Utterance Of Sentence Research Articles

Tracking the speech signal – Time-locked MEG signals during perception of ultra-fast and moderately fast speech in blind and in sighted listeners

Blind people can learn to understand speech at ultra-high syllable rates (ca. 20syllables/s), a capability associated with hemodynamic activation of the central-visual system. To further elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying this skill, magnetoencephalographic (MEG) measurements during listening to sentence utterances were cross-correlated with time courses derived from the speech signal (envelope, syllable onsets and pitch periodicity) to capture phase-locked MEG components (14 blind, 12 sighted subjects; speech rate=8 or 16syllables/s, pre-defined source regions: auditory and visual cortex, inferior frontal gyrus). Blind individuals showed stronger phase locking in auditory cortex than sighted controls, and right-hemisphere visual cortex activity correlated with syllable onsets in case of ultra-fast speech. Furthermore, inferior-frontal MEG components time-locked to pitch periodicity displayed opposite lateralization effects in sighted (towards right hemisphere) and blind subjects (left). Thus, ultra-fast speech comprehension in blind individuals appears associated with changes in early signal-related processing mechanisms both within and outside the central-auditory terrain.

Insincerity

This paper argues for an account of insincerity in speech according to which an utterance is insincere if and only if it communicates something that does not correspond to the speaker's conscious attitudes. Two main topics are addressed: the relation between insincerity and the saying‐meaning distinction, and the mental attitude underlying insincere speech. The account is applied to both assertoric and non‐assertoric utterances of declarative sentences, and to utterances of non‐declarative sentences. It is shown how the account gives the right results for a range of cases.

Emotion judgment method from a user utterance sentence

Authors are conducting research aiming to develop new interfaces that follow the mechanism of human communication, particularly focusing on human common sense. In this paper, a method is proposed which processes any subject using knowledge base and an Association Mechanism. In proposed method, 27 attributes of subject were judged by knowledge base. Moreover, an unknown word processing is proposed which deals with actor words which were registered in the knowledge base. The result of the proposed method gave the answer in 75% of cases. If the not out-of-common-sense answers were counted as part of the correct answers, the correct-answer ratio rose to 96%. Therefore, if the proposed method and the existing method were combined, the correct-answer ratio was approximately 85%.

Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition

AbstractThere are two major semantic theories of proper names: Semantic Descriptivism and Direct Reference. According to Semantic Descriptivism, the semantic content of a proper name N for a speaker S is identical to the semantic content of a definite description “the F” that the speaker associates with the name. According to Direct Reference, the semantic content of a proper name is identical to its referent. Semantic Descriptivism suffers from a number of drawbacks first pointed out by Donnellan (1970) and Kripke (1972). Direct Reference faces difficulties of its own, most importantly the problem of empty names. The most promising Directly Referential solution to this problem is the Unfilled Proposition view, according to which utterances of sentences containing empty names semantically express unfilled propositions. But this view faces the problem of accounting for the intuition that negative existentials involving empty names are true. The most promising way of dealing with this problem within Unfilled Proposition theory is to suppose (i) that utterances of sentences may be used to pragmatically convey propositions they do not semantically express, and (ii) that the proposition pragmatically conveyed by a speaker S's utterance of a sentence containing an empty name N (where “the F” is a definite description S associates with N) is identical to the proposition semantically expressed by an utterance of the sentence obtained by replacing N with “the F”. Call this view “Pragmatic Descriptivism”. With respect to the problem of negative existentials, Pragmatic Descriptivists can insist that, although an utterance of “Santa does not exist” is literally neither true nor false, our taking it to be true may be explained as the result of our having confused the unfilled proposition it semantically expresses with the clearly true descriptive proposition it pragmatically conveys. Despite its theoretical virtues, Pragmatic Descriptivism has recently come under fire. Everett (2003), in particular, has advanced four different lines of criticism, to which Adams and Dietrich (2004) have responded in some detail. In this article, I have two main aims. The first is to argue that Adams and Dietrich's replies to Everett's criticisms (with one exception) are ineffective. I conclude that there is no acceptable strategy for solving the problem of empty names within Direct Reference theory. The second is to argue that there is a promising alternative to Semantic Descriptivism and Direct Reference that requires us to fill unfilled propositions with names, thereby solving the problem of empty names.

Typ oder Token? Zum Auftreten von est' in russischen Possessivsätzen

Abstract This paper investigates the semantic composition of Russian possessive constructions. It is argued that in sentences of the kind u X est' Y, the Y-expression is used to refer to a type. Accordingly, the nominal sobaka in a sentence like U Igorja est' sobaka denotes the type ‘dog’. The fact that the sentence (utterance) is nevertheless about a particular dog, i.e. about some token of the type, is explained by the semantic impact of the existence predicate est'. It is demonstrated how the proposed analysis can account for the linguistic data known about Russian possessive constructions, and how it can be implemented in terms of DRT.

ADHD: Linguistic abilities and EEG findings compared to specific language impairment

BackgroundAttention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is often associated with language impairment (LI). Additionally, it may be associated with abnormal electroencephalographic (EEG) findings. AimTo assess language abilities and EEG findings in children with ADHD presented with LI in comparison to children with specific Language Impairment (SLI). Patients and methodsA comparative study was conducted on the different linguistic abilities and electroencephalographic findings of 30 Arabic speaking ADHD children with LI and 30age and gender matched children with SLI. Abnormal EEG findings were classified according to anatomical distribution. ResultsThe group of ADHD children with LI had significant delay in the acquisition of first word and two word sentence utterance in comparison to the group of SLI children. The ADHD children with LI had significantly lower language scores than the SLI group involving the total language, and all language parameters except for the expressive syntax parameter. In addition, they had significantly more frequent abnormal EEG findings and highly significantly abnormal epileptiform activity than children with SLI. The most frequently occurring abnormal EEG findings in the ADHD children with LI were generalized abnormal epileptiform activity and abnormal bilateral focal discharge. ConclusionThe ADHD children with LI had worse language parameters and more frequent abnormal EEG findings than children with SLI.

Verb morphology as clinical marker of specific language impairment: Evidence from first and second language learners

The goal of this study was to search for verb morphology characteristics as possible clinical markers of SLI in Dutch as a first and second language. We also wanted to find out to what extent bilingual children with SLI are additionally disadvantaged in comparison to monolingual children with SLI, on the one hand, and to typically developing bilingual children, on the other hand. Therefore, we examined the use of verb morphology in the narratives of four groups of 7- and 9-year-old children: native Dutch (monolingual) children without SLI, bilingual children without SLI, native Dutch (monolingual) children with SLI, and bilingual children with SLI. The narrative performance in Dutch as measured by mean length of utterance and number of ungrammatical sentences was found to be generally worse for children learning Dutch as a second language, for children suffering from SLI, and for younger children. Furthermore, omission of an agreement marker in the third person singular verb form can be seen as a clinical marker of SLI in both first and second language learners. Bilingual children with SLI were found to be in an additionally disadvantaged position as far as their use of L2 verb morphology.

A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language

It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person’s utterance of a sentence according to which φing has a moral characteristic, such as “φing is wrong,” conveys two things: The sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that φing has a moral property, and the utterance of the sentence carries a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the person in question has an action‐guiding attitude in relation to φing. This account has significant advantages over competing views: (i) As it is purely cognitivist, it does not have the difficulties of expressivism and various ecumenical positions. (ii) Yet, in spite of this, it can explain the close, “meaning‐like,” connection between moral language and attitudes. (iii) In contrast to other pragmatic accounts, it is compatible with any relevant cognitivist view. (iv) It does not rest on a contentious pragmatic notion, such as conventional implicature. (v) It does not imply that utterances of complex moral sentences, such as conditionals, convey attitudes. In addition, the generalized implicature in question is fully calculable and cancellable.

Kinematic analysis of lingual movements during consonant productions in dysarthric speakers with Friedreich's ataxia: A case-by-case analysis

Articulatory kinematics were investigated using electromagnetic articulography (EMA) in four dysarthric speakers with Friedreich's ataxia (FRDA). Specifically, tongue-tip and tongue-back movements were recorded by the AG-200 EMA system during production of the consonants /t/ and /k/ as produced within a sentence utterance and during a rapid syllable repetition task. The results obtained for each of the participants with FRDA were individually compared to those obtained by a control group (n = 10). Results revealed significantly greater movement durations and increased articulatory distances, most predominantly during the approach phase of consonant production. A task difference was observed with lingual kinematics more disturbed during the syllable repetition task than during the sentence utterance. Despite expectations of slowed articulatory movements in FRDA dysarthria, the EMA data indicated that the observed prolongation of consonant phase durations was generally associated with greater articulatory distances, rather than slowed movement execution.

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocutionary

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocutionary

Speech acts and poetry

Geoffrey Hill (2008) and Christopher Ricks (1996) strenuously reject what we may call Austin’s Claim: that utterance of a sentence in poetry could not be ‘serious’ (Austin 1962: 9–10, 21–22, 92, 104). But they accept the conclusion that Austin, with others (e.g. Strawson 1964; Searle 1969), draw from this claim: that the utterance of a sentence in poetry could not be a performative utterance. Hill and Ricks are mistaken, I believe, and since speech act theory stands directly to benefit, it is important to see why. This is the argument offered by Hill and Ricks. Suppose that Austin’s Claim is false. Suppose also that some particular utterance of a sentence in poetry is indeed serious, and that this sentence contains a ‘commissive’ like ‘I promise’. Suppose, finally, that this utterance is not ‘defective’ – it is not what Austin would have called a ‘misfire’ or ‘abuse’. Then in producing the utterance, the poet responsible for the utterance would have successfully performed an act of commitment. But it would be absurd to suppose that poets perform such acts in producing utterances in poetry, and equally absurd to suppose they might bind themselves in doing so. Hence we must deny that utterance of a sentence in poetry could be performative. But this argument fails. Commissives are a mere sub-set of the phrases whose inclusion in sentences is apt to make their utterance the performance of an act, for example, the act named in that very sentence. Hill himself offers an instance of another sort in his poem The Triumph of Love:

Unarticulated comparison classes

Relative gradable adjectives (“tall”, “big”) raise serious problems in semantics. First, I explore a few intuitions about relative gradable predicates and clarify some points. Second, I propose a multipropositionalist, Perry-inspired, perspective on relative gradable predicate utterances. Perry’s version of multipropositionalism introduces many different propositions or contents, including indexical content, referential content, and designational content, which are carried by the utterance of a single sentence. It also offers a new approach to relative gradable predicates, and suggests an explanation for the way relative predicates work in linguistic communication and for the divergent intuitions about these predicates. My approach focuses on the cognitive significance of relative gradable sentence utterances.

Kinematic analysis of lingual function in dysarthric speakers with Parkinson's disease: An electromagnetic articulograph study

Dysarthria in people with Parkinson's disease (PD) has been widely studied. However, a limited number of studies have investigated lingual function during speech production in this population. This study aimed to investigate lingual kinematics during speech production using electromagnetic articulography (AG-200 EMA). The PD group consisted of eight dysarthric speakers with PD and was matched with a group of eight controls. The tongue tip and tongue back movements of all participants during sentence production were recorded by EMA. Results showed that, perceptually, the participants with PD were mildly dysarthric. Kinematic results documented comparable (for alveolar sentence production) and increased (for velar sentence production) range of lingual movement in the PD group when compared to the control group. Lingual movement velocity, acceleration, and deceleration were also increased in the PD group, predominantly for the release phase of consonant production during sentence utterances. The PD group had longer duration in the production of alveolar consonant and comparable duration in the production of velar consonant. The results of the present study suggest the presence of impaired lingual control in individuals with PD. Increased range of articulatory movement, primarily in the release phase of consonant production, may account for articulatory imprecision in this population.

Branching with Uncertain Semantics

Branching with Uncertain Semantics

NEO-MEINONGIAN NEO-RUSSELLIANS

Neo-Russellianism, which incorporates both Millianism (with regard to proper names) and the thesis of singular Russellian propositions, has widely been defended after the publication of Kripke's Naming and Necessity. The view, however, encounters various problems regarding empty names, names that do not have semantic referents. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames have defended neo-Russellianism against such problems in a novel way; to account for various intuitions of competent and rational speakers regarding utterances of sentences containing empty names, Salmon and Soames appeal neither to entities similar to Fregean senses, e.g. propositional guises or modes of presentation, nor to Gricean implicatures. In this paper, however, I argue that their view slips into neo-Meinongianism; it is committed to nonexistent objects, assigns various properties to them, and allows quantifiers range over such entities. This, I conclude, makes Salmon and Soames' view less appealing, if not implausible.

Reply to Baumann on factivity and contextualism

In Brueckner and Buford 2009, we attempted to provide a resolution of an apparent Factivity Problem for contextualism. In Bauman 2009, Peter Baumann criticizes our resolution, and we now reply. Mary’s utterance of ‘Mary knows that she has hands’ is not true in her demanding context D due to the fact that, say, her evidence does not meet the demanding standards of D: However, Frank’s utterance of the same sentence is true in his less-demanding, ordinary context O. So we have (1): Let us suppose that Mary somehow learns about Frank’s epistemic state, so that we have: The factivity of knowledge and disquotation give us: (DF) ‘A knows that p’ (as uttered in some context) is true → p

Situated minimalism versus free enrichment

In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thought and communicated is typically enriched relative to what is said. We show that situationalism dispenses with free enrichment both at the level of what is said (proposition expressed) and of what is thought (mental level). According to situationalism, an alleged underdetermined utterance can, pace minimalism, be true in one situation while false in another, and two people using the same alleged underdetermined sentence can be characterized, pace contextualism, as having said the same thing.

Crossmodal and incremental perception of audiovisual cues to emotional speech

In this article we report on two experiments about the perception of audiovisual cues to emotional speech. The article addresses two questions: 1) how do visual cues from a speaker's face to emotion relate to auditory cues, and (2) what is the recognition speed for various facial cues to emotion? Both experiments reported below are based on tests with video clips of emotional utterances collected via a variant of the well-known Velten method. More specifically, we recorded speakers who displayed positive or negative emotions, which were congruent or incongruent with the (emotional) lexical content of the uttered sentence. In order to test this, we conducted two experiments. The first experiment is a perception experiment in which Czech participants, who do not speak Dutch, rate the perceived emotional state of Dutch speakers in a bimodal (audiovisual) or a unimodal (audio- or vision-only) condition. It was found that incongruent emotional speech leads to significantly more extreme perceived emotion scores than congruent emotional speech, where the difference between congruent and incongruent emotional speech is larger for the negative than for the positive conditions. Interestingly, the largest overall differences between congruent and incongruent emotions were found for the audio-only condition, which suggests that posing an incongruent emotion has a particularly strong effect on the spoken realization of emotions. The second experiment uses a gating paradigm to test the recognition speed for various emotional expressions from a speaker's face. In this experiment participants were presented with the same clips as experiment I, but this time presented vision-only. The clips were shown in successive segments (gates) of increasing duration. Results show that participants are surprisingly accurate in their recognition of the various emotions, as they already reach high recognition scores in the first gate (after only 160 ms). Interestingly, the recognition scores raise faster for positive than negative conditions. Finally, the gating results suggest that incongruent emotions are perceived as more intense than congruent emotions, as the former get more extreme recognition scores than the latter, already after a short period of exposure.

Are Cantonese-speakers really descriptivists? Revisiting cross-cultural semantics

In an article in Cognition [Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2004). Semantics cross-cultural style. Cognition, 92, B1–B12] present data which purports to show that East Asian Cantonese-speakers tend to have descriptivist intuitions about the referents of proper names, while Western English-speakers tend to have causal–historical intuitions about proper names. Machery et al. take this finding to support the view that some intuitions, the universality of which they claim is central to philosophical theories, vary according to cultural background. Machery et al. conclude from their findings that the philosophical methodology of consulting intuitions about hypothetical cases is flawed vis a vis the goal of determining truths about some philosophical domains like philosophical semantics. In the following study, three new vignettes in English were given to Western native English-speakers, and Cantonese translations were given to native Cantonese-speaking immigrants from a Cantonese community in Southern California. For all three vignettes, questions were given to elicit intuitions about the referent of a proper name and the truth-value of an uttered sentence containing a proper name. The results from this study reveal that East Asian Cantonese-speakers do not differ from Western English-speakers in ways that support Machery et al.’s conclusions. This new data concerning the intuitions of Cantonese-speakers raises questions about whether cross-cultural variation in answers to questions on certain vignettes reveal genuine differences in intuitions, or whether such differences stem from non-intuitional differences, such as differences in linguistic competence.

Playing Poker

AbstractSome researchers claim that utterances of sentences like "Claire has the three of clubs", shift their truth-values across situations of utterance. I examine one theory, Eros Corazza's, supplemented with the work of Barwise and Perry on situation semantics, to account for this supposed shift in truth-value. I argue that this account is inadequate. I then reconsider the example involving Claire and show that, when it is properly described, it does not support the claim that there is a change in its truth-value across different situations of utterance. Finally, I shall suggest that my re-description of the Claire example can be extended to other allegedly context-sensitive examples in the literature, the re-description of which calls into question the support that they are supposed to offer to contextualist semantic theories.