Van Fraassen Research Articles

El criterio de empirical grounding en el Estructuralismo Empirista

Van Fraassen’s Empiricist Structuralism has been threatened by what is known as the loss of reality objection: the pre-eminence of pragmatic factors in the scientific representation of phenomena seems to neglect the role of the world itself in the adequacy of theories. One of van Fraassen’s weapons for addressing to this objection is a set of methodological rules he calls criterion of empirical grounding. In the present work we question the effectiveness of this criterion (and the methodological strategy in general) to avoid objections such as the loss of reality.

The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation

In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen in The scientific image, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own “positive argument” for CE by their own lights.

Regression to the mean and Judy Benjamin

Van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin problem asks how one ought to update one’s credence in A upon receiving evidence of the sort “A may or may not obtain, but B is k times likelier than C”, where $$\{A,B,C\}$$ is a partition. Van Fraassen’s solution, in the limiting case $$k\rightarrow \infty $$, recommends a posterior converging to $$P(A|A\cup B)$$ (where P is one’s prior probability function). Grove and Halpern, and more recently Douven and Romeijn, have argued that one ought to leave credence in A unchanged, i.e. fixed at P(A). We argue that while the former approach is superior, it brings about a reflection violation due in part to neglect of a “regression to the mean” phenomenon, whereby when C is eliminated by random evidence that leaves A and B alive, the ratio P(A) : P(B) ought to drift in the direction of 1 : 1.

Realism, empiricism and causal inquiry in International Relations: What is at stake?

Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.

Scientific Realism Again

The present paper concerns how scientific realism is formulated and defended. It is argued that van Fraassen is fundamentally right that scientific realism requires metaphysics in general, and modality in particular. This is because of several relationships that raise problems for the ontology of scientific realism, namely those between: scientific realism and common sense realism; past and current theories; the sciences of different scales; and the ontologies of the special sciences and fundamental physics. These problems are related. It is argued that ontic structural realism, in the form of the real-patterns account of ontology, offers a unified solution to them all (or at least that it is required to do so, if it is to make good on the promise of naturalised metaphysics).

Entropy and Insufficient Reason: A Note on the Judy Benjamin Problem

One well-known objection to the principle of maximum entropy is the so-called Judy Benjamin problem, first introduced by van Fraassen ([1981]). The problem turns on the apparently puzzling fact that, on the basis of information relating an event’s conditional probability, the maximum entropy distribution will almost always assign to the event conditionalized on a probability strictly less than that assigned to it by the uniform distribution. In this article, I present an analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem that can help to make sense of this seemingly odd feature of maximum entropy inference. My analysis is based on the claim that, in applying the principle of maximum entropy, Judy Benjamin is not acting out of a concern to maximize uncertainty in the face of new evidence, but is rather exercising a certain brand of epistemic charity towards her informant. This epistemic charity takes the form of an assumption on the part of Judy Benjamin that her informant’s evidential report leaves out no relevant information. Such a reconceptualization of the motives underlying Judy Benjamin’s appeal to the principle of maximum entropy can help to further our understanding of the true epistemological grounds of this principle and correct a common misapprehension regarding its relationship to the principle of insufficient reason. 1. Introduction2. The Principle of Maximum Entropy3. An Apologia for Judy Benjamin4. Conclusion: Entropy and Insufficient Reason

The epistemological glaucoma and psematical paradox (autological feature of truth and heterological feature of false)

In this paper is considered the main arguments of the deflationary concept of truth: the approaches of A. Tarski, W.V. Quine, H. Putnam and some others. Here are presented two representative examples of the elimination of truth as the value of the proposition: the concept of “languages games” by L. Witgenstein and “constructive empiricism” by B. van Fraassen. It is revealed that the statement “there are no true statements” is self-predictive and leads to absurdity. It is demonstrated that the elimination of “truth” from epistemology will require, with necessity, the elimination of “false” also. It is shown, that when we try to get answer on the question “Can a “false sentence”, understood as a “not true” sentence, i.e. р, has the same denotation on which it denotes (not be true)” a paradox arises, which calls “psematic” from the Greek word ψέματα (false). The essence of the paradox is that “every false sentence denotes false” denotes every false sentence denoting false, if and only if, “every false sentence denoting false” is not every true sentence denoting the truth. The result is: a) if “every false sentence denoting false” itself is not every true sentence denoting the truth, then, by the definition of “every false sentence denoting false”, it is not a sentence denoting false . And vice versa: b) If “every false sentence denoting false” itself is every true sentence denoting the truth, then, consequently, it is “every false sentence denoting false” and it is a sentence denoting false. In any case, it turns out that the proposition “false sentences denote false”, simultaneously have the sign that they designate and do not have it. It was found that “truth” has an autological nature, and “false” has heterological one.

The Reality of Jean Perrin's Atoms and Molecules

Jean Perrin’s proof in the early-twentieth century of the reality of atoms and molecules is often taken as an exemplary form of robustness reasoning, where an empirical result receives validation if it is generated using multiple experimental approaches. In this article, I describe in detail Perrin’s style of reasoning, and locate both qualitative and quantitative forms of argumentation. Particularly, I argue that his quantitative style of reasoning has mistakenly been viewed as a form of robustness reasoning, whereas I believe it is something different, what I call ‘calibration’. From this perspective, I re-evaluate recent interpretations of Perrin provided by Stathis Psillos, Peter Achinstein, Alan Chalmers, and Bas van Fraassen, all of whom read Perrin as a robustness reasoner, though not necessarily in the same sort of way. I then argue that by viewing Perrin as a ‘calibration’ reasoner we gain a better understanding of why he believes himself to have established the reality of atoms and molecules. To conclude, I provide an alternative and more productive understanding of the basis of the dispute between realists and anti-realists. 1 Introduction2 Perrin’s Reasoning: The Qualitative Argument3 Perrin’s Reasoning: The Quantitative Argument4 Perrin’s Realism5 Psillos, Achinstein, Chalmers, and van Fraassen on Understanding Perrin6 Conclusion

Stance empiricism and epistemic reason

Some versions of empiricism have been accused of being neither empirically confirmable nor analytically true and therefore meaningless or unknowable by their own lights. Carnap, and more recently van Fraassen, have responded to this objection by construing empiricism as a stance containing non-cognitive attitudes. The resulting stance empiricism is not subject to the norms of knowledge, and so does not self-defeat as per the objection. In response to this proposal, several philosophers have argued that if empiricism is a stance, then there can be no distinctively epistemic reasons in favor of adopting it, but only prudential or moral reasons. I defend stance empiricism against this objection by showing that stance empiricism furthers many plausibly epistemic goals, such as false belief avoidance, wisdom, and justification. I respond to three objections to my argument: that I assume a conception of epistemic reason that leads to problematic tradeoffs (I do not), that to have epistemic reason is just to be epistemically justified (it is not), and that my premise that experience is the only source of information has no empirical content (it does).

Contrast explanation in economics: its context, meaning, and potential

In this article we place Tony Lawson’s account of contrast explanation in context. Lawson’s development of it is given meaning both by the roots of the approach in his work on social ontology and the state of economics that provides the grounds for the critique contained in that social ontology. This is important because such an approach to explanation is not new. Most notably, van Fraassen and Garfinkel have developed it in particular ways and for particular purposes within the philosophy of science and social theory. Setting out the different ways in which the contrastive approach has been developed is useful for identifying what is different about Lawson’s approach, its potential and limits. Lawson’s proposal is more modest and focusses on causal investigation in a manner that flows from his approach to social ontology. Contrast explanation provides a substitute for controlled experiments and facilitates identifying social mechanisms. It also enables exploration of the manifold presuppositions of our explanatory questions. We argue that this is a useful and important contribution to overcoming some of the many problems economics faces.

The Coincidentalist Reply to the No-Miracles Argument

Proponents of the no-miracles argument contend that scientific realism is “the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle.” Bas van Fraassen argued, however, that the success of our best theories can be explained in Darwinian terms—by the fact they are survivors of a winnowing process in which unsuccessful theories are rejected. Critics of this selectionist explanation complain that while it may account for the fact we have chosen successful theories, it does not explain why any particular one of those theories succeeds. Against this I defend the claim that if selectionists manage to account for the former, they have no burden to account for the latter; the success of any particular one of our best theories might as well be an extraordinary coincidence. I refer to this enhanced selectionist reply as “coincidentalism” and argue that it is a serious but underappreciated response to the no-miracles argument. More generally, I argue the considerations raised in favor of this response show that versions of the no-miracles argument focusing on the success of particular theories are misguided.

KONSTRUKTYVUSIS EMPIRIZMAS BE EPISTEMINĖS BENDRUOMENĖS

Konstruktyvusis empirizmas (KE), plačiai nagrinėta ir nagrinėjama Baso van Fraasseno antirealistinė mokslo koncepcija, siūlo filosofinę mokslo praktikos interpretaciją. KE filosofijoje mokslo praktikos subjektas yra, kaip nurodo pats van Fraassenas, vadinamoji episteminė bendruomenė. Tačiau Williamas Seageris prieštarauja, kad jeigu KE šalininkai remiasi episteminės bendruomenės sąvoka, tai KE filosofija neišvengiamai numato, jog mokslininkai tiki nestebimaisiais esiniais. Maža to, Simone Bahrenberg ir kt. teigia, kad nuo to, iš ko sudaryta episteminė bendruomenė, priklauso, kurie esiniai yra stebimieji, todėl stebimumas negali būti objektyvi savybė, o KE laikosi nuostatos, kad stebimumas yra objektyvi savybė. Straipsnyje, remiantis keturiais mintiniais eksperimentais, aptariamas atskiras hipotetinis episteminės bendruomenės, kurioje tėra vienas asmuo, atvejis ir teigiama, kad šiuo hipotetiniu atveju Seagerio bei Bahrenberg ir kt. kontrargumentai nepagrįsti: Seagerio reikalavimas kitų episteminės bendruomenės narių liudijimus laikyti episteminius įsitikinimus grindžiančiais duomenimis tiesiog neveikia; o, contra Bahrenberg ir kt., tai, kas stebima vienam asmeniui, KE filosofijoje yra neproblemiškai objektyvu. Remiantis šia įžvalga teigiama, kad konstruktyvusis empirizmas būtų stipresnė filosofinė pozicija, jeigu performuluotų savo tezę taip, lyg ši aprašytų vieną pažįstantįjį subjektą (asmenį, mokslininką), nes i) taip ne tik kartą ir visiems laikams atremtų visus episteminės bendruomenės sąvoka besikliaujančius prieštaravimus, bet ir ii) šiuo pakeitimu tiesiogiai atsižvelgtų į kai kuriuos mokslo praktikos atvejus, į kuriuos nemodifikuota KE tezė taip akivaizdžiai atsižvelgti negali. Siūlomas KE nuostatos pakeitimas iii) išlaiko pagrindinius KE pozicijos aspektus, − skirtį tarp stebimųjų ir nestebimųjų esinių, skirtį tarp priėmimo ir įsitikinimo, episteminės ekonomijos principą ir mokslo racionalumo principą, − bent tiek pat pagrįstus, kiek ir naudojant originaliąją van Fraasseno tezę.

Reactionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection

As it is standardly conceived, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a form of ampliative inference in which one infers a hypothesis because it provides a better potential explanation of one's evidence than any other available, competing explanatory hypothesis. Bas van Fraassen famously objected to IBE thus formulated that we may have no reason to think that any of the available, competing explanatory hypotheses are true. While revisionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection concede that IBE needs to be reformulated in light of this problem, reactionary responses argue that the Bad Lot Objection is fallacious, incoherent, or misguided. This paper shows that the most influential reactionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection do nothing to undermine the original objection. This strongly suggests that proponents of IBE should focus their efforts on revisionary responses, i.e. on finding a more sophisticated characterization of IBE for which the Bad Lot Objection loses its bite.

What If Madhyamaka Is a Stance? Reading Nāgārjuna with the Help of Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü and Bas van Fraassen

What If Madhyamaka Is a Stance? Reading Nāgārjuna with the Help of Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü and Bas van Fraassen

Somewhere over the... what?

In order to defend his controversial claim that observation is unaided perception, Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, suggested that, for all we know, the images produced by a microscope could be in a situation analogous to that of the rainbows, which are ‘images of nothing’. He added that reflections in the water, rainbows, and the like are ‘public hallucinations’, but it is not clear whether this constitutes an ontological category apart or an empty set. In this paper an argument will be put forward to the effect that rainbows can be thought of as events, that is, as part of a subcategory of entities that van Fraassen has always considered legitimate phenomena. I argue that rainbows are actually not images in the relevant (representational) sense and that there is no need to ontologically inflate the category of entities in order to account for them, which would run counter to the empiricist principle of parsimony. Keywords: constructive empiricism, observability, observation, public hallucination, rainbow, van Fraassen.

Regularity theories disconfirmed: a revamped argument and a wager

Regularity theories of causation assert that causal or nomic notions are to be reduced into “mere” frequencies of particular, non-nomic, co-located qualities and matters of fact. In this essay, I present a critical exploration of Armstrong (1983) and Strawson’s (1989) explanatory arguments against regularity theories. The shortcomings of these older arguments for nomic realism are identified and a revamped version which is immune to such problems is outlined and defended. I argue that anti-realism suffers substantial disconfirmation due to its comparative inability to unify empirical regularities in the absence of any probabilistic counterweights. I also show that realist theories are much more probable than their anti-realist competitors both individually and in aggregate. This is shown to be the case with even the most humble of observational data. This revamped argument is Bayesian in character; it is immune to the criticisms of Beebee (2006), Everitt (1991), Loewer (1996), and van Fraassen (1985); and it is empiricist friendly to boot.

Deference, respect and intensionality

This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle (van Fraassen in J Philos 81(5):235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle (Elga in Nous 41(3):478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8(3):281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124(494):449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on how that person and that time are designated. In this paper I suggest a way of completing the Reflection Principle and Group Reflection Principle, and I argue that so completed these principles are plausible. In particular, they do not fall foul of the Sleeping Beauty case (Elga in Analysis 60(2):143–147, 2000), the Cable Guy Paradox (Hajek in Analysis 65(286):112–119, 2005), Arntzenius’ prisoner cases (Arntzenius in J Philos, 100(7):356–370, 2003), or the Puzzle of the Hats (Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8(3):281–300, 2011).

On What Empiricism Cannot Be

Bas C. van Fraassen, in his Terry Lectures at Yale University (subsequently published as The Empirical Stance), is concerned to elucidate what empiricism is, and could be, given past and current failures of characterization. He contends that naive empiricism—the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of a thesis—is self-refuting, and he offers a reductio ad absurdum to substantiate this claim. Moreover, in place of naive empiricism, van Fraassen endorses stance empiricism: the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of certain attitudes and commitments. The present article, however, argues that van Fraassen begs the question in his reductio of naive empiricism, and thus that his primary defense of stance empiricism is inadequate.

On the Pragmatic Equivalence between Representing Data and Phenomena

Van Fraassen argues that data provide the target-end structures required by structuralist accounts of scientific representation. But models represent phenomena not data. Van Fraassen agrees but argues that there is no pragmatic difference between taking a scientific model to accurately represent a physical system and accurately represent data extracted from it. In this article I reconstruct his argument and show that it turns on the false premise that the pragmatic content of acts of representation include doxastic commitments.

Reconstructed Empiricism

According to Bas van Fraassen, scientific realists and anti-realists disagree about whether accepting a scientific theory involves believing that the theory is true. On van Fraassen’s own anti-realist empiricist position, accepting a theory involves believing only that the theory is correct in its claims about observable aspects of the world. However, a number of philosophers have argued that acceptance and belief cannot be distinguished and thus that the debate is either confused or trivially settled in favor of the realist. In addition, another set of philosophers have argued that van Fraassen’s empiricist position appeals to an unmotivated distinction between observable and unobservable aspects of the world. This paper aims to reconstruct a van Fraassen-style empiricism about scientific acceptance that avoids these two objections – reconstructed empiricism.