Outcome Valence Research Articles

Reward positivity: Reward prediction error or salience prediction error?

The reward positivity is a component of the human ERP elicited by feedback stimuli in trial-and-error learning and guessing tasks. A prominent theory holds that the reward positivity reflects a reward prediction error signal that is sensitive to outcome valence, being larger for unexpected positive events relative to unexpected negative events (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Although the theory has found substantial empirical support, most of these studies have utilized either monetary or performance feedback to test the hypothesis. However, in apparent contradiction to the theory, a recent study found that unexpected physical punishments also elicit the reward positivity (Talmi, Atkinson, & El-Deredy, 2013). The authors of this report argued that the reward positivity reflects a salience prediction error rather than a reward prediction error. To investigate this finding further, in the present study participants navigated a virtual T maze and received feedback on each trial under two conditions. In a reward condition, the feedback indicated that they would either receive a monetary reward or not and in a punishment condition the feedback indicated that they would receive a small shock or not. We found that the feedback stimuli elicited a typical reward positivity in the reward condition and an apparently delayed reward positivity in the punishment condition. Importantly, this signal was more positive to the stimuli that predicted the omission of a possible punishment relative to stimuli that predicted a forthcoming punishment, which is inconsistent with the salience hypothesis.

Emotional valence, sense of agency and responsibility: A study using intentional binding.

We investigated how the emotional valence of an action outcome influences the experience of control, in an intentional binding experiment. Voluntary actions were followed by emotionally positive or negative human vocalisations, or by neutral tones. We used mental chronometry to measure a retrospective component of sense of agency (SoA), triggered by the occurrence of the action outcome, and a prospective component, driven by the expectation that the outcome will occur. Positive outcomes enhanced the retrospective component of SoA, but only when both occurrence and the valence of the outcome were unexpected. When the valence of outcomes was blocked - and therefore predictable - we found a prospective component of SoA when neutral tones were expected but did not actually occur. This prospective binding was absent, and reversed, for positive and negative expected outcomes. Emotional expectation counteracts the prospective component of SoA, suggesting a distancing effect.

When your pain signifies my gain: neural activity while evaluating outcomes based on another person's pain.

The overlap between pain and reward processing pathways leds researchers to hypothesize that there are interactions between them in the human brain. Two hypotheses have been proposed. The “competition hypothesis” posits that reward can reduce pain-related neural activity and vice versa. The “salience hypothesis” suggests that the motivational salience of pain and reward can be mutually reinforced. However, no study has tested these two hypotheses from temporal perspective as we know. In the present study, pictures depicted other people in painful or non-painful situations were used to indicate the valence of outcomes in a gambling task. The event-related potential results revealed an interaction between another person’s pain and outcome valence in multiple time stages. Specifically, the amplitudes of the N1 and P3 were enhanced in the win condition compared with the loss condition when the outcome was indicated by painful picture. This interactions between pain and reward support the salience hypothesis but not the competition hypothesis. The present results provide evidence from human subjects that support the salience hypothesis, which claims that observing other people’s pain can enhance the salience of reward.

Chasing probabilities — Signaling negative and positive prediction errors across domains

Adaptive actions build on internal probabilistic models of possible outcomes that are tuned according to the errors of their predictions when experiencing an actual outcome. Prediction errors (PEs) inform choice behavior across a diversity of outcome domains and dimensions, yet neuroimaging studies have so far only investigated such signals in singular experimental contexts. It is thus unclear whether the neuroanatomical distribution of PE encoding reported previously pertains to computational features that are invariant with respect to outcome valence, sensory domain, or some combination of the two. We acquired functional MRI data while volunteers performed four probabilistic reversal learning tasks which differed in terms of outcome valence (reward-seeking versus punishment-avoidance) and domain (abstract symbols versus facial expressions) of outcomes. We found that ventral striatum and frontopolar cortex coded increasingly positive PEs, whereas dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) traced increasingly negative PEs, irrespectively of the outcome dimension. Individual reversal behavior was unaffected by context manipulations and was predicted by activity in dACC and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). The stronger the response to negative PEs in these areas, the lower was the tendency to reverse choice behavior in response to negative events, suggesting that these regions enforce a rule-based strategy across outcome dimensions. Outcome valence influenced PE-related activity in left amygdala, IFG, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, where activity selectively scaled with increasingly positive PEs in the reward-seeking but not punishment-avoidance context, irrespective of sensory domain. Left amygdala displayed an additional influence of sensory domain. In the context of avoiding punishment, amygdala activity increased with increasingly negative PEs, but only for facial stimuli, indicating an integration of outcome valence and sensory domain during probabilistic choices.

Outcome valence and externality valence framing in public good dilemmas

The aim of this paper is to examine how framing influences people’ s cooperation behavior in social dilemmas. In Experiment 1 we investigated the influence of outcome valence (positive vs. negative outcome) and externality valence (positive vs. negative externality) framing on players’ willingness to cooperate in a repeated public good game. We found a significant interaction effect on first-round cooperation, indicating larger cooperation rates when there is a negative outcome valence and a positive externality on others. Furthermore, this effect remained largely stable when comparing cooperation over all rounds, resulting in 45–63% increased cooperation compared to the other conditions. In Experiment 2 we replicated the effect in an applied vignette study, lending support for the generalizability of this framing effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that public goods provisions may be increased substantially by framing the situation’s outcome valence as negative rather than positive.

Altruistic traits are predicted by neural responses to monetary outcomes for selfvscharity

Human altruism is often expressed through charitable donation-supporting a cause that benefits others in society, at cost to oneself. The underlying mechanisms of this other-regarding behavior remain imperfectly understood. By recording event-related-potential (ERP) measures of brain activity from human participants during a social gambling task, we identified markers of differential responses to receipt of monetary outcomes for oneself vs for a charitable cause. We focused our ERP analyses on the frontocentral feedback-related negativity (FRN) and three subcomponents of the attention-related P300 (P3) brain wave: the frontocentral P2 and P3a and the parietal P3b. The FRN distinguished between gains and losses for both self and charity outcomes. Importantly, this effect of outcome valence was greater for self than charity for both groups and was independent of two altruism-related measures: participants' pre-declared intended donations and the actual donations resulting from their choices. In contrast, differences in P3 subcomponents for outcomes for self vs charity strongly predicted both of our laboratory measures of altruism-as well as self-reported engagement in real-life altruistic behaviors. These results indicate that individual differences in altruism are linked to individual differences in the relative deployment of attention (as indexed by the P3) toward outcomes affecting other people.

Bad is freer than good: Positive-negative asymmetry in attributions of free will.

Recent findings support the idea that the belief in free will serves as the basis for moral responsibility, thus promoting the punishment of immoral agents. We theorized that free will extends beyond morality to serve as the basis for accountability and the capacity for change more broadly, not only for others but also for the self. Five experiments showed that people attributed higher freedom of will to negative than to positive valence, regardless of morality or intent, for both self and others. In recalling everyday life situations and in classical decision making paradigms, negative actions, negatives outcomes, and negative framing were attributed higher free will than positive ones. Free will attributions were mainly driven by action or outcome valence, but not intent. These findings show consistent support for the idea that free will underlies laypersons' sense-making for accountability and change under negative circumstances.

When Boastful Word of Mouth Helps versus Hurts Social Perceptions and Persuasion

Although self-enhancement has recently been established as a central motive for sharing word of mouth information, little is known about the impact of self-enhancing assertions (e.g., boasting) on persuasion. We theorize, and demonstrate in three studies, that although boasting is perceived negatively, such immodest self-presentations can either impede or enhance social perceptions and persuasion. The valence of the persuasion outcome depends heavily on trust cues that change the meaning of boasting to the word of mouth recipient. Boasting in the presence of low trust cues activates heightened vigilance (e.g., valenced thoughts) about the source's motives, leading to decreased persuasion. However, when given reason to trust the source specifically or people generally, boasting is readily accepted as a signal of source expertise, leading to increased persuasion. Implications for consumer decision-making and firms seeking to manage consumer social influence are discussed.

Improving Consumer Decisions: The Conscious Use of Primes as Performance Enhancers

Through this article we examine ways through which consumers can take advantage of marketers' priming attempts and make better decisions. Specifically, we investigate what happens when individuals are made aware of primes that may potentially improve their performance. Using an Embedded Figures Test, we demonstrate that individuals can be consciously primed into an analytic thinking mindset and perform better when they believe that the prime will enhance performance. Individuals are able to successfully ignore the prime when they believe that the prime hinders performance. Utilizing both holistic and analytic primes and by alternating the valence of the prime's potential outcome, we are able to disentangle the conscious effects of primes from demand effects. We discuss how these findings may lead to and suggest avenues for future research.

Children’s spontaneous counterfactuals: The roles of valence, expectancy, and cognitive flexibility

The current set of studies examined whether 8- to 11-year-olds generate counterfactuals spontaneously and whether outcome valence and outcome expectancy affect counterfactual reasoning within this age group. The role of cognitive flexibility in such reasoning also was explored. In Study 1, relatively few children spontaneously generated counterfactuals, yet both outcome expectancy and outcome valence influenced counterfactual reasoning. In Study 2, the majority of children generated counterfactuals without an explicit prompt and outcome valence influenced reasoning. Cognitive flexibility accounted for unique variance in counterfactual reasoning. The findings suggest that in middle childhood children spontaneously engage in counterfactual reasoning and that some of the same factors influence counterfactual reasoning in childhood as in adulthood.

The impact of outcome valence on the susceptibility to suggestion for post-event causal misinformation

ABSTRACTRecent research has demonstrated that people are especially susceptible to false memory development for suggested misinformation that fills a causal role (i.e., explains some known outcome) (Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013). However, little is known about how factors associated with the witnessed outcome impact the likelihood of false memory development. In the present study, outcome valence (negative, positive, or neutral) was manipulated. Participants heard several short stories that contained an outcome (e.g., a counselor getting promoted) that lacked a causal explanation. Participants were subsequently exposed to suggested causal misinformation that explained that outcome (e.g., the counselor performed an impressive act the previous day) and then were tested on their memory for the original event. Results indicated that participants incorrectly reported the suggested causal information more when it explained either a positive or negative outcome as opposed to a neutral outcome. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Preparing for (valenced) action: The role of differential effort in the orthogonalized go/no-go task.

Associating reward to task performance has been shown to benefit scores of cognitive functions. Importantly, this typically entails associating reward to the execution of a response, hence intertwining action-related processes with motivational ones. However, recently, preparatory action requirements (go/no-go) and outcome valence (reward/punishment) were elegantly separated using a cued orthogonalized go/no-go task. Functional magnetic resonance imaging results from this task showed that typical areas of the "reward network," like the dopaminergic midbrain and the striatum, predominantly encode action rather than valence, displaying enhanced activity when preparing for action (go) compared to inaction (no-go). In the current study, we used ERPs to probe for differences in preparatory state related to cognitive effort in this task, which has similarly been linked to reward-network activity. Importantly, the contingent negative variation, which is linked to effortful cognitive preparation processes during cue-target intervals, was clearly observed in go trials but not in no-go trials. Moreover, target-locked ERP results (N1 and P3) suggested that attention to the target was enhanced when an action had to be performed (go trials), and typical inhibition-related ERP components were not observed in no-go trials, suggesting a lack of active response inhibition. Finally, feedback-related P3 results could suggest that correct feedback was valued more in motivated go trials, again implying that more effort was required to correctly perform the task. Together, these results indicate that the anticipation of action compared to inaction simultaneously entails differences in mental effort, highlighting the need for further dissociation of these concepts.

Deontic introduction: A theory of inference from is to ought.

Humans have a unique ability to generate novel norms. Faced with the knowledge that there are hungry children in Somalia, we easily and naturally infer that we ought to donate to famine relief charities. Although a contentious and lively issue in metaethics, such inference from "is" to "ought" has not been systematically studied in the psychology of reasoning. We propose that deontic introduction is the result of a rich chain of pragmatic inference, most of it implicit; specifically, when an action is causally linked to a valenced goal, valence transfers to the action and bridges into a deontic conclusion. Participants in 5 experiments were presented with utility conditionals in which an action results in a benefit, a cost, or neutral outcome (e.g., "If Lisa buys the booklet, she will pass the exam") and asked to evaluate how strongly deontic conclusions (e.g., "Lisa should buy the booklet") follow from the premises. Findings show that the direction of the conclusions was determined by outcome valence (Experiments 1a and 1b), whereas their strength was determined by the strength of the causal link between action and outcome (Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b). We also found that deontic introduction is defeasible and can be suppressed by additional premises that interfere with any of the links in the implicit chain of inference (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3). We propose that deontic introduction is a species-specific generative capacity whose function is to regulate future behavior.

Impaired reward processing in the human prefrontal cortex distinguishes between persistent and remittent attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.

Symptoms of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children often persist into adulthood and can lead to severe antisocial behavior. However, to-date it remains unclear whether neuro-functional abnormalities cause ADHD, which in turn can then provide a marker of persistent ADHD. Using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we measured blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal changes in subjects during a reversal learning task in which choice of the correct stimulus led to a probabilistically determined 'monetary' reward or punishment. Participants were diagnosed with ADHD during their childhood (N=32) and were paired with age, gender, and education matched healthy controls (N=32). Reassessment of the ADHD group as adults resulted in a split between either persistent (persisters, N=17) or remitted ADHDs (remitters, N=15). All three groups showed significantly decreased activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the left striatum during punished correct responses, however only remitters and controls presented significant psycho-physiological interaction between these fronto-striatal reward and outcome valence networks. Comparing persisters to remitters and controls showed significantly inverted responses to punishment (P<0.05, family-wise error corrected) in left PFC region. Interestingly, the decreased activation shown after punishment was located in different areas of the PFC for remitters compared with controls, suggesting that remitters might have learned compensation strategies to overcome their ADHD symptoms. Thus, fMRI helps understanding the neuro-functional basis of ADHD related behavior differences and differentiates between persistent and remittent ADHD.

“Our differences don’t separate us”: Immigrant families navigate intrafamilial acculturation gaps through diverse resilience processes.

In light of mixed findings regarding the valence of outcomes associated with acculturation gaps in mixed-generation immigrant families, this research adopted a qualitative methodology to explore the rich complexity of acculturation gaps and their navigation. Through multiple individual, dyadic, and family semistructured interviews with 2 mixed-generation Salvadoran immigrant families living in the United States, this study explored the ways in which families (a) described and understood their acculturation gaps, (b) determined whether gaps were benign, potentially problematic, or useful for the family, and (c) navigated gaps depending on their determined valence. The individual and family narratives were analyzed through constructivist grounded theory, guided by the theories of acculturation gap-distress (Lau et al., 2005; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996) and family resilience (Walsh, 2003). This research revealed that acculturation gaps can exist among all family members and that although families described gaps in terms of differences in overt behavioral practices, only those discrepant practices that were related to underlying value or identification differences were considered potentially problematic. The families were seen to use their belief systems, organizational patterns, communication and problem-solving strategies, and methods of escape to effectively navigate these gaps in 18 diverse ways depending upon the gaps’ valences. This study suggests that (a) a family resilience model can be applied to the study of acculturation gaps, (b) expansion of such model as applied to acculturation gaps may be indicated, and (c) such model may provide insight into why some families with acculturation gaps experience negative outcomes whereas others flourish.

Teasing apart the anticipatory and consummatory processing of monetary incentives: An event-related potential study of reward dynamics.

The monetary incentive delay (MID) task has been widely used in fMRI studies to investigate the neural networks involved in anticipatory and consummatory reward processing. Previous efforts to adapt the MID task for use with ERPs, however, have had limited success. Here, we sought to further decompose reward dynamics using a comprehensive set of anticipatory (cue-N2, cue-P3, contingent negative variation [CNV]) and consummatory ERPs (feedback negativity [FN], feedback P3 [fb-P3]). ERP data was recorded during adapted versions of the MID task across two experiments. Unlike previous studies, monetary incentive cues modulated the cue-N2, cue-P3, and CNV; however, cue-related ERPs and the CNV were uncorrelated with one another, indicating distinct anticipatory subprocesses. With regard to consummatory processing, FN amplitude primarily tracked outcome valence (reward vs. nonreward), whereas fb-P3 amplitude primarily tracked outcome salience (uncertain vs. certain). Independent modulation of the cue-P3 and fb-P3 was observed, indicating that these two P3 responses may uniquely capture the allocation of attention during anticipatory and consummatory reward processing, respectively. Overall, across two samples, consistent evidence of both anticipatory and consummatory ERP activity was observed on an adapted version of the MID paradigm, demonstrating for the first time how these ERP components may be integrated with one another to more fully characterize the time course of reward processing. This ERP-MID paradigm is well suited to parsing reward dynamics, and can be applied to both healthy and clinical populations.

Electrophysiological correlates of observational learning in children.

Observational learning is an important mechanism for cognitive and social development. However, the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying observational learning in children are not well understood. In this study, we used a probabilistic reward-based observational learning paradigm to compare behavioral and electrophysiological markers of individual and observational reinforcement learning in 8- to 10-year-old children. Specifically, we manipulated the amount of observable information as well as children's similarity in age to the observed person (same-aged child vs. adult) to examine the effects of similarity in age on the integration of observed information in children. We show that the feedback-related negativity (FRN) during individual reinforcement learning reflects the valence of outcomes of own actions. Furthermore, we found that the feedback-related negativity during observational reinforcement learning (oFRN) showed a similar distinction between outcome valences of observed actions. This suggests that the oFRN can serve as a measure of observational learning in middle childhood. Moreover, during observational learning children profited from the additional social information and imitated the choices of their own peers more than those of adults, indicating that children have a tendency to conform more with similar others (e.g. their own peers) compared to dissimilar others (adults). Taken together, our results show that children can benefit from integrating observable information and that oFRN may serve as a measure of observational learning in children.

No unified reward prediction error in local field potentials from the human nucleus accumbens: evidence from epilepsy patients.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), cyclic voltammetry, and single-unit electrophysiology studies suggest that signals measured in the nucleus accumbens (Nacc) during value-based decision making represent reward prediction errors (RPEs), the difference between actual and predicted rewards. Here, we studied the precise temporal and spectral pattern of reward-related signals in the human Nacc. We recorded local field potentials (LFPs) from the Nacc of six epilepsy patients during an economic decision-making task. On each trial, patients decided whether to accept or reject a gamble with equal probabilities of a monetary gain or loss. The behavior of four patients was consistent with choices being guided by value expectations. Expected value signals before outcome onset were observed in three of those patients, at varying latencies and with nonoverlapping spectral patterns. Signals after outcome onset were correlated with RPE regressors in all subjects. However, further analysis revealed that these signals were better explained as outcome valence rather than RPE signals, with gamble gains and losses differing in the power of beta oscillations and in evoked response amplitudes. Taken together, our results do not support the idea that postsynaptic potentials in the Nacc represent a RPE that unifies outcome magnitude and prior value expectation. We discuss the generalizability of our findings to healthy individuals and the relation of our results to measurements of RPE signals obtained from the Nacc with other methods.

Disentangling the impacts of outcome valence and outcome frequency on the post-error slowing.

Post-error slowing (PES) reflects efficient outcome monitoring, manifested as slower reaction time after errors. Cognitive control account assumes that PES depends on error information, whereas orienting account posits that it depends on error frequency. This raises the question how the outcome valence and outcome frequency separably influence the generation of PES. To address this issue, we varied the probability of observation errors (50/50 and 20/80, correct/error) the “partner” committed by employing an observation-execution task and investigated the corresponding behavioral and neural effects. On each trial, participants first viewed the outcome of a flanker-run that was supposedly performed by a ‘partner’, and then performed a flanker-run themselves afterwards. We observed PES in the two error rate conditions. However, electroencephalographic data suggested error-related potentials (oERN and oPe) and rhythmic oscillation associated with attentional process (alpha band) were respectively sensitive to outcome valence and outcome frequency. Importantly, oERN amplitude was positively correlated with PES. Taken together, these findings support the assumption of the cognitive control account, suggesting that outcome valence and outcome frequency are both involved in PES. Moreover, the generation of PES is indexed by oERN, whereas the modulation of PES size could be reflected on the alpha band.

Contextual valence modulates the neural dynamics of risk processing.

A well-known bias in risky decision making is that most people tend to be risk averse when gains are salient but risk seeking when losses are salient. The present study addressed the neural dynamics of this process by recording ERPs during a gambling task in a gain and a loss context. Behaviorally, participants were found to be risk averse in the gain context but risk neutral in the loss context. During the anticipation stage, an increased stimulus-preceding negativity was elicited by high- versus low-risk choices in the gain but not the loss context. During the outcome-appraisal stage, the feedback-related negativity was larger after high- versus low-risk choices in the gain instead of the loss context. For the P300, an outcome valence effect (a larger P300 for gain vs. loss outcomes) emerged following the high- versus low-risk decisions in the gain but not the loss context. Our findings suggest that risk processing can be modulated by the context of valence during the anticipation stage and by both the contextual valence and the outcome valence during the outcome-appraisal stage, which may be driven by the motivational salience imposed by the context of valence.