Veto Rule Research Articles

Veto Rights and Vital Interests: Formal and Informal Veto Rules for Minority Representation in Deeply Divided Societies

ABSTRACT In consociational theory, veto rights are a primary means by which ethnic groups defend their vital interests. Yet, the uses and effects of vetoes are variable. Sometimes, the veto is protective, used as a policy of last resort to facilitate inter-group cooperation and community protection. At other times, the veto is a blocking mechanism, used against minority interests or to immobilise the legislative agenda. What accounts for this variation in veto outcomes? In this article, we set out a new framework for assessing veto variability and apply the framework to three consociations – Northern Ireland, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and North Macedonia. We argue that whether a veto trajectory is blocking or protective is contingent on the interplay between three dynamics: formal institutional rules; informal forms of dispute resolution, and; the wider political environment in which these formal and informal rules intersect. Our findings aim to refine extant consociational theory, which has largely under-conceptualised these variations in veto trajectories.

Budgetary choices and institutional rules: veto rules and budget volatility

Studies of the line item veto have traditionally focused on whether it leads to less spending than an all-or-nothing veto and have only produced modest results. However, other impacts that differences in rule choice might effectuate have not been investigated in detail. We examine the role of veto rules for budgetary volatility, the extent to which expenditures vary. Theoretically, we model budget choices given all-or-nothing, line item, and item-reduction vetoes and demonstrate that more encompassing veto authority does not necessarily decrease spending but should result in more political gridlock, implying less volatility. We then analyze the model’s prediction by examining American state budget expenditures from 1978 to 2007. Whether one looks at budget categories or total spending, volatility is greater with the all-or-nothing veto relative to more stringent alternatives. Hence, delegating greater authority to executives such as governors, perhaps unexpectedly, likely strengthens expectations about future budgets while reducing the responsiveness of spending to changing preferences or circumstances.

Appropriate location for remanufacturing plant towards sustainable supply chain

Confronted with the scarcity of natural resources, increase in product returns and government regulations on protection of environment, firms are implementing remanufacturing operations to achieve growth which is more sustainable and contribute to the millennium sustainable development goals. The challenge before the managers is to decide the appropriate location to establish the remanufacturing facilities in the reverse supply chain. Several conflicting criteria need to be considered before establishing a remanufacturing facility. In this paper, a framework is proposed to evaluate an ideal location for opening a remanufacturing plant, with the aid of ideal solution based multi criteria decision making (MCDM) tools, specifically TOPSIS, GRA and VIKOR. The suitable candidate location is then selected using the veto rule, which helps to overcome the limitation of using a single MCDM tool. An illustrative application in the Indian automotive sector is demonstrated to show the applicability of proposed framework. The approach is useful when there is a lack of quantitative data or the information is incomplete. The developed framework will help industries and economies to impact the use of eco-efficient and socio-economic systems and suggest pathways of transitioning to a more sustainable future.

Three proposals to increase Australia's organ supply.

In 2008 the Australian Government introduced a national reform agenda to increase organ and tissue donation. Australia continues to perform poorly by international standards on measures of organ procurement, however. This paper outlines three proposals to improve donation rates and considers the empirical evidence available for each. A number of ethical objections frequently given to resist such proposals are also addressed. Firstly, it is recommended that Australia implement an 'opt-out' system of organ donation. Secondly, the existing veto rules should be changed to better protect the wishes of those who wish to donate. Finally, a numer of incentives should be offered to increase donation rates; these could include incentives of financial value, but also non-financial incentives such as prioritisation for the receipt of organs for previous donors.

Economic Crisis in a Stalemated Democracy

In Southern Europe, the economic crisis (2008-2013) triggered a deeper political crisis, affecting a number of aspects of a representative democracy. Italy provides a particularly telling case of what happens when an economic crisis occurs in an unstable political context characterized by low government effectiveness, low efficiency, corruption, decline of electoral participation, fragmented and radicalized party competition, social inequality, high public debt, and other related features, here summarized in the model of “stalemated democracy.” On the basis of a comprehensive data set developed along with eight dimensions of democracy assessment and taking into account the policies pursued during the years of the crisis, we analyze the different effects of economic crisis—some of them expected, others more surprising—and how those effects characterize Italian political crisis and a new phase of great uncertainty. In the concluding remarks we offer an explanation of the role played by the economic crisis, focusing on the interplay between veto rules and actual veto players. Such an explanation is also relevant to see key, more in-depth aspects of Italian democracy during last 20 years and earlier.

Functional Approach to Duty of Neutrality vs Board Veto Dilemma – Guidelines for Emerging Economies

Takeover law is traditionally characterized by two basic problems: the issue of individual decision making by target company shareholders and the issue of inherent conflict of interest between members of the board of directors and the company. Legal regulations should strive to minimize these problems. That is why numerous mechanisms have been developed to mitigate them. Among them, two opposing principles that define the authority of a target company’s board of directors in a takeover are particularly significant – the principle of neutrality and the board veto rule. The principle of neutrality is the most efficient means of mitigating inherent conflict of interest between board members and the company, while the board veto rule efficiently eradicates the issue of individual target company shareholder decision making. In this article, the author begins with the question of which principle should be adopted by developing countries as their leading rule. A study of numerous papers citing the pros and cons of the two principles does not make it possible to draw an abstract conclusion that one is superior to the other and subsequently recommendable for all legal systems. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the advantages of one principle are, at the same time, disadvantages of the other. That is why the author advocates the so called functional approach, whereby each country should first determine which of the two basic issues of takeover law is better regulated by other legal norms, i.e. the resolution of which is less pressing for the country. Once such a conclusion is reached, a country should implement the principle that reduces the insufficiently regulated problem. The functional approach is not aimed at defining the “winner in the neutrality principle v. board veto rule duel”. It merely strives to determine which principle could render better results in minimizing basic takeover law related problems. By applying the functional approach to the Serbian law, the author has shown that the board veto rule is not the best solution at this particular point in time.

Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes

We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg voting game when the rule is anonymous; this algorithm is efficient if the number of alternatives is no more than a constant. We show how to use compilation functions to further reduce the time and space requirements. Our main theoretical results are paradoxes for the backward-induction outcomes of Stackelberg voting games. We show that for any n ≥ 5 and any voting rule that satisfies nonimposition and with a low domination index, there exists a profile consisting of n voters, such that the backward-induction outcome is ranked somewhere in the bottom two positions in almost every voter’s preferences. Moreover, this outcome loses all but one of its pairwise elections. Furthermore, we show that many common voting rules have a very low (= 1) domination index, including all majority-consistent voting rules. For the plurality and nomination rules, we show even stronger paradoxes. Finally, using our dynamic-programming algorithm, we run simulations to compare the backward-induction outcome of the Stackelberg voting game to the winner when voters vote truthfully, for the plurality and veto rules. Surprisingly, our experimental results suggest that on average, more voters prefer the backward-induction outcome.

Wincenty Skrzetuski o sukcesji tronu i porządku obrad sejmu

Wincenty Skrzetuski's political views place him among the followers of the designers of the reform of the 18th century Republic of Poland. In his work on The Political Right of the Polish Nation, Skrzetuski described the principles according to which the Polish Seym of those times functioned, and, more importantly, depicted the liberum veto rule which he considered to be one of the most disastrous mechanisms allowing an abuse of civil rights. He also proposed procedures that would facilitate a better and more efficient conduct of parliamentary sessions and enhance discipline among its participants. Skrzetuski's views on the succession to the throne expressed in his work on Speeches on major political matters are also noteworthy. His criticism of Royal Election constituted an important element in the 18th century dispute between the supporters of the old order and the propagators of the reforms. Skrzetuski was among those who were first to advocate the necessity of building a strong modern state. In his works such a Speeches or The Political Right he often warned that delaying reforms, e.g. such as introduction of the succession to the throne, or maintaining the liberum veto principle, would lead to a decline and ultimate fall of the Republic.

The Political Economy of Policy Reform in the Philippines: 1992–1998

From 1992 to 1998, the Philippines saw a period of sweeping policy reforms when 273 economic, social and political legislations were adopted. When and why do policy reforms happen and what explains the scope, pace and sequencing of their implementation? My analytic narrative differs from the literature in its emphasis on: (1) the attributes of the players, particularly the role of leadership; (2) the attributes of the policy; and (3) the political rules of the game, including electoral cycles, tenure limits, veto rules and “turncoatism.”

The Role of Information in Choices Over Income Distributions

How people distribute income is investigated, using participants in two experimental treatments—one with and the other without a veil of ignorance. The experiment tests two major hypotheses: (1) the veil of ignorance generates Rawlsian choices, and (2) equal bargaining power and the veto rule generate Rawlsian choices, even though there is no veil of ignorance. Rawlsian choices are defined as those that maximize the income of the lowest income group. Results show that the proportion of Rawlsian choices is bigger in those groups in which there is no veil of ignorance. In group discussions, arguments related to justice are also more common in the no veil of ignorance than in the veil of ignorance treatment.

Veto procedure for improved fault detection performance

A simple but generic procedure is suggested that may be employed in order to enhance the fault detection performance of any utilized algorithm. The procedure is based on suitable calibration of several algorithms and application of simple veto rules. A simple but quite representative example illustrates the proposed veto procedure along with the achievable gains.

The first word and the last word in the budgetary process: A comparative institutional analysis of proposal and veto authorities

This study examines the role of proposal authority and executive veto in the budgetary process. A five stage sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional actors — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. We examine: (i) the factors that affect the executive's power in shaping the final budget when the executive is granted proposal authority; (ii) how increased veto authority, in combination with executive proposal authority, affects the executive's power in forming the final budget; and (iii) the effects of different types of proposal authority and veto rules on the efficiency of the budgetary process.

The multiscale veto model: A two-stage analog network for edge detection and image reconstruction

This article presents the theory behind a model for a two-stage analog network for edge detection and image reconstruction to be implemented in analog VLSI. Edges are detected in the first stage using the multiscale veto rule, which states that an edge exists only if it can pass a threshold test for each of a set of smoothing filters of decreasing bandwidth. The image is reconstructed in the second stage from the brightness values at the pixels between which edges occur. The effect of the multiscale veto rule is that noise is removed with the efficiency of the narrowest-band smoothing filter, while edges are well-localized to feature boundaries without having to identify maxima in the magnitude of the gradient. Unlike previous analog models for edge detection and reconstruction, there are no problems of local minima, and for any given set of parameters, there is a unique solution. The reconstructed images appear natural and are very similar visually to the originals.

Executive budget proposal, executive veto, legislative override, and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process

This study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal, the executive veto, the legislative override, and legislative uncertainty about the executive's preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process. A sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. To focus attention on the executive proposal, the veto, the override provision, and uncertainty, simplifying assumptions are made: (1) the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power, and (2) there is a closed amendment control rule. In order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions, we examine a particular arrangement of agents' preferences and a two item budget. The results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal, the executive veto rule, the override provision, and the uncertainty. We achieve three striking results. First, the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto. Second, for a given override provision, a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases. Third, with the same change in institutions, the government budget may increase.

Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium

In this study the structure-induced equilibrium approach for modeling democratic institutions is extended to allow for the added structural features of executive veto and legislative override. A multidimensional model is presented for a budgetary process involving three actors — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive. In order to focus attention on the role of the veto and override possibilities, simplifying assumptions are made with regard to other aspects of the agenda formation process. In particular, the committee has monopoly agenda power, a closed amendment control rule is operative, and perfect-foresight expectations are held by the committee and the executive. Given these assumptions, utility maximization by the several actors generates a budget outcome characterized as a structure-induced equilibrium. The general model is illustrated geometrically with a two-dimensional example, permitting budget outcomes to be analyzed for various combinations of veto rules and override provisions. The analysis demonstrates that budget outcomes are sensitive to alternative specifications of veto rules and override provisions. In the illustration, executive veto power is shown to vary directly with both the permissiveness of the veto rule and the stringency of the override provision. Similar relationships, however, are not found to exist for total budget expenditures.