Heidegger's View Research Articles

Heidegger's Conception of World and the Possibility of Great Art

AbstractInfluential interpretations of Heidegger's Origin of the Work of Art focus on the view that great art is massive and communal—typically structures like temples and cathedrals. This approach, however, faces two interpretive problems. First, what are we to do with artworks in the essay that clearly are not monumental or communal, such as van Gogh's Shoes? Second, how should we understand our experience of works such as the Greek temple, which once were but are no longer central in this way? Heidegger himself says that great art of the past becomes either a relic of the past or a mere object of aesthetic experience, but his description of his own experience with a Greek temple seems to contradict this. To understand Heidegger's views on art—including his explicit claims about the limited vitality of great art of the past and his unintentional case for the continued power of great art of the past—it is crucial to distinguish, first, between Heidegger's notions of world and worldhood, and, second, between two senses of what makes art great—world disclosure and world gathering. Doing so allows us to make better sense both of the essay as a whole and the potential continued vitality of great art of the past.

ESSENCE – EXISTENCE – COMMUNICATION: ALTERNATIVES OF TANGENTS

Existential tradition provides at least two lines of development of the problem: the first line is created as a return to true existence by the abandonment of mediocre communication; The second line emphasizes the doom of a collision with the Other, in which the latter is one of the stages in the formation of self-consciousness. The actuality of the study is due to the need for the integration of these two models, refuting the widespread opinion on existentialism as the apology of complete decline, decadence, solipsism, human passivity, and, finally, the unnecessity of philosophical act in the state of complete neglect of the subject, as well as the conditions of homelessness of their own being. We will move in a logical way, which can be schematically represented in the form of a parabola: from the phenomenological macro level (J.-P. Sartre) to ambiguity, curiosity, reminiscences of everyday We, and through the ontologization of the latter to the problem of existence (M. Heidegger), of course, in the existential interpretation of it. We will be interested not only in the potential of language transformational processes in a certain field of philosophy, but also in parallel with their real incarnations in what we call the phenomenon of postmodern, full of the consequences of the Heideggerian view of language in its distorted variation (J. Derrida). The purpose of the study is to establish alternatives in the coordinates of the essence of existence-communication through overcoming both “atomicity” and “totalitarianism” of the subject on the basis of philosophical and existential principles.

Disclosing Worldhood or Expressing Life? Heidegger and Henry on the Origin of the Work of Art

What and how is the work of art? This paper considers Heidegger’s venerable question by way of a related one: what exactly is the essence of the painting? En route to critiquing the Heideggerian conception of the work of art as that which discloses a world, I present Michel Henry’s competing aesthetic theory. According to Henry, the artwork’s task is not to disclose the exteriority of the world, but rather to express the interiority of life’s pathos—what he calls transcendental self-affectivity. To clarify Henry’s view, I examine his analysis of the abstract painting of Kandinsky, after which I illustrate the significance of Kandinsky’s abstractionism by showing how the representational paintings of Paul Signac, Andrew Harrison, Alphonse Osbert, and Henry Ossawa Tanner attempt to express the invisibility of subjectivity. I then reveal how Heidegger’s account of the work of art in terms of world disclosure overlooks the work’s task of exalting life. In closing, I accordingly suggest that Henry’s view of painting—which locates its essence in Life rather than the world—not only presents a competing position to the Heideggerian view of the origin of the work of art worthy of our attention, but one that explains how art can contribute to overcoming our age’s nihilism.

Modern Technology's Effort to Master Time as a Challenge for Ethics

Modern technology has been striving to free humans from their subjection to space and time since its very beginnings. Overcoming spatial distances, intrinsically linked to the phenomenon of globalisation, and the parallel process of gaining mastery over time by new means of production and communication, has promised to bring man closer to a fulfilled life. However, instead of giving us more time for an authentic existence, the acceleration of time in modernity (as analysed by sociologist Hartmut Rosa) has led to a chronic lack of time and poses a general question of a good life and ethics. In this article, I intend to refer to Heidegger's view on the essence of modern technology as an endeavour to win victory over time, and the need of philosophical reflection regarding the positive nature of time. However, authentic time cannot come about without relationships to our fellow humans, and Levinas' account of temporality will serve as both a correction to Heidegger's position and a way towards an ethical consideration of time.

Language in the poem: Heidegger's topological interpretation on Trakl's poetry

The author opens the problem of Heidegger's topological interpretation of poetry of Georg Trakl. The text sets the first problem the nature of topological interpretation of art, bearing in mind the interpretation which has been conducted in The Origin of Artwork. Then the author shows that Heidegger's thoughtful reflection on the role of art in the era the techniques following Trakl poetic reflection on the role of the poet in the said epoch. Such dialogue singing and thinking is then viewed through Heidegger's views on the thinking as to the original ethics set forth in the Letter of Humanism.

Wittgenstein and Heidegger

Wittgenstein and Heidegger

Heidegger on Animality and Anthropocentrism

ABSTRACTThroughout his writings, Heidegger's view of animals is ostensibly anthropocentric, defining them as deficient in relation to human beings. His most extensive analysis of animality, found in the 1929–1930 lecture course entitled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, seems to be a clear example of this anthropocentrism, defining the animal as poor in world in opposition to the human being's world-forming character. Nevertheless, Heidegger is explicitly ambivalent regarding the anthropocentric implications of this conception of animality. This paper examines Heidegger's articulation of the notion of world-poverty as a distinct form of negativity, its implications for the question concerning Heidegger's anthropocentrism, as well as his ambivalence with regard to this question.

Caring Leadership: A Heideggerian Perspective

This paper develops the idea of caring leadership based on Heidegger’s philosophy of care. From this perspective, caring leadership is grounded in the practices of ‘leaping-in’ and ‘leaping-ahead’ as modes of intervention in the affairs of the world and the efforts of others. This involves gauging and taking responsibility for the ramifications of intervention, balancing the urge for certainty of outcome and visibility of contribution with the desire to encourage and enable others. Our analysis suggests several twists to contemporary leadership debates. We argue that the popular models of transactional and transformational leadership are to be critiqued not for their over-reliance but, rather, their under-reliance on agency. This is a different kind of agency to that of heroic or charismatic models. It involves tolerance of complexity and ambivalence; a rich sense of temporal trajectory; concern for one’s presence in the world; and crucially, the ability to resist the soothing normativity of ‘best practice’. From this position, we argue that the problem with the growing scholarly interest in an ethic of care is that it provides too tempting a recipe to follow. In a Heideggerian view, caring leadership has little to do with compassion, kindness or niceness; it involves and requires a fundamental organization and leadership of self.

Heidegger: metafizyka czy hermeneutyka?

When asked after the war about the understanding of humanity, humanism, ethics and responsibility, Heidegger gave an extensive and ambiguous answer in Letter on Humanism. Additional explanations are included in his post-war papers, read-outs and sketches (the essay collects them and compares to the main themes of Letter). An European asked about humanism is re-directed towards the tradition of Rome and cut off from the Greek roots of his history. However, it was in Greek, not Latin, that the fundamental solutions to our common thinking were taken. By cutting ourselves away from and forgetting them, we turn ourselves groundless and stand on the brink of a chasm (Abgrund). Heidegger asked about the medium of thinking, the speech and the language. He pointed out to the diversity of the Greek and Latin naming of speech and to the consequences of forgetting about the connections of poiesis and techne. He reminded of the difference in naming and understanding the ‘truth’ – aletheia and veritas, about the ambiguity of ‘thinking’ and its Greek root of logos. The essay brings up the views of Heidegger that, in his opinion, legitimise the necessity of backing away from the answer to the question of human condition and humanism. It would be rash and dangerous, unless we first decide to listen to what the history of our thinking says.

Signs to dogma: A Heideggerian view of how artefacts distort the project world

There are a variety of artefacts that are commonly associated with projects and their management. This article uses the Heideggerian concept of signs to disclose the elements of the “lived experience” of project work that are veiled or distorted by these artefacts. The exploration also identifies the elements of the dominant thinking of project management (dogma) that are referred to by these artefacts. The reason for this veiling and distortion is discussed with reference to the linguistics concept of veiled intention. A key implication of these findings is that effort is being expended on these artefacts which reinforce thinking that is not aligned with the “lived experience” of projects. It also indicates the relationship of the dominant project management dogma to the discipline’s artefacts.

Heidegger, education, nation and race

There are many arguments about Heidegger's work Being and Time (1954). Many critics believe that Heidegger provides a new way of understanding ourselves from a philosophical perspective. However, while some critics emphasize the de-Nazification of Heidegger's thinking, other still promote the notion that Being and Time is pro-Nazi. What is more, this new way of understanding brings a new challenge to education. In this paper, the concepts of Volk (people) and its relation with Being and Time is studied. Also, education is investigated in order to bring up authentic Dasein on Heidegger's view. The exploration undertaken in this paper illustrates that the concept of Volk is not, in Heidegger's view, related to the biological features of a race, but to the mood of attunement to Being, which itself is determined by its historicity and its capacity to bring about both differentiation and order. In general, Heidegger's interpretation of work is based on his concept of Dasein in the Being and Time and, as Radloff ((2007) Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism: Disclosure and Gestalt. Toronto: University of Toronto Press) believed, this is not tactical accommodation to Nazism. In Being and Time, Heidegger tries to save Dasein from everydayness and what he calls ‘the they’ by calling attention to be authentic. In Heidegger's (1985) view, the questioning process unlocks the essentials in things by forcing us to focus on what would seem to be simple and obvious. Also questioning Dasein’s beliefs and behaviours unfold the causes of them and is a way of bringing up an authentic Dasein and open-minded person. In order to achieve this, we need an authentic teacher who is not lost in ‘the they’. Hence, we might speculate that if schools follow Heidegger's thinking, they would be attractive places in which to provide situations for students to ask question and not be bored. Students are encouraged to learn while pursuing questions. They are active and eager learners who learn through rethinking matters, even if these matters are completely obvious. They learn about them in a manner that their thinking enters unconcealment. If this were the case, education might lead students to become more thoughtful.

Stigmatization of Overweight Patients by Nurses

The focus of this research study was the exploration of the phenomenon of stigmatization of obese persons by nurses. The philosophical tradition of Phenomenology based on Heidegger's view of the person guided the researchers in uncovering the meaning of stigmatization for eight chronically ill individuals with a body mass index greater than 30. Stigmatization by nurses for this group of medically obese women meant being exposed to unintentional harm, presuppositions, and reluctant care. Perceptions of stigma were manifested in shame, marginalization, and anxiety in seeking health care. Nursing care could advance positive outcomes when including non-discriminatory care related to weight in the total care needs identified for obese patients.

The Untranslatable Word? Reflections onEreignis

According to Heidegger, his key word Ereignis “can no more be translated” than “guiding words” in other languages, such as logos and dao. This essay presents a few reflections on the sense of Ereignis in Heidegger's thought and on the problem of translation. I distinguish three phases in Heidegger's use of the word Ereignis and draw on Paul Ricoeur and John Sallis to establish a view of translation that lies between the extremes of perfect translation and complete untranslatability. I argue that while perfect translation is impossible, imperfect translations—illuminating shifts from one context or language to another—are both possible and necessary, even when it comes to the word Ereignis. This position is compatible with Heidegger's view that encounter is made possible by distance.

Provocation: “All You Need to Know”: On Intellectual Life and Moral Responsibility

In Fall 2011, while wrestling with Being and Time, I made a comment to Jim and others that I was determined to understand Martin Heidegger. In response, Jim replied: All you need to know about Heidegger is this line from a 1933 speech to his students: study must again become a risk, not a refuge for cowardly. Whoever does not survive battle, lies where he falls. The new courage must accustom itself to steadfastness, for battle for institutions where our leaders are educated will continue for a long time. It will be fought out of strengths of new Reich that Chancellor Hitler will bring to reality. A hard race with no thought of self must fight this battle, a race that lives from constant testing and that remains directed toward goal to which it committed itself. It is a battle to determine who shall be teachers and leaders at university (Aune, personal communication, December 3, 2011). At times, at least, it seemed that Aune had decided not to consider Heidegger's (arguably) because of his involvement with Nazism. Given that two of us shared same religious background, I understood source of his discomfort. At same time, I was uncomfortable rejecting Heidegger solely on that basis. Not fully satisfied with Jim's response, I enrolled in a graduate course on Heidegger. The course, which professor Dennis Schmidt had named Intellectual Life and Moral Responsibility, focused on Heidegger question, or, as Schmidt put it, whether it was possible to be a person of while being blind to world and to one's own (Schmidt, personal communication, 2013). Aune may have considered this question closed, but this essay seeks to reopen it. In an effort to expand how rhetoricians have studied (or not studied) Heidegger, I call for deep reflections upon complexity of ethos in both our readings of controversial figures and our own intellectual practices. In field of rhetorical studies, several individuals have engaged in studies of Heidegger. Ramsey Eric Ramsey, for instance, written about relationships between Mitdasein (Being-with-the-other) and rhetorical listening (Ramsey, 1993) and Heidegger's Principle of Reason address (Ramsey, 1997). Michael Hyde, Susan Zickmund, Allen Scult, and others have also written about Heidegger's relationship with rhetoric. However, as late as 2005, Gross argued in Heidegger and Rhetoric that story of Heidegger and rhetoric has not been adequately told (Gross & Kemmann, 2005, p. 1). The subsequent chapters in that volume include into Heidegger's views of pathos, kairos, audiences, and a variety of other subjects. However, volume focuses heavily on Being and Time and on a lecture course that Heidegger gave in 1924 on Aristotle's Rhetoric. This focus on Heidegger's early work brackets ethical questions about his involvement with Nazism and his subsequent work after leaving Rector position at University of Freiburg. Gross posits that the art of listening in SS 1924 [the unfortunate common name for Heidegger's summer session on Aristotle] obviously a more practical orientation than does later Heideggerian (Gross & Kemmann, 2005, p. 1). However, I argue that it is primarily through Heidegger's later dabbling in poetics during war that we can find evidence of great insights part of Professor Schmidt's question. First, ideas that Heidegger presented during and after war--particularly those on growing influence of technology and decline of social ties-seem to have been, in retrospect, far ahead of their time, recognizing postmodern themes that would not be picked up for decades. His lecture course on Holderlin's Der Ister and Sophocles's Antigone in 1942 takes up Greek to demon or German unheimlich, which might be translated as being outside of oneself' or homeless at height of World War II. …

Looking into the Nursing from the Viewpoint of Heidegger: Reflections on the Existence of Being

Purpose This article is aimed at broadening the perspectives of nursing by applying Heidegger's philosophical reasoning and views to nursing beliefs. Methods Heidegger's main concepts on a human's way of being were the source for examining the encounter between care-receiver and caregiver in nursing. In addition, the paper illustrates the attitudes that nurses must present to their care-receiver in existential nursing. Results As nurses and care-receivers experience existential crises due to anxiety about death and fear over uncontrollable situations, they both raise questions about the significance of their existences. By putting their deep reflections on these questions into nursing practice, nurses can exist as "Mitdasein" and be open to a number of possibilities in nursing. Conclusion Nurses must be open to a number of possibilities in nursing by embracing various experiences of life and individuality without criticism, and pursuing the existing lives of their counterparts as well as their owns. They are able to take this attitude by raising fundamental questions about life and the existence of human beings through ceaseless reflections on their experiences, then implementing the result of these reflections in their lives and nursing practices.

Heidegger, Sociality, and Human Agency

AbstractAccording to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being‐with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life.

Martin Heidegger on Science and Technology: It’s Implication to the Society

Martin Heidegger stands out as one of the greatest philosophers in the contemporary period. His philosophy centers on Being. His contribution to philosophy is to recover the real meaning of Being that other philosophers had forgotten. For him, Being manifests itself anew at different times. He approaches this problem of Being in three stages, the first stage is Dasein analysis, the second is art and truth as a path to Being; the final stage is Being as a process that is expressed as ereignis and Gelassenheit. Science and technology falls with the second stage of Heidegger's view on Being. Heidegger is not against science and technology but the abuse. According to Heidegger, the poet names the holy, the philosopher thinks Being, the men of science and technology are also aspired by Being; therefore, the men of science and technology should not produce things that will bring progress to man. But today people are slaves to things they produce one cannot think well again without using calculator or cell phone, one cannot spell English words correctly without the aid of computer. We are now annihilated human beings. In this work, I wish to make us aware of certain elements which might prove destructive to our society, if they are not properly guarded against in our bid to reach the apex of science and technology. Our method is textual analysis, a critical look at the original tools of Heidegger and the commentaries written on an aim by other books authors to know the effects of science and technology in our society.

The primacy of fact perception

After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue that which facts are perceived is determined by contexts which are themselves determined by our interests. Here I appeal to Heidegger's views on everyday coping as a foundational form of intentional directedness. A discussion of Simons and Chabris’ gorilla experiment provides contemporary empirical support of the Heideggerian analysis. Finally, I argue that there cannot be context-free perception on the enactive account inasmuch as perception, qua action, is always permeated with the interests of the subject.

Being at Sea: Ontologising the Sea Narrative

This article engages with the sea narrative in terms of the question of the ontological predication of the sea voyage as such. Focusing particularly on Stephen Crane's ‘The Open Boat’ and Herman Melville's White-Jacket – as examples of texts in which the presence of the sea is introduced as a radically destabilizing, factor vis-à-vis human temporality – the article seeks to explore some of the potential implications of the condition of being-at-sea for what Peter Brooks calls ‘the dynamics of narrative’ (xiv). Brooks's theory of plot specifically invokes a terranean metaphorics, which is in turn related to his sense of the psychological and ontological work that narratives perform. The question that this paper addresses is what this metaphorical bias might mean for the status and character of the sea narrative, and it seeks to elucidate this question by drawing on Martin Heidegger's views regarding Dasein's enframing of the world. Heidegger of course also deploys the metaphor of the ground in his ontological inquiry, but his critique of the territorializing imperatives of human discourse and practice (which I here put in conversation with Brooks's theory of plot) provides a useful point of departure in reconsidering the evergreen conception of the ocean as a dissolutive, abyssal and even a-historical space. By pursuing this line of inquiry, I hope to add further dimension to the current use of ‘the oceanic’ as a category of literary and historical inquiry.

Thoughts on Thirty Years in the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy

Thoughts on Thirty Years in the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy