Liberal Democratic Values Research Articles

Fighting for Europe: The EU's Democratic Pull Phenomenon in Ukraine, Poland and Belarus

AbstractWhat drives ordinary citizens to want their country to join or stay in the European Union (EU)? Whilst scholarship addressed value‐based dispositions as drivers of pro‐EU positions, material benefits dominate explanations of support for EU accession and membership. New research suggests that it is precisely the growing import of being an adherent of liberal democratic values that drove citizens in countries as disparate as Ukraine, Poland and Belarus to support EU accession and remained the key driver for those already in the Union wanting to stay in. Employing national surveys and regression analyses, this article shows that (a) not only is a shift to supporting EU accession accompanied by citizens also moving towards supporting democracy in Ukraine; (b) this EU democratic pull phenomenon can also be identified amongst citizens of other EU neighbourhood countries, as well as in EU member states.

Norms of Democracy, Staged Democrats, and Supply of Exclusionary Ideology

Existing literature sees attitudinal support for liberal democratic values as a crucial way to prevent the success of illiberal actors and their policies. But recent studies show that democratic support can coexist with lack of punishment for backsliding practices. To reconcile these findings, I argue that social norms generate incentives to declare that one opposes illiberal actors even if one does not—what I call staged democrats. Staged democrats are not a stable safeguard against illiberal politicians, because information shocks can reveal that they do not sincerely oppose illiberalism. Studying Switzerland, where referendums provide information on the sincere preferences of citizens, I collect data on referendum results, public opinion surveys, and party positions. My analyses show that if referendums reveal that the positions of far-right parties are more popular than expected, those parties become more exclusionary. Attitudes only prevent illiberal policy if they are sincerely held.

Tweeting the academic resistance in Turkey and Hungary: from cultural crisis to defending the nation

ABSTRACT This paper explores the reemergence of universities as spaces for the contestation of government policies in an era of illiberalism, rising nationalism and populism. We focus on high-profile contestations occurring at two public universities in Turkey and Hungary: Boğaziçi University and the University of Theatre and Film Arts, respectively. At both universities, attacks on democratic governance and liberal-democratic values have resulted in academic resistance that have played out on physical campuses and in online spaces. We conceptualise a virtual space as a space of contestation and analyse social media data to identify the dominant narratives of governments and their supporters on one side and resistance supporters on the other that gives the way to two major narratives: while right-wing imaginaries and pro-government actors frame the liberal and pro-freedom inclinations of universities as a ‘threat’ to the nation, students and faculty portray the government as the true threat to their rights and freedoms and knowledge production within what was once a ‘safe space’ in universities, thus framing themselves as the ‘true guardians’ of their institutions. Our analysis shows how universities have become contemporary flashpoints in and upon which broader political contestations over national culture play out.

Moral Policing of Gender Norms: Honor-Based Violence as a Mobilizing Factor Towards Militant Islamism

Honor culture, in which the virtue of the family—if not community—depends on the “purity” of its female members, enforced through “moral policing” of gender norms to collectively control women’s sexuality and uphold a patriarchal gender order, is a central aspect of both honor-based violence and the Salafi-jihadist culture in militant Islamist milieus. Drawing on interviews with 1) an imprisoned Danish woman convicted of ISIS-related terrorism, 2) a mother of a deceased Swedish ISIS foreign fighter, who herself was previously part of the Salafi-jihadist milieu, and 3) “professionals” (e.g. police officers, social workers and municipal employees) conducted during ethnographic fieldwork in Sweden and prison ethnography in Denmark, this article explores how honor-based violence can constitute a mobilizing factor for Western Muslims towards militant Islamism in three distinct ways. First, isolation of Muslim women and children through gender segregation and restrictions on accessing public space to “moral police” gender norms enables the Salafi-jihadist milieu to cement and extend its ideological, religious, and physical control. Second, in an honor culture with intense pressure on men to defend and restore family honor whenever it is challenged, joining ISIS can be perceived as a means to fulfill this obligation, thereby affirming “real” Muslim masculinity and upholding a patriarchal gender order. The deeply ingrained cultural expectations to defend honor can even be exploited by militant Islamist milieus in their recruitment efforts. Third, besides providing a “safe space” where one cannot be persecuted and punished for dishonoring one’s family by leaving it as an unmarried woman, ISIS’s multiethnic diversity and embrace of interethnic marriage can be appealing for someone who wants to escape forced endogamous marriage. Given that honor-based violence strikes at the individual freedoms and rights, thereby undermining liberal democratic values and the rule of law, our article contributes knowledge on the broader threat to democracy from anti-democratic forces in the context of militant Islamism.

Corporate Social Responsibility in The Disinformation Age

Following a long period in which pressures to adopt CSR practices came largely from the left, the current communication environment has become far more divisive with the rise of illiberal political pressures from the right. These conflicting pressures arise from irreconcilable communication logics that threaten the future of CSR. This paper examines how these disruptive communication logics reflect the changing roles of disinformation in CSR communication, highlighting two overlapping eras: (1) the history of some companies using disinformation strategically to avoid or misrepresent CSR commitments; and (2) the more recent addition of what we term systemic disinformation generated by politicians, think tanks, and irresponsible competitors. These disinformation spheres challenge liberal democratic values and amplify attacks on CSR values. We discuss the dilemmas for companies seeking to adopt more responsible business practices and explore the implications of CSR communication becoming increasingly linked to larger societal conflicts over the nature of democracy.

전환기 슬로베니아 고등교육 개혁의 특징과 결과 연구

At the outset of Slovenia’s transition period, the urgent national task was to establish democracy, liberalism, and pluralistic values across all sectors. This comprehensive transition involved institutional reorganization in society, politics, education, and media, alongside reforms targeting the general public. Education emerged as a crucial tool for fostering and disseminating liberal democratic values, aiming to socialize individuals into understanding the moral, civic, and societal obligations of the new system. Slovenian school reform during this period was grounded in liberal democratic values, human rights, and knowledge. Initially, higher education reform lagged due to internal circumstances, with a focus on complementing previous socialist-era reforms rather than enacting substantive changes. However, upon Slovenia's accession to the European Union, a process of Europeanization swept across the nation, prompting the initiation of higher education reform aligned with the Bologna Process. Despite expectations, the Bologna Process encountered resistance in Slovenian higher education and yielded less favorable outcomes than anticipated. This study examines the foundational values of Slovenia’s educational reform for establishing a liberal democratic system and Europeanizing it, while also analyzing the controversies and results surrounding the ‘Bologna Process’, a key symbol of higher education globalization.

U.S.-China Hegemonic Competition and Power Transitions: Focusing on the Role of Allies

The U.S.-China hegemonic competition is clearly underway, as the Biden administration acknowledges China as the only challenger to the existing global hegemony. This recognition has initiated a power struggle between the two, despite neither possessing absolute national power for complete dominance. This article goes beyond the traditional debate of whether China will eventually surpass the U.S. and focuses on deriving pertinent implications. The role of allies in shaping the U.S.-China competition is gaining significance. The U.S. is restructuring the global supply chain to exclude China, creating overlapping mini-lateral cooperative networks with traditional allies and friendly nations. Conversely, China is expanding its influence through traditional multilateral cooperation, aligning with alliance transition theory. Furthermore, mid-sized countries, especially pivotal ones are assuming a more critical role. This situation has implications for ROK government's foreign policy, which aims to play an active role as a Global Pivotal State emphasizing liberal democratic values and common interests.

Ukraine and the Debacle of Russian Soft Power

ABSTRACT The war in Ukraine has demonstrated Russia’s incapacity to implement a foreign policy strategy without resorting to hard power means, exposing the limits in its soft power capacity to ‘attract’ and ‘persuade’. Specifically, Russian soft power in Ukraine built around the model of the ‘Russian world’ (Russkiy Mir) was unable to persuade Kyiv to align with Moscow through peaceable means. Simultaneously, EU-inspired soft power based on the idea of ‘Greater Europe’ and Ukrainian ‘Europeanness’ conceived through the normative prism of liberal-democratic values and the potential of higher levels of economic development, limited the impact of Russia’s soft power in Ukraine. Russian soft power in Ukraine was not inspired by the idea of attraction but conceived as a propagandistic means to justify expansionist policies, merging de facto with hard power. After the 2022 invasion, in the occupied regions, Moscow’s influence could only be imposed coercively as an ancillary tool of hard power through a unique combination of smart and sharp power. Overall, a comparison of the influence of Russian and EU soft power in Ukraine highlights that the latter proved to be generally more persuasive, leading Moscow to resort to military force.

Constructing liberty and equality – political, not juridical

ABSTRACT When offering constructions of political values, it is common to generally strive for unity, i.e., to aim at principled definitions and the reduction of normative conflict. In this article, by contrast, I argue that we should aim to construct broad and conflicting concepts of the central liberal democratic values of liberty and equality. Taking my cue from an under-appreciated debate between Ronald Dworkin and Bernard Williams, I suggest that the demand for unity derives its appeal from a juridical model of political value construction, which assumes the unified perspective of public decision-making. But while this model may be apt for constructing institutional rights, the construction of the political values liberty and equality had better operate according to a political model, which focuses on the perspective of citizens that live in a relationship of political opposition. Not only is there no demand for unity from that perspective, but there is a positive demand for political plurality: we need to draw on broad and conflicting concepts of liberty and equality if we are to respect the claims of fellow citizens with whom we have value-based political disagreements.

Dialogue between the Slovenian Highest Courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union

The relationship between European Union (EU) law and national Slovenian law progressed across three different stages starting from the beginning of this century to date, as discussed by EU and Slovenian legal theorists. The first one, just before Slovenia’s entry into the EU, considered the EU an international organisation and EU law a type of public international law. It was dismissed even before Slovenia joined the EU, with an amendment to the Constitution, and was succeeded by the second, supranationalist, view that required maximum restraint by national courts while dealing with EU issues. Finally, about a decade ago, the third pluralist view of EU law vis-à-vis national law emerged, calling the particularly highest national courts to enter a more critical dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Although Slovenian theorists have been actively discussing the relationship between EU and national law before and immediately after Slovenia joined the EU, it seems that practising lawyers and judges needed time to adapt to the new law. Finally, in 2009, the first reference for a preliminary ruling was made by Slovenian courts. Soon after, the Slovenian Supreme Court made its first preliminary ruling reference and, in nearly 20 years since, proved itself to be the most frequent interlocutor with the CJEU from Slovenia. It regularly cites CJEU cases in its case laws, and demands that lower courts follow them wherever appropriate. From the highest national courts in Slovenia, the Constitutional Court joined the dialogue with the CJEU last. It has made four preliminary ruling references to the CJEU and demonstrated restraint vis-à-vis reviewing legal issues touching upon EU law. The legal culture (including public opinion) in Slovenia has predominantly been pro-EU. This applies to the internal legal culture, namely lawyers who support liberal democratic values such as the rule of law, human rights, and democracy. As long as the EU remains dedicated to these values, in such an environment, the highest Slovenian courts are not expected to show a bolder attitude vis-à-vis CJEU case law

UNVEILING THE ESSENCE OF EUROPEAN ISLAM: A Critical Analysis of Abdennour Bidar's Concepts of Self Islam and Islamic Existentialism

This article discusses the challenges of European Islam at the intersection of Islamic traditions and modern liberal democratic values and the urgency of bridging the two. European Islam is looking for a common ground that can combine reason and faith in harmony, integrate the values of modernity with the spiritual view of Islam, and identify the challenges and opportunities faced by European Islam in the context of Western liberal society. Bidar, in his contribution to the concept of European Islam, argues that religion is not only about rituals but also about profound spiritual experiences. He proposed the concept of Self Islam, which emphasizes individual freedom, personal responsibility, and spiritual connection with Allah. According to Bidar, individual freedom is the key to spiritual life. In addition, everyone can choose how to practice religion according to his spiritual needs. Bidar proposed Islamic reform, oriented towards the unification of religions and modernity, by prioritizing humanist values and human rights and reforming Islam in the light of modernity. According to him, humans become God's autonomous vicegerent on earth and have the right to manage it freely but responsibly. In addition, in harmony with Kantian, Bidar believes that human immortality can be achieved through piety and good deeds. According to him, humans become God's autonomous vicegerent on earth and have the right to manage it freely but responsibly. In addition, in harmony with Kantian, Bidar believes that human immortality can be achieved through piety and good deeds. According to him, humans become God's autonomous vicegerent on earth and have the right to manage it freely but responsibly. In addition, in harmony with Kantian, Bidar believes that human immortality can be achieved through piety and good deeds.

Estimating the value of democracy relative to other institutional and economic outcomes among citizens in Brazil, France, and the United States.

How much do citizens value democracy? How willing are they to sacrifice their liberties and voting rights for growth, equality, or other social outcomes? We design a conjoint experiment in nationally representative surveys in Brazil, France, and the United States in which respondents choose between different societies that randomly vary in their economic outcomes (country income, income inequality, social mobility), political outcomes (democracy, public health insurance), and the level of personal income for each respondent. Our research allows us to estimate the respondents' willingness to trade off democracy for individual income (as well as other societal attributes). We find that, on average, individuals are strongly attached to democracy and a robust welfare state. They prefer to live in a country without free democratic elections only if their individual income multiplies by at least three times and in a country without public health insurance only if their individual income more than doubles. After estimating these preferences at the individual level for all respondents, we show that, although there is an authoritarian minority in all three countries, forming a nondemocratic majority (by offering more income and/or other goods to respondents) is very unlikely. Our findings imply that, contrary to a growing discussion about the crisis of democracy, liberal democratic values remain substantially robust in high and middle income democracies.

Challenging the Muslimification of Muslims in research on ‘liberal democratic values’: why culture matters beyond religion

ABSTRACT This study critiques the use of ‘Muslim’ as an analytic category and overfocus on religiosity as an explanatory variable in studies on conflicts between Muslims and national majorities over ‘liberal democratic values’. We call this tendency the Muslimification of Muslims. We demonstrate how this research reproduces and reinforces stereotypes drawn from dominant resonant public debates. To challenge these assumptions, we turn the research inquiry around so that ‘Muslim’ and religiosity become objects not tools for analysis. Revisiting the EurIslam survey data-set, explicitly designed for studying socio-cultural distances between Muslims and majorities, we examine boundary construction over ‘liberal democratic values’. For Muslims, first, we test for differences between four ethnonational family origin groups – Ex-Yugoslavians, Moroccans, Turks, Pakistanis- and second, for the explanatory power of religiosity compared to non-religious cultural variables. Findings are clear-cut: family ethnonational origin matters and there are different group trajectories of acculturation; religiosity has a very modest impact and much less than self-identification with settlement-country which pushes in the opposite acculturative direction. Simply put, regarding the construction of differences over ‘liberal democratic values’, not all Muslims are the same, and it is not all about practicing Islam. It is time for a re-think and a de-Muslimification of academic research.

Security, digital border technologies, and immigration admissions: Challenges of and to non-discrimination, liberty and equality

Normative debates on migration control, while characterised by profound disagreement, do appear to agree that the state has at least a prima facie right to prevent the entry of security threats. While concern is sometimes raised that this ‘security exception’ can be abused, there has been little focus by normative theorists on concrete practices of security, and how we can determine what a ‘principled’ use of the security exception would be. I argue that even if states have a right to prevent migrants from entering on grounds of security, the practices required to implement this right will likely compromise core liberal democratic values in ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. I draw on literature from Science and Technology Studies and Critical Security Studies to examine the proliferation of digital border control technologies which are increasingly dominating state security practices, and explain the challenges these technologies pose to non-discrimination, liberty and equality. I also highlight the difficulties of taking these principles as presumptive limitations on the operation of the security exception. A more sustained conversation among ethical theorists is needed to address the profound ethical challenges that the ever-increasing use of these technologies poses, particularly in pursuit of security.

Are Shared Values Valuable? Liberal Democracy and Human Rights among AUKUS and its Future Membership

Do shared values make a military partnership attractive to potential member countries and strengthen perceptions of that partnership's deterrent effects? While military cooperation attracts potential members through strategic benefits such as military capabilities, recent security cooperation initiatives like AUKUS emphasize liberal democratic values and human rights as their core values. This study focuses on Japan as a potential member of AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific region and explores how the Japanese public evaluates Japan's future participation in AUKUS and the agreement's anticipated deterrence effects. The results indicate that emphasizing liberal democratic values does not boost support for AUKUS or reinforce a belief in the agreement's ability to deter potential enemies. However, the findings highlight the connection between support for security cooperation and the expansion of membership, irrespective of regime types. In particular, the domestic audience exhibits selective attitudes towards South Korea, a democratic government that should be an important candidate for partnership. These findings suggest a cynical view among third-party audiences regarding the efficacy of shared values in security cooperation, as well as a double standard among the Japanese in shaping new security cooperation in the region.

Constitutional and Political crisis in Israel: Revision of the idea of a national Jewish State

In modern states, the process of "ideological search" has the property of permanence, while the activation of such a process, as a rule, is one of the symptoms of the constitutional and political crisis in the sphere of state-building. In newly formed states, the process of forming state ideology is becoming particularly relevant, which is due to the need to establish the state as a special political institution, determine the goals of its existence, ensure stable development, and form a national legal system. The article examines the reasons for the activation of the processes of "ideological search" in the state of Israel, their relationship with the national constitutional and political crisis of 2023, analyzes the prospects for the development of the state of Israel as a national Jewish state. The use of a systematic, functional, historical research method, the study of the scientific works of P. A. Astafichev, A.V. Polyakov, B. S. Ebzeev, F. Hayek, S. Huntington, P. Anderson and other authors, allowed to formulate the author's interpretation of a number of terms: national ideology; constitutional ideology; state ideology; ideology of the ruling group. The author hypothesizes the following reasons for the constitutional and political crisis in the State of Israel: 1. an unsuccessful attempt to combine two opposites, liberal democratic values of the Western world with archaic provisions of Judaism; 2. the presence of the Lapierre paradox. The attitudes of ethnocentrism, actively imposed by the state authorities and based on references to the common history (of Jews), religious rituals of Judaism, do not correspond to the real behavior of the population of the country, its values, needs and interests, are in contradiction with the constitutional and national ideology; 3) the crisis of the idea of the nation-state. It is proposed to single out as the ideological functions of the state: guaranteeing ideological freedom; ensuring the implementation of national and constitutional ideology; prohibiting the extreme form of ideology that affects the "viability" of the state, changing its most essential features. In conclusion, the author's vision of the vector of evolution of national states is also presented.

Exporting Educational Change: Unexamined Assumptions

This paper takes a philosophical look at what it means to talk about educational change in the context of the global proliferation of Western secular liberal democratic values. A handful of challenges, contradictions, and incoherencies that potentially impede the success of educational change projects in developing countries are examined with a view to furthering discussion about what vision of the learner and society they promote, either implicitly or through taken-for-granted assumptions. Politics, leadership, and timelines become impediments to real change. Brief reference is made to these concepts. The author provides examples from 10 years of international curriculum work on several continents in an attempt to highlight some of the latent irregularities that impede the progress of educational change endeavors.

Ren and Civic Friendship

Abstract: The concept of civic friendship, perhaps originating from Aristotle, has re-emerged in recent studies. Scholars argue the relevance of this concept in liberal democratic societies today because it can potentially strengthen or re-establish the sense of community or public-spiritedness. Moreover, there is a need to describe the characteristic virtue/s that will buttress civic friendship. This article proposes the Confucian virtue of ren as a possible foundation for such a relationship. As it is discussed here, ren can contribute to the resolution of problems that emerge in liberal democratic societies today because it can counteract the negative tendency—that is, neglecting the other or the relationship with the other—of an individualist understanding of liberal democratic values.

Recasting “Fundamental ‘British’ Values”: Education, Justice, and Preventing Violent Extremism

AbstractSocieties concerned with preventing acts of violent extremism often target the ideas that are thought to motivate such acts. The state's use of educational institutions is one mechanism by which those ideas are subjected to challenge. Teaching liberal democratic values to students is one method. Here, David Stevens argues that this model is misguided. First, commitment to violent methods is not primarily driven by the attractiveness of radical ideas themselves, but by material facts and circumstances. Second, an education that ignores the teaching of various socioeconomic values, such as a commitment to a certain degree of material equality and welfare provision, is inadequate as a conception of citizenship. These criticisms are related. Citizens are owed certain resources and commitments as citizens, and grounds for dissatisfaction and violence are reduced when citizens receive the holdings to which they are entitled, and when their fellow citizens recognize and endorse this. Consequently, it is the role of education to teach directively toward the adoption of such socioeconomic values and commitments.

Decentering death: The war on terror and the less‐than‐lethal paradigm

AbstractHow does violent military coercion work alongside liberal democratic values in contemporary iterations of imperialism? This article shows how the less‐than‐lethal paradigm occludes death and perpetuates extreme forms of both deadly and not‐deadly military coercion in Iraq. Key to the 2003 invasion and subsequent counterinsurgency in Iraq, the less‐than‐lethal paradigm extends across military doctrine and US popular discourse. Based on the idea that killing is an undesirable way to dominate, the less‐than‐lethal paradigm is not necessarily benevolent or less deadly; instead, it is a legal, discursive, and logistical maneuver to minimize the political power of death and dying on the global stage. Decentering death, the less‐than‐lethal paradigm rebrands violence by reframing war as a precondition for peace, minimizing killing and death, disseminating nonkilling forms of coercion, and assigning responsibility to others for violence.