Van De Kaa Research Articles

Analytical Overview of the Established Demographic Theories of Fertility: Agenda for Further Advancement

Abstract: The demographic theory of fertility has interested prominent scholars for more than a century. Most recently and notably, Greenhalgh (1994), Van de Kaa (1995), de Bruijn (2006) and Leridon (2015) have dedicated their works to the analysis of the established demographic theories. They have provided a typology and analysis of demographic theories of fertility and illuminated many components of the latter, including the logic of theories’ development and evolution, their multidisciplinary nature and their “anchors” in the existing body of knowledge in their respective broader fields. Still, scholars acknowledge … “we still have no universally accepted explanation for why the Western post-war baby boom occurred, and why it ended. Nor do we have any clear idea of how fertility will evolve in countries where it is currently below replacement level. Homo demographicus is yet to be born…” (Leridon, 2015). The proposed agenda for advancing demographic theories include linking them to their predecessors in social sciences, analyzing them from the theory construction standpoint, providing distinctions between several branches of each of these theories, and outlining a strategy for the integration of compatible parts of these theories.

CHILDBIRTH POSTPONEMENT AND AGE-RELATED INFERTILITY IN SERBIA

Childbirth postponement has been a widely discussed topic since the 1990s, and was pushed to the top of the demographic agenda with the emergence of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) paradigm. Mechanisms of childbirth postponement mostly explained by economists or sociologists were understood as rational-based decisions of individuals (or couples) trying to cope with the requirements of modern society. These mechanisms explained by income and consumption rationale (Becker, Modigliani), or by liberal and postmodern values (Van de Kaa, Lestheage), barely mention the physiological limitations of the individual choice. These limitations given by the human species reproductive span, with no exception, affect everyone trying to make an optimal reproductive choice. There are two main effects of fertility postponement on births and fertility rates. The first effect arises when couples postpone childbearing to a later age during a certain period and fewer births take place than in the absence of such postponement – the ‘tempo effect’. The second is a negative effect of fertility postponement on completed fertility and increased childlessness attributable to the age-related increase in infertility. This second negative effect in particular is our field of interest. The decline in cohort fertility due to postponement has been mostly studied using data on age at first birth and subsequent fertility, as well as models of fecundity, pregnancy loss and time to conception by age, which we will try to apply to the period data. Using period data, we will try to quantify the potential number of births that would occur in the absence of childbirth postponement in Serbia during the past two decades.

Evlilik: Modernleşme Sürecinde Kuşaklararasında Yaşanan Değişim

The main objective of this research is trying to understand and explain the intergenerational transformation of marriage in the process of modernization. This transformation has been grounded on the conceptual and theoretical framework and explained with the data obtained from the participants' interviews. The opinions of the participants in two different generations on the meaning of family and marriage, their thoughts about marriage and their experiences of marriage were evaluated in the context of the relationship between individualization, which is an indication of modernization, and family and marriage. At the same time, the theory dealt with the second demographic transition theory of Van de Kaa has been supported and the conceptual-theoretical framework of the research has been grounded in this way. Field work has been carried out using qualitative research methods. Within the scope of the field research, in-depth interviews have been carried out in Izmir with 47 married participants who are composed of 12 females and 12 males, in total 24 participants from the first generation; 13 females and 10 males, in total 23 participants from the second generation. In the interpretation of the data, content analysis technique has been used. As a result, it was found that the second generation participants were able to make individual and independent decisions at the stage of marriage. It is compatible with the approaches suggested by the theory of individualization that marriage is decided based on love. At the same time, it includes the signs that the transformation of the second demographic transition theory on the population dynamics is experienced in the second generation of participants, the first marriage age is high, the fertility rates decrease, the postponement of the births

Review of the volume Reproductive Behavior of Women in Republic of Moldova, Sociological Study. Authors: Maria Bulgaru and Oleg Bulgaru

The reproductive behavior and its dynamics are a topic of particular relevance due to the major societal changes imposed by the modernization process currently taking place in the Republic of Moldova. Among these changes we can include an egoistic attitude towards parenthood and the correlation of parenthood with a certain level of living and a certain socio-professional status that leads to postponing the decision to become a parent in favor of completing studies and career development. The increase in the birth rate is correlated with an increase in the marriage age, but also with a fragility of the marital couple, coupled with a much higher divorce rate. Increasing the birth rate leads to a decrease in the fertile period of future mothers, and implicitly to the decrease in the average number of children per family couple (Van de Kaa, 2002), which is below the rate of natural replacement of generations (Metro Media Transilvania, 2005; Varlamova, Noskova & Sedova, 2006).

Gimstamumo, laimės ir lyčių vaidmenų sąsajos

Šio straipsnio tikslas – pristatyti naujas gimstamumo teorines prieigas, aiškinančias vaikų susilaukimo, laimės bei lyčių vaidmenų, lyčių (ne)lygybės ir (ne)teisingumo sąsajas, atskleisti šių teorinių prieigų ryšį, aptarti galimybes jas jungti, išryškinant jų perspektyvumą jau išplėtotų teorijų kontekste. Pastarųjų kelių dešimtmečių išsivysčiusių šalių neigiami gimstamumo pokyčiai, pasižymintys gimstamumo mažėjimu ir žemu lygiu, neužtikrinančiu kartų kaitos, nuo XX a. devinto dešimtmečio aiškinti remiantis antrojo demografinio perėjimo (ADP) teorija. Tačiau kai kuriose šalyse jau matomo gimstamumo atsigavimo ADP teorija paaiškinti negali. Kaip atsakas į išplėtotų gimstamumo teorijų trūkumus ir prieštaringus gimstamumo pokyčius šiuo metu plėtojamos dvi naujos, tarpusavyje susijusios teorinės perspektyvos – laimės ir lyčių vaidmenų sąsajos su gimstamumo pokyčiais. Šiuos tris dėmesnis integruojanti analitinė perspektyva papildo R. Lesthaeghe’o ir D. van de Kaa pasiūlytas ADP idėjas. Joje plėtojama bei naujai pritaikoma ir P. McDonaldo pasiūlyta teorinė schema, apimanti kintamas gimstamumo ir lyčių lygybės, lyčių teisingumo sąsajas. Kintamų lyčių vaidmenų modelių ir laimės bei gimstamumo kitimas priklauso nuo platesnio konteksto – darbo ir šeimos vaidmenų derinimo galimybių, susijusių su socialine ir šeimos politika bei darbo rinkos lankstumu, į individą ir šeimą orientuotų institucijų prisitaikymo prie kintamų lyčių vaidmenų. Dėl institucijų neprisitaikymo lyčių vaidmenų modelių kaita, pereinant nuo tradicinio prie egalitarinio lyčių vaidmenų modelio, yra „įstrigusi“ pereinamajame etape, pasireiškiančiame normatyvine sumaištimi, darbo ir šeimos vaidmenų derinimo konfliktu, dėl struktūrinių suvaržymų ribojančiu prokreacinių lūkesčių realizaciją. Pagrindinė dviejų teorijų junginio ir naujas gimstamumo pokyčių aiškinimo galimybes suteikiančios kompleksinės teorinės perspektyvos idėja – žemas gimstamumo ir laimės lygis yra pasikeitusių lyčių vaidmenų preferencijų ir struktūrinių galimybių neatitikimo padarinys, kai institucijos negeba prisitaikyti prie kintamų lyčių vaidmenų.

The Rise in Divorce and Cohabitation: Is There a Link?

Over the past decades, divorce and cohabitation have increased dramatically throughout Europe. Divorce has fundamentally altered the institution of marriage from a life-long union to one that may dissolve. Cohabitation allows couples to live together without undertaking the vows of marriage, but also allows couples to avoid the potentially higher costs of divorce. Thus, divorce and cohabitation seem to be intrinsically linked. Here we theorize how the increase in divorce may be linked to the increase in cohabitation on the macro-, meso-, and micro- levels. Using focus group data from 8 countries, we explore how divorce may have changed attitudes and beliefs concerning marriage and cohabitation. We then investigate whether survey data and official statistics in 16 countries provide evidence consistent with a link. While exogenous factors have been important for the increase in cohabitation, we argue that the divorce revolution has been a catalyst for the cohabitation boom.

Traditional and modern cohabitation in Latin America

AbstractBACKGROUNDThe existence of cohabitation is a historical feature of nuptiality in Latin America. Traditionally, cohabitation was common in less developed regions, among the lower social classes. But today its occurrence is increasing and in social groups and regions in which it was not common. The features of this latter type of cohabitation remain unclear.OBJECTIVEWe differentiate types of cohabitation in Latin America on the basis of relationship context at its outset and its outcomes in terms of childbearing. The comparability of these types over countries is attested, as well as their evolution over time and the educational and age profiles of cohabitants.METHODSDemographic and Health Survey data for the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s for up to eight countries are analyzed by means of Multiple Group Latent Class Analysis.RESULTSThree types of cohabitation are found. The traditional type includes young and lower-educated women who start to cohabit during adolescence. They have more children at younger ages. The remaining two types of cohabitation included higher-educated women and are considered modern. The innovative type groups women from all age groups, with fewer children born at a higher age and never as a single woman. Blended cohabitation refers to older women, who could negotiate a marriage, but do not. They start to cohabit during adulthood, but always after single pregnancy.CONCLUSIONSThe persistence of historical trends is attested. Traditional cohabitation is related to socioeconomic deprivation and prevails in Central American and Caribbean countries. However, two modern types of cohabitation are emerging in the region. They are concentrated in the South and related to women's independence.1. IntroductionPatterns of family formation have changed markedly over the past decades in the West. Economic, technological, social, and ideational changes have led to significant transformations in family life, such as union formation, union stability, and gender relations. In developed countries, new forms of living arrangement, especially unmarried cohabitation, are interpreted as outcomes of the modernization process, female economic independence, and the rising symmetry in gender roles (van de Kaa 1987). Recent evidence has shown that cohabitation in the West is also related to economic deprivation and has been used as an alternative to marriage by people with few economic resources or poor economic expectations (e.g., Hiekel et al. 2012; Kalmijn 2011; Kiernan et al. 2011 [for European results]; Sassler and Miller 2011; Bumpass et al. 1991 [results for the US]).Although the rise in consensual unions is present in developed countries as well as in Latin American countries, the features of these unions can differ. This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by investigating the types of cohabitation that exist in Latin America, as well as their prevalence, main characteristics, and evolution through time. Therefore we differentiate types of cohabitation on the basis of the relationship context at their beginning (woman's age and occurrence of pre-cohabitation pregnancy or childbearing) and their outcomes in terms of childbearing (number of children and mother's age at birth of first child).The coexistence of marriage and cohabitation is a historical feature of nuptiality in Latin America (Castro-Martin 2002). Cohabitation has always been marked by high fertility, it was most prevalent in rural regions and among the lower and less-educated social classes (Parrado and Tienda 1997). Today, there is evidence that another type of cohabitation is coming into existence alongside traditional cohabitation in the region (e.g., Castro-Martin 2002; Esteve et al. 2012). Yet the exact interpretation of this new type of cohabitation, often characterized as a more modern type of union formation, remains unclear. Indications exist illustrating that this type of cohabitation is closely linked to the consensual union practiced by higher-educated groups in Western developed countries5 (Binstock and Cabella 20116; Parrado and Tienda 19977), where cohabitation is usually a childless period, an alternative to marriage or singlehood, and more visible among younger cohorts (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004; Kiernan 2004). …

Long-term trends of men’s co-residence with children in England and Wales

AbstractBACKGROUNDIncreasing numbers of childless men as well as with reduced or no contact with their children have sparked concern about an erosion of fatherhood. Although the general trend is undisputed, claims about men's decreasing family involvement lack a sound empirical basis that enables comparisons between countries and sub-groups of society.OBJECTIVEThis study derives long-term trends in father-child co-residence over the life course in England and Wales, and provides comparisons of these trends by level of education and ethnic origin.METHODSThe paper calculates shares of father-child co-residence from the National Statistics Longitudinal Study (LS) and the British Labour-Force Surveys (LFS).RESULTSThere has been a decline of father-child co-residence in England and Wales for men in their thirties, an even greater decline for men in their twenties, and a small increase in the shares of father-child co-residence at higher ages. The trends for different educational groups were similar, but men with a degree had particularly low rates of father-child co-residence at younger ages, and relatively high ones at older ages. Neither less-educated men, nor men from Black-Caribbean and Black-African origins showed rates of father-child co-residence as low as one might have expected.CONCLUSIONSThe steady decline of father-child co-residence among men born between 1930 and 1979 in England and Wales lends support to claims about an erosion of fatherhood. However, it is unwarranted to generalize findings from other countries about particularly low levels of father-child co-residence among less-educated men to men in England and Wales.(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)1. IntroductionIn all developed societies, the Second Demographic Transition (Lesthaeghe 1995, van de Kaa 1987) has changed the structure of men and women's life courses. Among the outcome of these transformations are the declining proportions of men living with children of their own, and the number of years of life that men live with their children. These trends have been well documented for the United States (Eggebeen and Uhlenberg 1985, King 1999, Eggebeen 2002, Goldscheider, Hogan, and Bures 2001, Hogan and Goldscheider 2001). In addition, Jensen (1998, 1999) has presented data for a number of European countries - excluding Britain - about the low shares of men in their twenties living with children.The drop in father-child co-residence is one of main bases of claims about fathers pulling out of family life' ( George and Gold 1991) and of shrinking fatherhood' (Jensen 1999). These claims have been linked to a number of problems at the individual and the societal level. A comprehensive body of literature has studied the potentially negative consequences of father absence for child development and well-being (Amato 2000; Lamb 2010). More recently there have been investigations into how fatherhood affects men's own well-being. The few studies addressing this issue indicated a better social integration and closer family ties of (Eggebeen and Knoester 2001; Keizer, Dykstra, and Poortman 2010). Furthermore, it has been argued that a decreasing involvement of in bringing up their children leads to an increased burden on women, who have to shoulder their stronger labour-market engagement without relief from their roles in the home (Jensen 1999). On the societal level, the concerns about increasing numbers of men not living with children of their own are related to claims of a polarization of society into a declining family sector and a diverse non-family sector (Daly 2005). The problems of combining full employment with bringing up children make families more economically vulnerable than childless individuals. With decreasing numbers of parents among employees, this raises fears that work-place culture might become less family friendly. …

Risk of Population Aging in Asia

Changes in the population age structure can be observed at each stage of the demographic transition due to demographic growth, economic changes, changes in the standard of living and the quality of life, social preferences, advances in medicine and pro- family policies (Alders and Broer, 2005). These processes lead to shifts in the age structure, which leads to the aging of society. This issue first emerged in advanced economies (Van de Kaa, 2003) with a clear decline in the number of births determined by changes in social preferences, life styles, and models of the family and a general revaluation of priorities in life. The aging of society became a key issue in Europe and spread to other continents. Advances in medicine and in other sciences helped to extend the human lifespan, which increased the percentage of older individuals. The issues described above, along with the migration of mostly young people (Withers, 2002), help provide a clear picture of the factors that make societies younger or older.The purpose of this paper is to describe the age structure of societies in Asia via selected parameters and estimates for 2030. The paper focuses on the largest and most populous continent inhabited by a wide variety of nations (excluding Asian Russia). Averaged data were obtained from the 2010 World Population Prospects. All the data were obtained from the same source, which makes it possible to produce a fully comparative analysis. The paper employs commonly used indicators based on averaged data for five-year periods from 2005 to 2030. Both static and dynamic indicators are used: 1) demographic aging index, 2) intergenerational support index, 3) potential support index. The final result is a spatial typology of aging in Asia, which shows regional differences.

Pathways to marriage and cohabitation in Central America

AbstractBACKGROUNDThe notion that increasing prevalence of cohabitation relative to marriage, and increasing age at first marriage are part of a broader shift in societal norms - a second demographic transition - is now well supported by studies focused on US and European populations. Recent research points to the similarly high prevalence of cohabitation in Latin America as perhaps signaling the diffusion of modern ideals and norms about union formation. In Central America this is unlikely to be the case given the long history and enduring acceptance of cohabitation that is unrelated to modern ideals. While there are studies that have documented this history and current prevalence, there is no research examining the intersecting life course pathways from adolescence through early adulthood that lead to marriage or cohabitation. This is not surprising given that available data for Central American countries are not ideally suited to studying the process.METHODSWe use retrospective questions from large, nationally representative Central American surveys (Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) to establish the timing of marriage or co-habitation and events that are closely tied to union formation. We utilize additive cause-specific hazard models, and predicted transition probabilities based on selected covariate pathways, to study the competing risks of exiting from the status of never in union.RESULTSOur results identify sexual activity and pregnancy as the primary drivers of union formation and indicate that education serves as a protective factor against union formation. We also find distinct differences among countries and a strong indication that cohabitations are less stable unions.(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)1. IntroductionIn Latin America it is, and has been, common for couples to form non-marital cohabita- tions (informal unions) instead of formal marriages. The decades long US and European (relevant to some countries) trend of increasing prevalence of cohabitation relative to mar- riage has been interpreted as signaling a shift in societal norms with associated long-term and short-term impacts on childbearing and contraception, household income, and stabil- ity (see Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Liefbroer 1991; Lesthaeghe 1995; Raley 2001; Liefbroer and Dourleijn 2006). Research has documented not only the trends, but also the life course processes leading to cohabitation or marriage, as well as the subsequent impact on life course processes following cohabitation or marriage. While there is now a broad and conclusive literature focused on US/ European populations, there is a dearth of research on Latin America, where cohabitation has much deeper history. De Vos (2000) suggests that inadequate nuptiality data and the perceived complexity of Latin American union behavior may explain the gap in research. Recent descriptive results suggest that Latin American cohabitation trends reflect underlying cultural or economic changes sim- ilar to those driving demographic change in Europe and the US (Esteve, Lesthaeghe, and Lopez-Gay 2012; Quilodran 1999). The trends, however, provide only indirect evidence of the underlying union formation processes at work. Further investigation of the inter- action of life events, or pathways, that lead to the formation of marriage or cohabitation are needed to provide insight into the decision-making process or sequence of events that leads to the formation of a specific type of union.While DeVos' (2000) comment about data limitations is true - there are no longitu- dinal data archives similar to those supporting US and European research - the structure of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Reproductive Health Surveys (RHS) provides enough information on timing of key events to support an analysis of life course processes leading to cohabitation or marriage during the formative early adolescent (age 12) to young adult (age 24) period. …

One or two pathways to individual modernity? The effects of education on family formation among women in Japan and Germany

Two prominent theses on social change concur with regard to the on-goingdevelopment of family systems in the process of general social change: the modelof the “second demographic transition”, suggested by the demographers van deKaa and Lesthaeghe; and the model of “family change”, proposed by the crossculturalpsychologist Kağıtçıbaşı. This paper presents an empirical test based onan analysis of family change in Japan, a collectivistic, yet modernised society;and in Germany, a society characterised by ‘Western’ individualism. Ourempirical test is based on 12 cumulated, representative surveys from these twosocieties, which together cover the family formation processes of 49,983 womenborn between 1915 and 1985. For both Germany and Japan, we examine theinfluence of educational inequality on family formation, and explore how it haschanged over a period of 60 years, by means of multivariate Cox regressionanalyses. The two models emphasise different aspects of the change in the familyformation process: although the changes point in the direction predicted by thesecond demographic transition model, the differences between the two societieshave remained stable or have even widened, in line with the family change model.

Relevance of Prospect Theory to Transport Choice Modeling: a Rejoinder

I was pleased to see that van de Kaa spelled out my comments on prospect theory and must have spent quite some time tracing back the references and conducting some additional qualitative research. The very purpose of my contribution to the workshop and the paper was to stimulate discussion and it seems to have succeeded in that regard.

Experimental investigation of the decay from a ship’s propeller

In the present study, an experimental investigation of the decay of the maximum velocity and its turbulent characteristics behind a ship propeller, in “bollard pull” condition (zero speed of advance), is reported. Velocity measurements were performed in laboratory by use of a Laser Doppler Anemometry (LDA) measurement system. Earlier researchers described that the maximum axial velocity is constant at the initial stage of a ship’s propeller jet (Fuehrer and Romisch, 1977; Blaauw and van de Kaa, 1978; Berger et al., 1981; Verhey, 1983) as reported in a pure water jet (Albertson et al., 1950; Lee et al., 2002; Dai, 2005), but a number of researchers disagreed with the constant velocity assumption. The present study found that the maximum axial velocity decays in the zone of flow establishment and the zone of established flow with different rates. The investigation provides an insight into the decays of both the maximum velocity and the maximum turbulent fluctuation in axial, tangential and radial components and the decay of the maximum turbulent kinetic energy. Empirical equations are proposed to allow coastal engineers to estimate the jet characteristics from a ship’s propeller.

Unsustainable Societies: The Failure of Familialism in East Asia's Compressed Modernity

Gesellschaften ohne Nachhaltigkeit: Das Versagen des Familialis- mus in der komprimierten Moderne Ostasiens«. Fertility in some East Asian societies has declined to a new global low level, which can be called ultra-low fertility. The first question of this article is whether East Asia is going through a second demographic transition just like Europe. The second question is whether individualism is the cause of the change. The answer to the first ques- tion is both yes and no, because the demographic changes currently underway in East Asia have similarities to those in Europe and North America, but there are considerable differences in essence. Unlike Europe, where cohabitation is replacing marriage, marriage as an institution of duty and responsibility rather than intimacy is still intact in East Asia. Because of that, risk-aversive indi- vidualization occurred to avoid the burden of a family. It is not individualism but that is causing the current demographic and family changes in East Asia. Different degrees of compression of modernity created the varieties of familialism: familialist reform in Japan and liberal familialism in other societies. We may conclude that both types of have failed in con- structing a sustainable social system. In today's world, East Asia is the region most associated with very low fertil- ity. The latest total rates (TFR) for Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singa- pore and Japan are 1.03 (2009), 1.06 (2008), 1.19 (2008), 1.28 (2008), 1.37 (2008) respectively. In the 1990s, Southern and German-speaking European countries recorded levels below 1.3, which was described as the low- est-low fertility (Kohler et al. 2002), but contemporary Asia has broken through that level. In the second demographic transition theory, lowered fertil- ity is hypothesized as being caused by individualism (Lesthaeghe 1991; van de Kaa 1987). The first question of this article is whether we can consider that East Asia is going through a second demographic transition, just like Europe. The second question is whether individualism is also the cause for the low in East Asia. In order to answer these questions, this paper uses two strategies. The first is to embed in the wider social context. By focusing on changes in mar-

Future changes in sexual behavior: women first and foremost?

After nearly 30 years of HIV epidemics around the world, understanding of the diversity and the long-term dynamics of sexual behaviors remains limited. The debate about sexual behavioral change and HIV is often narrowed into considerations of A, B, C (abstinence, be faithful, and condom use) or concurrent versus serial sexual partnerships, and in too many epidemiological studies, sexual behaviors are extracted from their cultural context and reduced to single variables [1–3]. Such reductionist approaches give rise to conventional recommendations on HIV prevention ‘messages’ addressed to individuals, with the naive belief that they will lead to important behavioral changes at the population level. This is why the paper of Bajos et al. in this issue [4] describing and analyzing changes in sexual behaviors over recent decades in France is particularly refreshing: it reminds us how much the evolution of sexual behavior, far from being a health-related behavior, is determined by changes in nuptiality and broader social structural factors. In their study in France, Bajos et al. show that, over 70 years, the lifetime number of partners reported by men has not changed and their age at first sex has declined only slightly. Most of the changes concerned women: their median age at first sex dropped from 22 to 17.6 years and their reported number of sexual partners more than doubled. Decade after decade, women reported a much more varied sexual repertoire and enjoyed sex much more. Similar surprising stability of men's sexual behavior but profound changes in women's sexuality over past decades have been described in other high-income countries [5,6]. The increasing disjunction or disconnect for women of the nexus ‘marriage, sex and reproduction’ is operating in nearly all high-income countries, but with great variability and at different speeds. These changes in women's sexual behavior accompany an evolution known to demographers as the ‘Second Demographic Transition’. The term was introduced by Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa [7] to explain demographic trends in western countries from the 1960s to the present, with an emphasis on gender relations. The concept encompasses decreased fertility and rises in modern contraceptive practice by women, increases in age at marriage and nonmarriage, in divorces and separations, and in the number of informal partnerships of varying duration. All sexual behavior surveys in high-income countries portray a similar pattern with some variations: most of changes are related to women and all changes carry increased risk of sexually transmitted infections (STIs): the steep rise in premarital sex, earlier age at first sex, more casual partners, and greater diversity of sexual practices. To explain the gender convergence in France, Bajos et al. identified ‘the increased social autonomy of women in other spheres of life; their increasing participation in the labor force and the postponement of childbearing’. One can add the massive increase in the education of women. The degree to which most changes in sexual behavior will stem from women in other regions remains unknown. In recent decades, female age at marriage has risen most rapidly in Asia and the Arab states, but premarital sex among women is not common [8]. In Latin America, sexual activity before marriage among single women increased in the past decade, as did the use of condoms and other contraceptives. Pregnancy rates for all single women aged 15–24 years rose, because the decline in virginity was greater than the rise in contraceptive protection [9]. In six countries in sub-Saharan Africa, a recent study of age at first sex, age at first marriage, and time spent single showed few changes over time, except for an increase in premarital sex for women [10]. In parts of sub-Saharan Africa where patriarchal or gender-stratified cultures are not prevalent, women's autonomy has often resulted in convergence between men and women's risk behavior [11]. In future decades, globalization and urbanization, together with progress in education, are likely to continue to provoke improvements in women's status that will be reflected in changes in sexual behavior and all indications point to more risk behavior for HIV and other STIs. Bajos et al. make the point that public health interventions are unlikely to succeed if they go against the force of secular trends. In response to the first HIV prevention campaigns in the mid-1980s, spectacular increases in condom use occurred and have been sustained over time in France, as in other high-income countries. In recent years, both in Africa and Latin America, condom use during risky sex outside marriage has increased substantially to reach typically about 30% in the most HIV-affected countries but not within cohabiting relationships [9,12,13]. The use of this male-initiated barrier method may become widespread only in countries where women's status and gender relations have changed radically.

Leaving the parental home in post-war Japan

Abstract Leaving home is a key life event in the transition to adulthood, but it has been relatively less explored in demographic studies of contemporary Japan. This paper examines the relationship between home-leaving intensities of young adults and the rapid social, economic, and demographic changes that took place in post-World War II Japan. By using event-history analysis, the study focuses on 1) family and socio-demographic characteristics, 2) stem-family norms, and 3) proximities of life events and leaving home as the main factors affecting the chances of leaving home. This study aims to explain cohort trends and sex differentials in home-leaving behaviors among young adults in post-war Japan. 1. Introduction Leaving the parental home has been extensively studied in Western countries2. It is often studied as a topic closely related to such issues as the independence of young adults (Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1987, Goldscheider and DaVanzo 1989, Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1993a), parent-adult child relationships (Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1989, 1993b, Jong Gierveld, Liefbroer, and Beekink 1991, Buck and Scott 1993), the changing roles of marriage as an adult status (Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1993a, Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1994), educational opportunities (Wagner 1990, Nilsson and Strandh 1999), increasing job insecurity among young adults (Keilmann 1987, Jacob and Kleinert 2008), and the availability of both the intra- and the extra-familial resources needed to establish a separate household (Avery, Goldscheider, and Alden 1992, Whittington and Peters 1996, Garasky, Haurin, and Haurin 2001). Some scholars have also argued that the patterns of leaving home reflect institutional settings inherent in the historical roots of the region, such as welfare regimes (Fussel and Gauthier 2004, Newman and Aptekar 2007), family ties (Reher 1998), and family systems (Kurosu 1996a, 1996b, van Poppel, Oris, and Lee 2004). In the field of demography, the emergence of non-traditional living arrangements, such as cohabitation and extramarital birth, are interpreted as a sign of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) (van de Kaa 1987, 2001, Lesthaege 1995). Patterns of leaving home are compatible with such non-traditional family behaviors, and are considered to be important factors in explaining the regional divergence in the processes of the SDT (Lesthaege and Moors 2000). Therefore, leaving home, particularly its incidence before marriage, is one of the important indicators in understanding the current development of family behaviors. Over the last half of the 20th century, Japan became highly industrialized, and achieved one of the highest living standards in the world. At the same time, Japanese families underwent enormous social and demographic changes during the post-World War II period. Family size became smaller as fertility rapidly declined, the population became more concentrated in urban areas than in rural areas, and the center of gravity of the labor force shifted away from the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and towards the service industry. As a result, compositions of family characteristics varied significantly by successive cohorts. Furthermore, each cohort faced different macro contexts as a consequence of economic fluctuations, institutional changes, and erosion of the traditional norms regarding family and household formations. As shown in this paper, these changes in macro contexts facilitated important changes in the transitions to adulthood in post-war Japan. For example, as in other industrialized countries, more young adults enrolled in tertiary education and more single women entered full-time employment, even as the employment of young adults became more insecure, and people began to marry later and less. There is, however, little research into how these social, economic, and demographic changes affected the living arrangements of young adults in post-war Japan. …

Men's childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century

Abstract The development of modern family patterns of the past decades has been accompanied by substantial changes in social norms, values and gender relations. There is theoretical support for the assumption that the persistence of low fertility levels across Europe is likely to be linked to the incomplete gender revolution, more specifically to the lack of, or only limited changes in the male gender role as opposed to the women's role. In order to have a deeper understanding of the development of fertility, we aim to shed more light on the impact of men's role orientation on their fertility intentions in this study. Our analyses include men aged 20-44 years in eight countries: Austria, Estonia, East Germany, West Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland. The data are extracted from the Population Policy Acceptance Study of the early 2000s. Examining within-country differences, we find that men with egalitarian attitudes seem to have higher fertility aspirations than their traditional counterparts in contemporary Europe. This is supported by both the descriptive and the multivariate analyses. The picture is somewhat less conclusive though when we focus on country-rankings by intended family size and by the prevalence of egalitarian versus traditional attitudes. 1. Introduction Since the onset of the Second Demographic Transition in the 1960s, family patterns have changed substantially in Europe along with the norms and attitudes regarding family life and childbearing (Frejka et al. 2008). High marriage and birth rates at relatively young ages, as well as low divorce rates and rareness of non-traditional family forms belong to the past. The present, the early 21st century shows a different picture. Fertility rates are below the replacement level, having declined in a number of countries to previously unimaginable lowest-low levels (Kohler, Billari, Ortega 2002). Postponement of, or even refrainment from parenthood, and the growing proportion of out-of-wedlock births are another important features of childbearing trends (Frejka, Sobotka 2008). Less committing forms of couple relationships, such as cohabitation and LAT-relationships, have become more and more common in the past decades. The prevalence of marriages decreased and they are formed at later ages, while divorce and separation rates, even among couples with children, increased dramatically. As a result, an ever-growing proportion of children have experiences of living with a single parent, usually the mother, or with a stepparent (Sobotka, Toulemon 2008). The development of modern family patterns has been accompanied by dramatic changes in gender relations, also known as the gender revolution (Goldscheider 2000). Women entered the public sphere, approaching participation rates of men in education, even at higher levels, and in the labour market. As their horizons expanded anticipating a long and continuous work life, and their bargaining position within the family improved, the role of the economic provider has become part of women's identity (Goldin 2006). At the same time, there have been few signs from men's side to acquire a share of family responsibilities, i.e. childcare and domestic tasks that would equal that of women (Bernhardt 2004; Neuwirth, Wernhart 2008). Thus, gender relations within the family have changed very little (Blossfeld, Drobnic 2001). This has led to incoherence in the levels of gender equity in what McDonald (2000) calls the individual-oriented institutions of the public sphere and family-oriented institutions of the private sphere. As a result, fertility declined and has remained at the present low levels. Substantial changes in norms and values have also facilitated the spread of new family patterns. Individualisation of the life course has opened the way for low fertility. As self-fulfilment and self-realisation have been increasingly emphasised, parenthood has become one of many possible but competing choices, which may be passed upon without any sanctions (van de Kaa 1987, 2004). …

Gender roles and values of children: Childless Couples in East and West Germany

Abstract Presuming that not just economic circumstances but also ideational factors influence fertility decisions, the paper examines the values of children of East and West-German childless men and women living with a partner. Based on the survey about 'Change and Development of Family Life Forms', a confirmatory factor analysis identifies an affective, a utility and a cost dimension of the values of children, and for West-German women an additional dimension of opportunity costs. Although East and West-German men and women differed in their values of children, hypotheses about the higher affective value of children for East Germans compared to West Germans or for women compared to men are not supported for the specific sample. The values of children varied with respondent's labour-market position and the division of household work. An analysis of panel data for West Germany shows that first-birth rates depended on the values of children especially of women and on the gender roles in the home. Couples that practised a patriarchal division of labour had a relatively high first-birth rate whereas less traditional couples' behaviour was more varied depending on their affective value of children. 1. Introduction A popular explanation of current fertility trends in Western societies is the neoclassical economic theory (Becker 1981), which assumes that it is economically advantageous for spouses to specialize in market and in family work, respectively. As women's level of employment has risen during the last decades, women's increasing income has raised the opportunity costs of having children, lowering the presumed advantage of specialization. While these changes explain the drop in fertility in many Western countries, they do not fully account for the differences in fertility levels between these countries (Friedman et al. 1994). Recent research on the low levels of fertility in Western societies has suggested that not just the division of market work between the spouses but also the division of household work are key to their explanation (McDonald 2000a, 2000b; Olah 2003; Cooke 2004; Torr and Short 2004; de Laat and Sevilla Sanz 2007). The main argument is that women find it difficult to combine work and family if the household work is divided in the traditional way between the spouses. As a consequence women are reluctant to have children especially if they pursue a career. A more egalitarian setting should be associated with fewer stressors and higher fertility rates. The other major explanation of current fertility trends emphasizes the importance of ideational and cultural factors as part of the theory of the 'Second Demographic Transition' (van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995). According to this approach, the drop in fertility in Western societies was related to a change in the role and structure of the family in the context of rising postmaterialist values of self-expression and quality of life. This change might have progressed differently in different societal groups. In contrast, Becker's neoclassical economic theory presumes that all people have the same preferences about children. If one assumes that some couples are more eager for the woman to have a career than others, and that some couples have a more positive attitude to children than others, one can distinguish three situations: (a) The couple values children highly and wants the woman to be in paid work: these couples should profit from equality in the societal institutions and in the home when pursuing their fertility goals. (b) The couple does not especially value the woman's involvement in paid work but still holds positive values of children. These couples' intentions are compatible with a more traditional male breadwinner model. (c) The couple does not hold positive values of children. For these couples one would expect no relationship between gender equality and fertility. To test these scenarios it is necessary to consider in fertility models attitudes to children and to women's careers and the anticipated gender division of household work. …

Family Formation in France: Individual Preferences and Subsequent Outcomes

Contents:Francesco C. BILLARI, Aart C. LIEFBROER, and Dimiter PHILIPOV: The Postponement of Childbearing in Europe: Driving Forces and Implications; Eva BERNHARDT and Frances GOLDSCHEIDER: Gender Equality, Parenthood Attidudes, and First Births in Sweden; Maria Rita TESTA and Laurent TOULEMON: Family Formation in France: Individual Preferences and Subsequent Outcomes; Ester RIZZI and Alexxandro ROSINA: Does Sex Matter? Ageing and Ability to Conceive; Hideko MATSUO: The Postponement of Motherhood and its Child Health Consequences: Birth Weight and Weight Gain during the First Year of Life; John BONGAARTS and Griffith FEENEY: The Tempo and Quantum of Life Cycle Events; Joshua R. GOLDSTEIN: How Late Can First Births Be Postponed? Some Illustrative Population-level Calculations; Wolfgang LUTZ, Vegard SKIRBEKK, and Maria Rita TESTA: The Low Fertility Trap Hypothesis: Forces that May Lead to further Postponement and Fewer Births in Europe; Dirk J. VAN DE KAA: Temporarily New: On Low Fertility and the Prospect of Pro-natal Policies; Peter McDONALD: An Assessment of Policies that Support Having Children from the Perspectives of Equity, Efficiency and Efficacy

The Postponement of Childbearing in Europe: Driving Forces and Implications

Contents:Francesco C. BILLARI, Aart C. LIEFBROER, and Dimiter PHILIPOV: The Postponement of Childbearing in Europe: Driving Forces and Implications; Eva BERNHARDT and Frances GOLDSCHEIDER: Gender Equality, Parenthood Attidudes, and First Births in Sweden; Maria Rita TESTA and Laurent TOULEMON: Family Formation in France: Individual Preferences and Subsequent Outcomes; Ester RIZZI and Alexxandro ROSINA: Does Sex Matter? Ageing and Ability to Conceive; Hideko MATSUO: The Postponement of Motherhood and its Child Health Consequences: Birth Weight and Weight Gain during the First Year of Life; John BONGAARTS and Griffith FEENEY: The Tempo and Quantum of Life Cycle Events; Joshua R. GOLDSTEIN: How Late Can First Births Be Postponed? Some Illustrative Population-level Calculations; Wolfgang LUTZ, Vegard SKIRBEKK, and Maria Rita TESTA: The Low Fertility Trap Hypothesis: Forces that May Lead to further Postponement and Fewer Births in Europe; Dirk J. VAN DE KAA: Temporarily New: On Low Fertility and the Prospect of Pro-natal Policies; Peter McDONALD: An Assessment of Policies that Support Having Children from the Perspectives of Equity, Efficiency and Efficacy