Utilitarian Moral Judgment Research Articles

Variation in the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) is associated with differences in moral judgment.

Moral judgments are produced through the coordinated interaction of multiple neural systems, each of which relies on a characteristic set of neurotransmitters. Genes that produce or regulate these neurotransmitters may have distinctive influences on moral judgment. Two studies examined potential genetic influences on moral judgment using dilemmas that reliably elicit competing automatic and controlled responses, generated by dissociable neural systems. Study 1 (N = 228) examined 49 common variants (SNPs) within 10 candidate genes and identified a nominal association between a polymorphism (rs237889) of the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) and variation in deontological vs utilitarian moral judgment (that is, judgments favoring individual rights vs the greater good). An association was likewise observed for rs1042615 of the arginine vasopressin receptor gene (AVPR1A). Study 2 (N = 322) aimed to replicate these findings using the aforementioned dilemmas as well as a new set of structurally similar medical dilemmas. Study 2 failed to replicate the association with AVPR1A, but replicated the OXTR finding using both the original and new dilemmas. Together, these findings suggest that moral judgment is influenced by variation in the oxytocin receptor gene and, more generally, that single genetic polymorphisms can have a detectable effect on complex decision processes.

It’s personal: The effect of personal value on utilitarian moral judgments

AbstractWe investigated whether the personal importance of objects influences utilitarian decision-making in which damaging property is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome. In Experiment 1, participants judged saving five objects by destroying a sixth object to be less acceptable when the action required destroying the sixth object directly (rather than as a side-effect) and the objects were personally important (rather than unimportant). In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that utilitarian judgments were not influenced by the objects’ monetary worth. Together these findings suggest that personal importance underlies people’s sensitivity to damaging property as a means for utilitarian gains.

At the heart of morality lies neuro-visceral integration: lower cardiac vagal tone predicts utilitarian moral judgment.

To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element of human morality. The aversion to harm others can be either rooted in the outcomes of an action (utilitarianism) or reactions to the action itself (deontology). We speculated that the human moral judgments rely on the integration of neural computations of harm and visceral reactions. The present research examined whether utilitarian or deontological aspects of moral judgment are associated with cardiac vagal tone, a physiological proxy for neuro-visceral integration. We investigated the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment by using a mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and psychophysiological measures. An index of bipolar deontology-utilitarianism was correlated with resting heart rate variability (HRV)-an index of cardiac vagal tone-such that more utilitarian judgments were associated with lower HRV. Follow-up analyses using process dissociation, which independently quantifies utilitarian and deontological moral inclinations, provided further evidence that utilitarian (but not deontological) judgments were associated with lower HRV. Our results suggest that the functional integration of neural and visceral systems during moral judgments can restrict outcome-based, utilitarian moral preferences. Implications for theories of moral judgment are discussed.

Divergent roles of autistic and alexithymic traits in utilitarian moral judgments in adults with autism.

This study investigated hypothetical moral choices in adults with high-functioning autism and the role of empathy and alexithymia in such choices. We used a highly emotionally salient moral dilemma task to investigate autistics’ hypothetical moral evaluations about personally carrying out harmful utilitarian behaviours aimed at maximizing welfare. Results showed that they exhibited a normal pattern of moral judgments despite the deficits in social cognition and emotional processing. Further analyses revealed that this was due to mutually conflicting biases associated with autistic and alexithymic traits after accounting for shared variance: (a) autistic traits were associated with reduced utilitarian bias due to elevated personal distress of demanding social situations, while (b) alexithymic traits were associated with increased utilitarian bias on account of reduced empathic concern for the victim. Additionally, autistics relied on their non-verbal reasoning skills to rigidly abide by harm-norms. Thus, utilitarian moral judgments in autism were spared due to opposite influences of autistic and alexithymic traits and compensatory intellectual strategies. These findings demonstrate the importance of empathy and alexithymia in autistic moral cognition and have methodological implications for studying moral judgments in several other clinical populations.

It's personal: The effect of personal value on utilitarian moral judgments

We investigated whether the personal importance of objects influences utilitarian decision-making in which damaging property is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome. In Experiment 1, participants judged saving five objects by destroying a sixth object to be less acceptable when the action required destroying the sixth object directly (rather than as a side-effect) and the objects were personally important (rather than unimportant). In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that utilitarian judgments were not influenced by the objects' monetary worth. Together these findings suggest that personal importance underlies people's sensitivity to damaging property as a means for utilitarian gains.

Advances in psychopathic individuals' moral judgments and the underlying neural mechanisms

Objective To review psychopathic individuals' moral judgments and the underlying neural mechanisms in order to provide cognitive basis and the corresponding intervention for their socially deviant behavior. Methods Literatures were searched in Academic Search Premier, Science Direct, Highwire, PubMed and Wanfang database by July 2015. Index strategy: AB [psychopathy OR psychopathic] AND AB [moral judgments OR moral reasoning] . Fortyseven articles including six in Chinese were chosen based on their abstracts and key words. Results 33 papers were adopted finally including 2 in Chinese. Most of the papers involved representative empirical studies within five years. Conclusion Compared with non-psychopathic individuals,psychopathic individuals are inclined to consider moral transgressions as more acceptable and are more inclined to make utilitarian moral judgments. Their impairment in moral judgments is associated with dysfunction in specific brain regions such as amygdale,dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,and ventromedial prefrontal cortex,and dysfunction in the basic brain system. Psychopathic individuals' moral judgment impairment needs to be examined within the frame of affect and their moral reasoning processes should be investigated in the future. Key words: Psychopathy; Moral judgments; Amygdale; Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Ventromedial prefrontal cortex

Manic patients exhibit more utilitarian moral judgments in comparison with euthymic bipolar and healthy persons

Both emotional and cognitive processes are involved in moral judgments. Ventromedial prefrontal lesions are related to impaired prosocial emotions and emotional dysregulation, and patients with these lesions exhibit increased utilitarian judgments of emotionally salient personal moral dilemmas. Bipolar patients experiencing manic episode also have impaired emotional regulation and behavioral control. We investigated the characteristics of moral judgment in manic and euthymic patients with bipolar disorder using the 50 hypothetical moral dilemma task (17 non-moral, 20 personal, and 13 impersonal). Our study included 27 manic bipolar patients, 26 euthymic bipolar patients, and 42 healthy controls. Subjects were instructed to determine whether or not each dilemma was morally acceptable, and their reaction times were recorded. Manic patients showed significantly greater utilitarian judgment than euthymic patients and normal controls for personal moral dilemmas. However, there were no significant between-group differences for the non-moral and impersonal moral dilemmas. Our results suggest that increased utilitarian judgments of personal moral dilemmas may be a state-related finding observed only in manic patients. This difference in moral judgment assessments may reflect the decision-making characteristics and underlying neurobiological mechanisms of bipolar disorder, especially during the manic state.

Why does the Cognitive Reflection Test (sometimes) predict utilitarian moral judgment (and other things)?

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to correlate with measures of utilitarian moral judgment because it measures system-2 correction of an initial intuitive response. And some theories of moral judgment hold that the same thing often happens when people arrive a utilitarian judgments. We find, however, that CRT-type items (using logic as well as arithmetic) can work just as well when they do not have obvious intuitive answers at predicting utilitarian moral judgment, assessed with self-report questionnaires as well as with hypothetical scenarios, and also at predicting a measure of actively open-minded thinking (AOT). Moreover, long response times, as well as high accuracy, also predict moral judgment and other outcomes. The CRT might thus be considered a test of reflection-impulsivity (RI). However, RI is only part of AOT, because RI is concerned only with the amount of thinking, not its direction. Tests of AOT also predict utilitarian moral judgments. Individual differences in AOT and moral judgments are both strongly (negatively) associated with belief that morality comes from God and cannot be understood through thought. The correlation of CRT and utilitarian judgment, when found, is thus likely due to the (imperfect) correlation of AOT and CRT. Intuition in these domains is thus not necessarily something that people overcome through additional thinking, but rather what they rely on when they do not think very much.

Cold-hearted or cool-headed: physical coldness promotes utilitarian moral judgment.

In the current study, we examine the effect of physical coldness on personal moral dilemma judgment. Previous studies have indicated that utilitarian moral judgment—sacrificing a few people to achieve the greater good for others—was facilitated when: (1) participants suppressed an initial emotional response and deliberately thought about the utility of outcomes; (2) participants had a high-level construal mindset and focused on abstract goals (e.g., save many); or (3) there was a decreasing emotional response to sacrificing a few. In two experiments, we exposed participants to extreme cold or typical room temperature and then asked them to make personal moral dilemma judgments. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that coldness prompted utilitarian judgment, but the effect of coldness was independent from deliberate thought or abstract high-level construal mindset. As Experiment 2 revealed, coldness facilitated utilitarian judgment via reduced empathic feelings. Therefore, physical coldness did not affect the “cool-headed” deliberate process or the abstract high-level construal mindset. Rather, coldness biased people toward being “cold-hearted,” reduced empathetic concern, and facilitated utilitarian moral judgments.

Ethics Under Uncertainty: The Morality and Appropriateness of Utilitarianism When Outcomes Are Uncertain

Real-life moral dilemmas inevitably involve uncertainty, yet research has not considered how uncertainty affects utilitarian moral judgments. In addition, even though moral dilemma researchers regularly ask respondents, "What is appropriate?" but interpret it to mean, "What is moral?," little research has examined whether a difference exists between asking these 2 types of questions. In this study, 140 college students read moral dilemmas that contained certain or uncertain consequences and then responded as to whether it was appropriate and whether it was moral to kill 1 to save many (a utilitarian choice). Ratings of the appropriateness and morality of the utilitarian choice were lower under uncertainty than certainty. A follow-up experiment found that these results could not be explained entirely by a change in the expected values of the outcomes or a desire to avoid the worst-case scenario. In addition, the utilitarian choice to kill 1 to save many was rated as more appropriate than moral. The results imply that moral decision making may depend critically on whether uncertainties in outcomes are admitted and whether people are asked about appropriateness or morality.

For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment

People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.

LA NEUROPSICOLOGÍA DEL JUICIO MORAL. SOBRE LAS CAUSAS DE RESPUESTAS CONTRAINTUITIVAS A LOS DILEMAS MORALES

Una literatura creciente en neuropsicología estudia el juicio moral aplicando dilemas morales a personas con daños neuronales o con rasgos de personalidad antisocial; y parece confirmar una tendencia al juicio utilitarista contra-intuitivo, es decir, estas personas aprueban el sacrificio de un inocente para salvar varias vidas. Argumentamos que las evidencias encontradas no respaldan la hipótesis de dos módulos morales (Greene et al. 2004), sino más bien una disfunción en la capacidad empática o en el procesamiento de emociones, que apoyaría una psicología moral de corte Humeano. Abogamos, además, por ampliar el explanandum: del juicio utilitarista contra-intuitivo al juicio moral contra-intuitivo sin más. Esto permitiría investigar experimentalmente un amplio rango de variables afectadas por disfunciones en la capacidad para la empatía.

Reduced empathic concern leads to utilitarian moral judgments in trait alexithymia.

Recent research with moral dilemmas supports dual-process model of moral decision making. This model posits two different paths via which people can endorse utilitarian solution that requires personally harming someone in order to achieve the greater good (e.g., killing one to save five people): (i) weakened emotional aversion to the prospect of harming someone due to reduced empathic concern for the victim; (ii) enhanced cognition which supports cost-benefit analysis and countervails the prepotent emotional aversion to harm. Direct prediction of this model would be that personality traits associated with reduced empathy would show higher propensity to endorse utilitarian solutions. As per this prediction, we found that trait alexithymia, which is well-known to have deficits in empathy, was indeed associated with increased utilitarian tendencies on emotionally aversive personal moral dilemmas and this was due to reduced empathic concern for the victim. Results underscore the importance of empathy for moral judgments in harm/care domain of morality.

The Dark Triad of personality and utilitarian moral judgment: The mediating role of Honesty/Humility and Harm/Care

Recent research on moral judgment has highlighted that socially aversive personality styles are linked to a utilitarian inclination in sacrificial dilemmas. The present research aims at extending these findings by testing some potential mediating factors, namely Honesty/Humility and Harm/Care. Our results showed that the Dark Triad of personality was positively related to utilitarianism and Harm/Care and Honesty/Humility negatively mediated this relationship, revealing that utilitarian inclinations are expressed by a lower concern for the no-harm principle and for prosocial behaviors. Among the Dark Triad, psychopathy appeared to be the only independent predictor of Harm/Care and utilitarianism, suggesting a stronger predictive value of psychopathy in explaining utilitarian judgment. Taken together, the results suggest that utilitarian inclination could arise from an inhibition of moral deontism.

Psychopathic personality and utilitarian moral judgment in college students

PurposeAlthough psychopathy is characterized by amoral behavior, literature on the association between psychopathy and moral judgment pattern is mixed. Recent evidence suggests that this may be due to the moderation effect of anxiety (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2011). The current study aims to examine the psychopathy-utilitarian judgment association in college students. MethodIn this study, a group of 302 college students completed a moral judgment test involving hypothetical dilemmas. Their psychopathic traits were assessed by the Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Short Form (PPI-SF) (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). ResultsIndividuals with higher psychopathic traits were more likely to make utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. Furthermore, the association between utilitarian responses and psychopathy was more salient for the behavioral factor of psychopathy (PPI-II), and this association was mediated by self-reported aggression. However, the moderating effect of anxiety was not found. ConclusionsThese results build upon work on utilitarian moral judgment in psychopathic individuals in a non-incarcerated, non-institutionalized sample, and have important implications for the behavioral correction system.

Polysubstance dependent patients display a more utilitarian profile in moral decision-making than alcohol-dependent patients, depressive patients and controls

BackgroundAddiction has been shown to be associated with the endorsement of utilitarian moral judgments. Ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) dysfunction may explain these findings. Methods100 subjects were recruited: 25 polysubstance dependent patients, 25 alcohol dependent patients, 25 patients with major depressive disorders, and 25 normal controls. Subjects were assessed with a battery of 24 moral dilemmas: 8 impersonal dilemmas (no physical contact involved); 8 personal pareto (direct action that does not make the harmed individual worse off) and 8 personal non-pareto (direct action that does make the harmed individual worse off). The Iowa Gambling Task was used to document a possible connection between VMPFC dysfunction and responses to the moral dilemmas. ResultsPolysubstance dependent patients endorsed more utilitarian choices than controls on all types of dilemmas and more than depressed patients on impersonal and personal pareto dilemmas. Alcohol dependent patients had intermediate results between polysubstance dependent patients and controls but these differences were not significant. All patients showed significantly poorer performance compared to controls on the Iowa Gambling Task, but there was no significant association between Iowa Gambling Tasks scores and moral dilemma choices. ConclusionPolysubstance dependent patients made more utilitarian choices when responding to moral dilemmas than depressed patients and normal controls, while alcoholic patients showed intermediate results. The absence of correlation between performance on the Iowa Gambling Task and the number of more utilitarian choices indicates that moral dilemma and decision making under uncertainty tap into separate mechanisms.

For whom do the ends justify the means? Social class and utilitarian moral judgment.

Though scholars have speculated for centuries on links between individuals' social class standing and approach to moral reasoning, little systematic research exists on how class and morality are associated. Here, we investigate whether the tendency of upper-class individuals to exhibit reduced empathy makes them more likely to resist intuitionist options in moral dilemmas, instead favoring utilitarian choices that maximize the greatest good for the greatest number. In Study 1, upper-class participants were more likely than lower-class participants to choose the utilitarian option in the footbridge dilemma, which evokes relatively strong moral intuitions, but not in the standard trolley dilemma, which evokes relatively weak moral intuitions. In Study 2, upper-class participants were more likely to take resources from one person to benefit several others in an allocation task, and this association was explained by their lower empathy for the person whose resources were taken. Finally, in Study 3, the association between social class and utilitarian judgment was reduced in a condition in which empathy was induced, but not in a control condition, suggesting that reduced empathy helps account for the utilitarianism of upper-class individuals.

Roman Catholic beliefs produce characteristic neural responses to moral dilemmas

This study provides exploratory evidence about how behavioral and neural responses to standard moral dilemmas are influenced by religious belief. Eleven Catholics and 13 Atheists (all female) judged 48 moral dilemmas. Differential neural activity between the two groups was found in precuneus and in prefrontal, frontal and temporal regions. Furthermore, a double dissociation showed that Catholics recruited different areas for deontological (precuneus; temporoparietal junction) and utilitarian moral judgments [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC); temporal poles], whereas Atheists did not (superior parietal gyrus for both types of judgment). Finally, we tested how both groups responded to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas: Catholics showed enhanced activity in DLPFC and posterior cingulate cortex during utilitarian moral judgments to impersonal moral dilemmas and enhanced responses in anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus during deontological moral judgments to personal moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that moral judgment can be influenced by an acquired set of norms and conventions transmitted through religious indoctrination and practice. Catholic individuals may hold enhanced awareness of the incommensurability between two unequivocal doctrines of the Catholic belief set, triggered explicitly in a moral dilemma: help and care in all circumstances-but thou shalt not kill.

Atypical moral judgment following traumatic brain injury

AbstractPrevious research has shown an association between emotions, particularly social emotions, and moral judgments. Some studies suggested an association between blunted emotion and the utilitarian moral judgments observed in patients with prefrontal lesions. In order to investigate how prefrontal brain damage affects moral judgment, we asked a sample of 29 TBI patients (12 females and 17 males) and 41 healthy participants (16 females and 25 males) to judge 22 hypothetical dilemmas split into three different categories (non-moral, impersonal and personal moral). The TBI group presented a higher proportion of affirmative (utilitarian) responses for personal moral dilemmas when compared to controls, suggesting an atypical pattern of utilitarian judgements. We also found a negative association between the performance on recognition of social emotions and the proportion of affirmative responses on personal moral dilemmas. These results suggested that the preference for utilitarian responses in this type of dilemmas is accompanied by difficulties in social emotion recognition. Overall, our findings suggest that deontological moral judgments are associated with normal social emotion processing and that frontal lobe plays an important role in both emotion and moral judgment.

Alcohol Dependence Associated with Increased Utilitarian Moral Judgment: A Case Control Study

Recent studies indicate that emotional processes, mediated by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), are of great importance for moral judgment. Neurological patients with VMPC dysfunction have been shown to generate increased utilitarian moral judgments, i.e. are more likely to endorse emotionally aversive actions in order to maximize aggregate welfare, when faced with emotionally salient personal moral dilemmas. Patients with alcohol dependence (AD) also exhibit impairments in functions mediated by the prefrontal cortex, but whether they exhibit increased utilitarian moral reasoning has not previously been investigated. The aim of this study was to investigate moral judgment in AD patients (n = 20) compared to healthy controls (n = 20) matched by sex, age and education years. Each subject responded to a battery of 50 hypothetical dilemmas categorized as non-moral, moral impersonal and moral personal. They also responded to a questionnaire evaluating explicit knowledge of social and moral norms. Results confirmed our hypothesis that AD patients generated increased utilitarian moral judgment compared to controls when faced with moral personal dilemmas. Crucially, there was no difference in their responses to non-moral or impersonal moral dilemmas, nor knowledge of explicit social and moral norms. One possible explanation is that damage to the VMPC, caused by long term repeated exposure to alcohol results in emotional dysfunction, predisposing to utilitarian moral judgment. This work elucidates a novel aspect of the neuropsychological profile of AD patients, namely a tendency to generate utilitarian moral judgment when faced with emotionally salient moral personal dilemmas.