Value Of Public Debt Research Articles

Debt strategies of European countries and vectors of implementation of best experience in the practice of external public debt management of Ukraine

The policy of external and domestic public debt management in different countries has its own specifics, and its results are not always unambiguous. Thus, the existing recommendations of the International Monetary Fund and the Maastricht criteria prove that the maximum value of public debt to GDP should be no more than 60 %. Exceeding this limit can lead to a deterioration in financial stability, debt sustainability, and ultimately to a technical default of the state. However, the practice of public debt management in many developed countries shows quite opposite trends, as a significant excess of the Maastricht criterion not only does not lead to default, but on the contrary allows countries to accumulate the necessary financial resources to ensure stable economic growth.
 Therefore, the study of European debt strategies and their effectiveness is a very important issue, especially given the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for developing countries. Given the growing external debt dependence of Ukraine as a result of both the war with the Russian Federation and the COVID-19 pandemic, the search for a better experience of European debt policy and consideration of ways to adapt it to domestic realities are discussed in our article.
 Based on the analysis of the debt policy of European countries, the expediency of using debt rules, aimed at regulating both the country's debt security and the effectiveness of the use of public borrowing to stimulate economic growth has been proved.
 Cluster analysis of debt strategies of some European countries has shown that the high level of dependence on external public debt has a negative impact on economic security in general, because in the event of deteriorating macroeconomic situation, the likelihood of foreign investors selling government securities increases, and in the case of external loans from international financial and credit organizations – the risks of negative impact of burdensome non-financial obligations on the national economy grow.

Interconnections between Public Indebtedness and Inflation in Contemporary Economies

This paper aims to analyze the specific interconnections established between public indebtedness and inflation, both from the perspective of considering inflation as a result of public borrowing and of voluntarily promoting inflation to reduce the (real) value of public debt and to ease its burden. It identifies the channels through which these effects are occurring, it determines the conditions of their manifestation and evaluates their relevance for different (developed and developing) contemporary economies. Although promoting irrational public borrowing may lead to inflation, such a correlation proved to be quite difficult to identify in the practice, especially for currently developed economies.

Nierówności dochodowe a zadłużenie publiczne krajów OECD

Purpose: The aim of the paper is to present the theoretical and empirical arguments for the causality between growing income inequality and increasing public debt within the capitalist economies. Methodology: The paper consists of two major parts. The first part discusses the long-term changes in value of public debt and income inequality within countries, and presents the theoretical arguments for the causality between these two categories. The second part of the paper is an attempt to investigate the impact of inequality in the upper and lower parts of income distribution on an increase of public debt in a sample of OECD-countries in 1995–2010. The statistical analysis is based on calculations of: (a) correlation coefficients between income inequality and public debt; and (b) parameters of regression equations of the level and rate of growth of public debt in a sample of countries. The parameters of regression equations were calculated with ordinary least squares and fixed effects methods. Findings: The results of the calculation illustrate that the growth of income inequality in the upper and lower parts of distribution stimulated an increase in value of public debt in the OECD countries between 1995 and 2010.

Inflation Dynamics: The Role of Public Debt and Policy Regimes

We investigate the roles of a time-varying inflation target and monetary and fiscal policy stances on the dynamics of inflation in a DSGE model. Under an active monetary and passive fiscal policy regime, inflation closely follows the path of the inflation target and a stronger reaction of monetary policy to inflation decreases the equilibrium response of inflation to non-policy shocks. In sharp contrast, under an active fiscal and passive monetary policy regime, inflation moves in an opposite direction from the inflation target and a stronger reaction of monetary policy to inflation increases the equilibrium response of inflation to non-policy shocks. Moreover, a weaker response of fiscal policy to debt decreases the response of inflation to non-policy shocks. These results are due to variation in the value of public debt that leads to wealth effects on households. Finally, under a passive monetary and passive fiscal policy regime, both monetary and fiscal policy stances affect inflation dynamics, but because of a role for self-fulfilling beliefs due to equilibrium indeterminacy, theory provides no clear answer on the overall behavior of inflation. We characterize these results analytically in a simple model and numerically in a richer quantitative model.

Comments on “Active monetary policy, passive fiscal policy and the value of public debt: Some further monetarist arithmetic”

Comments on “Active monetary policy, passive fiscal policy and the value of public debt: Some further monetarist arithmetic”

Active monetary policy, passive fiscal policy and the value of public debt: Some further monetarist arithmetic

We compare the properties of a `constant money growth rule' and a `strict inflation targeting rule' in an intertemporal equilibrium model with flexible prices in which monetary policy is `active', while fiscal policy is `passive'. The paper shows that dynamic properties of the economy may differ significantly between the two monetary policy rules if public debt is issued in nominal terms. Under a constant money growth rule which allows for temporary deviations of inflation from target in response to shocks there is scope for revaluations of public debt, acting as automatic stabilizers of government debt dynamics. By contrast, a policy of strict inflation targeting implements the target inflation rate also outside the steady state and precludes such stabilizing revaluations. Owing to this feature, additional fiscal restraint may be needed which is not required under a constant money growth rule.

Active Monetary Policy, Passive Fiscal Policy and the Value of Public Debt: Some Further Monetarist Arithmetic

We consider the properties of two monetary policy rules (strict inflation targeting, money growth rule) in an intertemporal equilibrium model with flexible prices in which monetary policy is active, while fiscal policy is passive. Specifically, we assume that the fiscal agent takes the monetary policy rule as given and restricts itself to a policy which is consistent with a sustainable debt burden and stable steady-state dynamics. The paper shows that dynamic properties of the model economy may differ significantly between the two monetary policy rules if public debt is issued in nominal terms. Under a constant money growth rule which allows for temporary deviations of inflation from target in response to shocks there is scope for revaluations of public debt, acting as automatic stabilizers of government debt dynamics. By contrast, a policy of strict inflation targeting implements the target inflation rate also outside the steady state and precludes thereby such stabilizing revaluations. Owing to this feature, additional fiscal restraint may be needed which is not required under a constant money growth rule.

Inflation and Sovereign Default

Recent research has highlighted the role that the government budget constraint plays in determining the consumer price level. According to the fiscal approach to price determination, prices adjust so that the discounted value of future real government primary surpluses equals the current real value of public debt. An important implication is that the probability of a crisis involving default on public debt may directly affect consumer prices. This paper examines the interaction of prices and sovereign insolvency crises using simple, continuous-time models of the government budget constraint. Copyright 2001, International Monetary Fund