Abstract
In this paper, I consider the question of whether crime victims can be said to have a moral right to see their victimizers punished (a “right to punishment”) that could explain why they often feel wronged or cheated when the state fails to punish offenders (or even to make such conduct punishable). In the first part, I explain what I mean by a “right to punishment” and what it is for such a right to “explain” the frustrated crime victim’s reaction. In the second part, I distinguish such a right from a Lockean-style right to punish, which is also shown incapable of providing the needed explanation. In the third part I argue that it is difficult to identify any benefit such that the right to punishment could plausibly be understood as a right to that benefit. I discuss two main candidates here: (i) the vaguely Hegelian idea that punishment is itself some sort of restitution for the wrong done to the victim; and (ii) the idea, due to Victor Tadros, that punishment is a form of compensation for wrongdoing by contributing indirectly to protecting victims from future harm. In the final section, I suggest instead that the frustrated crime victim’s reaction, when justified, is best explained, not by the violation of any right to punishment, but rather by the state’s failure to treat the victim as an equal.
Highlights
Imagine that you are the victim of a serious crime, and that you know who the offender is
I explain what I mean by a “right to punishment” and what it is for such a right to “explain” the frustrated crime victim’s reaction
I discuss two main candidates here: (i) the vaguely Hegelian idea that punishment is itself some sort of restitution for the wrong done to the victim; and (ii) the idea, due to Victor Tadros, that punishment is a form of compensation for wrongdoing by contributing indirectly to protecting victims from future harm
Summary
Our question needs clarification in two respects. First, how are we to understand the crime victim’s supposed “right to punishment”; and second, what is involved in that right’s “explaining” the frustrated victim’s reaction? Let me address these two matters in order. I am interested only in that aspect of the ordinary philosophical notion of a moral right needed to justify the frustrated crime victim’s sense of having been wronged by the state’s failure to punish the offender. There is little harm in our employing such a relatively narrow definition, and I will do so The reason why such a restriction is harmless is precisely that our focus is the right supposedly belonging to the frustrated crime victim; for I assert that, even if the notion of punishment in a Lockean state of nature makes sense (and I do not deny this), the failure of its members to punish wrongdoing does not wrong the victim of that wrongdoing, and a reaction like that of the frustrated crime victim would be unwarranted (if it occurred at all). Abstracting from a phenomenon that, if anything, makes such a right harder to defend seems legitimate
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
