Veil Of Uncertainty Research Articles

The Urgency of Professional Indemnity Insurance in Research and Innovation Practices in Indonesia

Humans can never know the future because it is still covered by a veil of uncertainty. For this reason, humans must be prepared to face various bad things or risks that may occur in the future. In the wake of this development, an insurance system was implemented to protect individuals and businesses from unforeseen dangers and losses. Article 57 of the National System of Science and Technology Law places the position of Indonesian researchers as an important subject that deserves serious protection from the state. Article 57 of the National System of Science and Technology Law also reflects the state's recognition of the key role of researchers in the development of science and technology. The provisions of Article 57 of the National System of Science and Technology Law also impose an obligation on the Government as the owner of the Government authority to immediately formulate clear and comprehensive regulations to ensure adequate legal protection for researchers. The author formulates that to develop science and technology by providing adequate legal protection to researchers, supporting the realization of targeted development, and improving the welfare of society, the Government needs to immediately implement a policy in the form of enforcing professional insurance for researchers which is professional indemnity insurance.

Article: When human rights and investment protection intertwined: the role of the European Court of Human Rights in the enforcement of intra-EU BITs within the EU

Since the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Achmea, a veil of uncertainty has surrounded the destiny of intra-EU investment agreements and their awards thereto. This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the consequences of Achmea focusing on the non-enforcement of intra-EU awards within the EU. Specifically, it examines whether the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) may play a role in case of non-enforcement of those awards. It essentially argues that, in some circumstances, the refusal to enforce intra-EU arbitral awards may be considered as contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by the Court, particularly Article 1 Protocol No. 1 (right to property) and Article 6 (right to a fair trial). In this regard, the central argument of this paper is that a refusal to enforce an award based on the Achmea objection can raise concrete issues of proportionality, especially if one considers the enforcement of ICSID awards. Specifically, the lack of an effective mechanism of effective redress for investors in EU law may lead to a breach of both the right to property and the right to a fair trial that cannot be justified either under the ECHR and the famous Bosphorus presumption.

Structural and functional analysis of Buchanan’s constitutional contract

Buchanan attempted to seek new theoretical construction through the contract method by introducing elements such as ‘individual’, ‘veil of uncertainty’, ‘public choice’, ‘decision costs’, and ‘unanimous agreement principle’. He not only transformed the contract theory model but also interpreted the ideas of consensus politics in an acceptable manner. Specifically, ‘individuals’ are entities of choice and behavior, and the process of choice allows individuals to express different goals and interests. The ‘veil of uncertainty’ prompts individuals to think about issues from a fair point of view when interests cannot be identified and future prospects are unpredictable and to make choices that are beneficial for both themselves and the group. ‘Public choice’ can solve the problem of justice diversity because it does not exclude different or conflicting motivations and goals. ‘Decision costs’ and ‘external costs’ both limit the way collective decisions are made and help identify the normal consequences of constitutional choices. The ‘unanimous agreement principle’ gives everyone equal status, allowing each person the right to pursue their own goals and values and preventing others from abusing their power. The use of the aforementioned theoretical elements not only helps people discuss constitutional choices at a general level but also helps to present the true face of the collective decision-making process, thereby establishing an empirical theory about the actual logic of individual actions in the political system.

Communication and hidden action: A credit market experiment

We study the impact of pre-contractual communication on market outcomes when economic relationships are subject to hidden action. Our experiment is framed in a credit market context and borrowers (second movers) can communicate with lenders (first movers) prior to entering the credit relationship. Communication reduces moral hazard (strategic default) and increases trust (credit provision) in an environment where opportunistic behavior by borrowers is revealed ex-post to lenders. By contrast, in an environment where strategic defaults are hidden behind a veil of uncertainty, we find a substantially weaker impact of communication. Borrowers are more likely to renege on repayment promises when they can hide opportunistic behavior from lenders. As a consequence, lenders extend less credit to borrowers who promise to repay. Hidden action undermines the positive effect of communication on market outcomes. Our findings have implications for the design of contracts and how to structure relationships with a risk of hidden action: for pre-contractual communication to unfold its full potential it needs to go hand-in-hand with post-contractual monitoring.

Overview and Perspectives of Chaos Theory and Its Applications in Economics

Starting from the contribution of such thinkers as the famous Giordano Bruno (1583) and the great mathematician and physicist Henri Poincaré (1889) and the surprising discovery of the meteorologist Edward Lorenz (1963), we consider the expansion of the mathematics of chaos in this article, paying attention to topology, qualitative geometry, and Catastrophe Theory, on the one hand, and addressing the possibilities derived from the new Computer Science as Quantum Algorithms and the advances in Artificial Intelligence, on the other. We especially highlight the section on computing chaos, which we consider to be new calculation and analysis instruments, such as machine learning and its algorithm called reservoir computing, through which we can know the dynamics of a chaotic system. With past data, with equations like Karamoto–Sivashinsky, one can improve predictions of the system eight times further ahead than in previous methods. Integrating the machine learning approach and traditional model-based prediction, one could obtain accurate predictions twelve Lyapunov times. As we know, in the framework of chaos theory, it is habitually accepted that the idea of long-term prediction seems impossible because we live under a veil of uncertainty. But with technological advances, the landscape begins to change, both in chaos theory and in its applications, especially in the field of economics, to which we devote particular attention, carrying out as an example the analysis of the evolution of the Madrid Stock Exchange in the 2006–2013 crisis. Above all this, a reflection of a general nature is necessary to enlighten us on the possibility of opening a new horizon.

Under the Veil of Uncertainty: Assessing the Greek Economy’s Resilience and Vulnerability in the Face of Different Uncertainty Types

AbstractThis study investigates the impact of uncertainty on sectoral gross value-added (GVA) in the Greek economy, using quarterly data from 1998 to 2022. Analyzing nine types of uncertainty using established indexes, including economic uncertainty and economic, fiscal, monetary, currency, banking, pension, tax, and debt policy uncertainty, the study aims to identify vulnerable and resilient sectors and provide policy recommendations for transforming the Greek economy. The findings contribute to understanding how uncertainty affects different sectors and offer insights into the relationship between uncertainty and sectoral GVA. The study highlights that each sector experiences distinct effects depending on the uncertainty type, with varying impact durations. The “real estate” sector is particularly susceptible to negative impacts, while the “professional, scientific, and technical activities sector, administrative and supportive activities,” the “construction,” and the “wholesale/retail trade” sectors demonstrate high sensitivity to uncertainty shocks. The currency policy and debt policy uncertainty indexes have the most adverse effects on sectoral GVA. This research provides valuable insights for policymakers and decision-makers in pursuing economic stability and growth.

Choosing inequality: how economic security fosters competitive regimes

In a novel experimental design, we study how social immobility affects the choice among distributional schemes in an experimental democracy. We design a two-period experiment in which subjects first choose a distributional scheme by majority voting (“social contract”). Then subjects engage in a competitive real-effort task to earn points. Based on production success, participants are ranked from best to worst. In combination with the initially chosen scheme, these ranks determine the final payout of the first round, leading to a pattern of societal stratification. Participants are informed individually about points and rank, before the same sequence of voting, production and payoff determination is repeated in a second round. To test the effect of social immobility on choosing distributional regimes the experiment is conducted with and without a social immobility factor, i.e. a different weighting of the two rounds. In our standard scenario, payoffs are simply added. In our “social immobility setting”, we alter the game as follows: the actual income in round 2 is calculated by adding 0.2 times the raw payoff from the second production game and 0.8 times the income from round 1. With the higher importance of round 1 success, we simulate the fact that economic movement upwards and downwards in societies (“social mobility”) is a de facto rigid constraint: high and low incomes tend to reproduce themselves. Our main findings are that in the Equal Weight Treatment, most groups opt for complete equality in both rounds, while in the unequal weight setting the initial choice of equality is followed by a shift to the most competitive regime. In both treatments, we observe that those performing well in round 1 tend to vote for unequal schemes in round 2, while low-performers develop an even stronger “taste for equality”. This supports a central Rawlsian idea: behind an (experimental) “veil of uncertainty”, the lack of idiosyncratic information is strong enough to let people decide as if driven by social preferences. The different group decisions in round 2 suggest that for this to happen, stakes need to be sufficiently high. To our surprise, other factors like gender, social background or real-life income have hardly any impact on unveiled decision making. We conclude that in our experimental democracy, competition based income allocation (a “market economy”) finds support only if people are sufficiently well off. Hence, increasing inequality perpetuated by social immobility is likely to undermine the general support for market-based systems.

Tax Uniformity as a Requirement of Justice

Barbara Fried takes the view that uniform taxation—that is, a single rate applicable to all income levels—cannot be defended on any grounds of justice. She goes further by saying that, of all possible rate structures, it might be “the hardest one”? to ground in “a”? theory of fairness. Using the contractarian-constitutional perspective advanced by John Rawls and James Buchanan, this article argues that tax uniformity can be seen as a requirement of justice. After modelling how the political world realistically decides to distribute tax shares (self-interested parties act under a majority constraint), I show how the uniformity principle could emerge from the constitutional contract. In other words, rational individuals would choose uniformity as a procedural constraint under a “veil of uncertainty”?; that is, with limited knowledge regarding their positions under the future application of the rule. Moreover, I elucidate how the uniformity requirement integrates generalized criteria of fairness and efficiency into fiscal politics as it precludes fiscal exploitation and constrains majorities, and their most influential subgroups, to opt for policies in the direction of the Pareto frontier, and as such promotes outcomes acceptable to all participants.

Bilinmeyeni Beklemek: Alfonso Sastre'nin Escuadra Hacia La Muerte (Ölüm Mangası) Oyununda Belirsizlik

1936-1939 yılları arasında yaşanan İspanyol İç Savaşının ardından İspanya Avrupa'ya kapılarını kapatır ve içine kapanır. Belirsiz bir geleceğe doğru ilerleyen İspanyol halkı savaş yaralarını sarmaya çalışırken yaşadıkları sefaletten ve baskıdan dolayı umutsuzdur. Muhaliflerin hemen hepsi yeni düzen tarafından susturulmuş, sansür mekanizması bütün sanat dünyasını ele geçirmişti. Böyle bir ortamda kaleme alınan Alfonso Sastre'nin Escuadra hacia la muerte adlı oyunu dönem insanın çaresizliğini ve umutsuzluğunu gözler önüne serer. Bu çalışmanın amacı İçsavaş sonrası İspanyol Tiyatrosu'nda Alfonso Sastre'nin önemini vurgularken, Escuadra hacia la muerte oyununda her tarafı bir belirsizlik sisiyle perdelenmiş oyun kişilerinin varolma mücadesini ve onların iktidarla olan ilişkisini ele almaktır.

Communication and Hidden Action: Evidence from a Person-to-Person Lending Experiment

We report the results of a laboratory experiment which examines the impact of pre-contractual communication in person-to-person lending. We show that potential hidden action undermines the positive effect of communication on repayment behavior and credit provision. When strategic defaults by borrowers are revealed to lenders, pre-contractual communication reduces strategic default and increases credit provision. When strategic defaults are hidden behind a veil of uncertainty, we find a substantially weaker impact of communication. Borrowers are more likely to renege on repayment promises when they can hide opportunistic behavior from lenders. These findings have important implications for the design of lending relationships and procedures: Pre-contractual communication and post-contractual monitoring go hand in hand.

Statutory Decrystallisation of the Floating Charge: Implications for Business Sustainability

This paper analyzes the provisions of the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 which, against the grain of general law rules on decrystallisation of floating charge, provides that a crystallised floating charge can decrystallise or refloat where the creditor withdraws from possession after the debtor has commenced payment or if the receiver, with consent of the creditor, is withdrawn. The analysis is relevant because the provision has dire implications for business sustainability since parties engage in debt transaction to sustain the going concern basis of their businesses. Bearing in mind that uncertainty pervades the boundaries between fixed and floating charge, the paper asks what is the priority status of a decrystallised floating charge as against a floating charge created prior to refloatation; and what is the relationship between the decrystallised floating charge and a fixed charge that predated the decrystallisation on the one hand and a fixed charge created post refloatation on the other hand. Using the case law and existing literature the paper showed that the statutory provision for decrystallisation of floating charge not only failed to clarify the general law rules on decrystallisation of floating charge, but it has cast a veil of uncertainty over the rights of parties to a debt transaction secured by floating charge. Since the provision can impact on the health of businesses, it behoves on the parties to be proactive in crafting debts contracts creating an interest secured by floating charge.

Apportionment Behind the Veil of Uncertainty

Apportionment of representatives is a basic rule of everyday politics. By definition, this basic rule is a constitutional stage problem and should be decided behind the veil of uncertainty. To bring apportionment closer to quotas, we introduce f-divergence for utilitarianism and Bregman divergence for consistent optimization. Even in our less restricted condition, we find that we must use α-divergence for optimization and show that the minimization of α-divergence induces the same divisor methods that correspond to the maximization of the Kolm–Atkinson social welfare function (or the expected utility function), which is bounded by constant relative risk aversion.

The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements

Transnational externalities (e.g. transboundary pollution, trade, contagious diseases and terrorism) warrant coordination and cooperation between governments, but this proves often difficult. One reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems, encouraging free-riding. Another reason one might suspect is uncertainty, surrounding most environmental problems, and in particular climate change. This provides often an excuse for remaining inactive. Paradoxically, some recent papers have concluded just the opposite: the “veil of uncertainty” can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation. In this paper, we explain why and under which conditions this can be true. However, we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule. Most important, we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect. Our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities.

The unanimity rule revisited: the case of revisions of hybrid constitutions

The unanimity rule is one of the major topics that James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock discuss in The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: see especially Chap. 7). This rule is a corner stone of an individualistic approach to constitutional economics. It minimizes externalities and protects individual freedom. In the absence of decision-making costs, it turns out to produce optimal results. If decision-making costs are introduced, the unanimity rule is no longer optimal as such. Yet, it is recommended for the choice of basic constitutional rules that are agreed upon under the veil of uncertainty. As a member of the European Constitutional Group that drafted a proposal for a European Constitution in 1993 (European Constitutional Group 1993), I applied the methodological instruments of constitutional economics to studying the constitutional problems of the European Union. Since then, I have discussed problems of unanimity rule and investigated the deadlock of budgetary rules in the European Union together with Charles Beat Blankart (Blankart and Kirchner 2004). At a conference of the Transatlantic Law Forum in Hamburg in 2011, I argued that under present circumstances, it is impossible to have major revisions of the Treaties constituting the European Union (the “European constitutional impossibility theorem”). On December 9th, 2011 member states of the European Union agreed to a socalled “fiscal compact.” But this “Statement by the Euro-Area Heads of Government” was signed by only 26 of the 27 EU’s member-states. The unanimity requirement of Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which is needed for a revision of that Treaty, has not been met. I have expressed doubt on the success of the attempt to circumvent this requirement through an intergovernmental treaty by a sub-group of the member-states (Kirchner 2011). In this paper, I demonstrate that unanimity rule leads to a final blockade in case of a hybrid constitution such as that of the European Union. By a ‘hybrid constitution,’ I mean a

International environmental agreements under uncertainty: does the 'veil of uncertainty' help?

Na and Shin showed that the ‘veil of uncertainty’ can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this conclusion about the negative impact of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyse whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only ‘no’ and ‘full learning’ but also ‘partial learning’. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Third, we propose a transfer scheme that mitigates the possible negative effect of learning and which may even transform it into a positive effect.

An Analogy: Symmetric Tragedies and Calculus of Consent

Any thoughtful reader would recognize the similarity between the anticommons [BUCHANAN - YOON, 2000] and the decision making costs in The Calculus of Consent [BUCHANAN - TULLOCK, 1962]. In both cases, the veto power of participants generates inefficient or costly outcomes. This analogy may suggest that there is an internal logic between the two literatures. The analogy, however, stops here and the internal logic cannot be generalized. The Calculus of Consent is concerned with a selection of a collective decision making rule from behind a veil of uncertainty in a constitutional convention, while anticommons considers individual decision making over alternatives under already defined existing rules. Yet, it can be instructive to clarify the differences. External costs and decision making costs in calculus are compared to commons and anticommons problems by introducing different property regimes.

International Environmental Agreements Under Uncertainty: Does the Veil of Uncertainty Help?

Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyze whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only no and full learning but also partial learning. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Third, we propose a transfer scheme that mitigates the possible negative effect of learning and which may even transform it into a positive effect.

Special Section on Implications of CATIE: Who Are the New Users of Antipsychotic Medications?

507 Second-generation antipsychotics have diffused rapidly among antipsychotic medication users and have generally been regarded as a first-line treatment for schizophrenia (1–4). Additional indications by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in bipolar disorder have increased the rate of antipsychotic use, as have significant levels of off-label use and use among youths (5–8). Antipsychotics have greater off-label use than many other therapeutic classes, and these uses may not be well supported by scientific evidence (9). Although spending on psychotropic medications is increasing at a higher annual rate than is spending on other medications (17.1% versus 12.1%) (10,11), psychotropic drugs may still be underused in mental health care (12) because of barriers to treatment, such as cost and stigma. Increases in antipsychotic medication use are justifiable if the population with conditions appropriately treated with antipsychotics, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, are undertreated and if antipsychotic medication treatment is cost-effective (13) compared with other alternatives. This implies that second-generation antipsychotics may not have to “pay for themselves” in terms of providing an offset in lower total health care costs (14), but they should provide greater benefits per dollar spent than older, less expensive antipsychotics or other treatments. Although there is significant variation in the benefit from drug products across individuals (15), in theory, drugs that provide greater value should diffuse much more quickly than other drugs. However, this is not always the case. Treatment decisions are made under a veil of uncertainty and market imperfections, and they are subject to a host of influences on prescribers: prescribers are never sure a priori which products will work best for any individual, and information on side effects is often recognized over time (as has been the case with significant product withdrawals, such as Vioxx). Diffusion of specific medications into treatment can be improved with a larger evidence base (16) on which to examine whether the growth of particular products is indeed rational. The Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Who Are the New Users of Antipsychotic Medications?

Vorschläge für eine konstitutionell begründete Rentenreform

Abstract For decades, economists have been urging politicians to reform pension systems, but in many cases the proposals have been rejected by referring to unresolved distributional aspects. This dilemma can be avoided by using the concept of constitutional economics, which allows us to address the issues of efficiency and justice at the same time. We conclude that a society behind a veil of uncertainty would settle for a compulsory pay-as-you-go pension system which provides a minimum pension. However, to avoid the system being undermined by free-riding (due to wrong expectations regarding the returns to investments on human capital), such a benefit would be granted according to the individual contribution to the accumulation of human capital. In addition, everyone would be obliged to save individually to secure a minimum pension.

Pre-commitment, the Timeless Perspective, and Policymaking from Behind a Veil of Uncertainty

Woodford (1999) develops the notion of a timelessly optimal pre-commitment policy. This paper uses a simple business cycle model to illustrate this notion. We show that timelessly optimal policies are not unique and that they are not necessarily better than the time-consistent solution. Further, we describe a method for constructing optimal pre-commitment rules in an environment where the policymaker does not know the initial state of the economy. This latter solution is useful for characterizing the benefits policymakers extract through exploiting initial conditions.