Victor Tadros Research Articles

To Do, To Die, To Reason Why: Individual Ethics in War, written by Victor Tadros

To Do, To Die, To Reason Why: Individual Ethics in War, written by Victor Tadros

Defending the Realm of Criminal Law

This is a response to ten critiques of my 2018 book The Realm of Criminal Law, by Stephen Bero and Alex Sarch, Kim Ferzan, Stuart Green, Doug Husak, Nicola Lacey, Sandra Mayson, Victor Tadros, Patrick Tomlin, Alec Walen, and Gideon Yaffe. I take the opportunity to explain the main aims and themes of the book, to clarify some of its arguments, and to note some of the ways in which those arguments need expansion, development, or revision. Topics discussed include: the usefulness and limits of ‘rational reconstruction’ as a method of normative theorising; public wrongs and the scope of the criminal law; the idea of civil order as central to a political theory of criminal law; wrongness constraints on criminalization; mala prohibita and regulatory offences; the ‘De Minimis’ principle; and criminal law ‘abolitionism’.

Distributing Responsibility

Distributing Responsibility

A Soft Defense of a Utilitarian Principle of Criminalization

The aim of this paper is to argue that the utilitarian principle of criminalization (UPC) is sounder than its poor reputation suggests. The paper begins by describing three possible answers to the research question: To what extent should the consequences of criminalization matter morally in a theory of criminalization? Hereafter I explain why I shall discuss only two of these answers. Then follows a detailed and critical specification of UPC. Furthermore, I will argue why criticisms of UPC made by philosophers such as Douglas Husak and Victor Tadros in their recent work are far from convincing. Finally, I will present a positive reason for accepting UPC as a principle of criminalization, namely: that UPC is consistent with what I call the Counterproductive Criminalization Principle, while non-consequentialist theories of criminalization are not.

Self-Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection: A Comment on Victor Tadros’s Wrongs and Crimes

In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros argues that wrongdoers acquire special duties to those they’ve wronged, and from there he generates wrongdoers’ duties to contribute to general deterrence by being punished. In support, he contends that my manipulation argument against compatibilism fails to show that causal determination is incompatible with the proposed duties wrongdoers owe to those they’ve wronged. I respond that I did not intend my manipulation argument to rule out a sense of moral responsibility that features such duties, and that I don’t believe it does. In fact, I’m willing to accept a restricted version of Tadros’s proposal, and I explain how this addition modifies the self-defense-based position on deterrence that I’ve defended in the past.

Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment

In this essay, I assess what I call the “Duty View,” subtly articulated and defended by Victor Tadros in Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford University Press, 2016). According to the Duty View, wrongdoers incur enforceable duties, including the duty to be punished in some circumstances, in virtue of their wrongdoing; therefore, punishment can be justified simply on the ground that wrongdoers’ duties are being legitimately enforced. I argue that, while wrongdoers do incur important duties, these are not necessarily fulfilled by providing protection against future offenses, and I offer a comparative evaluation of the Duty View and an alternative approach, which I call the “Desert Plus View.” The Desert Plus View shares some of the key commitments of the Duty View, such as the rejection of the intrinsic goodness of wrongdoers getting what they deserve. More positively, however, according to the Desert Plus View, the fact that people are deserving can, together with certain additional conditions, such as the need for protection of its citizens, provide a reason for the state to give them what they deserve.

On Wrongs and Crimes: Does Consent Require Only an Attempt to Communicate?

In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros clarifies the debate about whether consent needs to be communicated by separating the question of whether consent requires expressive behaviour from the question of whether it requires “uptake” in the form of comprehension by the consent-receiver. Once this distinction is drawn, Tadros argues both that consent does not require uptake and that consent does not require expressive behaviour that provides evidence to the consent-receiver. As a result, Tadros takes the view that consent requires an attempt to communicate, but nothing more. While I have found Tadros’s arguments for this conclusion intriguing and challenging, I am yet to be persuaded by them. In this essay, I try to say why.

Crime Victims and the Right to Punishment

In this paper, I consider the question of whether crime victims can be said to have a moral right to see their victimizers punished (a “right to punishment”) that could explain why they often feel wronged or cheated when the state fails to punish offenders (or even to make such conduct punishable). In the first part, I explain what I mean by a “right to punishment” and what it is for such a right to “explain” the frustrated crime victim’s reaction. In the second part, I distinguish such a right from a Lockean-style right to punish, which is also shown incapable of providing the needed explanation. In the third part I argue that it is difficult to identify any benefit such that the right to punishment could plausibly be understood as a right to that benefit. I discuss two main candidates here: (i) the vaguely Hegelian idea that punishment is itself some sort of restitution for the wrong done to the victim; and (ii) the idea, due to Victor Tadros, that punishment is a form of compensation for wrongdoing by contributing indirectly to protecting victims from future harm. In the final section, I suggest instead that the frustrated crime victim’s reaction, when justified, is best explained, not by the violation of any right to punishment, but rather by the state’s failure to treat the victim as an equal.

Book Review: Victor Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes

Book Review: Victor Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes

The Public Health-Quarantine Model

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per se face significant independent moral objections (Pereboom 2014:153). Despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s (2001, 2013, 2014), taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—which I call the public health-quarantine model (Caruso 2016, 2017a)—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own since it prioritizes prevention and social justice. In Section 1, I begin by (very) briefly summarizing my arguments against free will and basic desert moral responsibility. In Section 2, I then introduce and defend my public health-quarantine model, which is a non-retributive alternative to criminal punishment that prioritizes prevention and social justice. In Sections 3 and 4, I take up and respond to two general objections to the public health-quarantine model. Since objections by Michael Corrado (2016), John Lemos (2016), Saul Smilanksy (2011, 2017), and Victor Tadros (2017) have been addressed in detail elsewhere (see Pereboom 2017a; Pereboom and Caruso 2018), I will here focus on objections that have not yet been addressed. In particular, I will respond to concerns about proportionality, human dignity, and victims’ rights. I will argue that each of these concerns can be met and that in the end the public health-quarantine model offers a superior alternative to retributive punishment and other non-retributive accounts.

Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 45, Issue 4 p. 356-396 Original Article Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention Jonathan Parry, Jonathan Parry orcid.org/0000-0002-2649-9220 Search for more papers by this author Jonathan Parry, Jonathan Parry orcid.org/0000-0002-2649-9220 Search for more papers by this author First published: 21 December 2017 https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12099Citations: 8 For comments on, and conversations about, this article, I am extremely grateful to Jessica Begon, Joseph Bowen, Lars Christie, Matthew Coakley, Helen Frowe, Jimmy Goodrich, Richard Healey, Lisa Hecht, Jeff McMahan, Janette Myers, Daniel Ramöller, Michael Robillard, Alex Silk, Victor Tadros, Leo Townsend, Alex Voorhoeve, and, especially, Daniel Viehoff. The article benefited from discussion with audiences at the University of Birmingham, the University of Oslo, the Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT), Stockholm University, the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar, the University of Nottingham, Ryerson University, the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Oxford Institute for the Ethics and Law of Armed Conflict (ELAC) hosted by the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace (SCEWP) at Stockholm University, and the Society for Applied Philosophy 2015 Annual Conference hosted by the University of Edinburgh. Special thanks to two anonymous Associate Editors for this journal, whose detailed and challenging comments improved the article immeasurably. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume45, Issue4Fall 2017Pages 356-396 RelatedInformation

A Defense of Free Will Skepticism: Replies to Commentaries by Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life

This paper features Derk Pereboom’s replies to commentaries by Victor Tadros and Saul Smilansky on his non-retributive, incapacitation-focused proposal for treatment of dangerous criminals; by Michael McKenna on his manipulation argument against compatibilism about basic desert and causal determination; and by Alfred R. Mele on his disappearing agent argument against event-causal libertarianism.

Innocence Lost: A Problem for Punishment as Duty

Constrained instrumentalist theories of punishment – those that seek to justify punishment by its good effects, but limit its scope – are an attractive alternative to pure retributivism or utilitarianism. One way in which we may be able to limit the scope of instrumental punishment is by justifying punishment through the concept of duty. This strategy is most clearly pursued in Victor Tadros’ influential ‘Duty View’ of punishment. In this paper, I show that the Duty View as it stands cannot find any moral distinction between the permissible punishment of the guilty and the permissible punishment of the innocent in extreme circumstances, therefore undermining one the key pillars of its intuitive appeal. I canvass several ways to respond to this problem, arguing that a rights (or claims) forfeiture theory which employs the distinction between rights forfeiture and rights infringement (or claims forfeiture and infringement) is the best solution.

Exploring Moral Desert

In The Geometry of Desert I used graphs to explore two common ideas about moral desert, namely, that people differ in terms of how deserving they are, and that it is a good thing if people get what they deserve. I argued that desert is a more complex value than we normally recognize, and I laid out a number of alternative possible views, defending some of them. In a pair of critical discussions published in this journal, Victor Tadros and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen offer a variety of objections to several of the ideas I have put forward. In this essay I welcome their criticisms and respond to some of the main points they raise.

The Myth of the Optional War: Why States Are Required to Wage the Wars They Are Permitted to Wage

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 43, Issue 4 p. 255-286 Original Article The Myth of the Optional War: Why States Are Required to Wage the Wars They Are Permitted to Wage KIERAN OBERMAN, KIERAN OBERMANSearch for more papers by this author KIERAN OBERMAN, KIERAN OBERMANSearch for more papers by this author First published: 10 December 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12063Citations: 8 I presented this article to Edinburgh University's Political Theory Research Group and received helpful feedback. I am also grateful to Alfred Archer, Daniel Butt, Philip Cook, Elizabeth Cripps, Christina Dineen, Holly Lawford-Smith, Alan Oberman, David Rodin, and Victor Tadros for their suggestions on various drafts. The insightful comments of the two reviewers transformed the article for the better. Particular thanks are owed to Jonathan Parry, James Stazicker, and Patrick Tomlin for multiple conversations and invaluable advice. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume43, Issue4Fall 2015Pages 255-286 RelatedInformation

Book Review: The Structures of the Criminal Law, written by R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo, and Victor Tadros

Book Review: The Structures of the Criminal Law, written by R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo, and Victor Tadros

R. A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S. E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros (eds): The Constitution of the Criminal Law

R. A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S. E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros (eds): The Constitution of the Criminal Law

Why We Shouldn’t Reject Conflicts: A Critique of Tadros

Victor Tadros thinks the idea that in a conflict both sides may permissibly use force should (typically) be rejected. Thus, he thinks that two shipwrecked persons should not fight for the only available flotsam (which can only carry one person) but instead toss a coin, and that a bomber justifiably attacking an ammunitions factory must not be counterattacked by the innocent bystanders he endangers. I shall argue that Tadros’s claim rests on unwarranted assumptions and is also mistaken in the light of the moral reasoning that he himself offers in support of his ‘means principle’.

The Normative Structure of Criminal Law: Moral or Political?

Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall, Massimo Renzo, and Victor Tadros have recently edited an excellent and important series of collections concerning the problem of criminalization, that is, the principles that should govern the public policy decision to use criminal law and punishment to regulate behaviour. The Structures of Criminal Law, the second of three volumes, is meant to address the following issue: ‘‘once it has been decided to use the criminal law, are there any particular constraints that accompany this?’’ Are there any ‘‘structural features of criminal law which contribute to or limit our understanding of what it is proper to criminalize’’? (p. 2) The editors distinguish three relevant senses of ‘‘structure’’: those relating to the structure of criminal law itself (p. 5), those relating to the place of criminal law in the legal system as a whole (p. 7), and those relating to other ‘‘social and political structures’’ (p. 8). Where necessary, I will refer to these three structural issues as doctrinal, legal, and social, respectively. As the editors recognize, the very terms of these questions are contestable—their contributors do not agree among themselves as to what the structure of criminal law is or as to whether its structure has any constraining effect on the use of criminal law as a policy instrument. In this review, I try to locate each of the papers in relation to a large structural issue that engages particularly with the legal and social structures of criminal law: I will call it the question of normative structure. What is the relationship between the normativity of criminal law and the normativity of ordinary morality? Judgments of criminal

A Criminal's Duty to Go to Jail? Four Arguments Against Tadros' Philosophy of Punishment, with Responses by Victor Tadros

For generations, philosophers of punishment have sought to revise or combine established theories of punishment in a way that could reconcile the utilitarian aims of punishment with the demands of justice. Victor Tadros’ recent work addresses the same problem, but answers it with an entirely original theory of punishment based on the duties criminals acquire by committing their crimes. The unexpected appearance of a new rationale for punishment has already inspired a robust dialogue between Tadros and his critics on many of the individual claims that, linked together, comprise his argument. Eric Blumenson’s critique focuses instead on Tadros’ theory as a whole and the methodology he uses to support it. It proposes that that Tadros’ argumentative strategy can’t justify his rationale by virtue of (1) the extent and complexity of the moral reasoning he invokes, (2) the counter-intuitive results his theory produces in an array of specific cases, and (3) the superiority of a negative-retributivist account in which moral reasoning and intuitive judgments, and the principles and applications that flow from each, are coherent and mutually supportive. Victor Tadros responds to these arguments in an essay following Blumenson’s critique.