The legal system relies heavily on human memory. Crime investigations, criminal trials, and many civil trials depend on memory to reconstruct critical events from the past. Getting at the truth is often synonymous with establishing the who, what, when, and how of some prior episode. Past events tend to leave traces, and the process of reconstructin g events from the past is aided by various types of trace evidence. These traces can be physical, such as a footprint, a blood stain, or a fingerprint. An event can also leave traces of a somewhat different type, namely memory traces. Although these traces can also be said to have a physical property, in the sense that there exists a biological residue for the event somewhere in the brain, they cannot be observed directly by crime investigators or triers of fact. Instead, the memory trace that resides within the human brain is manifested for investigators and triers of fact through verbal testimony. It is probably safe to conclude that courts of law could not function without relying on human memory. Even physical evidence, such as a bloody glove, requires someone to take the witness stand and recall where it was found, by whom, at what time, in what condition, and so on. The scientific study of human memory was initiated over 100 years ago by Hermann Ebbinghouse (1885/1913), and the scientific study of human memory today remains almost exclusively the province of psychology and related cognitive and neurological sciences. The scientific study of memory is so fundamental to psychology that no general textbook in psychology could fail to devote a chapter or its equivalent to memory. Over the last 20 years or so, psychologists have developed a specific research literature on witness testimony. This research has been directed primarily at eyewitnesses, such as victims or bystanders to a criminal event. This issue of Psychology, Public Policy, and Law is devoted to the potential contributions of the scientific study of witness testimony to public policy and legal issues. Making policy or procedure recommendations to the criminal justice system on eyewitness reliability issues is not new for psychologists. 90 years ago, Hugo Munsterberg (1908) argued that Nearly every chapter and sub-chapter of sense psychology may help to clear up the chaos and confusion which prevail in the observation of witnesses (p. 33), and he bemoaned the fact that juries and judges are not obliged to know and understand these things. Following a long period of near dormancy on the issue, research programs in psychology arose again in the mid-1970s, and there has been a renewal of the argument that scientific psychology has something important to offer the legal system. Unlike Munsterberg, who tried to rely almost exclusively on basic findings and theories of sensation and perception, modern researchers on eyewitness issues have made heavy use of complex stimulus
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