Crisis In Venezuela Research Articles

This Kindred People: Canadian-American Relations and the Anglo-Saxon Ideal, 1895-1903 (review)

Reviewed by: This Kindred People: Canadian-American Relations and the Anglo-Saxon Ideal, 1895–1903 John Herd Thompson (bio) Edward P. Kohn, This Kindred People: Canadian-American Relations and the Anglo-Saxon Ideal, 1895–1903 McGill-Queen’s University Press 2004. vii, 254. $75.00 In This Kindred People, Edward P. Kohn admirably summarizes the Anglo-American rapprochement that took place between the Venezuela Crisis of 1895 and the settlement of the Alaska Boundary in 1903, and discusses the complicating and complicated role that Canada played in that evolving relationship. This is territory well trodden by diplomatic historians, but Kohn adds a new dimension to an old account by exploring 'a nexus of intellectual and diplomatic history.' He argues that 'Anglo-Saxonism' – a 'common lexicon of racial superiority' over 'blacks, Asians, Jews, and Slavs' – made rapprochement possible because for 'many North Americans,' it 'provided a way to moderate resentment' about past differences and 'to emphasize their common destiny upon the continent and their common mission throughout the world.' Although Kohn identifies a number of prominent men as Anglo-Saxonists, he never pretends that the doctrine directly influenced British, American, or Canadian decisions (to the limited extent that Canadians participated in such decisions) about the Venezuela and Alaska boundaries, the Panama Canal, America's imperialist war with Spain, or Britain's in South Africa. Instead, he contends that 'while rarely finding its way into diplomatic dispatches, Anglo-Saxonism provided a general framework for the nations of the North Atlantic Triangle during the rapprochement.' Kohn's argument that Anglo-Saxon discourse smoothed national differences to build Anglo-American-Canadian amity is not always convincing, but his fascinating evidence suggests that he has a case worth considering. And Kohn's frequent caveats suggest that he understands that his thesis must be tentative. For example, in an absorbing discussion of Anglo-Saxonist discourse as a Canadian rationalization both for the us war with Spain, and for the British Empire's war in South Africa, he admits that, 'certainly, many English Canadians supported the war because of other [End Page 485] motivations, such as imperialism, loyalty to Great Britain, and perhaps even anti-Americanism.' This Kindred People demonstrates the broad limitations of most intellectual history, even when written by renowned masters of the genre like Richard Hofstadter or Carl Berger. Kohn draws his evidence from the usual suspects, elite males who wrote newspaper editorials, articles for elite quarterlies, and private correspondence to other elite males. He does not attempt to determine how representative these sources might be. Instead, he asserts repeatedly (29 times in 205 pages) that his quotations prove that 'many' Canadians, 'many' Americans, or 'many English speaking North Americans' held Anglo-Saxonist beliefs. Two sentences thirteen pages apart illustrate this technique: 'many Canadians accommodated their often anti-American views through the medium of Anglo-Saxon rhetoric,' and 'many English Canadians utilized Anglo-Saxon rhetoric to accommodate their views to the reality of international affairs.' If Kohn's intellectual history is bold but not entirely successful, his diplomatic history is accomplished but less than original. Other historians have investigated the Anglo-American rapprochement from 1895 to 1903 from every possible perspective, and there remains little to add. To create an illusion of innovation, Kohn sets up other historians as straw men. In his otherwise worthy summary of the Alaska Boundary Dispute, for example, he asserts that 'Canadian historians' have worked 'within a very narrow framework,' blinded by nationalist indignation at American bullying and British betrayal. But when he cites the guilty 'Canadian historians,' Kohn disinters long-dead fall guys O.D. Skelton, J.W. Dafoe, and Donald Creighton, who published in 1921, 1931, and 1944 respectively. (To his credit, Kohn allows in his endnotes that Canadian historians Norman Penlington and David Hall pretty much got things right in the 1970s and 1980s.) Kohn's claim for the novelty of his chapter, it would seem, has little more substance than Canada's claim to the Alaskan panhandle! Kohn deserves praise, however, for his effective use of eight political cartoons. All come from Canadian newspapers – then as now, 'Canadian-American relations' loomed larger in Canada than America. Kohn uses the cartoons as evidence, rather than simply...

The Making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: A Case of Complex Multilateralism

This article examines the diplomatic process found in the making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Many components of this dynamic point to a significant bending of the “old” pattern of multilateralism associated with the Organization of American States (OAS). The normative purpose behind the charter centered on the collective right to democracy as opposed to the traditional defense of sovereignty. The pattern of involvement contained some parallels with initiatives considered the prototypes of a “new” multilateralism, namely the campaigns against antipersonnel land mines and for an International Criminal Court. That is to say it featured an intense style and a “bottom-up” diplomacy with extensive engagement by secondary states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Notwithstanding these features, the multilateralism in the making of the Inter-American Charter is depicted as not simply “new” but complex. Stimulated by the 2000 political crisis located in that country, leadership on the charter came from Peru not a classic middle power. The United States was not the maker of the charter but neither was it an opponent or breaker of the initiative. The early burst of speed slowed when resistance appeared from a cluster of states. Serious splits appeared among NGOs involved with the charter process on a north/south basis. To nuance the claims of “new” multilateralism is not to discount the conceptual or (as witnessed by its use in the April 2002 crisis in Venezuela) operational significance of the charter. The argument made in this article, however, is that it was this hybrid nature of the initiative that contributed to its claims of innovation and measure of success.

Breaking Democracy: Venezuela's Media Coup

This article endeavours to describe and analyse the media's role in the 11–13 April 2002 attempt to oust Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez. The short-lived and unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government exposed the politicised and undemocratic nature of Venezuela's private commercial media. At an international news level, the events of April 2002 demonstrated that foreign news coverage tends to reproduce the version of the dominant elite and over-simplify the causes and outcomes of complex historical events. In this case, most of the foreign news not only reproduced the local private media coverage, but also amplified the strength of the coup. Essentially, this media coup revealed the centrality of the commercial, privately owned media in bringing together some of the key players behind this political operation: businesses, right-wing politicians and some sectors of the military. The key component of the current social and political crisis in Venezuela is the bitter struggle between the government and the commercial media.

Scientists and the Venezuelan Crisis

The current political crisis in Venezuela threatens to destroy the Venezuelan scientific infrastructure, built up during the past 50 years. During 2002, the Ministry of Science and Technology received only one-third of the approved budget, and most of the spending was diverted to maintain its bureaucracy. In 2003, the government is actively engaged in a continuous dismantling of scientific research. Specifically, it has decided to restructure Intevep, the well-known research and development institute of the national oil company PDVSA. On 4 February, the government expelled 881 employees from Intevep. This and other hapless decisions, such as the arbitrary imposition of a new law regulating science and technology, containing provisions allowing for authoriarian interference from the central government, undermine the continuity of the modest but high-quality scientific activity of Venezuela, which was ranked fifth among Latin American countries. Likewise, universities are not counting on, or expecting, budgetary resources to guarantee their operation, as even salaries for professors and employees are at risk. The budget for higher education is being cut by 22% in the first semester of 2003, while the bolivar, the local currency, has lost more than half of its value during the past year. With real buying power reduced to about one-third of that in 2002 and with free access to foreign currencies blocked by decree, libraries will be unable to maintain subscriptions, and most research will have to be suspended. Such circumstances have been experienced elsewhere in Latin America before. We envision a stampede of scientists to neighboring and developed world countries, a hiatus in the growth of young researchers, and the slowing and even disappearance of a research community that has shown moderate but continuous growth over the past five decades. Although our political crisis will have to be resolved by ourselves, the awareness of our tragedy in the international scientific community might help reduce its devastating effects.

Strengthening checks and balances: Democracy defence and promotion in the Americas

The Inter‐American Democratic Charter fails to specify the meaning of an “unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order.” Arguing that the principle threat to democracy in Americas is the violation of the separation of powers by democratically elected leaders, five conditions are outlined to specify when such an alteration has occurred. The crisis in Peru in 2000 is examined to show how the presence of these conditions gave rise to the Charter, and the crisis in Venezuela in April 2002 is used as a test of the Charter. The paper concludes with recommendations for strengthening the Charter.

Accident or intent? The U.S. policy response to the crisis in Venezuela

‘Latin America often remains an afterthought of American foreign policy’, candidate George W. Bush declared, but as president he promised to ‘look south, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment’.1 While he never specified the nature of this commitment, his administration initially did seem to give the region unusual priority. The president met with a number of Latin American leaders, supported the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement in Quebec City, devoted his first state dinner to Mexico's President Fox, and later visited the region. For a time, it seemed as if policy towards Latin America might actually playa significant role in the U.S. vision of the world and that a genuine policy for the region might be crafted. But September 11 quickly demonstrated that U.S.-Latin America policy would be business as usual. As Argentina imploded, the war on drugs in Colombia crumbled, trade policy stalled, and the special relationship with President Fox failed to produce the promised ‘grand bargain’ over immigration, Latin America seemed condemned to return to its low priority profile and the relative policy continuity of the past two decades. Any significant changes in U.S. policy also seemed destined for the back burner given the focus on events in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Colombian Venezuela?s Border Crisis

Historical, political and economic links between Colombia and Venezuela have been strong. After economic integration policies that dominated state affairs in the early sixties, the degree of social and economic interaction, especially in the border region of Santander and Tachira strengthened. Also, increasingly important for both countries? welfare, has been the liberal economic policies adopted, after the apertura program followed by both Presidents as well as after the demonstrated will to sign at the end of 1994 the G-3 Trade Agreement. However, successive political crisis in Venezuela and border Guerrilla activities and drogs?lords warfare fought in Colombia, has deteriorated bilateral and international diplomatic communication channels. The paper shows after studying different diplomatic and commercial sources that bilateral and regional stability is a serious historical commitment to integrate a common geographical border. Economic policy for both countries development and common border preservation of stability coincides with the application of a financial and commercial plan to encourage the creation of a specialised development investment bank for productive projects. Also the establishment of a bilateral permanent trading zone to encourage and funnel both countries bilateral trading successful exchanges.

Democratizing the Democracy? Crisis and Reform in Venezuela

Venezuelan politics presents a puzzle to students of Latin America, and to anyone concerned with the comparative analysis of democratization and democracy. As the major countries of Latin America (and the majority of scholars) worked their way from authoritarianism through “transitions”to democracy and hopefully toward democracy’s consolidation, Venezuela moved in the opposite direction. After decades of political stability and social peace, beginning in 1987 Venezuela’s democratic order was shaken by widespread unrest and citizen disaffection, the decay of key parties and state institutions, attempted coups, and the impeachment and removal of the president in 1993.

The Rigidity of Democratic Institutions and the Current Legitimacy Crisis in Venezuela

Differential loyalty to democratic norms is the result of the capitalist context in which the political rules exist. A number of scholars concerned with the link between economics and politics, including Jturgen Habermas, Claus Offe, and James O'Connor, suggest that it is impossible to speak of a purely political crisis of the state because the state is contained within an economic system (Held and Krieger, 1983). Thus, one cannot study democratic legitimacy or its crises except as a subset of capitalist legitimacy and its crises. In fact, legitimacy crises come about precisely because the state finds it difficult to reconcile highly inegalitarian capital accumulation processes with its democratic pretensions. The rigidity of the institutions established in Venezuela magnified and made even more obvious this inherent conflict. Rules, procedures, and institutional arrangements are in large part a reflection of the groups responsible for the political system's original construction. Thus, political norms, even democratic ones, reflect the power inequities that exist in a given society. Political institutions are not, however, just the reflection of other explanatory variables. They shape future relative

Venezuela falters

Venezuela Falters Anibal Romero (bio) Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela. By Michael Coppedge. Stanford University Press, 1994. 241 pp. Democracy for the Privileged: Crisis and Transition in Venezuela. By Richard S. Hillman. Lynne Rienner, 1994. 198 pp. Venezuela’s democratic regime has grown old and tired. After three decades of international and domestic popularity, it now faces a fate as sad as that experienced by veteran sopranos, whose voices inexorably decline, but who never seem to know when to stop trying to sing the heroine’s role. From the late 1950s until well into the 1980s, Venezuela was widely celebrated as one of the most stable democracies in Latin America; then, suddenly, and precisely when the poor old lady was attempting to take on new and even more flamboyant roles by adopting far-reaching institutional and economic reforms, radical criticism erupted. Two schools of thought can be distinguished: 1) the newly arrived critics, who know about the soprano’s great moments only through old recordings, but never personally experienced the excitement of the supposedly legendary performances, and find it difficult to say something nice about the anachronistic heroine; and 2) the old-hands-in-the-business crowd, those who always saw that behind the colorful makeup and scenery there lurked ugliness, that the show was much too expensive to run, and that debts, mismanagement, and moral corruption were efficiently doing the work of destruction. For the first group of critics, disappointment with Venezuelan democracy is a spur for theoretical [End Page 168] innovation and recommendations on how to overhaul the show. For the old hands, however, disappointment is just the long-awaited confirmation of past suspicions, and possibly the prologue to more setbacks to come. The new critics yearn to see a renovated heroine rising from her grave; others, less optimistic, know that Venezuelan democracy never actually fit the exalted role attributed to it by some. They realize that the best that can be expected in the coming months and years is mediocre and lackluster performance leavened by the hope that the present democradura does not degenerate into outright dictatorship. The authors of the books under review belong broadly to the first group, the “new critics,” but there are differences between them. Both studies offer interesting observations about a phenomenon of democratic deconsolidation that quite probably still has a few surprises in store for us. Coppedge’s book is a solid piece of scholarly work that offers valuable new insights about the inner workings of Acción Democrática, Venezuela’s predominant political party. It is obvious to this reader that Coppedge finds it hard to accept the manifest flaws and limitations of Venezuelan democracy. He places excessive weight on purely institutional factors, such as partidocracia or “partyarchy”—defined as a “pathological kind of political control” (p. 2)—and presidentialism, and pays insufficient attention to economic and cultural factors that, I believe, must be taken into account in any attempt to explain what has happened to the regime established in 1958. Hillman’s book, though markedly less theoretically ambitious than Coppedge’s volume and written in a more journalistic style, provides a less institutionally centered assessment of what went wrong in Venezuela. One wonders if Coppedge demands too much from Venezuelan democracy. He argues that “in Venezuela there is great freedom of expression in the media and on the street,” but adds that “in order to have a truly effective voice, one must be able to organize; the freedoms must be complete” (p. 159). The existence of a plurality of organizations, including strong party organizations, has been one of the distinguishing features of Venezuelan democracy. In Coppedge’s view, however, these parties are largely to blame for the ills now affecting the democratic regime. In Venezuela, he writes, “political parties interfere with the requirements of polyarchy” (freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, free and fair elections, and so on) in such a way that “Venezuela is probably the most extreme case” of partyarchy to be found among all the world’s pluralistic polities (p. 2). Coppedge’s characterization of Venezuelan democracy, as it was until the 1992 attempted coups d’état...

Democracy for the Privileged: Crisis and Transition in Venezuela. By Richard S. Hillman. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994. 198p. $36.50.

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Democracy for the privileged: crisis and transition in Venezuela

This work looks at the process of democratisation in Venezuela, examining the conditions that support or inhibit the consolidation of democracy and explaining the significance of critical events. It shows how the patron/client system has failed to respond to mass aspirations sufficiently.

Social effects of labour migration: the Colombia experience.

Colombia has traditionally been classified as a net exporter of manpower. However, the US's restrictions on immigration and the economic crisis in Venezuela, Colombia's sister republic, have affected both the volume and composition of emigration. It could be initially concluded that despite domestic difficulties and external problems, favorable economic prospects explain the present reduced outflow of immigrants. On the basis of a sample survey of applications taken during the last 2 years, 94% of arrivals were classified as professionals and technicians; the remainder were administrative workers. This achievement (which contrasts with high levels of unemployment among Colombian professionals) reflects new technological innovations. It appears that while Colombia exports engineers, it imports engineering. Opinion surveys conducted among employers, migrants, and educational authorities show that costs are not fully compensated by the migrant's improved standard of living in the country of destination, even if he has sent remittances to his country of origin. Investments in education and training yield no returns to the country if the recipient emigrates. The advantages of emigration, identified in the same surveys, include 1) reduction in internal pressure on the labor market, 2) improvement in the incomes of those who do not emigrate, and 3) resolution of economic problems for migrants. The Social Economics Plan implemented by the current government indirectly affects migratory processes by focusing on: 1) eradication of poverty; 2) the National Rehabilitation Plan, by which regional growth is stimulated in poor and economically precarious districts; and 3) the Integral Rural Development Plan which aims to eradicate poverty and improve production and commercialization in small-holding areas. The author concludes that the effects of migration on social structures must be examined in depth.

IMPACT OF THE VENEZUELAN RECESSION ON RETURN MIGRATION TO COLOMBIA: THE CASE OF THE PRINCIPAL URBAN SENDING AREAS

This chapter begins with a discussion of the economic trends in Colombia and Venezuela over the last 3 decades. This is followed by brief case studies of the 5 principal labor exporting cities for the period of the recession in Colombia and Venezuela. Recovery was directly influenced by the degree and range of economic interdependence each city had with Venezuela. The rates of return migration however did not impact these cities as much. The case studies graphically show that it was not only labor exchange but also trade in commodities that linked Colombia and Venezuela. Those labor exporting cities that were most dependent on trade with Venezuela were hit hardest by the Venezuelan recession. The marked increase in unemployment in these cities was caused much more by a reduction in export sales and by recession than by return migration. The impact of the Venezuelan crisis on each of the principal urban sending areas of Colombia varied in quantitative and qualitative terms. The differences can be attributed to many factors. These include the economic characteristics and development of each city the interdependence among the cities and the relationship of the city to the national economies of Colombia and Venezuela. Generally return migration occurred among persons who recently migrated to Venezuela but did not have stable and legal working conditions. These workers did not establish economic and social networks in Venezuela and did not consolidate sources of income which could have been competitive with those in Colombia. It would be erroneous to conclude that the returning workers from Venezuela seriously affected the rates of unemployment and underemployment in Colombia but the decline in remittances from Venezuela affected consumer demand in the 5 cities and also had a negative impact on the standard of living for many Colombian families. It forced them to search for additional income by undertaking various jobs and extending their workday activities which contributed to the increase in the informal sector. The crisis has caused migratory movements to become more seasonal and multiple and it is possible that many persons feel obligated to combine internal migration with international migration to improve their economic conditions.

The Venezuela Crisis and the Liberal Opposition, 1895-96

As students of the period know there is a large historiography on the Venezuela crisis of 1895-96 and on Anglo-American relations during the eighteen nineties. This work has tried mainly to answer such questions as: why did the United States take up Venezuela's case; how did the British Government react to American pressure, when it already facing difficulties with other Powers; how agreement reached and why did the settlement of 1899 take the form it did; did the crisis promote closer Anglo-American relations and how deep growing friendship between the two nations? One recent scholar has concluded that for Britain the Venezuela crisis was the moment of truth as regards her attitude towards the United States,'l but apart froma few nassing references little attention has been paid to the rile played during the crisis by the Parliamentary Opposition. This is perhaps surprising in view of the considerable interest taken in recent years in the problems of the British Liberal Party at this time, especially as Imperialism is usually regarded as having been one of the chief sources of difficulty for the Party.1 Since the treaty of Washington of 1871 the British had assumed amicable relations with the United States to be axiomatic even though the United States not regarded as a major diplomatic factor and actively close relations between the two Powers were not feasible on account of America's traditional opposition to involvement in international politics, her suspicion of British imperialism and the influence of Irish and German immigrants in American politics. Yet the United States remained the m.ost important foreign country for British capital investment and one of her principal export markets.4 American

Perilous Obscurity: Public Diplomacy and the Press in the Venezuelan Crisis, 1902–1903

Perilous Obscurity: Public Diplomacy and the Press in the Venezuelan Crisis, 1902–1903

Presidential Address: Anglo-American Rivalries and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895

Historians should be grateful to President Cleveland. It was his insistence on the arbitration of the dispute between Britain and Venezuela over the boundary of British Guiana that led to an intensive search in Spanish, Dutch, British and other archives for the evidence of European activities between the Amazon and the Orinoco during the three centuries after the discovery of America. The documents so found and printed are essential for any understanding of the historical background of the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute and of great interest to the colonial historian in general.

Informal Diplomacy in the Venezuelan Crisis of 1896

Informal Diplomacy in the Venezuelan Crisis of 1896

Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903

FEW episodes in the career of Theodore Roosevelt have caused as much controversy among historians. as the part played by the President in settling the difficulties arising out of the Anglo-German naval demonstration against Venezuela in 1902-1903. Roosevelt's story of the manner in which he used the presence of Dewey's fleet in the Caribbean to expedite Germany's acceptance of American arbitration proposals has been roughly treated by critics on the ground that no documentary evidence exists to confirm it, and the Rough Rider has been assailed for perverting the facts of the situation to fit his anti-German views.1 Most historians have therefore dismissed the story as legendary and discounted Roosevelt's remarks, uttered in the turmoil of the i9i6 presidential campaign, as the product of misguided patriotism and political prejudice. On the other hand, there are friends and admirers of the former President who have refused to concede that their hero would so falsify the facts from unworthy motives.2 The weight of authoritative historical opinion, however, is decidedly against the Roosevelt interpretation of what happened in December, I902, and January, I903. Oddly enough, neither side in the controversy has tak.en the trouble to investigate very thoroughly one of the major factors in the entire Venezuelan imbroglio. Almost no attention has been paid to the character of the naval

Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902–1903

Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902–1903