts confirmed that maritime cybersecurity lags behind other critical infrastructure sectors and needs updated governance. Initial International Maritime Organization (IMO) guidelines lack specificity but revisions and updated IMO guidance are in process, while Port state implementation of maritime cybersecurity standards varies. Crucially, information sharing remains inadequate, even as recorded attacks increase. Findings underscore that although major hybrid incidents have not occurred, simulations and threat actors’ capabilities demonstrate potential for catastrophic collisions or cascading disruption in congested waterways. Mitigating factors like redundancy and crew training are deficient currently. Some alignment between SOMS states on maritime security cooperation exists, but not on cyber threats specifically. Key recommendations include an anonymous cyber attack reporting system, reinforced training and shipboard systems, and consolidated regional frameworks. Until these priorities are addressed, the analysis concludes that hybrid vulnerabilities in this vital global chokepoint remain a serious concern.

The personality of violent Jihadists: Examining violent and nonviolent defense of Muslims.

Although violent extremism is often attributed to clinical (dysfunctional) dispositions, it is also possible that violent Jihadists might be clinically "normal" but bear certain personality signatures. This alternative view has yet to be tested. In six studies, employing hard-to-reach Muslim samples, including one study of former Mujahideen, we investigated the relationship between basic personality traits and violent extremism. We further used a known group paradigm to validate the personality signatures of violent extremism, comparing a sample of former Mujahideen with another sample from Afghanistan. These studies and an internal meta-analysis revealed that Lower Openness to Experience, lower Emotionality, and lower Altruism were associated with more violent intentions to support Muslims. Higher Altruism was associated with higher levels of nonviolent intention to support Muslims. Supporting the validity of the nonviolent intention measure, similar associations were found in Study 3 with overt behavioral support of Muslims (donations). More important, compared to the nonMujahideen, the Mujahideen sample scored lower on average on, for instance, Openness, indicating that these results go beyond self-reported, findings. We demonstrated that personality predicts violent and nonviolent defense of Muslims among four general populations of Muslims living in the West and in Asia (including the Middle East), and a sample of Mujahideen in Afghanistan.

State and Religion: The French Response to Jihadist Violence

The five acts of jihadist violence between 2012–2020, particularly the 2015 Paris attacks, combined with an increasingly polarized political discourse in France, have pushed jihadist extremism to the center of government policy and public opinion. Approaches to jihadist extremism in the last decade have comprised two characteristics: claims amalgamating Islam and Muslim religious practice—especially in its stricter forms—with extremist violence, along with the idea that such forms of dangerous religious indoctrination are best battled through education. As a result, there has been a renewed debate concerning the principle of laïcité (secularism) within public schools and other public institutions. One of the leading efforts in this context has focused on processes of “deradicalization”. These projects include various educational tools, rehabilitation attempts inside and outside of prisons, cultural and artistic initiatives, and administrative bans imposed on organizations inciting violence. However, the most ambitious of these efforts have also been subject to the greatest criticism. Projects within the public school system have been accused of securitizing education and stigmatizing Muslim students, whereas measures undertaken in prisons are currently limited to risk assessment of inmates linked with jihadist violence, while lacking more meaningful plans for their rehabilitation. Public–private partnerships have developed more promising initiatives, but their moderate success is still recent and requires further study.

Toward a Skinnerian interpretivist methodological approach for terrorist propaganda

AbstractObjectiveThis article revisits the prevalent use of content analysis for examining terrorist propaganda in response to the methodological stagnation and aims to propose a novel methodological framework for understanding terrorist propaganda.MethodBorrowing from Quentin Skinner's intellectual works and using a terrorist propaganda video as our case study, we construct an analytical framework and apply it into practice.ResultsThe application of this approach yields and enlightens a prevalent speech act of inviting performed through terrorist propaganda.ConclusionWe highlight the role of an innovative methodological approach that underscores the role of revolutionary political concepts in legitimizing violent jihadist activities.

Learning from the enemy? Jihadist power in Mali, and implications for security and development agendas

This article explores howviolent jihadist groups structure and expand their presence in Mali, and itsuggests some policy implications for security and development. A theoreticalframework is presented that combines rebel governance literature, with specialreference to so-called jihadist proto-states, with an analysis of powerrevolving around three dimensions: cultural hegemony, political dominion, andforce. This framework is applied to Mali. The complex galaxy of militant groupsoperating in the country is briefly introduced, with their coalitions andfragmentation, and the consequences of their activities on community securityand livelihoods are outlined. An embryonic theory follows, that accounts forhow militants project power and exert control over communities: not only withviolence, but also through ideological struggles and service delivery. Jihadistsuccesses, in Mali and beyond, largely result from skilful applications ofthese 3 dimensions of power, different yet mutually reinforcing. Policies aimedat countering violent jihad should likewise target all the 3 dimensions bygoing beyond armed counterterrorism, by engaging jihadists in ideological debates,and by promoting better forms of governance.

Ideology and identity transformation in the deradicalization of Muslim extremists in Indonesia

This article used a biographical approach to follow the lives of former Muslim extremists in examining individual deradicalization from the actors' perspective. The results of the extremists' deradicalization were examined using theories of Salafi ideology and identity transformation. Deradicalization marks a period of transformation - a process of taking a new ideology and identity and initiating a new power. The doers adopt a new jihad ideology after being influenced by a colorful interpretation of jihad. The deradicalization also shifts from the Salafi jihadi/irhabi to the Salafi Purist, or from a violent to a less-violent jihad. They continue to support violent jihad but restrict how its principles are used. Few extremists decide to engage in moderate or non-violent jihad on their own initiative and without the influence of others. In conclusion, deradicalization does not ensure their eradication. It implies a certain amount of transformation into a new identity, which has profound short- and long-term effects. The first demonstrates that former Muslim extremists who still identify as jihadists, adhere to their ideology, and engage in a variety of jihad-related activities. The deradicalization of the extremists will be more challenging the more in-depth the knowledge and experience of violent jihad. On the other hand, the latter is dedicated to leaving the violent jihad group and ending recidivism.

A Theoretical, Empirical, and Methodologically Based Instrument to Assess the Risk of Violent Jihadist Radicalization in Prisons: The DRAVY-3

ABSTRACT A main goal of the Spanish National Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to improve the detection and control of inmates who may participate or collaborate with terrorist groups after release convicted and detained inmates linked to terrorist acts, as well as of those individuals involved, during their stay in prison, in violent extremist recruitment or indoctrination. This manuscript introduces an instrument for assessing the risk of violent jihadist radicalization in prisons, the Detention of Violent Jihadists Radicalization (DRAVY-3 for its Spanish initials). This instrument was built on tools already existing, a review of the literature, the experience of the prison staff, indicators suggested by researchers from two institutions, a field study conducted with Muslim inmates (jihadists and non-jihadists), and the results of six implementations of two preliminary versions. The DRAVY-3 was tested by evaluating 570 inmates from five groups (related to jihadist terrorism and controls). The analyses showed that the indicators are distributed into three scales: violence in general, violence of jihadist aetiology, and radicalism. Analyses also informed that a combination of indicators confirm an index of prediction of the level of danger. Results demonstrate the internal strength of the instrument and its capacity to detect potential radicalization leading to violence.

9/11 was an Instance of Transnational Balancing: An Intervention in Statist IR Theory

With the end of the Cold War and through the start of the 21st century, conventional IR theories were anticipating an eventual balancing against the United States. Puzzled when this phenomenon did not occur, balancing theorists engaged in a lively discussion, bringing with it the development of proposed alternative forms of balancing and a debate over whether the concept itself had perhaps outlived its relevance. This article reengages with this discussion, suggesting that many of the involved theorists were hampered by theoretical blinders based on statism, and that in fact balancing did occur, but in an unconventional manner and at the hands of an unexpected suspect: al Qaeda, a violent non-state actor, acting in a transnational manner. In this context, this article treats the 9/11 attacks of the violent Jihadist anti-Western movement as an instance of balancing against the hegemon, a successful one in that the Jihadists arguably aimed not at “winning,” but at revealing the superpower’s weaknesses so that others would subsequently join the balancing effort. By failing to view the Jihadists’ efforts as an ideological balancing effort, the United States responded with force rather than ideational counter-balancing. They waged a war instead of emphasizing efforts to separate the radical violent Jihadist perpetrators from the idea they were championing—a struggle in the name of Muslims/the downtrodden East against the United States—and thus allowing the challenger to rise into a position of "dissident" in the Muslim world, and, arguably, paving the path for today's state revisionist behaviors. The article proposes a framework based on traditionally state-based concepts of intent and impact/capacity to show how non-state actors can in fact balance superpowers and therefore should be incorporated into balancing theories, and presents the actions of the violent Jihadists as an example of transnational, ideational balancing—a phenomenon as real and consequential as state-balancing.

Distinctions between the Ancient Islamism and the Contemporary Islamism in Nigeria

The misconception that is woven around Islamism has necessitated the choice of discourse in this chapter. In Nigeria, Islam as a religion is at the center of the misconception because adherents of the religion, today, have adopted a violent method to protect its principles. It has, therefore, become important to analytically unravel the conceptual entanglement between the ancient Islamism and the violent Islamism. The ancient Islamists maintained the Islamic civilisation without inflicting other civilisations, especially the Western. On the contrary, violent Islamists have agitated for a new order that is destructive of other civilisations. This chapter contributes to the ongoing debate in the literature apropos of the conceptual entanglement associated with Islam and Islamism. This chapter is connected to the broader scope of the book as it makes a difference between the acceptable Islamism that accommodates other civilisations, and violent Islamism that embraces violent jihadism (armed struggle with infidels). This is important because the conceptual entanglement has blurred our understanding of Islam with its instrumental values. This chapter uses secondary data to analyse ancient Islamism and the contemporary Islamism that embraces violence in Nigeria. It concludes that Islam is not associated with violence and, analytically, separates the contemporary violent Islamism from the ancient Islamism.

THE YOUTH RADICALIZATION IN PAKISTANI SOCIETY: PERCEPTION OF STUDENTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTES

Although Pakistan was founded with a progressive and enlightened vision, the country's diversity has been decimated by extremism and violence. In Pakistan, youth radicalization is very common. This was due to factors such as a poor education system, socioeconomic determinants, and unequal economic opportunities across the society. The radical groups are targeting youth to carry out their agendas. The 9/11 attacks in the U.S. created the framework for radicalism among Pakistan's youth. Radicalism can be seen in many forms, including violent extremism and ethnic violence in Pakistan. However, there were immediate concerns about Pakistan's human development experience as a result of the emergence of jihadist violence in Pakistan. This research was done to identify risk factors for youth that lead them towards radicalization. It also looked at the sources and awareness of youth who are inclined towards radicalization. The research was qualitative in nature and exploratory in type. The researcher used Stratified sampling, which is a method of collecting data using a scheduled questionnaire. The Researcher used Simple random Sampling for both the distribution of Universities and the allocation of respondents

Book Review: The Language of Violent Jihad

Book Review: The Language of Violent Jihad

“I Don’t Justify Anything Regarding My Son:” Danish Foreign Fighters’ Initial Attraction and Reaffirmed Commitment to Islamic State and Al Qaeda—Testimonies from Five Relatives

ABSTRACT Relatives are a potentially rich source of insight regarding foreign fighters’ pathways into Islamist fundamentalism. However, a small fraction of the literature that explores Salafi-jihadist trajectories examines the testimonies of extremists’ families. Based on qualitative interviews with relatives of five Danish, non-returned male foreign fighters, this article explores how and why—according to their relatives—the men were initially attracted and reaffirmed their commitment to violent jihadism. Findings reveal tensions within the data between ascribing responsibility to the men and mitigating their responsibility. Yet, the article suggests that the relatives’ testimonies should not be perceived simply as using “neutralization techniques” nor as exculpatory narratives, since there is a tendency for the relatives to acknowledge and even accept the men’s deviance.

BURKINA FASO: Jihadist Violence

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural SeriesVolume 59, Issue 3 p. 23521A-23522A National Security BURKINA FASO: Jihadist Violence First published: 18 April 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2022.10453.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume59, Issue3April 2022Pages 23521A-23522A RelatedInformation

BURKINA FASO: Jihadist Violence

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural SeriesVolume 58, Issue 11 p. 23376A-23377A National Security BURKINA FASO: Jihadist Violence First published: 14 December 2021 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2021.10273.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume58, Issue11December 2021Pages 23376A-23377A RelatedInformation

How Jihadi Salafists Sometimes Breach, But Mostly Circumvent, Facebook’s Community Standards in Crisis, Identity and Solution Frames

We analyzed posts written by Facebook profiles who advocate violent jihad without supporting any terrorist group. They share extremist content in the middle of regular posts, thanks to which they are likely to reach a large audience. We identified to what extent their ingroup-outgroup opposition is constructed in crisis, identity, and solution frames and how they use these frames in posts which sometimes breach Facebook’s community standards, but which mostly circumvent them through various strategies of doublespeak. Among them, myth, in the sense of Barthes, and eudaimonic content appeared as particularly powerful to naturalize and spread jihadi ideology on social media.

The Age of Ambiguity: Art and the War on Terror Twenty Years after 9/11

9/11 and its aftermath was to have a dramatic impact on the visual arts and the artistic response to the War on Terror. This study surveys the evolution of these responses from the dramatic events of 11 September 2001 to the longer term reactions generated by the two-decade long encounter with the so-called War on Terrorism, primarily via the Imperial War Museum’s Age of Terror/Art Since 9/11 exhibition of 2017–2018. The analysis suggests that the visual artistic response moved from the initial amazement at the destruction of the Twin Towers, through satirical caricature of the terrorist persona, to a trite predictability that mirrored official equivocation about the threat posed by violent jihadist activism. Artistic endeavor on these terms became notable only for its moral ambiguity and complicity in self-censorship rather than contributing to the creation of artwork of enduring value.

Burkina Faso – Jihadist Violence

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural SeriesVolume 58, Issue 3 p. 23091B-23091C National Security Burkina Faso – Jihadist Violence First published: 16 April 2021 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2021.09918.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume58, Issue3April 2021Pages 23091B-23091C RelatedInformation

Discourse patterns used by extremist Salafists on Facebook: identifying potential triggers to cognitive biases in radicalized content

ABSTRACT Understanding how extremist Salafists communicate, and not only what, is key to gaining insights into the ways they construct their social order and use psychological forces to radicalize potential sympathizers on social media. With a view to contributing to the existing body of research which mainly focuses on terrorist organizations, we analyzed accounts that advocate violent jihad without supporting (at least publicly) any terrorist group and hence might be able to reach a large and not yet radicalized audience. We constructed a critical multimodal and multidisciplinary framework of discourse patterns that may work as potential triggers to a selection of key cognitive biases and we applied it to a corpus of Facebook posts published by seven extremist Salafists. Results reveal how these posts are either based on an intense crisis construct (through negative outgroup nomination, intensification and emotion) or on simplistic solutions composed of taken-for-granted statements. Devoid of any grey zone, these posts do not seek to convince the reader; polarization is framed as a presuppositional established reality. These observations reveal that extremist Salafist communication is constructed in a way that may trigger specific cognitive biases, which are discussed in the paper.