Version Of GOST Research Articles

The adjustment suggestions for the GOST R 8.596-20xx “State system for ensuring the uniformity of measurements. Metrological assurance for measuring systems. Main principles”

It’s suggested to adjust the existing normative documents, in particular the first version of GOST R 8.596-20xx “State system for ensuring the uniformity of measurements. Metrological assurance for measuring systems. Main principles”. The aim of the proposed adjustment is to legitimate the nuclear power plants complex measuring systems application, taking into account their peculiarities in the sphere of state regulation of ensuring the unity of measurements. Generally complex measuring systems possess all features of the adaptive and intelligent measuring systems, which parameters and algorithms can vary during operation. Therefore, it is proposed for adaptive and intelligent measuring systems and for branched measuring channels, to provide the possibility of dividing into separate measuring components without the whole system or channel approving. The systems and channels measuring components are proposed to be considered as approval measuring instruments, which interaction is regulated by certified measurement techniques. When selecting the boundaries of the measuring system or channel, it is proposed to provide the possibility to be guided by the reasonability of the sorting the technical means or operations involved in parameter control as metrologically significant. In addition, it is proposed to introduce a statute that allows to avoid the type approving of the “degenerate” systems consisting of one or more simple channels formed only by the measuring means.

Using of risk-oriented thinking in testing laboratories

A new version of ISO/IEC 17025:2017 released in November 2017, and a new version of GOST ISO/IEC 17025 developed on the basis of this document which is to appear in 2019 are discussed. An emphasis is made on the concept of management and operation of testing industrial laboratories (IL) in quality assurance, including application of the process approach and risk management which are considered the main tools of the quality management system (QMS) of testing laboratories. The goal of the article is to provide practical assistance in ensuring a smooth transition of IL from meeting the requirements of the current GOST ISO/IEC 17025-2009 standard to the new version based on the aforementioned process approach and risk-based thinking, the main focus being on the embodiment of risk management requirements. We consider the stages and objectives of the risk management process and options for a systematic approach to risk management, taking into account the initial and subsequent stages of further improvement of the process. Specific recommendations for risk management implementation in IL with a description of the risk management process in the laboratory within the life cycle of the laboratory products or the main business process are proposed. Examples of risk assessment in IL using effective tools: “brainstorm” and “matrix of consequences and probabilities” are presented. The guidelines of improving risk management and subsequent the transition to a more detailed assessment and management of risks are specified and exemplified in the framework of the IL activity. The directions of further developing the QMS of IL regard-ing setting goals and objectives are outlined taking into account risk assessment and risk management both within the internal context of the laboratory and the enterprise, and with allowance for the external environmental impact.

Cryptanalysis of GOST2

GOST 28147 is a 256-bit key 64-bit block cipher developed by the USSR, later adopted by the Russian government as a national standard. In 2010, GOST was suggested to be included in ISO/IEC 18033-3, but was rejected due to weaknesses found in its key schedule. In 2015, a new version of GOST was suggested with the purpose of mitigating such attacks. In this paper, we show that similar weaknesses exist in the new version as well. More specifically, we present a fixed-point attack on the full cipher with time complexity of 2 237 encryptions. We also present a reflection attack with time complexity of 2 192 for a key that is chosen from a class of 2 224 weak keys. Finally, we discuss an impossible reflection attack which improves on exhaustive search by a factor of 2 e , and several possible related-key attacks.

Cryptanalysis of GOST2

GOST 28147 is a 256-bit key 64-bit block cipher developed by the USSR, later adopted by the Russian government as a national standard. In 2010, GOST was suggested to be included in ISO/IEC 18033-3, but was rejected due to weaknesses found in its key schedule. In 2015, a new version of GOST was suggested with the purpose of mitigating such attacks. In this paper, we show that similar weaknesses exist in the new version as well. More specifically, we present a fixed-point attack on the full cipher with time complexity of 2237 encryptions. We also present a reflection attack with time complexity of 2192 for a key that is chosen from a class of 2224 weak keys. Finally, we discuss an impossible reflection attack which improves on exhaustive search by a factor of 2e, and several possible related-key attacks.

Can GOST Be Made Secure Against Differential Cryptanalysis?

GOST is a well-known Russian government standard block cipher which was submitted to ISO in 2010 to become an international standard. A number of advanced differential attacks on GOST have been proposed including the best known single-key attack on GOST to date in 2179 [14]. This attack, however, was designed for the oldest known set of GOST S-boxes hoping that similar attacks should exist for other versions of GOST. This claim was bitterly disputed by Russian researchers as recently as July 2012, who stated that “S-boxes heavily affect security” and “with ‘good’ S-boxes the attack fails” [32].Nothing can be more mistaken. In this article, the authors review 40 years of development of block ciphers in order to resist differential attacks. They study all ten known sets of GOST S-boxes. It appears that the choice of S-boxes has a limited effect on the actual security of GOST against advanced differential attacks. There is no evidence that the version of GOST submitted to ISO in 2011 is stronger than any previous version of GOST.