Utilitarian Welfare Function Research Articles

Grants structure when the type of public project is endogenous

This paper gives an insight into changes in intergovernmental grants structure, focusing on the type of public project. Presenting a simple model which incorporates the endogenous determination of project type and grants structure, the results show that as the relative cost encountered by central government in collecting public funds increases, the central government tends to choose types of projects which local governments prefer and adopt block grant systems. The resulting equilibrium is compared with an optimal solution based on an utilitarian welfare function.

Social Preferences and Price Cap Regulation

This paper analyzes the allocative properties of price cap regulation under very general hypotheses on the nature of society’s preferences. We propose a generalized price cap that ensures the convergence to optimal (second best) prices in the long‐run equilibrium for virtually any form of the welfare function. Hence, the result of the convergence to Ramsey prices of Laspeyres‐type price cap regulation is a particular instance of our more general result. We also provide an explicit and relatively easy to calculate and implement generalized price cap formula for distributionally weighted utilitarian welfare functions, as suggested by Feldstein (1972a).

Social Security, Retirement Age and Optimal Income Taxation

It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would be no such implicit taxation. The point of this paper is that when first-best redistributive instruments are not available, because some variables are not observable, the optimal policy does imply a distortion of the retirement decision. Consequently, the inducement of early retirement may be part of the optimal tax-transfer policy. We consider a model in which individuals differ in their productivity and their capacity to work long and choose both their weekly labor supply and their age of retirement. We characterize the optimal non linear tax-transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when weekly earnings and the length of active life are observable while individuals' productivity and health status are not observable.

Optimal Distribution and the Family

Income tax burdens, welfare payments, and social security benefits depend on the composition of family units. Substantial controversy exists over the appropriate forms of adjustment, as reflected by the wide variation in methods among programs, across jurisdictions, and over time. In contrast to approaches based on 'ability to pay' or equivalence scales, a utilitarian welfare function is used here to derive the equitable distribution of income for different family configurations. The analysis considers how allocations should depend on family sharing arrangements, economies of scale, altruism among family members, and differences in utility functions among family members. Copyright 1996 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Relative income position, individual and social income satisfaction, and income inequality

The survival probability as estimated by an individual is,ceteris paribus supposed to depend on his relative income position in a set of reference incomes. The relative income position is thus defined in close connection to the preference formation theory of Kapteyn. It is shown that then this survival probability, called ‘utility,’ may be equated to the relative income position. A nice result of this approach is the possibility to formulate a utilitarian welfare function, which leads to the definition of income inequality measures. It is shown that the use of sets of reference incomes may lead to considerably smaller measured inequality.