Verification Of Protocols Research Articles

Purity Assessment of Single-Wall Carbon Nanotubes, Using Optical Absorption Spectroscopy

A demand currently exists for a method of assessing the purity of single-wall carbon nanotubes (SWNTs), which will allow for meaningful material comparisons. An established metric and protocol will enable accurate and reproducible purity claims to be substantiated. In the present work, the ability to accurately quantify the mass fraction of SWNTs in the carbonaceous portion of a given sample is demonstrated, using optical absorption spectroscopy on both laser and arc discharge-generated SWNT-N,N-dimethylacetamide (DMA) dispersions. Verification of purity assessment protocols is based upon constructed sample sets comprising designed mass fractions of purified SWNTs and representative carbonaceous synthesis byproducts. Application of a previously reported method based on a ratio of the areal absorbance from linear subtractions of the second interband electronic transitions of semiconducting SWNTs ((S)E(22)) has shown a severe overestimation of SWNT purity (average error >24%). Instead, the development of a nonlinear pi-plasmon model, which considers overlap of electronic transitions and peak broadening, has dramatically improved the purity assessment accuracy (average error <7%), derived from a strong correlation to the constructed sample sets. This approach has enabled corroboration of rapid assessment procedures, such as absorbance peak maxima ratio and Beer's law analysis, directed at purification monitoring and synthesis sample screening. Specifically, a simple protocol for purity assessment of laser and arc-discharge SWNTs has been established that can be extended to other synthetic types (i.e. CVD, HiPco, etc.) and diameter distributions.

A semantics for web services authentication

We consider the problem of specifying and verifying cryptographic security protocols for XML web services. The security specification WS-Security describes a range of XML security elements, such as username tokens, public-key certificates, and digital signatures, amounting to a flexible vocabulary for expressing protocols. To describe the syntax of these elements, we extend the usual XML data model with symbolic representations of cryptographic values. We use predicates on this data model to describe the semantics of security elements and of sample protocols distributed with the Microsoft WSE implementation of WS-Security. By embedding our data model within Abadi and Fournet's applied pi calculus, we formulate and prove security properties with respect to the standard Dolev–Yao threat model. Moreover, we informally discuss issues not addressed by the formal model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach to the specification and verification of security protocols based on a faithful account of the XML wire format.

Performance evaluation and verification of communication protocol for railway signaling systems

As long as railway signaling systems is digitalized, communication link is getting more important as a result of variety of communication links, such as links for interface between each signaling are replaced by digital communication channels. However, the communication links for current railroad signaling have some problems in Korea. At first, the maintenance is difficult because protocols for interface are applied differently at the each manufacturer. Also, communication protocols, such as structure, byte format, and error correction method, have a little non-logical part, which threatens safety. In order to solve this problem, the standard communication verified by using formal method is required. After designing new protocol for railway signaling, this paper analyzed the designed protocol's structure and performance through simulation. Also, as a very important part in the development of protocol, this paper specified the designed protocol in Labeled Transition System (LTS) with model check method, and verified safety and liveness proprieties of the designed protocol. Therefore, it is expected that the safety, reliability, and efficiency of maintenance for the railway signaling systems will be increased by using the newly designed communication protocol in Korea.

An overview of the verification of SET

This paper describes the verification of Secure Electronic Transaction (SET), an e-commerce protocol by VISA and MasterCard. The main tasks are to comprehend the written documentation, to produce an accurate formal model, to identify specific protocol goals, and, finally, to prove them. The main obstacles are the protocol’s complexity (due in part to its use of digital envelopes) and its unusual goals involving partial information sharing. Our verification efforts show that the protocol does not completely satisfy its goals, although the flaws are minor. The primary outcome of the project is experience with verification of enormous and complicated protocols. This paper summarizes the project – the details appear elsewhere [11, 12 , 13 ] – focusing on the issues and the conclusions.

A Coordination-based Methodology for Security Protocol Verification

The quest for the formal certification of properties of systems is one of the most challenging research issues in the field of formal methods. It requires the development of formal models together with effective verification techniques. In this paper, we describe a formal methodology for verifying security protocols based on ideas borrowed from the analysis of open systems, where applications interact with one another by dynamically sharing common resources and services in a not fully trusted environment. The methodology is supported by ASPASyA, a tool based on symbolic model checking techniques.

Symbolic Reachability Analysis Using Narrowing and its Application to Verification of Cryptographic Protocols

Narrowing was introduced, and has traditionally been used, to solve equations in initial and free algebras modulo a set of equations E. This paper proposes a generalization of narrowing which can be used to solve reachability goals in initial and free models of a rewrite theory R. We show that narrowing is sound and weakly complete (i.e., complete for normalized solutions) under reasonable executability assumptions about R. We also show that in general narrowing is not strongly com- plete, that is, not complete when some solutions can be further rewritten by R. We then identify several large classes of rewrite theories, covering many practical applications, for which narrowing is strongly complete. Finally, we illustrate an application of narrowing to analysis of cryptographic protocols.

Knowledge structure approach to verification of authentication protocols

The standard Kripke semantics of epistemic logics has been applied successfully to reasoning communication protocols under the assumption that the network is not hostile. This paper introduces a natural semantics of Kripke semantics called knowledge structure and, by this kind of Kripke semantics, analyzes communication protocols over hostile networks, especially on authentication protocols. Compared with BAN-like logics, the method is automatically implementable because it operates on the actual definitions of the protocols, not on some difficult-to-establish justifications of them. What is more, the corresponding tool called SPV (Security Protocol Verifier) has been developed. Another salient point of this approach is that it is justification-oriented instead of falsification-oriented, i.e. finding bugs in protocols.

Rule-based Programming in Java For Protocol Verification

This paper presents an approach for the development of model-checkers in a framework, called TOM, merging declarative and imperative features. We illustrate our method by specifying in TOM the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol that aims to establish a mutual authentication between an initiator and a responder that communicate via an insecure network. We describe the behavior of the agents exchanging messages as well as the intruders and the security invariants the protocol should verify using the rewrite rules of TOM. The (depth-first or breadth-first) exploration of the search space is described using the imperative features of the language. We propose several optimizations and we compare our results to existing approaches.

A Cryptographically Sound Security Proof of the Needham–Schroeder–Lowe Public-Key Protocol

We present a cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol for entity authentication. This protocol was previously only proved over unfounded abstractions from cryptography. We show that it is secure against arbitrary active attacks if it is implemented using standard provably secure cryptographic primitives. Nevertheless, our proof does not have to deal with the probabilistic aspects of cryptography and is, hence, in the scope of current automated proof tools. We achieve this by exploiting a recently proposed Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library with a provably secure cryptographic implementation. Besides establishing the cryptographic security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, our result exemplifies the potential of this cryptographic library and paves the way for the cryptographically sound verification of security protocols by automated proof tools.

Verifying security protocols with PVS: widening the rank function approach

To enable the verification of authentication protocols, Schneider formulated the rank function approach which could be used, under suitable circumstances, to verify protocols modelled using the process algebra CSP. We develop this theoretical result and extend it to a practical framework which can be used to model and analyse a wider variety of security protocols with respect to a wider range of security specifications than were hitherto possible. These results are achieved using PVS, which also provides tool support for the rank function approach.

MODEL CHECKING A KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE SCENARIO

We are interested in applying model checking techniques to the verification of communication protocols that require safe communication. Typically, in such scenarios, one desires to demonstrate that one party can reliably communicate information to another party without a third party being able to determine this information. Our approach involves using the modal logic of knowledge, which has only relatively recently been studied in the context of security protocols. We demonstrate our approach by means of a detailed case study: the Russian cards problem. This is an example of a security protocol with nontrivial requirements on the knowledge of the agents involved. Using the Russian cards problem as an example, it is shown how the satisfaction of properties involving knowledge can be verified in a standard model checker, which in our case is SPIN.

Performance evaluation and verification of communication protocol for railway signaling systems

As long as railway signaling systems is digitalized, communication link is getting more important as a result of variety of communication links, such as links for interface between each signaling are replaced by digital communication channels. However, the communication links for current railroad signaling have some problems in Korea. At first, the maintenance is difficult because protocols for interface are applied differently at the each manufacturer. Also, communication protocols, such as structure, byte format, and error correction method, have a little non-logical part, which threatens safety. In order to solve this problem, the standard communication verified by using formal method is required. After designing new protocol for railway signaling, this paper analyzed the designed protocol's structure and performance through simulation. Also, as a very important part in the development of protocol, this paper specified the designed protocol in Labeled Transition System (LTS) with model check method, and verified safety and liveness proprieties of the designed protocol. Therefore, it is expected that the safety, reliability, and efficiency of maintenance for the railway signaling systems will be increased by using the newly designed communication protocol in Korea.

Discrete event systems approach to the verification of the information flow properties in secure protocols

This paper introduces a new algorithmic approach to the problem of checking the intransitive non-interference (INI) using discrete event systems (DES) tools and concepts. INI is an information flow property widely used in formal verification of computer systems and security protocols. First a new property called iP-observability (observability based on a purge function) is introduced to capture INI. An equivalence between iP-observability and P-observability (observability as used in DES) is then established. This paper also presents an algorithm to transform the automaton modelling the system/protocol into an automaton where P-observability can be checked, which is equivalent to verifying INI for the original system. Since P-obervability can be checked with a polynomial complexity, this algorithmic approach can effectively verify the important security property of INI.

Specification and Verification of Protocols With Time Constraints

Specification and Verification of Protocols With Time Constraints

The Affine Hull of a Binary Automaton is Computable in Polynomial Time

We present the class of binary automaton, a new representation for the subsets of Nm that naturally extends the NDD ([Wolper, P. and B. Boigelot, An automata-theoretic approach to Presburger arithmetic constraints, in: Proc. 2nd Int. Symp. Static Analysis (SAS'95), Glasgow, UK, Sep. 1995, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 983 (1995), pp. 21–32], [Boudet, A. and H. Comon, Diophantine equations, Presburger arithmetic and finite automata, in: Proc. 21st Int. Coll. on Trees in Algebra and Programming (CAAP'96), Linköping, Sweden, Apr. 1996, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1059 (1996), pp. 30–43]). We prove that the affine hull of the set of vectors represented by a binary automaton is computable in polynomial time. As application, we show that the set of place invariants [Ciardo, G., Petri nets with marking-dependent arc cardinality: Properties and analysis, in: Proc. 15th Int. Conf. Application and Theory of Petri Nets (ICATPN'94), Zaragoza, Spain, June 1994, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 815 (1994), pp. 179–198] of a counter system (an extension of the Broadcast Protocols [Emerson, E. A. and K. S. Namjoshi, On model checking for non-deterministic infinite-state systems, in: Proc. 13th IEEE Symp. Logic in Computer Science (LICS'98), Indianapolis, IN, USA, June 1998 (1998), pp. 70–80], [Delzanno, G., Verification of consistency protocols via infinite-state symbolic model checking: A case study, in: Proc. IFIP Joint Int. Conf. Formal Description Techniques & Protocol Specification, Testing, and Verification (FORTE-PSTV'00), Pisa, Italy, Oct. 2000, IFIP Conference Proceedings 183 (2000), pp. 171–186], [Delzanno, G., Constraint-based verification of parameterized cache coherence protocols, Formal Methods in System Design. To appear], the Reset/Transfer Petri Nets [Dufourd, C., A. Finkel and P. Schnoebelen, Reset nets between decidability and undecidability, in: Proc. 25th Int. Coll. Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP'98), Aalborg, Denmark, July 1998, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1443 (1998), pp. 103–115], [Ciardo, G., Petri nets with marking-dependent arc cardinality: Properties and analysis, in: Proc. 15th Int. Conf. Application and Theory of Petri Nets (ICATPN'94), Zaragoza, Spain, June 1994, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 815 (1994), pp. 179–198] and the linear systems [Finkel, A. and J. Leroux, How to compose Presburger-accelerations: Applications to broadcast protocols, in: Proc. 22nd Conf. Found. of Software Technology and Theor. Comp. Sci. (FST&TCS'2002), Kanpur, India, Dec. 2002, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2556 (2002), pp. 145–156]), is computable in polynomial time.

Authentication tests and disjoint encryption: A design method for security protocols*

We describe a protocol design process, and illustrate its use by creating ATSPECT, an Authentication Test-based Secure Protocol for Electronic Commerce Transactions. The design process is organized around the authentication tests, a method for protoc

Rewriting-Based Verification of Authentication Protocols

We propose a method of formally analysing security protocols based on rewriting. The method is roughly as follows. A security protocol is modeled as an observational transition system, which is described in CafeOBJ. Proof scores showing that the protocol has safety (security) properties are then written in CafeOBJ and the proof scores are executed (rewritten) by the CafeOBJ system.

A Tool For Specification And Verification Of Epistemic Properties In Interpreted Systems

We present a compiler that translates a multi-agent systems specification given in the formalism of Interpreted Systems into an SMV program. We show how an SMV model checker can be coupled with a Kripke model editor (Akka) to allow for the mechanical verification of epistemic properties of multi-agent systems. We apply this methodology to the verification of a communication protocol — the dining cryptographers.

Lossy Communicating Finite State Machines

A network of communicating finite state machines (CFSM) consists of a set of finite state machines that communicate asynchronously with each other over (potentially) unbounded FIFO channels by sending and receiving typed messages. As a concurrency model, CFSMs has been widely used to specify and validate communications protocols. In this paper we propose to extend the classical CFSM model by introducing a new type of actions --- the deletion action. The resulted model is called lossy communicating finite state machines (LCFSMs). The LCFSM model remedies two weaknesses in classical CFSM model. We show that the LCFSM model allows specification and verification of unreliable communication channels with no need of extra CFSMs. The LCFSM model enables more succinct specification and verification of communication protocols that use unreliable communication channels. LCFSM paradigm can also be used to concisely model communication errors such as dropping datagrams in UDP due to lack of local buffers.

PITL2MONA: Implementing a Decision Procedure for Propositional Interval Temporal Logic

Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is a finite-time linear temporal logic with applications in hardware verification, temporal logic programming and specification of multimedia documents. Due to the logic's non-elementary complexity, efficient ITL-based verification tools have been difficult to develop, even for propositional subsets. MONA is an efficient implementation of an automata-based decision procedure for the logic WS1S. Despite the non-elementary complexity of WS1S, MONA has been successfully applied in problems such as hardware synthesis, protocol verification and theorem proving. Here we consider a rich propositional subset of ITL, PITL, whose expressive power is equivalent to that of WS1S, and in turn to that of regular languages. PITL not only includes operators such as chop (;), star (*) and projection (proj), but also past operators such as previous (-), chop in the past (˜) and since (S). We provide an interpretation of PITL formulas in WS1S, which led us to a direct translation from PITL formulas to MONA specifications. We present the tool PITL2MONA as an implementation of such translation. With PITL2MONA acting as a front-end, MONA is used as a decision procedure for PITL. To our knowledge, this is one of the few implementations of a decision procedure for PITL, the first one based on automata, and the only one which handles both projection and past operators. We have tested our implementation on a number of examples; we show in this paper the application of PITL and its MONA-based decision procedure in solutions to the dining-philosophers and a multimedia synchronisation problem, together with some experimental results on these and some other examples.