Verifiable E-voting Research Articles

RETRACTED: Liu et al. A Publicly Verifiable E-Voting System Based on Biometrics. Cryptography 2023, 7, 62

RETRACTED: Liu et al. A Publicly Verifiable E-Voting System Based on Biometrics. Cryptography 2023, 7, 62

A Publicly Verifiable E-Voting System Based on Biometrics

Voters use traditional paper ballots, a method limited by the factors of time and space, to ensure their voting rights are exercised; this method requires a lot of manpower and resources. Duplicate voting problems may also occur, meaning the transparency and reliability of the voting results cannot be guaranteed. With the rapid developments in science and technology, E-voting system technology is being adopted more frequently in election activities. However, E-voting systems still cannot address the verifiability of the election process; the results of a given election and the credibility of the host organization will be questioned if the election’s verifiability cannot be ensured. Elections may also pose a series of problems related to privacy, security, and so on. To address these issues, this paper presents a public, and verifiable E-voting system with hidden statistics; this system is based on commitment, zk-SNARKs, and machine learning. The system can deal with a large number of candidates, complex voting methods, and result functions in counting both hidden and public votes and can satisfy the requirements of verifiability, privacy, security, and intelligence. Our security analysis shows that our scheme achieves privacy, hidden vote counting and verifiability. Our performance evaluation demonstrates that our system has reasonable applications in real scenarios.

PVPBC: Privacy and Verifiability Preserving E-Voting Based on Permissioned Blockchain

Privacy and verifiability are crucial security requirements in e-voting systems and combining them is considered to be a challenge given that they seem to be contradictory. On one hand, privacy means that cast votes cannot be traced to the corresponding voters. On the other hand, linkability of voters and their votes is a requirement of verifiability which has the consequence that a voter is able to check their vote in the election result. These two contradictory features can be addressed by adopting privacy-preserving cryptographic primitives, which at the same time as achieving privacy, achieve verifiability. Many end-to-end schemes that support verifiability and privacy have the need for some voter action. This makes ballot casting more complex for voters. We propose the PVPBC voting system, which is an e-voting system that preserves privacy and verifiability without affecting voter usability. The PVPBC voting system uses an effective and distributed method of authorization, which is based on revocable anonymity, by making use of a permissioned distributed ledger and smart contract. In addition, the underlying PVPBC voting system satisfies election verifiability using the Selene voting scheme. The Selene protocol is a verifiable e-voting protocol. It publishes votes in plaintext accompanied by tracking numbers. This enables voters to confirm that their votes have been captured correctly by the system. Numerical experiments support the claim that PVPBC scales well as a function of the number of voters and candidates. In particular, PVPBC’s authorization time increases linearly as a function of the population size. The average latency associated with accessing the system also increases linearly with the voter population size. The latency incurred when a valid authentication transaction is created and sent on the DLT network is 6.275 ms. Empirical results suggest that the cost in GBP for casting and storing an encrypted ballot alongside a tracker commitment is a linear function of the number of candidates, which is an attractive aspect of PVPBC.

A secure end-to-end verifiable e-voting system using blockchain and cloud server

We propose a cryptographic technique for an authenticated, end-to-end verifiable and secret ballot election. Currently, almost all verifiable e-voting systems require trusted authorities to perform the tallying process except for the DRE-i and DRE-ip systems. We have shown a weakness of the DRE-ip system and proposed a solution. We propose a secure and verifiable voter registration and authentication mechanism. The proposed scheme prevents ballot stuffing attack. We have modified the DRE-ip system so that no adversary can create and post a valid ballot on the public bulletin board without detection. We propose a method for publishing the final tally without revealing the tally from individual Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) machines using secure multi-party computation and non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof. We propose two methods to store these ballots using blockchain and cloud server. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first end-to-end verifiable DRE based e-voting system using blockchain. We provide security proofs to prove the security properties of the proposed scheme. We prove that the efficient NIZK proof proposed by Lin et al. in APSIPA ASC 2019 is not correct since it does not satisfy the witness indistinguishability property of a zero-knowledge proof. We introduce an improved NIZK proof that boosts the efficiency of the system. The experimental data obtained from our tests show the protocol’s potential for real-world deployment.

End-to-End Verifiable E-Voting Trial for Polling Station Voting

On 2 May 2019, during United Kingdom local elections, an e-voting trial was conducted in Gateshead, using a touchscreen, end-to-end verifiable system. This was the first test of its kind in the United Kingdom, and it presented a case study to envisage the future of e-voting.

Blockchain technology based e-voting system

Election could be a important event during a trendy democracy however massive sections of society round the world don’t trust their election system that is major concern for the democracy. Even the world’s largest democracies like Republic of India, us, and Japan still suffer from a blemished legal system. Vote rigging, hacking of the EVM (Electronic vote machine), election manipulation, and booth capturing square measure the key problems within the current electoral system. during this system, we tend to square measure work the problems|the problems within the election vote systems and attempting to propose the E-voting model which might resolve these issues. The system can highlight a number of the popular blockchain frameworks that provide blockchain as a service and associated electronic E-voting system that is predicated on blockchain that addresses all limitations severally, it additionally preserve participant’s obscurity whereas still being hospitable public examination. Building Associate in Nursing electronic electoral system that satisfies the legal necessities of legislators has been a challenge for an extended time. Distributed ledger technologies is Associate in Nursing exciting technological advancement within the info technology world. Blockchain technologies supply Associate in Nursing infinite vary of applications cashing in on sharing economies. Blockchain could be a unquiet technology of current era and guarantees to enhance the resilience of e-voting systems. this technique presents a shot to leverage edges of blockchain like cryptological foundations and transparency to attain an efficient theme for e-voting. The projected theme conforms to the elemental necessities for e-voting schemes and achieves end-to-end verifiability. The system presents in-depth analysis of the theme that with success demonstrates its effectiveness to attain Associate in Nursing end-to-end verifiable e-voting theme.

Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems

We present the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems; one completely asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Their distributed voting operation is human verifiable; a voter can vote over the web, using an unsafe web client stack, without sacrificing her privacy, and get recorded-as-cast assurance. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement prototypes of the complete systems, measure their performance experimentally, demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections, and demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the two versions.

Transparent, Auditable, and Stepwise Verifiable Online E-Voting Enabling an Open and Fair Election

Many e-voting techniques have been proposed but not widely used in reality. One of the problems associated with most existing e-voting techniques is the lack of transparency, leading to a failure to deliver voter assurance. In this work, we p verifiable, viewable, and mutual restraining e-voting protocol that exploits the existing multi-party political dynamics such as in the US. The new e-voting protocol consists of three original technical contributions—universal verifiable voting vector, forward and backward mutual lock voting, and in-process check and enforcement—that, along with a public real time bulletin board, resolves the apparent conflicts in voting such as anonymity vs. accountability and privacy vs. verifiability. Especially, the trust is split equally among tallying authorities who have conflicting interests and will technically restrain each other. The voting and tallying processes are transparent/viewable to anyone, which allow any voter to visually verify that his vote is indeed counted and also allow any third party to audit the tally, thus, enabling open and fair election. Depending on the voting environment, our interactive protocol is suitable for small groups where interaction is encouraged, while the non-interactive protocol allows large groups to vote without interaction.

A Verifiable E-voting Scheme with Secret Sharing

Traditional e-voting schemes use centralized and non- transparent count centers, which leads to people's distrust of the centers and doubt of the voting on impartiality and correctness. In this paper, we propose a distributed and verifiable e-voting scheme based on Mignotte's threshold secret sharing scheme, which effectively balances the conflict of interest between voters and count centers. Additionally, this scheme can also resist potential attacks from malicious participants, and satisfy special requirements of e-voting, especially for privacy and accountability, which contradict each other. Moreover, voters take on the major computation load in our scheme, which effectively reduces the computation burden of the vote counter.