View Of Justice Research Articles

The Apostles’ justice: Cambridge reflections on economic inequality from Moore’sPrincipia Ethicato Keynes’sGeneral Theory(1903–36)

This article explores economic justice in the writings of the Cambridge authors G. L. Dickinson, G. Shove, R. Hawtrey, D. H. Robertson, H.O. Meredith, J. H. Bell and F. Ramsey, who were either members of the Apostles’ discussion society or, like Hugh Dalton, ‘lay’ followers of its philosophical leader, G. E. Moore. The article challenges the prevalent view depicting the Apostles as uninterested in social problems. Their analyses of economic inequality are reviewed in connection with the Marshallian tradition, the impact of Fabianism and J. M. Keynes’s views of social justice. Special attention is paid to some neglected aspects of Moore’s Principia Ethica, which were debated in the Society and influenced the Apostles’ social awareness. They believed that large inequalities were both unjust and inefficient, and, as Moore’s disciples, they rejected the hedonistic perspective and considered justice not as an end in itself but as a means to the Good.

RAWLSIAN THEORY OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A MARXIST CRITIQUE ( RAWLS'UN ADALET TEORİSİ ÜZERİNE MARKSİST BİR ELEŞTİRİ

Inspired by many philosophers such as John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill, Rawls in his famous book called A Theory of Justice puts forward theoretical arguments regarding the notion of social justice. These arguments, based on Rawlsian approach, basically aim to make social justice possible by emphasising on how economic and political institutions that alleviate unfair distribution of rights and income in a given society should be organised. In this regard, this paper, based on Marx’s view of social justice, mainly seeks an answer to the simple question: “Is it possible to construct a just society in the way Rawls puts forward?” Basing arguments on Marx’s view of justice, the paper concludes that Rawls’ theory of justice fails to construct a just society. Rather, it is concluded that Rawls’ theory of justice legitimises economic and political inequalities in a capitalist society

The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification

AbstractAccording to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems.

Freedom as non-domination and educational justice

This article considers how the distribution of educational resources is relevant to facilitating republican freedom and the degree to which an egalitarian conception of educational justice is allied with the ideal of non-domination. I argue that the republican ideal of non-domination provides a credible account of some features of educational justice, but that it falls short of providing a fully adequate theory of educational justice. I present three challenges to the republican approach to educational justice. First, the ideal of non-domination is not fully applicable to addressing the distinctive claims of children. Second, even when modified non-domination provides an incomplete basis for identifying the full range of pedagogical objectives that matter from the point of view of justice. Third, non-domination is compatible with arbitrary and unfair exclusion of some children from valuable educational resources.

The Right and the Good in Aeschylus’ Oresteia and Yael Farber’s Molora:<br>Transitional Justice between Deontology and Teleology

The antagonism between deontological and teleological conceptions of law can be felt throughout the field of law. It is particularly pressing, however, in the context of what is commonly referred to as ‘transitional justice’. Should the legal response to massive violence and bloodshed be primarily a deontological one, giving primacy to the right in awarding ‘each what is his’ (suum cuique) according to a given set of principles of law? Or should this response be primarily teleological in nature, with the right being subservient to the restoration of society as a higher good? Our paper investigates this issue from the perspective of a Ricoeurian reading of Aeschylus’ Oresteia and Yael Farber’s Molora, a modern play in which Aeschylus’ story is staged against the backdrop of post-apartheid South Africa. It is argued that both the Greek original and its modern adaptation confirm Ricoeur’s view of justice as a precarious balance between Kantian deontology on the one hand and Aristotelian teleology on the other.

Toleration, decency and self-determination in The Law of Peoples

In this article I address two objections to Rawls’ account of international toleration. The first claims that the idea of a decent people does not cohere with Rawls’ understanding of reasonable pluralism and sanctions the oppressive use of state power. The second argues that liberal peoples would agree to a more expansive set of principles in the first original position of Law of Peoples. Contra the first I argue that it does not properly distinguish between the use of state power aimed at curtailing difference and the oppressive use of state power. Contra the second I argue that transposing a liberal egalitarian set of principles in Law of Peoples would entail the unnecessary duplication of entitlements within different levels of governance and affect liberal peoples’ self-determination. The article also highlights how these criticisms are premised on the assumption that all societies should be liberal and that the correct view of global justice is a cosmopolitan one.

Disability as a test of justice in a globalising world

This paper shows how most modern theories of justice could require or at least condone international aid aimed at alleviating the ill effects of disability. Seen from the general viewpoint of liberal egalitarianism, this is moderately encouraging, since according to the creed people in bad positions should be aided, and disability tends to put people in such positions. The actual responses of many theories, including John Rawls's famous view of justice, remain, however, unclear. Communitarian, liberal egalitarian, and luck egalitarian thinkers alike have to consider their attitude towards cosmopolitan ideals before they can extend their theories across national borders. The only view of justice that automatically rejects the obligation of international aid based on disability is libertarianism. This is significant for two reasons. Libertarianism is arguably the economic doctrine of globalisation; and its moral appeal to voluntary charity draws attention to the foundations of voluntary corporate social responsibility. Is the latter a prompt for greater or lesser social and political responsibility in global matters?

The Problems with Language Policy and Planning

This article begins with a critique of dominant approaches to language policy in education that are based on the notion of “rights” and “peoples.” It makes the case for an approach that is based on the tripartite view of social justice, as articulated by Nancy Fraser. This view of social justice sees a complementary relationship between the politics of recognition, distribution and representation. The study on which the article is based demonstrates how the experience of using a second language can be analysed with these dimensions in mind. The study is based on the biographical, educational narratives of a group of academics who recount experiences of learning and using a second language at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. The study was conducted during a time of intense concern with the language policy of the university. It suggests that if language policies or plans are needed, these should be based upon principles of social justice and the needs of people rather than on the needs of reified languages or the rights of peoples.

The Downside of Moral Emotions: A Justice Perspective on Guilt and Employee Withdrawal

Despite recent popularity in behavioral ethics, work has still underexplored emotions. This is an important omission since moral emotions represent the key mechanism between moral standards and moral behavior (Haidt, 2003). Research outside of ethics has shown that emotions like guilt, a quintessential moral emotion, are positively associated with important work outcomes: organizational commitment (Flynn & Schaumberg, 2012) and leadership (Schaumberg & Flynn, 212). Even in light of this interest, we also know that guilt can be a painful and hurtful experience. Accordingly, we use the deontic view of justice (Folger, 2001) to explore some of the negative work outcomes of the emotion of guilt. Across a field study of 173 employee- supervisor dyads, we test a moderated-mediation model whereby justice mediates the relationship between a supervisor eliciting guilt and an employee’s withdrawal behaviors (i.e. absenteeism and drops in Organization directed OCBs) for those that are low in moral identity.

Adam Smith on Markets and Justice

AbstractThis paper discusses Adam Smith's views of social justice. It first describes Smith's optimistic view of markets, for example with regard to the absence of negative externalities, which implies that he considered certain normative problems to be the exception rather than the rule. Then, Smith's views on redistribution are discussed: although he is sympathetic to progressive taxation, his main focus remains on free markets, which can partly be explained by his distrust of politicians. If one takes a closer look as Smith's views of markets, however, it turns out that one of the reasons why he endorses them is their distributive features. He saw them as an antidote to the inequalities of the feudal age, offering all individuals an opportunity to work their way up to a decent standard of living and leading to more equality in the long run. Thus, Smith's account, while out‐dated in certain ways, can serve as an inspiration for thinking about distributive justice not only as a question of redistributive taxation but also as a question of the institutional design of markets.

Equality, prioritising the disadvantaged, and the new educational landscape

This paper takes Mary Warnock’s paper in the first issue of the Oxford Review of Education as its starting point, and explores how both philosophical thinking about equality in education and the landscape of educational provision have changed. It articulates a view of justice in education that emphasises benefiting the least advantaged; and shows that detailed philosophical thinking about values can be valuable for making policy decisions, while also showing that deploying careful value considerations is not a straightforward exercise.

Discrimination and Violence in Alfarabi's Virtuous City:

ABSTRACT In a 2013 issue of Utopian Studies, Alireza Omid Bakhsh argues that Alfarabi established the foundation of Iranian and Islamic utopianism. According to Bakhsh, Alfarabi bases utopianism on (1) a conception of justice that resists social discrimination and (2) opposition to violence. While social equality and nonviolence are worthy political aspirations, Alfarabi does not endorse them in the way Bakhsh suggests. In actuality, Alfarabi's view of justice entails that the virtuous society should be hierarchically organized according to the inherent worth of individuals and the tasks they perform. Alfarabi also allows some leeway for offensive wars to enforce happiness. In addition, he advises the virtuous ruler to use coercion against rebellious individuals he calls “weeds” and to enslave or execute feral human beings who roam the wild. Bakhsh's misinterpretation masks these crucial issues and, consequently, Alfarabi's nuanced theoretical reflections on the virtuous city and the political realities it faces.

Symbolically Laden Sites in the Landscape and Climate Change

Attention is drawn to the threat posed by climate change to symbolically laden places, landscapes and landmarks, and suggested that, insofar as some of those sites are treated as sacred by certain populations, their disturbance may be especially problematic. Special consideration is given to the significance glacial retreat for local, nearby populations, and its importance from the point of view of climate justice and ethics is discussed. The potential value of iconic sites from the perspective of engagement and action on climate change is considered. It is concluded that climate impacts on symbolically charged places in the landscape should be of significant concern, as well as interest, for policy and decision-making.

Just Freedom?

As Philip Pettit notes in his acknowledgements, Just Freedom ‘draws together strands from [his] work in political philosophy over the past 20 years’ (241). Anybody who wishes to acquaint himor herself with Pettit’s work in a quick way can therefore easily do so using this book. It is written to be accessible to a general audience, and Pettit has indeed admirably succeeded in presenting the ideas he has developed over the past two decades in a very lucid and engaging way. But the book is also an accomplishment in its own right; it gives the reader Pettit’s distinctive development of the ‘republican’ conceptions of freedom and justice in a more systematic, simplified, and axiomatic way than any of his previous books have done. This is not to say that there is nothing that those who take similar views will want to object to, but it is to say that few recent books have captured this general sort of republican view of freedom and justice in as cogent a way as Pettit does here. Pettit aims to offer the reader a ‘moral compass for a complex world’, and he thinks that republican freedom as non-domination fits the bill. Freedom, he tells us, is not the only value, but it is a ‘gateway good’ (189). If we can secure freedom for all in their relations to their fellow citizens and to their governments, and we can also secure republican independence for free peoples in relation to other corporate entities (such as states or powerful non-state actors), this gives us, Pettit argues, a kind of basic justice from which all the rest of social, political, and international justice can flow or derive its content and justification. As Pettit summarizes his view, ‘justice is freedom, freedom justice’ (xxiii). Thus, Pettit writes that whereas John Rawls gives us two basic principles of justice, his own favored approach is

El objetivo de una sociedad inclusiva: bases para una propuesta alternativa

The discourse of the unviable nature of the welfare state is argued as an inevitable consequence of economic logic, but in reality it involves changing the margins of tolerance adopted by society when faced with exclusion or, put another way, abandoning the hitherto accepted concept of an inclusive society. The crisis of an inclusive society is not the result of the failure of certain social policies. When the capacity for inclusion fails, it is the model itself that is failing. This is what, in the current circumstances, makes it obligatory to think again about what is to be included or excluded. The demand for what should be goals of inclusion forms a central plank of the social and economic model and is the best reflection of its view of justice. This paper discusses three reflections. The first of these concerns the need to be familiar with the current features of trends in inequality, which represent the underlying factor weakening inclusiveness. The second takes up the current debate on the concept of welfare and its implications for greater demands for fairness. The third outlines the frame of reference of alternative thought, especially regarding human development, as theoretical categories allowing demands for inclusion to be reframed.

Social justice in India

This study focuses on social justice from the perspective of five school leaders in Delhi, India. Four of the schools in the study are affluent. One school serves primarily students who live in extreme poverty. Through interviewing these leaders, two major themes were identified. First, these leaders tended to view human rights as a driver of a social justice paradigm. The environment where they lived and worked, however, greatly impacted their views of social justice. Second, we found that these leaders enacted social justice differently based on the context and the students whom they served. School leaders at the more affluent schools tended to focus on teaching about social justice and serving others. The leader of the less affluent school focused more on providing opportunities for students that would allow them to move out of poverty in hopes of changing their status in society. Both themes highlight the importance of context.

Understanding social justice leadership

This article is an examination of two social justice leaders, one in Costa Rica and one in England. It is part of the International Study of Leadership Development Network, a multi-nation study of social justice and educational leadership. A brief discussion of the philosophy of social justice and an examination of the macro and micro context in each of the countries set the stage to understand the social perspective of the two school leaders. Interviews were conducted to construct a narrative to illuminate their views of social justice. A comparison of the leaders found more similarities than differences even though the settings in each country were quite different. They both felt that it was important to challenge inequities in society and demand that the government provide for all citizens; they emphasized respect for students; and, to some extent, they grounded their beliefs in faith. These narratives can be valuable for both practitioners and researchers to learn from the conceptions of social justice and the challenges of these leaders. Illuminating the agency of a school leader in one national context may stir the possibility of emancipation in another context.

Human rights and Cohen’s anti-statism

G. A. Cohen’s critique of standard liberal interpretations of the difference principle has been very influential. According to Cohen, justice is not realized simply because the state’s tax policies and other distributive tools maximize the position of the worst off. Rather – possibly in addition to, but not to the exclusion of, certain state policies – justice requires talented people to improve the position of the worst off through their actions in their daily lives. Specifically, it prohibits talented people from insisting on inequality-causing incentives. To this extent, Cohen’s view of distributive justice is anti-statist. On standard liberal interpretations, human rights are such that, logically, they can be violated only by states, not private individuals. An individual who tortures someone commits a moral wrong but does not violate the victim’s human rights. For this reason, the crime is less problematic than it would have been had a police officer done it on behalf of the state. To this extent the standard liberal understanding of human rights is statist. This parallel between liberal understandings of distributive justice and human rights raises two questions: (1) Is the statist understanding of human rights vulnerable to Cohenian criticisms parallel to those that he canvasses against the statist understanding of distributive justice? (2) If so, should we welcome an anti-statist understanding of human rights, or should we see it as a problem with Cohen’s critique of a statist focus in distributive justice that it commits us to an implausible anti-statist view of human rights?

IDENTITY, REASON AND CHOICE

In criticizing communitarian views of justice, Amartya Sen argues that identity is not merely a matter of discovery but an object of reasoned choice subject to constraints. Distinguishing three notions of identity – self-perception, perceived identity and social affiliation – I claim that the relevant constraints implied by this argument are minimal. Some of Sen's arguments about perceived identity and social context do not establish any further constraints. Sen also argues that a model of multiculturalism and some forms of education can restrict, or fail to promote, reasoned and informed identity choice. This argument is better understood in the light of Sen's work on capability and justice, notably his concern with ways in which underdogs can adapt and his emphasis on public reasoning. It highlights limitations on information and opportunities for reasoning. I suggest that these lead to genuine constraints on (reasoned and informed) identity choice. The paper focuses on Sen's work, though its claims are also relevant to George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton's analysis of identity.

Justice and Confucianism

AbstractThis article surveys contemporary scholarship on justice and early Confucianism and builds upon recent work on justice in the Analects by examining the relationship between justice and moral self‐cultivation in the Mengzi (Mencius) and the Xunzi. It is argued that focusing on early Confucian accounts of how a sense of justice is cultivated offers insights into Confucian views of justice because it shows how remarks on justice in the Analects, Mengzi, and Xunzi are not tangential, but rather are an important part of their accounts of Confucian moral self‐cultivation.