Van Parijs Research Articles

Poverty, Well‐Being, and Gender: What Counts, Who's Heard?

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 31, Issue 3 p. 280-316 Poverty, Well-Being, and Gender: What Counts, Who's Heard? SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, SUSAN MOLLER OKIN SUSAN MOLLER OIUN is Marta Sutton Weeks Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. The author of Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 1979, second edition 1992), Justice, Gender; and the Family (Basic Books, 1989), and Is Multiculturalism Badfor Women? (Princeton University Press, iggg), she is currently working on gender and development, feminism and multiculturalism, and popular accounts of genetics and evolutionary biology.Search for more papers by this author SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, SUSAN MOLLER OKIN SUSAN MOLLER OIUN is Marta Sutton Weeks Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. The author of Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 1979, second edition 1992), Justice, Gender; and the Family (Basic Books, 1989), and Is Multiculturalism Badfor Women? (Princeton University Press, iggg), she is currently working on gender and development, feminism and multiculturalism, and popular accounts of genetics and evolutionary biology.Search for more papers by this author First published: 11 January 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2003.00280.xCitations: 65 This article discusses recent literature on global poverty and economic development, focussing on Brooke Ackerly, Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999). I am very grateful to Pranap Bardhan, Samuel Bowles, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Joshua Cohen, Gerald Cohen, Lynn Eden, Jane Mansbridge, John Roemer, Philippe van Parijs, Robert van der Veen, Debra Satz, Hillel Steiner, Myra Strober, Cass Sunstein, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume31, Issue3July 2003Pages 280-316 RelatedInformation

Double-counting Inequalities

Philippe Van Parijs has argued that, in a globalizing economy, acquiring a second language, additional to one's native language, is more necessary for some persons than others — and that this asymmetric bilingualism is a form of injustice which should be rectified by a more equitable global sharing of the costs of second-language acquisition. This article responds by suggesting that (1) since native languages have geographic locations, and (2) since locations with less globally useful native languages thereby sustain lowered living costs, then (3) the costs which persons incur, in acquiring a second, more globally useful language, may already be offset by the lower costs they incur by virtue of their living in a location with a less globally useful native language. Hence, theories of justice (such as Van Parijs's) that require the egalitarian redistribution of locational values would impose, rather than remedy, an injustice by redistributing second-language-acquisition costs.

Flp recombinase regulated lacZ expression at the ROSA26 locus.

Manipulation of gene expression patterns through gene targeting in mouse embryonic stem (ES) cells (Thomas and Capecchi, 1987) and the more recent advent of conditional mutagenesis has revolutionized mouse genetics. The recombinase system most commonly used for conditional alleles in mouse is Cre/loxP derived from bacteriophage P1 (Sauer and Henderson, 1988). While less utilized, FLP/FRT derived from S. cerevisiae (O’Gorman et al., 1991) has been elegantly used by Martin and colleagues in combination with Cre to create a series of alleles for Fgf8 of varying strength (Meyers et al., 1998). The utility of Flp as a robust tool for mammalian genetics has been markedly improved by Stewart and colleagues who cleverly used cycling mutagenesis to select for variant alleles of Flp that carry out recombination at high efficiency in mammalian cells (Buchholz et al., 1998). Experimental strategies to sequentially inactivate and reactivate a given gene, or to test epistatic relationships between genes in somatic cells, are now possible using a combination of Cre with the enhanced Flpe. As Cre and Flp transgenes used to regulate conditional alleles may not recapitulate the expected pattern of expression (e.g., Tallquist and Soriano, 2000), it is essential to characterize the activity of these recombinase alleles to correctly interpret the phenotypes of conditionally mutant animals. Whereas several reporter lines for Cre have been described, we have found the allele created by Soriano in which Cre regulates lacZ expression at the ROSA26 locus to be especially useful (Soriano, 1999). ROSA26 insertions are ubiquitously expressed and show no overt phenotype when homozygous (Zambrowicz et al., 1997). We therefore created an analogous ROSA26 allele, which we term R26FR, to monitor Flp activity in vivo. The targeting vector contains an FRT-flanked neomycin resistance gene with four transcriptional stop signals placed upstream of a -galactosidase-neo fusion ( -geo; Friedrich and Soriano, 1991) all inserted into ROSA26 genomic sequence (Fig. 1a). The vector was transfected into V6.5 ES cells (Eggan et al., 2001), 48 clones were analyzed by Southern blotting, and 24 correctly targeted clones were identified (Fig. 1b). To demonstrate that the R26FR clones could activate – geo, a CMV-FLPe expression plasmid (Buchholz et al., 1998) was introduced by transient lipofection. One hundred ninety-two clones were picked and aliquots analyzed for – galactosidase activity by X– gal staining. Both Flpe-recombined (Fig. 2a) and parental clones (Fig. 2d) were identified, and absence or presence of the stop cassette was confirmed by Southern blotting (Fig. 1b). To create the reporter mouse strain, completely ESderived mice (Eggan et al., 2001; Nagy et al., 1990) were made by injecting targeted clones into tetraploid blastocysts. Four viable pups were produced, and two were used to derive tail fibroblast cell lines. To demonstrate functionality of the reporter in somatic cells, Flpe was cloned into an MSCV-IRES-GFP retroviral vector (Van Parijs et al., 1999) and used to infect the transformed reporter cell lines. Cells sorted for and against GFP expression were enriched by FACS and compared with those infected with an antisense Flpe retroviral control vector. Sorted cells were stained with X-gal and analyzed by Southern blotting, which demonstrated conditional recombination (Fig. 1b) and -galactosidase activity (Fig. 2b) dependent upon Flpe. To confirm activity of the reporter allele in vivo, R26FR mice were crossed to a -actin-Flpe transgenic mouse (Rodriguez et al., 2000). Embryos dissected at day 10.5 pc were stained with X-gal and showed ubiquitous Flp-mediated activation (Fig. 2c). The purpose of this FLP reporter allele is to specify the extent of FLP activity with a convenient and widely used enzymatic activity, -galactosidase. Development of FLP/ FRT tools such as our R26FR reporter allele and the recently described alkaline phosphatase reporter (Awatramani et al., 2001) improve the ability to characterize Flpe alleles in vivo and therefore expand the opportunities for using precisely regulated dual recombinase experimental strategies.

Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life

The Thomist 66 (2002): 61-99 AQUINAS ON HUMAN WELL-BEING AND THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE JOHN D. }ONES Marquette University Milwaukee, Wisconsin RE YOU SURE you really need that?" We are all familiar with this sort of question. In allocating resources in our personal nd social lives, we often assign a key role to distinguishing what people need from what they do not need or perhaps merely desire. David Macarov, for example, claims that a basic function of social welfare programs is to distinguish needs from desires.1 Discourse about needs ("needs discourse") also plays a key role in various psycho-social theories of development and well-being.2 But needs discourse is not merely practical in nature; it raises a host of complex theoretical problems related to defining needs, distinguishing basic needs from other needs, determining the relation between culture and needs, and so forth. 3 1 David Macarov, Social Welfare: Structure and Practice (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995), 17-18. 2 Abraham Maslow's need-based theory of psychological development is perhaps the best example in this genre. 3 Needless to say, there is an immense contemporary literature on all aspects of needs discourse. For a small sample of some recent work, one can consult Fernando I. Soriano, Conducting Needs Assessments: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995); Janie Percy-Smith, ed., Needs Assessments in Public Policy (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1996); Philippe van Parijs, Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform (London: Verso, 1992); D. P. Ghai, et. al., The Basic-Needs Approach to Development: Some Issues Regarding Concepts and Methodology (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1977); Paul Streeten, First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing Countries (New York: Published for the World Bank [by] Oxford University Press, 1981); Edmond Preteceille and Jean-Pierre Terrail, Capitalism, Consumption, and Needs, trans. Sarah Matthews (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985); Conrad Lodziak, Manipulating Needs: Capitalism and Culture (Boulder, Co: Pluto Press,1995); Katrin Lederer 61 62 JOHN D. JONES Yet, however pervasive is the role of needs discourse in contemporary life, that role pales in face of the foundational role Aquinas assigns to it in his conception of human life, both individual and social. One of the fundamental properties of happiness is self-sufficiency, namely, that it is in itself (per se) sufficient as a final end of human life. Commenting on Aristotle's claim that happiness is a self-sufficient good because it needs nothing exterior (nullo exterior indigentem),4 Aquinas observes that the happiness of this life "has self-sufficiency, since, namely, it contains in itself everything that is necessary for a human."5 At the same time, the self-sufficiency of happiness entails that humans are naturally social, since "one person does not suffice for things necessary for life if he lives alone."6 Further, the major communities in everyday human life are defined and distinguished from one another in terms of the sorts of needs they satisfy and the corresponding degree of self-sufficiency they attain. The household (domus) provides those things which are necessary for daily life. The household is the locus of the most elemental human associations between man and woman, master and slave, and father and son, each of which Aquinas, following Aristotle, claims to be necessary for the generation and the preservation of life.7 The vicus, which Aquinas defines in terms of the street of a medieval town in which a particular art or craft was practiced, provides the necessities required for the practice of the craft and, thus, for the satisfaction of those needs which the single family cannot provide.8 The city, to which both the household and Johan Galtung, eds., Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980); William Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988); and John D. Jones, Poverty and the Human Condition (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990): 159-78. 4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.5.1097b15. 5 "habet per se sufficientiam, quia scilicet in se continet omne illud quod est homini necessarium" (I Ethic., lect. 9). Latin texts are drawn from the editions contained in...

Real Freedom, the Market and the Family

Abstract The conception of social justice presented and defended in Philippe Van Parijs’ Real Freedom for All entails, among other implications, the justification of an unconditional basic income. It was the subject of seven critical comments that forms issue 22(2) and part of 23(1) of Analyse & Kritik. In this article a comprehensive reply is offered.

Why Mothers Should Be Fed

Abstract This paper reconstructs Van Parijs’ core argument for an unconditional basic income and presents three objections against it. The first and most theoretical objection attacks the egalitarian basis of Van Parijs’ argument and suggests an alternative, humanitarian theory of justice. The second and third more concrete objections accuse Van Parijs of selling-out the right to work as well as the right to recognition of work, for example of family work. The conclusion drawn from these three objections, however, is not that an unconditional basic income cannot be defended. Instead the paper ends by indicating an alternative, humanitarian argument for an unconditional basic income.

Ambition-Sensitivity and an Unconditional Basic Income

Abstract This paper concerns Philippe Van Parijs’s case for an unconditional basic income. It argues that given central egalitarian commitments-to wit, (i) equal concern and respect; (ii) endowment-insensitivity (which can be seen to include Van Parijs’s project of maximizing or leximinning real freedom); (iii) ambition-sensitivity; and (iv) neutrality-endorsed by Van Parijs, a basic income does not appear to be a requirement of justice. The core claim defended is that there is a serious tension between (iii) and the idea of an unconditional basic income.

Kann das Grundeinkommen die Arbeitslosigkeit abbauen?

Abstract I agree with Van Parijs that a theory of justice must meet the condition of indicating institutions that eliminate compulsory unemployment, but argue that his basic income is another form of unemployment compensation with all the disadvantages such compensations suffer from. In particular, it does not advance real freedom, but is liable to contribute to narrow political ends. I indicate an alternative and explicate, since Van Parijs disregards it, the right to work and its basis in the common property of natural resources. Finally, I compare the two competing conceptions of a good life that underlie his recommendation of a basic income and my rejection of it.

Sharing Job Resources: Ethical Reftections on the Justification of Basic Income

Abstract Philippe Van Parijs’s ethical justification of basic income is based on the argument that job resources must be shared equally. Underlying this idea are two important claims: (1) all individuals in society hold an ex. ante entitlement in job resources and (2) job resources are tradable: First, I present the real-libertarian argument for sharing job resources. Next, I identify and critically review three different objections against this view: the liability objection, the cooperation objection and the parasitism objection. I believe the parasitism objection poses a serious challenge to basic income, and argue that Van Parijs’s most plausible response-based on the idea that job resources are socially owned-is flawed. I provide the outline of an alternative normative basis for grounding a person's ex ante entitlement to job resources using an institutionalist approach.

Sind Marktpreise gerecht?

Abstract This article objects to two major economistic shortcomings of Philippe Van Parijs’s Real Freedom for All: (1) Van Parijs claims that market prices are the best metric for equal real freedom. This is challenged. Market prices admittedly are the best instrument for distributive purposes at hand. They are, however, a means of transport for supply and demand contingendes. Hence market prices are to be considered as an insufficient metric for equal freedom. (2) Van Parijs claims that Real Freedom for All is all there is to social justice. This claim is rejected. Despite its demanding egalitarian ambition, Real Freedom for All fails to protect a flourishing human life. Basic human rights like the right to social recognition and, in part, the right to health care are violated. Curiously even the right to autonomy is in want of full protection. These lacks are caused by the monetarism and the Straightforward market optimism of Real Freedom for All.

Basic Income in Complex Worlds

Abstract This paper is about difficulties in the normative justification of an unconditional basic income-difficulties which are related to the scope of egalitarian justice as well as the dimension(s) of the equalisandum. More specifically, it is contended that Philippe Van Parijs’s justification derived from the principle of Maximin real freedom runs into problems in environments in which scarcity does not offer a conceptual basis for a satisfactory account of social interdependencies. We discuss the following cases: (i) Scarcity is seen as a general equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic environment. (ii) Social forces of production (particularly non-rival and only partially excludable inputs) play a role in creating wealth. (iii) Informal exclusion mechanisms and patterns of ‘local justice’ matter. (iv) Certain forms of heterogeneity play a role.

New Perspectives on the Guaranteed Income

Renewed interest in a guaranteed income is evident from the number of books that have been published on the topic in the 1990s. This paper discusses and compares seven of those books: Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform, edited by Philippe Van Parijs; Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? by Philippe Van Parijs; Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal, by A. B. Atkinson; The $30,000 Solution, by Robert R. Schutz; The Benefit of Another?s Pains: Parasitism, Scarcity, Basic Income, by Gijs Van Donselaar; ...And Economic Justice for All Welfare Reform for the 21st Century, by Michael L. Murray; and The National Tax Rebate: A New America with Less Government, by Leonard M. Greene.

Resource Egalitarianism and the Limits to Basic Income

In his widely-discussed book, Real Freedom for All, Philippe Van Parijs argues that justice requires the provision of a universal, unconditional basic income. Some critics reject that conclusion on the grounds that it violates requirements of reciprocity or prohibitions on exploitation, free-riding and parasitism. This paper explores a less familiar critique, which operates within the same resource egalitarian parameters as Van Parijs's argument, and leaves unchallenged his conviction that justice requires a basic income. Instead the paper suggests two reasons to doubt his ambitious claims about its magnitude. First, the paper argues that if envy elimination is the fundamental egalitarian aim then Van Parijs's argument for boosting basic income by including jobs within the class of external assets to be equalized is unsuccessful. Second, it argues that Van Parijs fails to show that the provision of basic income should not be constrained by a more restrictive principle for correcting inequalities in personal resources than his favored compensatory norm. Before defending these criticisms, two preliminary sections describe Van Parijs's distributive principles and his central argument for basic income.

Justice and a Citizens' Basic Income

Is it possible for a society with a market economy to be just? Unlike Marxists, egalitarian liberals believe that there are some conceivable circumstances where such a society could fulfil the requirements of social justice. A market society need not be exploitative. One proposal that has recently received much attention among political theorists is the suggestion that citizens should receive a basic income. Philippe Van Parijs's Real Freedom for All: What (if anything) can justify capitalism? presents one of the most sophisticated philosophical arguments in favour of a citizens' basic income. In this paper I critically assess Van Parijs's proposal for a citizens' unconditional basic income. I develop three Rawlsian objections which cast doubt on the idea that Van Parijs's proposal can play a foundational role in a viable theory of social justice. I label these objections: (1) the objection from leisure (2) the objection from citizenship and (3) the objection from self‐respect.

The Disfranchisement of the Elderly, and Other Attempts to Secure Intergenerational Justice

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 27, Issue 4 p. 292-333 The Disfranchisement of the Elderly, and Other Attempts to Secure Intergenerational Justice PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS directs the Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics at the Universitd catholique de huvain (Belgium). His most recent books include Real Freedom for All (Oxford University Press, 1995), Sauver la solidarité, and Refonder la solidarité (Cerf, 1995 and 1996, respectively). He is a past contributor to Philosophy & Public Affairs.Search for more papers by this author PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS directs the Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics at the Universitd catholique de huvain (Belgium). His most recent books include Real Freedom for All (Oxford University Press, 1995), Sauver la solidarité, and Refonder la solidarité (Cerf, 1995 and 1996, respectively). He is a past contributor to Philosophy & Public Affairs.Search for more papers by this author First published: 15 June 2006 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.1998.tb00072.xCitations: 75 Earlier versions of this article were presented at the University of California (Davis), the University of Arizona (Tucson), Virginia Commonwealth University (Richmond), New York University, the Massachussetts Institute of Technology, the Universita catholica del Sacro Cuore (Milan), at the 1998 annual meeting of the September Group (Cambridge, Mass.) and at the 1999 Oxford Political Thought Conference. I am most grateful to the organisers of these events (especially John Roemer, Tom Christiano, Peter Vallentyne, Frances Kamm, Josh Cohen, Andrea Villani, Robert van der Veen and Dario Castiglione) for their own critical comments as well as for these opportunities to elicit precious feedback; to Vittorio Bufacchi, Axel Gosseries, Gerd Grozinger, Wayne Norman, Claus Offe, Kenneth Shepsle, Quentin Skinner, Peter Vallentyne, Stuart White, Andrew Williams and Erik O. Wright for insightful written comments or suggestions; to Bruce Ackerman, Axel Gosseries, Paul-Marie Boulanger, Gerd Grozinger. Klaus Hurrelmann, Ted Marmor, Silvano Mockli, Claus Offe, Stein Ringen and some of my Louvain students for useful material, and to the Program on Ethics, Politics and Economics at Yale University, its director, its registrar and its students for the stimulating setting it provided for most of the preparation of this article. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume27, Issue4October 1998Pages 292-333 RelatedInformation

The Freedom-based Account of Solidarity and Basic Income

Real-libertarianism, as it is expressed in Philippe Van Parijs' recent monograph Real Freedom for All is characteristically committed to both self-ownership and 'solidarity’ with the infirm or handicapped. In this article it is argued that the conception of (real) freedom that is used to endorse self-ownership is inconsistent with the conception of (social) freedom or opportunity that is used to justify transfer payments to those with no or low earning capacity. The problem turns around the question whether one's freedom consists in the access one has to a share of the social product or in the measure of economic self-sufficiency one enjoys. Accordingly the role of private property in external resources as a condition for freedom is unclear: is it the basis of people's capacity for self-determination or is it the basis of people's bargaining power? Van Parijs' commitment to self-ownership suggests the former, his commitment to solidarity suggests the latter. A similar ambivalence is pointed out in his argument for a universal basic income, for which Real Freedom for All is so well-known.

Does “Real‐Freedom‐for‐All” Really Justify Basic Income?

AbstractWe here examine Philippe Van Parijs's concept of "real freedom" which justifies in his view the introduction of a basic income. What we call into question is whether this concept can be understood, as Van Parijs argues, as the counterfactual freedom to do what one might want to do, that is as a notion of freedom based on the idea of potential desire. We oppose to it an alternative conception of "real freedom" related, first, to a notion of basic needs which a well‐ordered society can satisfy by means of compensation, second, to a notion of social mediation in the evaluation of individual preferences. In this way we restore the relationship between freedom and desire, which allows us to take into account the conception the social actors have of their own freedom, more than does the too abstract conception of freedom based on the idea of potential desire.

Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income

This paper considers whether arguments presented in Philippe Van Parijs' Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? succeed in rebutting the objection that the introduction of a substantial unconditional basic income (UBI) would allow non-working citizens to free-ride on the efforts of, and so exploit, working citizens. It considers Van Parjis' ‘external assets argument’ for UBI, and finds that this argument does not succeed in reconciling payment of a substantial UBI with the reciprocity principle which underpins this ‘exploitation objection’. It considers and rejects Van Parijs' implicit claim that the exploitation objection must be grounded in a distributive principle which contradicts the egalitarian commitment to prevent brute luck inequality. It concludes that Van Parjis has failed, thus far, to articulate a convincing response to the exploitation objection.

Self-Ownership and Equality: Brute Luck, Gifts, Universal Dominance, and LeximinReal Freedom for All. Philippe Van Parijs's

Previous articleNext article No AccessReview EssaySelf-Ownership and Equality: Brute Luck, Gifts, Universal Dominance, and Leximin Real Freedom for All. Philippe Van Parijs'sPeter VallentynePeter Vallentyne Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 107, Number 2Jan., 1997 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/233723 Views: 20Total views on this site Citations: 23Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1997 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Giacomo Pisani A justification of basic income beyond a theory of justice, Oñati Socio-Legal Series 12, no.44 (Aug 2022): 737–761.https://doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-1265M. Niaz Asadullah, Alain Trannoy, Sandy Tubeuf, Gaston Yalonetzky Measuring educational inequality of opportunity: pupil’s effort matters, World Development 138 (Feb 2021): 105262.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105262Roberto Fumagalli Buyer Beware: A Critique of Leading Virtue Ethics Defenses of Markets, Journal of Social Philosophy 51, no.33 (Mar 2020): 457–482.https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12336Sang Yoon (Tim) Lee, Ananth Seshadri Economic Policy and Equality of Opportunity, The Economic Journal 128, no.612612 (Jan 2018): F114–F151.https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12480Jørgen Pedersen Just inheritance taxation, Philosophy Compass 13, no.44 (Feb 2018): e12491.https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12491Arnaud Lefranc, Alain Trannoy Equality of opportunity, moral hazard and the timing of luck, Social Choice and Welfare 49, no.3-43-4 (May 2017): 469–497.https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1054-8Anna-Karin Andersson, Frode Lindemark, Kjell Arne Johansson Priority rules as solutions to conflicting health care rights, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 20, no.11 (Sep 2016): 67–76.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-016-9728-zMaximilian Sommer The Normative Argument for an Unconditional Basic Income, (Mar 2016): 7–49.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24064-0_2Christopher Freiman, Adam Lerner Self-ownership and disgust: why compulsory body part redistribution gets under our skin, Philosophical Studies 172, no.1212 (Mar 2015): 3167–3190.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0463-8Cornelius Cappelen, Jørgen Pedersen Borgerlønn: en rettferdig reform?, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 56, no.33 (Sep 2015): 354–371.https://doi.org/10.18261/ISSN1504-291X-2015-03-06Hugh Lazenby Luck, Risk and the Market, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no.44 (Sep 2013): 667–680.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9454-zSerena Olsaretti RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY FROM LIBERTARIANISM, Economics and Philosophy 29, no.11 (Apr 2013): 43–63.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267113000072Gideon Elford Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16, no.11 (Dec 2011): 139–149.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9331-6Jean-Sébastien Gharbi, Cléa Sambuc Propriété de soi et justice sociale chez les libertariens, Cahiers d'économie Politique n° 62, no.11 (Sep 2012): 187–222.https://doi.org/10.3917/cep.062.0187Lloyd P. Gerson WHO OWNS WHAT? SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Social Philosophy and Policy 29, no.11 (Dec 2011): 81–105.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052511000069Arnaud Lefranc, Nicolas Pistolesi, Alain Trannoy Equality of opportunity and luck: Definitions and testable conditions, with an application to income in France, Journal of Public Economics 93, no.11-1211-12 (Dec 2009): 1189–1207.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.008Davide Tondani Universal Basic Income and Negative Income Tax: Two different ways of thinking redistribution, The Journal of Socio-Economics 38, no.22 (Mar 2009): 246–255.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2008.10.006Arnaud Lefranc, Nicolas Pistolesi, Alain Trannoy INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITIES VS. INEQUALITY OF OUTCOMES: ARE WESTERN SOCIETIES ALL ALIKE?, Review of Income and Wealth 54, no.44 (Dec 2008): 513–546.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.2008.00289.xKASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN Against Self-Ownership: There Are No Fact-Insensitive Ownership Rights over One's Body, Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, no.11 (Jan 2008): 86–118.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00125.xJean-Fabien Spitz Le libertarisme de gauche : l'égalité sous condition de la propriété de soi, Raisons politiques 23, no.33 (Jan 2006): 23.https://doi.org/10.3917/rai.023.0023Serena Olsaretti Liberty, Desert and the Market, 48 (Sep 2009).https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487422Richard Sturn, Rudi Dujmovits Basic Income in Complex Worlds, Analyse & Kritik 22, no.22 (Jan 2000).https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2000-0203Daniel Shapiro Why Even Egalitarians Should Favor Market Health Insurance, Social Philosophy and Policy 15, no.22 (Jan 2009): 84–132.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500001965

Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) can Justify Capitalism?

Capitalist societies are full of unacceptable inequalities. Freedom is of paramount importance. These two convictions are widely shared across the world. Yet they often seem in complete contradiction with each other. Fighting inequality jeopardizes freedom; taking freedom seriously boosts inequality. What can be done? Philippe Van Parijs offers a solution to the dilemma. Assessing and rejecting the claims of both socialism and conventional capitalism, he presents an alternative vision of the just society: a capitalist society offering a substantial unconditional basic income to all its members. The author then goes on to demonstrate what his ideal of free society means in the real world by drawing out its policy implications.