Veridical Representation Research Articles

Perception, Evolution, and the Explanatory Scope of Scientific Theories

According to the interface theory of perception, our perceptual systems have evolved to provide a species-specific interface to guide adaptive behaviour, and not to provide veridical representations of an observer-independent world. Results of simulations of evolutionary resource games, genetic algorithms, and multiple mathematical theorems have supported and fleshed out this claim in various ways. They indicate that the probability is zero that any perceptual system has been shaped by natural selection to represent the true structure of an observer-independent world. Bagwell (2023) thinks that this argument is self-defeating because it implies that organisms, resources, genes, etc. that are essential constituents of Darwin's theory do not provide an insight into the nature of observerindependent reality. Bagwell's argument relies on a false premise, however — namely, that the mathematical formulation of a scientific theory cannot dethrone its fundamental concepts. More broadly, his argument involves a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of scientific theories — of their explanatory scope and their necessary limits.

Concurrent maintenance of both veridical and transformed working memory representations within unique coding schemes

Abstract In the dynamic environment we live in, the already limited information that human working memory can maintain needs to be constantly updated to optimally guide behaviour. Indeed, previous studies showed that leading up to a response, representations maintained in working memory representations are transformed continuously. This goes hand-in-hand with the removal of task-irrelevant items. However, does such removal also include the representations of stimuli as they were originally, prior to transformation? Here, we assessed the neural representation of task-relevant transformed representations, and the no-longer-relevant veridical representations they originated from. We applied multivariate pattern analysis to electroencephalographic data during maintenance of orientation gratings with and without mental rotation. During maintenance, we perturbed the representational network by means of a visual impulse stimulus, and were thus able to successfully decode veridical as well as imaginary, transformed orientation gratings from impulse-driven activity. The impulse response reflected only task-relevant (cued), but not task-irrelevant (uncued) items, suggesting that the latter were quickly discarded from working memory. By contrast, even though the original cued orientation gratings were also no longer task-relevant after mental rotation, these items continued to be represented next to the rotated ones, in different representational formats. This seemingly inefficient use of scarce working memory capacity was associated with reduced probe response times and may thus serve to increase precision and flexibility in guiding behaviour in dynamic environments.

A fatal flaw: Positive leadership style research creates causal illusions

We argue and show empirically that constructs and measures of positive leadership styles, such as authentic, ethical, and servant leadership, are not veridical representations of leadership behaviors. Instead, these styles conflate behaviors with subjective evaluations of leaders. Labelling behaviors as, for example, “ethical” means evaluating leadership behaviors on positively valenced terms rather than describing these behaviors. Across four experiments, we show that positive leadership styles are outcomes that depend on non-behavioral, evaluative factors, such as information about a leader’s previous success or value alignment between leaders and followers. More importantly, the measures of these leadership styles create causal illusions by spuriously predicting objective outcomes, even when leader behaviors and other leader-specific factors are kept constant. Furthermore, these measures have predictive properties similar to those of a purely evaluative measure of leadership. In conclusion, our studies cast serious doubts on previous research claiming that positive leadership styles cause positive outcomes. Moreover, positive leadership style research is not only wrong but also practically futile because its constructs and measures are amalgams that do not isolate concrete and learnable behaviors. We call for a radical reorientation of leadership style research and sketch out options for more solid future research.

Idealized Models as Selective Representations

This paper calls into question one fundamental claim at the basis of an alleged puzzle for veritistic accounts of the value of idealized models: the claim that idealized models cannot be veridical representations of the world. Catherine Elgin has argued that the value of idealized models can only be explained if we construe them as exemplars, which do not represent the world. I argue that Elgin’s proposal is problematic and cannot accommodate central cases of idealization. Nevertheless, there is value in Elgin’s proposal. I rescue her notion of selectiveness in exemplification and incorporate it within a revised account of representation. I provide independent motivation in favour of a form of veritism, which motivates a revision of Elgin’s case against it. I argue that an account based on selective representation has the resources to rescue veritism from the problems raised by Elgin. In the proposal I advance, idealized models are literally veridical representations of the world.

Consolidation without intention: Sleep strengthens veridical and gist representations of information after incidental encoding.

Sleep strengthens declarative memory, but research investigating the effect of sleep on memory for information that is not explicitly studied for a test is sparse. In two experiments, we investigated the effect of sleep on gist-based and veridical representations of incidentally encoded information. Participants rated words from Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists in either a deep or shallow encoding task and completed a surprise memory test after either sleep or wake. In Experiment 1, words were presented in lists, in order of descending associativity with the unpresented critical lure. Memory for list words and critical lures in both encoding tasks was stronger after sleep than wake, suggesting that sleep consolidated gist-based memory. In Experiment 2, the same words were presented in a random order across the experiment to minimize gist-based processing. Sleep strengthened veridical memory for list words following deep, but not shallow, encoding and did not affect critical lures. These results suggest sleep consolidates gist and veridical representations of information after incidental encoding, and that sleep-dependent consolidation processes may depend on processes at encoding, such as overlapping context and the strength of veridical memory traces.

Do readers misassign thematic roles? Evidence from a trailing boundary-change paradigm

ABSTRACT We report an eye-tracking experiment with a trailing boundary-change paradigm as people read subject- and object-relative clauses that were either plausible or implausible. We sought to determine whether readers sometime misassign thematic roles to arguments in implausible, noncanonical sentences. In some sentences, argument nouns were reversed after participants had read them. Thus, implausible noncanonical sentences like “The bird that the worm ate yesterday was small” changed to plausible “The worm that the bird ate was small.” If initial processing generates veridical representations, all changes should disrupt rereading, irrespective of plausibility or syntactic structure. Misinterpretation effects should only arise in offline comprehension. If misassignment of thematic roles occurs during initial processing, differences should be apparent in first-pass reading times, and rereading should be differentially affected by the direction of the text change. Results provide evidence that readers sometimes misassign roles during initial processing and sometimes fail to revise misassignments during rereading.

From pictures to reality: modelling the phenomenology and psychophysics of 3D perception.

The dominant inferential approach to human 3D perception assumes a model of spatial encoding based on a physical description of objects and space. Prevailing models based on this physicalist approach assume that the visual system infers an objective, unitary and mostly veridical representation ofthe external world. However, careful consideration of the phenomenology of 3Dperception challenges these assumptions. I review important aspects of phenomenology, psychophysics and neurophysiology which suggest that human visual perception of 3D objects and space is underwritten by distinct and dissociated spatial encodings that are optimized for specific regions of space. Specifically, I argue that 3D perception is underwritten by at least three distinct encodings for (1) egocentric distance perception at the ambulatory scale, (2) exocentric distance (scaled depth) perception optimized for near space, and (3) perception of object shape and layout (unscaled depth). This tripartite division can more satisfactorily account for the phenomenology, psychophysics and adaptive logic of human 3D perception. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'New approaches to 3D vision'.

Flexible Goals Require that Inflexible Perceptual Systems Produce Veridical Representations: Implications for Realism as Revealed by Evolutionary Simulations.

How veridical is perception? Rather than representing objects as they actually exist in the world, might perception instead represent objects only in terms of the utility they offer to an observer? Previous work employed evolutionary modeling to show that under certain assumptions, natural selection favors such "strict-interface" perceptual systems. This view has fueled considerable debate, but we think that discussions so far have failed to consider the implications of two critical aspects of perception. First, while existing models have explored single utility functions, perception will often serve multiple largely independent goals. (Sometimes when looking at a stick you want to know how appropriate it would be as kindling for a campfire, and other times you want to know how appropriate it would be as a weapon for self-defense.) Second, perception often operates in an inflexible, automatic manner-proving "impenetrable" to shifting higher-level goals. (When your goal shifts from "burning" to "fighting," your visual experience does not dramatically transform.) These two points have important implications for the veridicality of perception. In particular, as the need for flexible goals increases, inflexible perceptual systems must become more veridical. We support this position by providing evidence from evolutionary simulations that as the number of independent utility functions increases, the distinction between "interface" and "veridical" perceptual systems dissolves. Although natural selection evaluates perceptual systems only on their fitness, the most fit perceptual systems may nevertheless represent the world as it is.

An adaptive perspective on visual working memory distortions.

When holding multiple items in visual working memory, representations of individual items are often attracted to, or repelled from, each other. While this is empirically well-established, existing frameworks do not account for both types of distortions, which appear to be in opposition. Here, we demonstrate that both types of memory distortion may confer functional benefits under different circumstances. When there are many items to remember and subjects are near their capacity to accurately remember each item individually, memories for each item become more similar (attraction). However, when remembering smaller sets of highly similar but discernible items, memory for each item becomes more distinct (repulsion), possibly to support better discrimination. Importantly, this repulsion grows stronger with longer delays, suggesting that it dynamically evolves in memory and is not just a differentiation process that occurs during encoding. Furthermore, both attraction and repulsion occur even in tasks designed to mitigate response bias concerns, suggesting they are genuine changes in memory representations. Together, these results are in line with the theory that attraction biases act to stabilize memory signals by capitalizing on information about an entire group of items, whereas repulsion biases reflect a tradeoff between maintaining accurate but distinct representations. Both biases suggest that human memory systems may sacrifice veridical representations in favor of representations that better support specific behavioral goals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

George Orwell, objectivity, and the reality behind illusions

Illusions are commonly defined as departures of our percepts from the veridical representation of objective, common-sense reality. However, it has been claimed recently that this definition lacks validity, for example, on the grounds that external reality cannot possibly be represented truly by our sensory systems, and indeed may even be a fiction. Here, I first demonstrate how novelist George Orwell warned that such denials of objective reality are dangerous mistakes, in that they can lead to the suppression and even the atrophy of independent thought and critical evaluation. Second, anti-realists assume their opponents hold a fully reductionist metaphysics, in which fundamental physics describes the only ground truth, thereby placing it beyond direct human sensory observation. In contrast, I point to a more recent and commonly used alternative, non-reductive metaphysics. This ascribes real existence to many levels of dynamic systems of information, emerging progressively from the subatomic to the biological, psychological, social, and ecological. Within such a worldview the notion of objective reality is valid, it comes in part within the range of our senses, and thus a definition of illusions as kinds of deviations from veridical perception becomes possible again.

Flexible goals require that inflexible perceptual systems produce veridical representations: Implications for realism as revealed by evolutionary simulations

Flexible goals require that inflexible perceptual systems produce veridical representations: Implications for realism as revealed by evolutionary simulations

Action biases perceptual decisions toward expected outcomes.

We predict how our actions will influence the world around us. Prevailing models in the action control literature propose that we use these predictions to suppress or “cancel” perception of expected action outcomes, to highlight more informative surprising events. However, contrasting normative Bayesian models in sensory cognition suggest that we are more, not less, likely to perceive what we expect—given that what we expect is more likely to occur. Here we adjudicated between these models by investigating how expectations influence perceptual decisions about action outcomes in a signal detection paradigm. Across three experiments, participants performed one of two manual actions that were sometimes accompanied by brief presentation of expected or unexpected visual outcomes. Contrary to dominant cancellation models but consistent with Bayesian accounts, we found that observers were biased to report the presence of expected action outcomes. There were no effects of expectation on sensitivity. Computational modeling revealed that the action-induced bias reflected a sensory bias in how evidence was accumulated rather than a baseline shift in decision circuits. Expectation effects remained in Experiments 2 and 3 when orthogonal cues indicated which finger was more likely to be probed (i.e. task-relevant). These biases toward perceiving expected action outcomes are suggestive of a mechanism that would enable generation of largely veridical representations of our actions and their consequences in an inherently uncertain sensory world.

An integrative framework of information as both objective and subjective

We present a model of information that integrates two competing perspectives of information by emulating the Chinese philosophy of yin-yang. The model embraces the two key dimensions of information that exist harmoniously: information as (1) objective and veridical representations in the world (information as object) and (2) socially constructed interpretations that are a result of contextual influences (information as subject). We argue that these two facets of information cocreate information as a unified system and complement one another through two processes, which we denote as forming and informing. While the information literature has historically treated these objective and subjective identities of information as incompatible, we argue that they are mutually relevant and that our understanding of one actually enhances our understanding of the other.

The attentional template in high and low similarity search: Optimal tuning or tuning to relations?

The attentional template is often described as the mental representation that drives attentional selection and guidance, for instance, in visual search. Recent research suggests that this template is not a veridical representation of the sought-for target, but instead an altered representation that allows more efficient search. The current paper contrasts two such theories. Firstly, the Optimal Tuning account which posits that the attentional template shifts to an exaggerated target value to maximise the signal-to-noise ratio between similar targets and non-targets. Secondly, the Relational account which states that instead of tuning to feature values, attention is directed to the relative value created by the search context, e.g. all redder items or the reddest item. Both theories are empirically supported, but used different paradigms (perceptual decision tasks vs. visual search), and different attentional measures (probe response accuracy vs. gaze capture). The current design incorporates both paradigms and measures. The results reveal that while Optimal Tuning shifts are observed in probe trials they do not drive early attention or eye- movement behaviour in visual search. Instead, early attention follows the Relational Account, selecting all items with the relative target colour (e.g., redder). This suggests that the masked probe trials used in Optimal Tuning do not probe the attentional template that guides attention. In Experiment 3 we find that optimal tuning shifts correspond in magnitude to purely perceptual shifts created by contrast biases in the visual search arrays. This suggests that the shift in probe responses may in fact be a perceptual artefact rather than a strategic adaptation to optimise the signal-to-noise ratio. These results highlight the distinction between early attentional mechanisms and later, target identification mechanisms. Significance statementClassical theories of attention suggest that attention is guided by a feature-specific target template. In recent designs this has been challenged by an apparent non- veridical tuning of the template in situations where the target stimulus is similar to non-targets. The current studies compare two theories that propose different explanations for non-veridical tuning; the Relational and the Optimal Tuning account. We show that the Relational account describes the mechanism that guides early search behaviour, while the Optimal Tuning account describes perceptual decision-making. Optimal Tuning effects may be due to an artefact that has not been described in visual search before (simultaneous contrast).

The brain in motion: How ensemble fluidity drives memory-updating and flexibility.

While memories are often thought of as flashbacks to a previous experience, they do not simply conserve veridical representations of the past but must continually integrate new information to ensure survival in dynamic environments. Therefore, ‘drift’ in neural firing patterns, typically construed as disruptive ‘instability’ or an undesirable consequence of noise, may actually be useful for updating memories. In our view, continual modifications in memory representations reconcile classical theories of stable memory traces with neural drift. Here we review how memory representations are updated through dynamic recruitment of neuronal ensembles on the basis of excitability and functional connectivity at the time of learning. Overall, we emphasize the importance of considering memories not as static entities, but instead as flexible network states that reactivate and evolve across time and experience.

Fitness Beats Truth in the Evolution of Perception.

Does natural selection favor veridical percepts-those that accurately (if not exhaustively) depict objective reality? Perceptual and cognitive scientists standardly claim that it does. Here we formalize this claim using the tools of evolutionary game theory and Bayesian decision theory. We state and prove the "Fitness-Beats-Truth (FBT) Theorem" which shows that the claim is false: If one starts with the assumption that perception involves inference to states of the objective world, then the FBT Theorem shows that a strategy that simply seeks to maximize expected-fitness payoff, with no attempt to estimate the "true" world state, does consistently better. More precisely, the FBT Theorem provides a quantitative measure of the extent to which the fitness-only strategy dominates the truth strategy, and of how this dominance increases with the size of the perceptual space. The FBT Theorem supports the Interface Theory of Perception (e.g. Hoffman et al. in Psychon Bull Rev https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0890-8 , 2015), which proposes that our perceptual systems have evolved to provide a species-specific interface to guide adaptive behavior, and not to provide a veridical representation of objective reality.

Learning action-oriented models through active inference.

Converging theories suggest that organisms learn and exploit probabilistic models of their environment. However, it remains unclear how such models can be learned in practice. The open-ended complexity of natural environments means that it is generally infeasible for organisms to model their environment comprehensively. Alternatively, action-oriented models attempt to encode a parsimonious representation of adaptive agent-environment interactions. One approach to learning action-oriented models is to learn online in the presence of goal-directed behaviours. This constrains an agent to behaviourally relevant trajectories, reducing the diversity of the data a model need account for. Unfortunately, this approach can cause models to prematurely converge to sub-optimal solutions, through a process we refer to as a bad-bootstrap. Here, we exploit the normative framework of active inference to show that efficient action-oriented models can be learned by balancing goal-oriented and epistemic (information-seeking) behaviours in a principled manner. We illustrate our approach using a simple agent-based model of bacterial chemotaxis. We first demonstrate that learning via goal-directed behaviour indeed constrains models to behaviorally relevant aspects of the environment, but that this approach is prone to sub-optimal convergence. We then demonstrate that epistemic behaviours facilitate the construction of accurate and comprehensive models, but that these models are not tailored to any specific behavioural niche and are therefore less efficient in their use of data. Finally, we show that active inference agents learn models that are parsimonious, tailored to action, and which avoid bad bootstraps and sub-optimal convergence. Critically, our results indicate that models learned through active inference can support adaptive behaviour in spite of, and indeed because of, their departure from veridical representations of the environment. Our approach provides a principled method for learning adaptive models from limited interactions with an environment, highlighting a route to sample efficient learning algorithms.

Dynamics and Hierarchical Encoding of Non-compact Acoustic Categories in Auditory and Frontal Cortex.

Categorical perception is a fundamental cognitive function enabling animals to flexibly assign sounds into behaviorally relevant categories. This study investigates the nature of acoustic category representations, their emergence in an ascending series of ferret auditory and frontal cortical fields, and the dynamics of this representation during passive listening to task-relevant stimuli and during active retrieval from memory while engaging in learned categorization tasks. Ferrets were trained on two auditory Go-NoGo categorization tasks to discriminate two non-compact sound categories (composed of tones or amplitude-modulated noise). Neuronal responses became progressively more categorical in higher cortical fields, especially during task performance. The dynamics of the categorical responses exhibited a cascading top-down modulation pattern that began earliest in the frontal cortex and subsequently flowed downstream to the secondary auditory cortex, followed by the primary auditory cortex. In a subpopulation of neurons, categorical responses persisted even during the passive listening condition, demonstrating memory for task categories and their enhanced categorical boundaries.

Neurocomputational mechanisms underlying motivated seeing.

People tend to believe that their perceptions are veridical representations of the world, but also commonly report perceiving what they want to see or hear. It remains unclear whether this reflects an actual change in what people perceive or merely a bias in their responding. Here we manipulated the percept that participants wanted to see as they performed a visual categorization task. Even though the reward-maximizing strategy was to perform the task accurately, the manipulation biased participants' perceptual judgements. Motivation increased neural activity selective for the motivationally relevant category, indicating a bias in participants' neural representation of the presented image. Using a drift diffusion model, we decomposed motivated seeing into response and perceptual components. Response bias was associated with anticipatory activity in the nucleus accumbens, whereas perceptual bias tracked category-selective neural activity. Our results provide a computational description of how the drive for reward leads to inaccurate representations of the world.

Unifying Physics and Psychophysics on the Basis of Symmetry, Least-Action ≈ Simplicity Principle, and Conservation Laws ≈ Veridicality

Abstract Psychophysics is the branch of experimental psychology that deals with the study of sensation and perception. A consensus has grown up among experts in psychophysics in the last hundred years that the human being’s percepts are inferences, which are based on a minimum, or simplicity, principle that is applied to the currently available sensory data. These educated guesses play the critical role in establishing veridical perceptual representations of the three-dimensional environment, where by “veridical” we mean that the percept agrees with what is “out there.” These veridical representations cannot be achieved without making use of symmetries, much like those known in physics, where they are essential for characterizing our physical world and deriving the conservation laws. But, unlike in physics, the important role that symmetry plays in psychophysics has been demonstrated and explained only within the last 10 years. Symmetries represent regularities in our physical world. These symmetries also serve as the source of the redundancies that are inherent in 3D objects and make vision possible. The main goal of this article is to show that the similarity between the mathematical formalisms used in physics and in psychophysics is not coincidental and that exploring this similarity can benefit the sciences of perception and cognition. This article includes a brief tutorial about symmetry groups and their relationship to transformation groups as well as to their invariants. It was included to make this material available to readers who are not familiar with these topics.