View Of Consciousness Research Articles

A Model of Consciousness

We propose a view of consciousness as a sort of metaphoric “funnel” transforming a fraction of the parallel processes taking place continually in our central nervous system into something intrinsically serial and sequential. A conscious state is the result of this temporary serialization of a set of parallel mental processes. Before this event, everything is parallel, but also after it, everything returns parallel. As a consequence, the simile we propose is that of a “clepsydra” or sandglass. A conscious state coincides with its bottleneck. Here, we explore possible consequences of the adoption of this model.

Book Review: "On the Contexts of Things Human: An Integrative View of Brain, Consciousness, and Freedom of Will", Ronald J. MacGregor, ed., (2006)

Journal of Integrative NeuroscienceVol. 07, No. 04, pp. 571-581 (2008) Book ReviewNo AccessBook Review: "On the Contexts of Things Human: An Integrative View of Brain, Consciousness, and Freedom of Will", Ronald J. MacGregor, ed., (2006)Gin McCollumGin McCollumLegacy Research Center, 1225 NE 2nd Avenue, Portland, Oregon 97232, USA Search for more papers by this author https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219635208001976Cited by:1 PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail World Scientific, ISBN: 978-981-256-735-2. References R. J. MacGregor, J. Integr. Neurosci. 4(3), 397 (2005), DOI: 10.1142/S0219635205000835. Link, Google Scholar W. M. Elsasser , Reflections on a Theory of Organisms ( The Johns Hopkins University Press , Baltimore , 1987 ) . Google Scholar E. F. Keller , Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors, and Machines ( Harvard University Press , Cambridge, Massachusetts , 2002 ) . Crossref, Google Scholar D. W. Thompson , On Growth and Form ( Dover Publications Inc. , New York , 1992 ) . Crossref, Google Scholar A. Pais , Niels Bohr's Times, in Physics, Philosophy, and Polity ( Clarendon Press , Oxford , 1991 ) . Google ScholarJ. T. Schwartz, Discrete Thoughts: Essays on Mathematics, Science, and Philosophy (Birkhaeuser, 1986) p. 117. Google Scholar G. de Santillana , The Crime of Galileo ( William Heinemann Ltd , London , 1955 ) . Google ScholarM. Golubitskyet al., Physica D 115, 56 (1998), DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2789(97)00222-4. Crossref, ISI, Google Scholar M. Golubitsky and I. Stewart , The Symmetry Perspective ( Birkhaüser-Verlag , Basel , 2002 ) . Crossref, Google ScholarR. Llinás and U. Ribary, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 90(5), 2078 (1993). Crossref, Medline, ISI, Google ScholarR. R. Llináset al., Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA. 96(26), 15222 (1999). Crossref, Medline, ISI, Google ScholarR. Llináset al., Trends. Neurosci. 28(6), 325 (2005). Crossref, Medline, ISI, Google ScholarR. R. Llinás and M. Steriade, J. Neurophysiol. 95(6), 3297 (2006). Crossref, Medline, ISI, Google Scholar A. Damasio , The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness ( Harcourt Brace , New York , 1999 ) . Google Scholar P. Hawken , Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming ( Viking , New York , 2007 ) . Google Scholar FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited By 1A NATURAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO CONSCIOUSNESSEDWIN R. LEWIS and RONALD J. MACGREGOR21 November 2011 | Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, Vol. 09, No. 02 Recommended Vol. 07, No. 04 Metrics History PDF download

Terrorism, Torture, and Conscience

In our current intellectual climate, the inner moral dialogue of conscience has been subjected to new criticisms. Competing authoritative discourses in the self are often reduced to clashing social power arrangements. Diverse voices in conscience are seen as evidence of a dispersed or divided self without continuing identity. Suspicion of metanarratives and universal claims accompanies emphasis on the particularity of social location. In this context, this essay examines the case of Lt. Col. Stuart Couch, the Marine lawyer who refused to prosecute a suspect at Guantanamo because he became convinced that the prisoner had been tortured. What is proposed is a view of conscience that takes the criticisms seriously without abandoning the authority, identity, and universality that true community fosters.

E.06.02 Philosophical challenges in neuroethics

Neuroethics is an area concerned with the possible benefitsand dangers of modern research on the brain. Researchers inneuroethics have focused mainly on applied neuroethics, suchas ethical issues involved in neuroimaging techniques, cognitiveenhancement, or neuropharmacology (Illes 2006). Another important,less prevalent, scientific approach is fundamental neuroethics:how knowledge of the brain’s functional architecture and itsevolution can deepen our understanding of identity, consciousnessand intentionality, including the development of moral thoughtand judgment (Evers 2008). The relevance of neuroscience tounderstanding moral judgment depends on the theoretical viewthat is taken on the brain. A modern, dynamic view of thebrain may provide a fruitful theoretical framework for neuroethicsthrough its high explanatory value in regard to the evolution andnature of moral judgment under the aspects of subjective evaluation,free will and personal or public responsibility (Evers 2007).Informed materialism is a model based on the notion that all theelementary cellular processes of brain networks are grounded onphysico-chemical mechanisms and adopts an evolutionary viewof consciousness as a biological function of neuronal activities,but describes the brain as an autonomously active, projective andvariable system in which emotions and values are incorporated asnecessary constraints. Dynamic processes of evaluation and theemotional systems involved in their genesis are basic properties ofour brains: we are neurobiologically predisposed to develop thesecomplex and diverse systems of moral and other values enablingus to establish appropriate relationships in our social, cultural andphysical environments.

Consciousness and the Moral Permissibility of Infanticide1

abstract In this paper, we present a conditional argument for the moral permissibility of some kinds of infanticide. The argument is based on a certain view of consciousness and the claim that there is an intimate connection between consciousness and infanticide. In bare outline, the argument is this: it is impermissible to intentionally kill a creature only if the creature is conscious; it is reasonable to believe that there is some time at which human infants are not conscious; therefore, it is reasonable to believe that it is permissible to intentionally kill some human infants.

Property Dualism, Epistemic Normativity and the Limits of Naturalism*

This paper examines some consequences of the (quasi‐)epiphenomenalism implied by a property dualistic view of phenomenal consciousness. The focus is upon the variation of phenomenal content over time. A thought‐experiment is constructed to support two claims. The weaker claim exhibits an incompatibility which arises in certain logically possible situations between a conscious subject’s epistemic norms and the requirement that one be aware of one’s conscious experience. This could be interpreted as providing some epistemic grounds for the postulation of bridging laws between the physical/functional and phenomenal domains. The stronger claim has it that the ontology of property dualism is not properly able to account for the certainty I have of being phenomenally conscious. The problem is viewed as resulting from the neglect of the intensional context involved in a proper representation of the argument for property dualism. It is argued that only a transcendental move can do justice to this certainty I have.

Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process?

I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the causal power of consciousness. What is meant by formal causation, in this context, is that consciousness has the causal power to organize or control neuronal activity. This notion of causation is elaborated and supported by recent findings in the neurosciences. An advantage of this empirically informed approach is that proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness no longer need to rely upon conceptually based arguments alone, but can build a case against reductive physicalism that has a significant empirical foundation.

Embodiment in Polanyi’s Theory of Tacit Knowing

One of Michael Polanyi's most important contributions philosophy is his clarification of the structure of tacit based upon two terms of awareness. For instance, in driving a nail, we are not only aware of the nail, but also aware of the hammer and the feelings in our palm and fingers that grasp the hammer. According Polanyi, our awareness of the nail is focal awareness, and the awareness of the hammer and the feelings in our palm and fingers is subsidiary awareness. rests on the dynamic relationship between these two terms of awareness. In order grasp an object (a comprehensive entity), we need integrate its various clues, particulars. Here we can identify the two terms of tacit knowing. Our subsidiary awareness of various clues, particulars and parts constitutes the first term of tacit knowing, and our focal awareness of the comprehensive object is the second term. We rely on the former so as know the latter. manifests itself in the dynamic process of attending the first term the second term. Tacit is a from-to knowing.1 In the 1960s, Polanyi's theory of tacit came fruition. In revealing the conceptual potential of the theory of tacit solve a series of philosophical problems, Polanyi also brieflydiscussed the connection between his theory and other philosophical traditions. Phenomenology was one of them. Polanyi's theory of tacit intersects phenomenology primarily at three points: intentionality, and embodiment. With regard the relation between tacit and intentionality, Polanyi says the following: Brentano (1942, orig. publ. 1847) has taught that consciousness necessarily attends an object, and that only a conscious mental act can attend an object. My analysis of tacit has amplified this view of consciousness. It ells us not only that consciousness is intentional, but also that it always has roots which it attends its object. It includes a tacit awareness of its subsidiaries.2 In Polanyi's view, the from-to structure of tacit clarifies the nature of consciousness more adequately than does Brentano's theory of intentionality. It not only displays intentionality, that is, the vectorial quality of consciousness, but also reveals the fact that such directedness of consciousness is based upon a tacit awareness of the subsidiaries. In addition its to aspect, consciousness also has a from aspect. As will be shown below, an important corollary of the from-to structure of tacit is the thesis of knowing by indwelling. It is in that Polanyi sees the connection between the theory of tacit and Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world. In the preface the Torchbook edition of Personal Knowledge (1964), Polanyi claims: All understanding is based upon our dwelling in the particulars of that which we comprehend. Such is a participation of ours in the existence of that which we comprehend; it is Heidegger's being-in-the-world.3 He further claims, is being-in-the-world. Every act of tacit shifts our existence, re-directing, contracting our participation in the world. Existentialism and phenomenology have studied such processes under other names. We must re-interpret such observations now in terms of the more concrete structure of tacit knowing.4 I have tried clarify the epistemological implications of Heidegger's notion of in the perspective of the theory of tacit elsewhere, in the direction pointed out by Polanyi.5 Although the claim that Indwelling is being-in-the-world is suggestive and inspiring, there is an important difference between Polanyi's indwelling and Heidegger's being-in-the-world, of which Polanyi seems not quite conscious. As will be shown below, while Polanyi's thesis of by is founded upon his insight into the unique position of our body in the universe, Heidegger does not take Dasein as being essentially embodied. …

A Perspective of Collective Consciousness of Business Organizations

The article discusses the meaning of consciousness and presents a collective consciousness view of business organizations and their development. It proposes an integrative hierarchical framework of three levels of organizational consciousness: material, social and spiritual. The concepts of excellence, ethical and moral temperament of organizations at different levels of consciousness are also discussed. The article describes the features of social and spiritually conscious business organizations, taking some examples from secondary sources. Overall, it is an attempt to link the ideals of human evolution with the potential behaviour of business corporations.

Advancing the dialogue between inner and outer empiricism: A comment on O’Nualláin

In a recent contribution to New Ideas in Psychology, Seán O’Nualláin draws out a distinction between inner and outer empiricism, and suggests that consciousness research can benefit from analysis in both directions, that is, via the exploration of facts and relations that facilitate a third-person understanding of consciousness (by reference to an analysis of the structures, processes, and functions of the brain) and via the direct exploration of conscious experience itself, both in terms of its computational (content filled) and non-computational (content empty) aspects. In positing a substrate of subjectivity independent of the contents of consciousness (and, more specifically, a state of “nothingness”), Ò’Nualláin follows a long tradition deeply rooted in mythical, religious, and esoteric schools of belief and practice. Although there is considerable debate amongst philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists as to whether or not a non-computational view of consciousness is viable, O’Nualláin accepts that such a possibility does exist. Further, he suggests that a dialogue between the inner and outer empiricists will be fruitful. In this comment I, critique Ò’Nualláin's initial thoughts on the subject and draw out a series of useful distinctions that will help to advance the dialogue between inner and outer empiricism. Critical amongst these distinctions is explicit reference to (1) ontological and epistemological interdependencies in consciousness research, and (2) states of consciousness that describe the transition from “mindfulness” through “nothingness” to “no-mind”.

Senso comum, ciência e filosofia: elo dos saberes necessários à promoção da saúde

No processo de evolução, a humanidade acumulou saberes que foram sistematizados como conhecimentos. A Filosofia nos auxilia nas funções teóricas e práticas a chegar a uma concepção do universo por meio da auto-reflexão.O senso comum contribui para que a ciência progrida. A partir de problemas do cotidiano das pessoas, surge a necessidade de pesquisar, de aprofundar interpretações dos achados e propor soluções para superar as dificuldades enfrentadas pela população. A ciência existe para esclarecer aspectos problemáticos do senso comum, fornecer respaldo aos questionamentos e fundamentar cada conhecimento produzido em resposta às demandas. Assim, os conhecimentos envolvidos nesta reflexão pretendem beneficiar uma articulação entre as formas básicas de conhecimento e desenvolver uma compreensão satisfatória da promoção da saúde, numa visão compartilhada e conscientizadora da mudança de paradigmas no sistema de saúde. Compreendemos que a promoção da saúde constitui um componente indispensável neste processo, tendo como foco central de suas intervenções o indivíduo pertencente a uma comunidade nas suas múltiplas relações, especialmente entre o contexto comunitário e a dimensão subjetiva, propiciando-lhe um resgate da cidadania.

Consciousness without corticocentrism: Beating an evolutionary path

Merker's approach allows the formulation of an evolutionary view of consciousness that abandons a dependence on structural homology – in this case, the presence of a cerebral cortex – in favor of functional concordance. In contrast to Merker, though, I maintain that the emergence of complex, dynamic interactions, such as those which occur between thalamus and cortex, was central to the appearance of consciousness.

국기(國技)로서의 태권도에 대한 대학생들의 가치관에 관한 고찰

국기(國技)로서의 태권도에 대한 대학생들의 가치관에 관한 고찰

DOES DESCARTES DENY CONSCIOUSNESS TO ANIMALS?

AbstractContrary to longstanding opinion, Descartes does not deny all feeling and awareness to non‐human animals. Though he undoubtedly denies that animals think, a case can be made that he nonetheless would allow them organism consciousness, perceptual consciousness, access consciousness and even phenomenal consciousness. Descartes does not employ or accept an ‘all‐or‐nothing’ view of consciousness. He merely denies (not that this is a small thing) that animals have the capacity for self‐conscious reflective reception or awareness of sensations and feelings.

Thomas Reid’s Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness and Intentionality

AbstractThomas Reid’s epistemological ambitions are decisively at the center of his work. However, if we take such ambitions to be the whole story, we are apt to overlook the theory of mind that Reid develops and deploys against the theory of ideas. Reid’s philosophy of mind is sophisticated and strikingly contemporary, and has, until recently, been lost in the shadow of his other philosophical accomplishments. Here I survey some aspects of Reid’s theory of mind that I find most interesting. I examine whether Reid is a mysterian about the mind, whether Reid has a direct realist theory of perception, and whether Reid has a higher‐order, or “inner‐sense,” view of consciousness. Along the way I will mention portions of the secondary literature that examine these aspects and point out whether and to what degree I part ways with the interpretations present in the literature.

Précis of Thinking about Consciousness*

My aim in Thinking about Consciousness is to develop a materialist view of consciousness. The book defends the thesis that conscious properties are identical to material properties, and explores the implications of this thesis for our understanding of consciousness. As well as defending materialism, the book is also centrally concerned to understand why so many people find materialism intuitively hard to believe. It seems undeniable that many people find it obvious that conscious states cannot possibly be the same as brain states. I call this widespread conviction the 'intuition of distinctness'. Much of the book is devoted to identifying the source of this intuition.

Multiplicity of Consciousness

Consciousness has traditionally been considered to be a single entity. It appears much more likely to be multiple in the sense that each consciousness content is its own instance of consciousness during its moment. This view of consciousness is in accord with identity theory and helps substantially in rendering the concept of consciousness understandable in terms of the neurological functioning of the brain.

Husserl's Ego

John Locke appears to have held that we possess, as part of our whole being, a soul substance, a thinking thing rooted squarely in the Cartesian tradition. But Locke adds that our awareness of personal identity does not depend on that soul and should not be confused with substantial identity. The sense of personal identity derives from consciousness, and particularly from memory. Many a soul or many a body could, in principle, host the same person, provided that a continuity of consciousness remained. A cynical commentator might be inclined to see here Locke as the philosophical hermaphrodite-half Descartes and half Hume, though tending a bit in the Humean direction. Edmund Husserl would not accept Locke's adherence to a soul substance. He would sympathize with Locke's view that the sense of personal identity depends on consciousness. This is not to suggest that in parting with Descartes' substantialist position (the view of consciousness as a "box" or "bag," as Husserl sometimes characterizes it),' Husserl joins forces with Hume in defending the bundle theory of the self. In his conception of the ego, Husserl, typically, adopts none of the standard positions delivered by the tradition. He does not view the ego as a hermetic container for psychic acts, or as an empty pole of consciousness, or as a swarm of psychic events held together in the present solely by their contiguity and, with respect to the past, by threads of memory. That Husserl is thus untraditional has not always been appreciated. Jean-Paul Sartre and Aron Gurwitsch argued that Husserl defended an essentially Cartesian view of the ego, and that this conception of the self was illegitimate and indefensible from the perspective of the very phenomenology that Husserl himself had fathered. I will argue in this essay that Sartre's and Gurwitsch's criticisms directed at Husserl's conception of the ego are misplaced and misguided. It may seem to some, of course, that this is a fine example of thrashing a dead horse. But this horse is still kicking. The issue of the ego and its proper interpretation remains vital for anyone concerned with phenomenology as Husserl conceived it. And while Sartre and Gurwitsch may have laid down their basic objections some seventy years ago, the pertinence and the demands these objections make on our attention have not weakened with age. I mean to show that Sartre's and Gurwitsch's objections are unsound, but only with the intent of revealing just how compelling Husserl's conception of the ego turns out to be. Since Sartre and Gurwitsch advance in all important respects the same arguments, I will base my discussion chiefly on Sartre's critique as it appears in his Transcendence of the Ego. Sartre's Critique of the Husserlian Ego Before presenting his philosophical arguments against what he takes to be Husserl's conception of the ego, Sartre takes note of the (now) familiar fact that while the transcendental ego appears in the Ideas of 1913, it is absent from the first edition of the Logical Investigations (1900-1901). Sartre takes this absence to be significant and appears to assume that when Husserl later fell victim to egological backsliding, the ego he came to accept is of the same nature as the one he earlier rejected. We will consider later whether that is a valid assumption. The ego against which Sartre argues has the following characteristics. It is not co-extensive with consciousness but "in" consciousness as an inhabitant is in a dwelling,2 as a blade is plunged into the heart (dividing, tearing, killing),3 as an empty pole indifferent to what it supports.4 It is personal,5 substantial,6 monadic, opaque,7 heavy, and ponderable.8 It is the owner of consciousness, the empty principle of the unification of consciousness, and "the inseparable companion" of each conscious act.9 "All this," Sartre writes, "is unfortunately the orientation of the new thought of Husserl" (that is, in the Ideas and Cartesian Mediations). …

Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in Consciousness Explained

Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (1991) is an inspiring but also a highly frustrating book. The line of the argument seems to be clear, but then at second sight it fades away. It turns out that Dennett uses six of the seven strategies which I discuss in my “The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: A Look into Freud’s Rhetorical Tool Box” (J. Gen. Phil. Sci., 2001) Discussing important examples of these strategies I show why Consciousness Explained is such a frustrating book. As the examples used do not reflect minor problems but go to the heart of the matter and concern the book’s main areas of contention, it turns out that, in spite of the valuable and insightful details, Dennett’s materialistic view of consciousness is supported mainly by rhetorical sleights of hand.

‘Don’t Tell the Crocodile’

This article explores the relationship between Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology and Maurice Leenhardt’s ethnographic study of New Caledonia. For Leenhardt, the kamo, or authentic person, was a participatory personage existing in relationship with other humans, with nature and with mythic beings. He used the term mythe vécu (living myth) to argue for an under-standing of myth that was grounded in experience, rather than narrative, and to elaborate his understanding of a uniquely Melanesian mode of Being. I argue that, as well as echoing some of Heidegger’s insights, Leenhardt’s view of mythic consciousness has much in common with Sartre’s analysis of emotional consciousness. The ‘experience’ I refer to in this discussion is that of the Hula, on the south-east coast of Papua New Guinea. Drawing also on some other Melanesian ethnography, I suggest that an existentialist perspective not only extends the relevance of Leenhardt’s interpretation of myth but also constitutes an important development in our understanding of Melanesian ontology.